Summary
In San Giuliano v. Black White Cab Co., 7 N.J. Misc 448, 145 A. 872, plaintiff recovered a verdict for $3. The court in granting a new trial said: "By its verdict the jury declared that the driver of the defendant's cab was guilty of negligence causing the accident and that the boy did not contribute thereto by his own negligence.
Summary of this case from Hicks v. Strain BrosOpinion
Opinion filed May 8, 1929.
Courts — Jurisdiction — Agreement To Try Case in Court Having Jurisdiction of Subject-Matter — Waiver of Certain Jurisdictional Requirements by Action of Parties.
1. In an action by one town against another, to recover for care and support of a poor person, by writ returnable before justice of the peace, where writ was not served and no action had thereon before justice, and parties by agreement entered case in city court having jurisdiction of subject-matter, as appeal from justice court, held that city court was not deprived of its jurisdiction by parties treating case as an appeal, although, there being nothing to appeal from or transfer from one court to another, agreement must be construed merely as agreement to try case in city court, since court had jurisdiction under G.L. 1641, 1649, whether case be considered as an appealed case or as an original entry.
2. Where city court had jurisdiction of subject-matter of action by one town against another to recover for care and support of a poor person, under G.L. 1641, 1649, parties having agreed that case might be tried by city court on appeal from justice court, although there was no cause for transfer by reason of writ not having been served and justice having taken no action in relation thereto, and case having been tried pursuant to agreement in city court and proceeded to judgment, held that parties by their conduct had waived all other jurisdictional requirements, and plaintiff's motion to strike off judgment and dismiss case on ground of court's lack of jurisdiction should have been denied.
ACTION OF CONTRACT by one town against another to recover for care and support of a poor person. Trial by Montpelier city court, Fred L. Laird, Municipal Judge. Judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff then moved to strike off the judgment and dismiss the case on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the cause, the process, or the parties. The motion was granted, and the defendant excepted. Reversed, and judgment for the defendant to recover its costs.
Both the justice of the peace and Montpelier city court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the city court had full appellate jurisdiction. G.L. 1658, 1693, and 1700.
All proceedings before the justice can be disregarded, since writ with the declaration was entered in the city court by the plaintiff itself, and plaintiff and defendant both having submitted to the jurisdiction of such court and tried the case upon its merit, any preceding irregularities are thereby waived. Huntley v. Henry, 37 Vt. 165; State v. Richmond, 6 Foster, 232; Blood v. Crandall, 28 Vt. 396; Spaulding v. Swift, 18 Vt. 214; Holt v. Daniels, 61 Vt. 89, 94; Bank of Bellows Falls v. Rutland Burlington R.R. Co. et. al., 28 Vt. 470, 480; Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133-147, 37 L. ed. 116; DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 220, 45 L. ed. 1047.
When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a case, its authority continues subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. Whittier v. McFarland, 79 Vt. 365, 65 A. 81; Miner's Exrx. v. Shanasy et al., 92 Vt. 110, 111; Merchants Heat Light Co. v. Glow Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 51 L. ed. 488.
Jurisdiction of a cause on appeal, which is confined to proceedings commenced by particular modes, and that partakes of the subject-matter, falls within rule that consent will not confer jurisdiction. State v. Richmond, 26 N.H. 232, 240; Frary v. Dakin, 7 Johns. 75; King v. Horne, 4 D. E. 349; Goodwin v. Parry, 4 D. E. 577.
Process, in a broad sense, may enter into the range of the subject-matter of a cause, and, if there is no process to confer jurisdiction, process is void, for jurisdiction of the process is necessary to jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Huntley v. Henry, 37 Vt. 165; Elwell v. Olin, 99 Vt. 460, 462; Perry v. Perry, 94 Vt. 487, 489.
Whatever the situation might be as to a court of general jurisdiction, like the county court, a city court, has only a special and limited jurisdiction given by statute; and if it appears on the face of the proceedings that such a court has proceeded in a manner not authorized by law, its action is absolutely void and may be treated as a nullity. Wallbridge v. Hall, 3 Vt. 114, 120; Barrett v. Crane, 16 Vt. 246, 250. In this respect a city court stands the same as a probate court. Hendrick v. Cleveland, 2 Vt. 329, 337; Probate Court v. Winch, 57 Vt. 282, 284; White's Admr. v. White, 91 Vt. 74; 77; Barber v. Chase, 101 Vt. 343, 143 A. 302, 305. Or like a county court in vacation. Barnes v. Albert, 87 Vt. 251, 253; Morgan v. Gould, 96 Vt. 275, 278; Saund v. Saund, 100 Vt. 176, 178, 100 Vt. 387; Leonard v. Willcox, 101 Vt. 195, 142 A. 762, 767. Or like the Public Service Commission. Bessette v. Goodard, 87 Vt. 77, 82; Waterbury v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 461, 464; Colonial P. L. Co. v. Creaser, 87 Vt. 457, 458; Sayers v. M. W.R.R. Co., 90 Vt. 201, 209. Or like the commissioner of industries. Petraska v. National Acme Co., 95 Vt. 76, 80. Or like the Supreme Court in chancery cases. Westinghouse Co. v. B. M.T. P. Co., 97 Vt. 306, 309. Or like the Supreme Court in original highway proceedings. Barton v. Sutton, 93 Vt. 102, 103, 104.
