MILLER, J.

Akerman LLP, and Kristen M. Fiore (Tallahassee), Luis A. Perez, Sandra J. Millor, Jenny Torres, and Andrew J. Dominguez, for appellants.

O'Connor Hernandez, and Patrick J. O'Connor, Patricia M. O'Connor, and Bryan Morera, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

MILLER, J.

Appellant, Maria Soledad Larrain Troncoso, challenges an order denying her motion to intervene in a lawsuit filed by her son, Manuel Antonio Ossandon Larrain, against his brother, Bernardo Ossandon Larrain, and Real State Golden Investments, Inc. ("RSGI"). Discerning no error, we affirm.

This dispute arrives at our court after nearly six years of litigation. In the main action, Manuel seeks to recover money due under two promissory notes executed in his favor by RSGI. Alternatively, he alleges fraudulent inducement against both Bernardo and RSGI, grounded upon his relinquishment of certain credits due to him by RSGI in return for one of the promissory notes.

On the proverbial eve of the specially set trial, Maria asserted a dual interest in the litigation by virtue of her joint ownership in an entity, Fundacion Educacional BLV (the "Foundation"), which is the sole shareholder of RSGI, along with her purported right to unilaterally determine the payment schedule under the notes pursuant to an ancillary agreement relating to the wealth management of family holdings. Through her intervention motion, Maria sought to file a counterclaim against Manuel and a third-party complaint against his wife.

Following our decision in Larrain Troncoso v. Ossandon Larrain, 273 So. 3d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), the lower tribunal conducted a hearing on the motion. During the proceedings, the court indicated its amenability to intervention, so long as Maria was willing to "abide by the pleadings as [she found] them at the time of [her] entry." Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp., 141 Fla. 538, 543, 194 So. 783, 784-85 (1939) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, she steadfastly expressed her intent to litigate her newly penned claims. The court then carefully considered all relevant factors to determine whether, it should, in its discretion, allow intervention, and, ultimately, denied relief. See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 1992) ; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230 ("Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.").

As an abuse of discretion informs our review, we view this matter through the lens of the trial court. See Fasig v. Fla. Soc'y of Pathologists, 769 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("The power to grant or deny intervention in a pending litigation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed without a showing of abuse of discretion.") (citations omitted). Here, notwithstanding the remote and derivative financial interest identified, that is, Maria stands to lose profits or gains in the Foundation as the result of any fluctuation in the shares of RSGI occasioned by an adverse judgment, along with the late timing of the request, the trial court found that the interjection of new and independent claims would "predominate over the issues shared with the main action," dramatically changing "the course and scope of the main case." It further noted that "[t]he shared aspects" of the actions would be "fully adjudicated as to all parties on the present claims and defenses–whether the notes are subject to a condition precedent, to wit: the consent of" Maria. See M2 Tech., Inc. v. M2 Software, Inc., 589 F. App'x 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Where ‘the party seeking to intervene has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, the existing party is presumed to adequately represent the party seeking to intervene unless that party demonstrates adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.’ ") (citation omitted).

These findings are in no way contravened by the record before us. Accordingly, we affirm the reasoned order under review. See Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 1996) ("A showing of indirect, inconsequential or contingent interest is wholly inadequate.") (citation omitted); Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 238-39, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918) ("[T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene ... must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.") (citation omitted); Humana Health Plans, Inc. v. Durant, 650 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("We do not believe that the trial court's denial of the first motion to intervene was in error as intervention is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's denial of intervention three weeks before trial so as not to delay the trial was clearly within the court's discretion.) (citation omitted); see also Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1989) ("In a sense, every company's stockholders ... have a stake in the outcome of any litigation involving the company, but this alone is insufficient to imbue them with the degree of ‘interest’ required for ... intervention."); Rigco, Inc. v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 110 F.R.D. 180, 184 (N.D. Tex. 1986) ("Shareholders’ interest is purely economic and a purely economic interest is insufficient to justify intervention ... If this court were to recognize Shareholders' asserted ‘interest’ as one that gives rise to intervention ..., it would be tantamount to extending the right to any person with a potential claim if the outcome of a lawsuit might increase or decrease the collectability of his claim.") (citations omitted).

Affirmed.