622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)

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Tripp v. State

Supreme Court of Florida

Aug 19, 1993

622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)

Summary

holding that if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense

Summary of this case from Francis v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

See 25 Summaries

Opinion

No. 79176.

March 25, 1993. Rehearing Denied June 10 and August 19, 1993.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Polk County, J. David Langford, J.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Norgard and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Wendy Buffington, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We review State v. Tripp, 591 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), in which the court certified the following as a question of great public importance:

IF A TRIAL COURT IMPOSES A TERM OF PROBATION ON ONE OFFENSE CONSECUTIVE TO A SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION ON ANOTHER OFFENSE, CAN JAIL CREDIT FROM THE FIRST OFFENSE BE DENIED ON A SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER A REVOCATION OF PROBATION ON THE SECOND OFFENSE?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.

Tripp was charged with burglary, grand theft, and resisting an officer without violence. The burglary and grand theft offenses were third-degree felonies. See §§ 810.02(3), 812.014(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1987). The resisting offense was a misdemeanor. See § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (1987). Tripp pled guilty to the two felony charges, and the misdemeanor charge was dismissed. Pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the trial judge sentenced Tripp to four years' imprisonment for the burglary charge and four years' probation for the grand theft. The probation was to be served consecutive to the imprisonment and was to begin upon Tripp's release from prison.

Tripp served his four-year prison sentence on the burglary charge in less than ten months and was released on probation. Subsequently, Tripp violated his probation, and it was revoked. The trial judge then sentenced Tripp to four and one-half years' incarceration on the grand theft charge, but he gave Tripp four years' credit for time previously served on the burglary sentence.

Tripp allegedly trespassed on railroad property and burglarized a home. The record is not clear as to the disposition of these charges.

The district court of appeal reversed the award of credit for time served. The court held that the original sentence imposed by the trial judge was the result of two separate convictions and that Tripp was not entitled to credit for time served on the first conviction after the revocation of probation for the second conviction. Accord Sylvester v. State, 572 So.2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ford v. State, 572 So.2d 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Pacheco v. State, 565 So.2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1991); Harris v. State, 557 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Folsom, 552 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); State v. Rodgers, 540 So.2d 872 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). However, the court expressed concern that its holding might conflict with the spirit of the sentencing guidelines and the limitations on sentencing imposed by this Court in State v. Lambert, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1989), and State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1989). The issue before us involves the propriety of the sentencing method employed by the district court of appeal in this case.

The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is "to establish a uniform set of standards to guide the sentencing judge in the sentence decision-making process" so as to eliminate unwarranted variation in sentencing. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(b). One guidelines scoresheet must be utilized for all offenses pending before the court for sentencing. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(1). A sentence must be imposed for each separate offense, but the total sentence cannot exceed the permitted range of the applicable guidelines scoresheet unless a written reason is given. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(12). Sentences imposed after revocation of probation must be within the recommended guidelines range and a one-cell bump. Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14).

When Tripp was originally sentenced, the maximum jail time he could have received within the permitted range of the sentencing guidelines was four and one-half years. Under ordinary circumstances, when he violated his probation, his sentence could not exceed the five-and-one-half-year maximum of the next highest permitted range (limited by the fact that the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony is five years), less credit for time served. The problem arises because Tripp committed two crimes. Unless he is given credit for time served on the one against the sentence imposed for the other upon the probation violation, his total sentence for the two crimes will be eight and one-half years, which is three years beyond the permitted range of a one-cell bump.

Thus, it appears that the sentencing method sanctioned by the district court of appeal is inconsistent with the intent of the sentencing guidelines. Under this method, trial judges can easily circumvent the guidelines by imposing the maximum incarcerative sentence for the primary offense and probation on the other counts. Then, upon violation of probation, the judge can impose a sentence which again meets the maximum incarcerative period. Without an award of credit for time served for the primary offense, the incarcerative period will exceed the range contemplated by the guidelines.

The State argues that Tripp was convicted of two separate crimes and received two separate sentences. Thus, Tripp is not entitled to credit for time served on his first conviction after revocation of probation on his second conviction. The State, however, ignores the fact that both offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet and must continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated. See Lambert, 545 So.2d at 838, 841; Fullwood v. State, 558 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

We hold that if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense. We answer the certified question in the negative and disapprove of the decisions in Sylvester, Ford, Pacheco, Harris, Folsom, and Rodgers. We quash the decision below and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We note that prior to the enactment of chapter 89-531, Laws of Florida, "credit for time served" included jail time actually served and gain time granted pursuant to section 944.275, Florida Statutes (1991). State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925, 927 (Fla. 1989). It does not include "provisional credits" or "administrative gain time" which is used to alleviate prison overcrowding and is not related to satisfactory behavior while in prison. See § 944.277, Fla. Stat. (1991). By virtue of chapter 89-531, the revocation of probation or community control now serves to forfeit any gain time previously earned. This change in the law is inapplicable to Tripp because his crimes were committed before October 1, 1989, the effective date of the act.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur.

