Summary
In Townsend v. McAvoy (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 314, 12 OBR 385, 466 N.E.2d 555, an insanity acquittee challenged the trial court's continuing jurisdiction when the state failed to file an application for continued commitment in a timely manner.
Summary of this case from State v. LanzyOpinion
No. 83-746
Decided August 1, 1984.
Courts — Mental illness — Jurisdiction of trial court regarding questions relating to continued commitment — R.C. 2945.40 — Jurisdiction continues until time of lawful discharge.
O.Jur 3d Criminal Law §§ 1362, 1363.
The trial court has jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the continued commitment of a person committed pursuant to R.C. 2945.40 after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, and such jurisdiction continues until the time of lawful discharge.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
This action was commenced by petitioner-appellant, Clarence Townsend, upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals, seeking his release from the Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital ("hospital").
The facts were stipulated as follows:
"1. Petitioner, Clarence Townsend, was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the crime of felonious assault by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Tyack presiding.
"2. On April 29, 1982, Judge Tyack held a commitment hearing pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 2945.40 and 5122.15, and determined that Petitioner met the legal definition of a `mentally ill person subject to involuntary hospitalization by court order' set out by Ohio Revised Code Section 5122.01(A) and (B).
"3. The trial court ordered the Petitioner's commitment to the maximum security T.B. Moritz Forensic Unit of the Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days.
"4. The commitment order expired on July 28, 1982.
"5. Neither the office of the Attorney General nor the Prosecutor filed an application for continued commitment prior to the expiration of the 90 day commitment order.
"6. The instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on September 20, 1982.
"7. On September 27, 1982, the designee of the Attorney General filed appeals termed `Application for Continued Commitment' with the trial court.
"8. On September 28, 1982, the designee for the Attorney General also began civil commitment proceedings by filing an affidavit of mental illness under Chapter 5122, Ohio Revised Code, against Petitioner in the Franklin County Probate Court. The Probate Court held a probable cause hearing in this case on September 29, 1982, and scheduled a full hearing to be held on October 6, 1982.
"9. On October 4, Judge Tyack held a hearing under Ohio Revised Code Sections 2945.40 and 5122.15, pursuant to the Application for Continued Commitment filed earlier, and committed Petitioner to the Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital.
"10. Following Judge Tyack's ruling, the case filed in Franklin County Probate Court was dismissed."
Respondent-appellee, Paul McAvoy, the superintendent of the hospital, filed a motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, contending that the October 4, 1982 continuing commitment order had made moot petitioner's allegations of unlawful confinement. Respondent further contended that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus would not lie from the continuing commitment order as appeal provided an adequate remedy at law.
Petitioner replied, contending that the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue his commitment, and that habeas corpus is an appropriate method to challenge jurisdiction regardless of the availability of appeal.
The court of appeals held that the trial court had the proper jurisdiction, sustained the motion to dismiss and denied the writ. The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Mr. G. Michael Kirkman, for appellant.
Mr. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Ms. Karen A. Kolmacic, for appellee.
Ordinarily, habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for appeal to challenge the involuntary commitment of an individual pursuant to R.C. 5122.15. Youngs v. Rogers (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 27 [19 O.O.3d 223]. However, habeas corpus may be used when challenging the jurisdiction of the court which ordered confinement, regardless of the availability of appeal. In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192 [47 O.O. 129]. As petitioner is challenging the jurisdiction of the committing court, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy.
R.C. 2945.40(A) provides that if a person is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court shall conduct a full hearing to determine whether the person is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order. Generally, the hearing is to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of R.C. 5122.15, which set out the procedures for hearings regarding the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill.
Petitioner was acquitted of charges of felonious assault by reason of insanity. The trial court then found petitioner to be mentally ill, and ordered petitioner committed for an initial period not to exceed ninety days pursuant to R.C. 2945.40 and 5122.15(C).
R.C. 5122.15(H) provides for determinations regarding the continuance of commitment or discharge at the end of the ninety days. In pertinent part, the section provides:
"If, at the end of the first ninety-day period or any subsequent period of continued commitment, there has been no disposition of the case, either by discharge or voluntary admission, the hospital, facility, or person shall discharge the patient immediately, unless at least ten days before the expiration of the period the designee of the attorney general or the prosecutor files with the court an application for continued commitment. * * *"
The section also contains an important limitation relevant hereto:
"* * * Whenever a hospital, facility, or person intends to discharge a person who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and whose commitment was pursuant to section 2945.40 of the Revised Code, the head of the hospital * * * shall not discharge the person until he has complied with division (F) of section 2945.40 of the Revised Code."
R.C. 2945.40(F) provides:
"Before discharging, releasing, authorizing a trial visit for, or transferring a person committed under this section, the head of the hospital * * * shall send written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the trial court in which the person was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the attorney general, and the prosecutor, advising the trial court, the attorney general, and the prosecutor of the proposed discharge, release, trial visit, or transfer. The notice shall include the hospital's or facility's report on the current status of the person and its recommendations concerning the pending action."
Thus, those originally committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity may not be lawfully discharged in the absence of notice to the trial court. This special notice requirement is designed to guard against inadvertent or misguided release of individuals who pose a particularly great threat to the safety of the public. R.C. 2945.40 and 5122.15 are replete with provisions, applicable only to those acquitted because of insanity, which ensure that extensive control will continue to be exercised over the individual by the trial court wherein he was acquitted and found to be mentally ill. These provisions evidence a clear intent that the trial court is to have continuing jurisdiction.
See, e.g., R.C. 5122.15(G)(2) and 2945.40(H) which prohibit a person found not guilty by reason of insanity from voluntarily committing himself, thus preventing the individual from circumventing the special provisions applicable to those committed after acquittal by reason of insanity. R.C. 2945.40(D)(4) requires that upon the contemplated release of the person acquitted by reason of insanity, notice shall be given to, among others, the trial court.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the continued commitment of a person committed pursuant to R.C. 2945.40 after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, and such jurisdiction continues until the time of lawful discharge.
As the trial court had jurisdiction to order the continued commitment of petitioner, the writ of habeas corpus must be denied.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES and C. BROWN, JJ., concur.