OPINION AND ORDER

HOLLY A. BRADY, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

Defendant, Jakwan Braster (“Braster”), was indicted in a seven count indictment with: four counts of distributing a controlled substance (Counts 1-4), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1); one count of maintaining a drug premises (Count 5), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §856(a)(1); and two gun counts- one for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (Count 6) and one for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (Count 7). (Indictment, ECF No. 1). Braster has moved to dismiss Count 7 asserting that the Supreme Court's opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) casts doubt on the Constitutionality of the federal felon in possession prohibition in the United States Code. (ECF No. 36). The Government has responded to the motion (ECF No. 40) and the time for Defendant's reply has expired, making the matter ripe for ruling.

DISCUSSION

Title 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) criminalizes the possession of a firearm by a felon. Braster asserts that this statute violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms as explained by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Bruen. For the reasons below, the Court concludes that §922(g)(1) survives constitutional scrutiny.

In Bruen, the Supreme Court rejected the means-end standard long used by courts of appeal to evaluate firearm restrictions under the Second Amendment. The Majority held that “when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2129-30. When the Second Amendment's plain text protects certain conduct, the burden shifts to the government to “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2126. If the government cannot demonstrate the existence of a historical tradition that would support applying the regulation to the conduct at issue, a court must conclude that the conduct is protected because it falls within the Second Amendment's “unqualified command.” Id.

The starting point then, is the text of the Second Amendment which provides: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. A trilogy of Supreme Court cases have defined the scope of this right, beginning with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) and ending just last year with the Bruen decision.

It is tempting, as many courts have undertaken the task, to wax poetic about the history and meaning of the Second Amendment and to retrace the underpinnings of gun rights in this country. So too, this Court could fill pages discussing the trio of Supreme Court cases in great detail. But the answer to the question posed by the Defendant here- whether a felon is in the class of persons protected by the Second Amendment - is found in all three Supreme Court precedents and in the opening sentence and concluding paragraph of Bruen.

In Heller, the Court repudiated the notion that anything in their opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ....” 554 U.S. at 626. Two years later in McDonald, the majority opinion emphasized Heller's holding:

We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id., at 626 - 627, 128 S.Ct., at 2816-2817. We repeat those assurances here.

Now, the Supreme Court has said it a third time in Bruen. In the opening sentence, the majority opinion reaffirms the Second and Fourteenth Amendment right of an “ordinary, lawabiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-protection” recognized in Heller and McDonald. 142 S.Ct. at 2122 (emphasis added). The concept that constitutionally protected gun rights apply to “law-abiding citizens” is repeated in the second sentence of Bruen as well as over a dozen additional times throughout the majority opinion. See id. at 2125-2156. It is also echoed in the concluding paragraph, “New York's proper-cause requirement violates the [Constitution] in that it prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 2156 (emphasis added).

This same “law-abiding citizen” language is mirrored in the concurring opinions of the Justices, see id. at 2159 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[a]ll we decide in this case is that the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding people to carry a gun outside the home ... “); id. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“‘[n]othing in [Bruen] should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ....'”).

Given the great care that the Bruen Court used to underscore that the Second Amendment protects the rights of “law-abiding” citizens to keep and bear arms, the Court sees no avenue for the Defendant here to argue that §922(g)(1), prohibiting his possession of a firearm as a felon (a non-law-abiding citizen), violates the Second Amendment even under Bruen's new guidance. The Supreme Court made clear that it was reaffirming its prior holdings in Heller and McDonald which recognize that felons are excluded from the protection of the Second Amendment.Thus, this court finds that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of felons to possess firearms.

This Court has reviewed the case law both before and after the Bruen decision and finds that Bruen's holding does not render the prohibition of felons from possessing firearms in § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has thrice said the right to bear arms contained in the Second Amendment belongs only to “law-abiding” citizens. This decision reflects the growing body of case law from other courts finding §922(g)(1) constitutional using similar reasoning. See e.g., United States v. Price, 2023 WL 1970251 (N.D. Ill. February 13, 2023); United States v. Garrett, 2023 WL 157961 (N.D. Ill. January 11, 2023).For this reason, then, Braster's Motion to Dismiss Count 7 is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Braster's Motion to Dismiss Count 7 (ECF No. 36). Trial dates will be set by separate entry.

SO ORDERED.