C.O. Granai and J.W. Gordon for the defendant.
Theriault Hunt for the plaintiff.
Present: WATSON, C.J., POWERS, SLACK, MOULTON, and CHASE, JJ.
The plaintiff seeks to recover for care and support of a poor person for which it claims defendant is liable. The case was tried by the Montpelier city court. After a full hearing on the merits and judgment had been entered for the defendant, plaintiff moved to strike off the judgment and dismiss the case on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the cause, the process, or the parties. The motion was granted, and the defendant excepted.
The court found the facts upon which the motion was predicated to be as follows: The writ, which demanded damages in the sum of forty dollars, was signed by a justice of the peace, and was returnable before him October 10, 1927. It never was served on the defendant, and no action whatever was had thereon before the justice. Pursuant to an agreement between the attorneys for the respective parties to enter the case in the Montpelier city court as an appeal from the justice court, and treat it as an appealed case, the plaintiff's attorney on or about January 27, 1928, sent the writ to the judge of that court who, upon receipt of the same, entered thereon the following: "Filed in Montpelier City Court, January 27, 1928, and the same is so filed by agreement of the parties and is to be treated as an appeal case." By agreement of the parties, the case was tried by that court on the merits February 29, 1928. Later and before judgment had been entered, plaintiff filed a motion to discontinue, which was denied, and on August 28, 1928, the court filed its findings and entered judgment thereon for the defendant. Thereupon, plaintiff filed the motion which is before us.
The only question is whether in the circumstances the Montpelier city court had jurisdiction to try and determine the case. The plaintiff insists that it did not. Not because it lacked jurisdiction of the parties or of the process, as that word is commonly used, or of the subject-matter "in the narrow sense of the matter in dispute between the parties as shown by the pleadings"; but because the case was treated as an appealed case and the record fails to show certain jurisdictional facts necessary to constitute an appeal, namely, a judgment by the justice court, an appeal therefrom within the time fixed by statute, the required security, etc. It is said that in this respect the city court stands the same as the probate court, the county court in vacation, the Public Service Commission, the commissioner of industries, the Supreme Court in chancery cases, and the Supreme Court in original highway proceedings, in that all necessary jurisdictional facts must affirmatively appear in order to give the court jurisdiction.
In the circumstances disclosed by the record, the agreement to treat the case as an appeal from the justice court must be construed as an agreement merely to try the case in the city court, since there was nothing to appeal from or to transfer from the one court to the other. It is apparent that the real, and the only, object which the parties had in mind was to get a trial in the city court. That they were united in seeking and that they got. Whether they got it by treating the case as an appealed case or as an original entry was not of the slightest consequence so far as the action of that court was concerned. That court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter whichever way the case was treated. G.L. 1641, 1649. The action might properly have been brought in either court.
Since this was so, the parties, by agreement, might have transferred the case from the justice court to the city court had there been a case in the justice court to transfer. Milner v. Chicago, etc., R.R. Co., 77 Iowa, 755, 42 N.W. 567; Greer v. Cagle, 84 N.C. 385. It is said in the latter case. "If the subject-matter of the action were such that the two courts had concurrent jurisdiction, it would not be difficult to determine the matter, for such has been the conduct of the parties in assenting either expressly or by clear implication to the jurisdiction of both tribunals, that either one of them might very properly have assumed control of the action and considered it to its determination." Or the parties might, as they in effect did, treat the process as though returnable to the city court and take a trial on the merits. It is held in Clough v. Ide, 107 Iowa, 669, 78 N.W. 697, and in Sentenis v. Ladew, 140 N.Y. 463, 35 N.E. 650, 37 A.S.R. 569, that an action brought in a court which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, though the wrong one, will be sustained if the parties proceed to a trial on the merits without objection.
Since the city court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the motion to dismiss should have been denied, because the parties by their conduct waived all other jurisdictional requirements. Huntley v. Henry, 37 Vt. 165; Stanton v. Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge, 47 Vt. 172; Andrews v. Andrews, 62 Vt. 495, 20 A. 817; Mack v. Lewis, 67 Vt. 383, 31 A. 888; Wade v. Wade's Admr., 81 Vt. 275, 69 A. 826; Andrew v. Buck, 97 Vt. 454, 124 A. 74.
It would be an intolerable abuse of the process of the court if a plaintiff could be permitted to select a competent tribunal, as this one did, and when defeated be heard to say that the action was not cognizable by the court, and the judgment which it had rendered was a nullity.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendant to recover its costs.
NOTE. — When this case was heard it was assigned to Mr. Justice Chase. Upon his retirement from the Bench, and at the February Term, 1929, it was reassigned to Mr. Justice Slack.