KOGAN, J., concurs in result only.

Summaries of

Tripp v. State

Supreme Court of Florida

Aug 19, 1993

622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)

Summary of this case from Francis v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Summary of this case from Knowles v. State

holding that if the trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense, consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense

Summary of this case from Wilken v. State

finding that "both offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet and must continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated"

Summary of this case from James v. State

In Tripp, we explained that under the sentencing guidelines, while an individual sentence was required to be imposed for each offense, the offenses were interrelated because a single total sentencing guidelines range was required to be established on a single scoresheet.

Summary of this case from State v. Matthews

In Tripp, the Court rejected the contention that because convictions for two separate crimes result in two separate sentences, the offender is not entitled to credit for time served.

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections

In Tripp, this Court answered, in the negative, the following certified question: "If a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, can jail credit from the first offense be denied on a sentence imposed after a revocation of probation on the second offense?"

Summary of this case from Moore v. State

In Tripp, we noted that if a defendant was not granted credit for time served, the guidelines could be "easily circumvent[ed]."

Summary of this case from Moore v. State

In Tripp, the Court rejected the contention that because convictions for two separate crimes result in two separate sentences, the offender is not entitled to credit for time served.

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Florida Department of Corrections

In Tripp, we rejected the State's argument that the defendant had received two separate sentences and thus was not entitled to credit for time served upon revocation of probation.

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Florida Department of Corrections

In Tripp, the supreme court held that when a court imposes a postrevocation sentence where the original sanctions on two underlying offenses were prison for the first offense followed by probation for the second offense, the court is required to award credit for time served on the first offense toward the new prison sentence on the second offense.

Summary of this case from Freeman-Jew v. State

In Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court held that if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded after revocation on the second offense.

Summary of this case from Binkley v. State

In Tripp, the Florida Supreme Court held that when separate offenses are sentenced together on the same scoresheet, they Amust continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated.

Summary of this case from Miller v. State

In Tripp, the defendant had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to charges of burglary and grand theft, which had occurred in November 1988, and had been charged in a single information.

Summary of this case from Moore v. State

In Tripp, the defendant was originally sentenced to a term of imprisonment on one count followed by probation on another count.

Summary of this case from Matthews v. State

In Tripp, the Florida Supreme Court held that when separate crimes are sentenced together on the same scoresheet, "if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense."

Summary of this case from Jefferson v. State

In Tripp, the supreme court rejected the contention that convictions for two separate crimes result in two separate sentences when sentencing takes place simultaneously and is based on a single scoresheet encompassing both cases. See also Cook v. State, 645 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1994); Horner v. State, 617 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1993).

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Florida Dept. of Corr

In Tripp, the defendant was convicted of burglary and grand theft, both offenses occurring as part of the same incident. At sentencing, both offenses were properly scored on one guidelines scoresheet.

Summary of this case from Ray v. State

In Tripp, the supreme court sought to prohibit the practice of imposing consecutive probation as a mechanism to boost, on a subsequent violation, the total incarcerative term beyond the guidelines range.

Summary of this case from Ray v. State

In Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941, 942 (Fla. 1993), our supreme court held that "if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense."

Summary of this case from Kendrick v. State

In Tripp, the supreme court held that, under the sentencing guidelines, if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a term of incarceration for another offense (as part of one sentencing scheme), credit for time served on the one offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation on the other offense.

Summary of this case from Wagner v. State

In Tripp, the Florida Supreme court held that when prison and probation terms are imposed for different crimes at the same sentencing proceeding, a subsequent prison sentence upon revocation of that probation must reflect an award of credit for the earlier time served.

Summary of this case from Duncan v. State

In Tripp, the supreme court held that the trial court's imposition of a term of probation on one offense, consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, entitles a defendant to credit for time served on the first offense on the sentence imposed following a revocation of probation on the second offense.

Summary of this case from Whitfield v. State

In Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941, 942 (Fla. 1993), the supreme court clarified Green and held that "credit for time served" includes time actually served and "earned" gain time, but does not include "provisional credits" or "administrative gain time" which is used to alleviate prison overcrowding and is not related to the defendant's satisfactory behavior while in prison.

Summary of this case from Smith v. State

In Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941, 942 (Fla. 1993), the supreme court held that "if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense."

Summary of this case from Pankhurst v. State

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