MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion by: PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.

Douglas and Silvia Tipton brought a forcible detainer action in justice court against Adela Ramirez claiming she was a holdover under a residential lease for property that the Tiptons owned. The justice court dismissed the suit without prejudice and the Tiptons appealed that decision to the county court. After an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction, the county court sustained Ramirez's plea

to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. In eight issues, the Tiptons now contend the county court erred in dismissing their suit for lack of jurisdiction. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand to the county court.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

A forcible detainer action is the procedure by which the right to immediate possession of real property is determined. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Dormady v. Dinero Land Cattle Co., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Jurisdiction to hear forcible detainer actions is expressly vested in the justice court where the property is located, and on appeal, to the county court for a trial de novo. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.004 (Vernon 2000); Tex. R. Civ. P. 749. The forcible detainer action was created to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain possession without the necessity of a more expensive suit on the title. Scott v. Hewitt, 127 Tex. 31, 35, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818-19 (1936). To meet these objectives, the applicable rule of procedure mandates that "the only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession; and the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 746. Therefore, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is only required to present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession; the plaintiff is not required to prove title. Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). If the right to immediate possession of the disputed property cannot be determined without first determining title, then the justice and county courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557-58.

We review a trial court's ruling on subject matter jurisdiction under a de novo standard. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). It is incumbent on the plaintiff to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to decide the case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). The trial court may consider evidence when making its determination as to jurisdiction, and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).

Hearing on Plea to the Jurisdiction

The record reveals a factual dispute between the parties as to the nature of their relationship. In their sworn complaint, the Tiptons alleged that Ramirez, who rented property from them, had refused to surrender possession despite written notice to vacate for failure to comply with all lease provisions. By contrast, at the evidentiary hearing on her plea to the jurisdiction, Ramirez claimed that she was not a tenant but had a purchase agreement with the Tiptons to purchase the house at issue; thus, there existed a question of title depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

In arriving at its judgment, the trial court considered testimony by Ramirez and several exhibits admitted into evidence. The documents and testimony establish that the property at issue in this suit was initially conveyed to Douglas Tipton by warranty deed in February 1980. Eight years later, in March 1998, Silvia Tipton as "seller" executed a one-page written document entitled "Purchase Agreement" in favor of Adela Ramirez as "buyer" for the "eventual assumption of the mortgage loan" on the same residential property. Ramirez testified that pursuant to the purchase agreement, she paid the Tiptons a total of $5,000 in 1998 and then made monthly payments to the Tiptons in the amount of $380 per month and later $450 per month. On cross-examination, Ramirez admitted that she had made no payment to the Tiptons since mid-2004.

Other documentary evidence showed that in November 2002, both Douglas and Silvia Tipton entered into a standard residential lease with Ramirez for an initial term of one year at a monthly rental of $450. In September 2005, after Ramirez failed to pay rent for eleven months under the lease, the Tiptons issued a written notice to Ramirez terminating her month-to-month tenancy and demanding that she vacate the premises. When Ramirez did not vacate, the Tiptons filed the sworn complaint for forcible detainer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, stating on the record that an issue of title existed.

Discussion

On appeal, the Tiptons insist the county court erred in dismissing their suit for lack of jurisdiction. We agree. The Tiptons pled that they were entitled to immediate possession of the property under a legally enforceable residential lease, thereby stating a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the justice and county courts. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712; Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Legislature expressly created the forcible detainer action to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive method of obtaining immediate possession to property. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d at 818. These legitimate purposes should not

be easily thwarted. Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557. The mere fact that the occupier of the premises claims a title dispute exists will not automatically deprive the justice and county courts of jurisdiction. See id. Only when the right to immediate possession cannot be determined until the title dispute is resolved do the justice and county courts lose jurisdiction. Id. at 557-58. Specifically, "if the question of title is so intertwined with the issue of possession, then possession may not be adjudicated without first determining title." Id.

Here, despite Ramirez's claim of ownership, the landlord-tenant relationship evidenced by the written residential lease provides an independent basis on which the trial court could determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title to the property. We conclude Ramirez's claim of title is not so inter-connected with the issue of possession that it deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, a forcible detainer action is not an exclusive remedy; if the party being evicted desires to dispute title, she is entitled to bring a separate suit in district court. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d at 818-19. Moreover, a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. Instead, it is simply a determination of who has the right to immediate possession. Id. Because the justice and county courts were not required to determine the issue of title in order to resolve the right to immediate possession, we conclude they had jurisdiction to hear the forcible detainer action. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal order and remand the cause to the county court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.