Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2981 Section "K" (3).
October 18, 2004
Before the Court the Motion of Sheriff Harry Lee for Dismissal of Personal Capacity Claims. (Doc. No. 64). This Court entered its Order and Reasons on June 18, 2004 outlining with specificity its conclusions as to claims made by plaintiff Toga Society, Inc. d/b/a the Krewe of Aladdin ("Toga") arising out of a Jefferson Parish ordinance that required the payment of security costs to obtain a Mardi Gras parade permit and its application with respect to Toga. Because of a lack of briefing with respect to claims against Harry Lee in his individual capacity, the Court ordered the subject motion to be filed. Reviewing the pleadings, memoranda and the relevant law, the Court finds that this motion has merit.
Rule 12(b) Standard
A court may dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept plaintiff's factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S. Ct. 189, 130 L.Ed.2d 122 (1994). Though the Court may not look beyond the pleadings, Id., the court may take into account matters of public record, orders, items appearing on the record of the case and exhibits attached to the complaint. 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1356 (2d ed. 1987). A court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief." Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1995), citing, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).Personal Capacity Claims
"Personal-capacity suits which seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law are recognized under § 1983." Craft v. City of New Orleans, 2004 WL 193134, *3 (E.D.La. Jan. 30, 2004), citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 211 S. Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). This Court continued:
A state official can be sued in his individual capacity and be held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 at 25-31. However, such persons are entitled to assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law or, qualified immunity.Id. Thus, it is clear that the qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step process:
First, a court must determine whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred.Glen v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In order to survive a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must articulate specific conduct and action giving rise to a constitutional violation. Mahrous v. O'Brien, 1998 WL 166189, *1-2 (E.D.La. April 8, 1998), citing Shultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995).
This Court has granted partial summary judgment against Lee in his official capacity with respect to plaintiff's First Amendment claim and Equal Protection claim. The Court found in its June 18th ruling that a parade implicates the First Amendment as it constitutes speech and that the administrator's unbridled discretion constituted a prior restraint of speech. Lee chose to use a "grandfather" premise — creating two classes of krewes, and restraining the new krewes' right to speech. As a result, that distinction created an Equal Protection claim as well. Thus, the first prong of the analysis is clearly present — there was a constitutional violation.
However, the Court is unwilling to find Lee liable in his personal capacity under the circumstances of this case. Lee's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Indeed, as stated in Stefanoff v. Hays County, Texas, 154 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1998), an official must realize "in a more particularized sense such that the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 525. Lee was asked to implement what the Court has found to be an unconstitutional overly broad ordinance. Costs for the management of parades had gone beyond what the Sheriff's office could subsidize, and the Parish Council chose to throw the problem into Lee's lap. Lee needed to cover those costs. Plaintiff has not cited, nor is the Court aware of case law finding an official liable in his personal capacity where he has been thrust into such a situation. This Court is unwilling to find an official liable in his personal capacity where he is simply implementing a duly promulgated ordinance. There was no "clearly established law" governing the conundrum which Lee was delivered with the passage of the subject ordinance, nor do any of the cases cited by plaintiff stand for that proposition. Grand-fathering is not an unconstitutional practice per se; it can be legitimately used. Rather, Lee was placed in a trick bag by virtue of a poorly drafted, open ended ordinance which he tried to implement. Such cannot be the basis for personal liability. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion of Sheriff Harry Lee for Dismissal of Personal Capacity Claims. (Doc. No. 64) is GRANTED.