MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER

GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking: (1) leave to file an amended complaint; (2) permission to name Sergeant Silas Gilliam, Officer Paul Cote, Officer Karim Haspil, Officer Michael Mallory, Officer Nicholas Percopo, Officer Raymond Rhodes and Officer Paul Schartau, the defendants previously identified as "John Does;" (3) permission to add Associate Warden DeCiuceis as an additional party; (4) permission to change the caption as set forth in the Proposed Amended Complaint to reflect the named and additional defendants; and (5) an order that service on the Westchester County Attorney by John Hunt, Esq. attorney for defendants, be deemed adequate service for all defendants. Defendants oppose these motions. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motions are granted, with the exception of plaintiff's request for an order that service on the Westchester County Attorney by John Hunt, Esq. be deemed adequate service for all defendants.

Additionally, defendants submitted motions to this Court seeking: (1) separate trials to bifurcate the trial of plaintiff's claims against the individual Emergency Response Team ("ERT") members and the trial of plaintiff's Monell claims against the supervisory defendants pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a stay of discovery concerning the Monell claims pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pending resolution of the threshold issue of whether the members of the ERT committed a battery against plaintiff, and (3) an order transferring this action from the Foley Square to the White Plains Courthouse, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and (b); and Rule 21(a)(i) of the Rules for the Division of Business Among Judges of the Southern District. On January 30, 2001, defendants also submitted a motion to compel a second deposition of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff opposes these motions. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to bifurcate plaintiff's claims, to transfer this action to White Plains, and to compel a second deposition of plaintiff are denied. However, defendants' motion to stay discovery on the Monell claims is granted.

Background

In his complaint, plaintiff, a former inmate at the Westchester County Jail, alleges that on January 23, 1999, he was involved in an altercation with another prisoner. Plaintiff alleges that after the altercation he proceeded to his cell, at which point members of the ERT arrived and removed plaintiff from his cell and handcuffed him. During this incident, plaintiff alleges that the ERT members beat plaintiff, causing him serious injury to his lower back, resulting in daily pain and suffering and emotional distress.

As a result of that incident, on July 26, 1999, plaintiff, Robert Thrower, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that while he was detained at the Westchester County Jail, he was the victim of excessive use of force in violation of his rights under the 14th Amendment. On September 29, 1999, plaintiff made a request to this Court for assignment of counsel. On August 11, 2000, this Court granted plaintiff's application, ordering that the Pro Se Office of this Court seek counsel for plaintiff in accordance with the Pro Bono Panel's procedures. Thereafter, the Pro Se Office contacted Washington Square Legal Services, requesting that they consider representing plaintiff on this matter. Washington Square Legal Services then agreed to represent plaintiff, and appeared on his behalf on November 15, 2000. The parties then appeared before this Court on November 21, 2000, at a pre-trial conference.

Discussion

I. Plaintiff's Motion

Plaintiff moves to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in pertinent part "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse parties; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, "[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given."' Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Moreover, a pro se complaint must be read liberally, "and with great leniency toward the pro se party, since he or she likely is untrained in the law and unfamiliar with how properly to plead factual allegations and to state all the various causes of action which may arise from a given incident." Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F. Supp.2d 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Once pro bono counsel appears on behalf of a pro se plaintiff, it is counsel's duty to review the pro se complaint "and promptly to cure any deficiencies, elaborate on allegations where appropriate and specify any additional causes of action worthy of pursuit." Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F. Supp.2d 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). If there is any indication that a valid claim may be stated in plaintiff's pro se complaint, then plaintiff "should have at least one further opportunity to state these claims as best [he can], especially after the appointment of pro bono counsel." DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint which may state a valid claim without granting leave to amend at least once). Therefore, "[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

In the instant case, plaintiff argues that he should be allowed to amend his complaint for several reasons. First, he asserts that due to the nature of the incident at issue in his lawsuit, he was unable to identify the corrections officers because "the ERT members were cloaked in fatigues, wearing helmets and protected by a shield." Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law In Support of His Motion to Amend Complaint ("Pl. Mem") at 5. Therefore, plaintiff named defendant members of the ERT as "John Does" in his original complaint. Subsequently, plaintiff's pro bono counsel was able to identify these defendants through discovery, and now requests that this Court allow plaintiff to name defendants to replace those previously named as "John Does." Plaintiff also argues that through investigation, his counsel "has developed a good faith belief that the supervisor defendants may have been deliberately indifferent toward the pervasive pattern and practice of violence and intimidation perpetrated by the ERT at the Westchester County Jail." Pl. Mem at 10. Plaintiff also asserts that he has "a good faith basis to believe that Associate Warden William DeCiuceis has been deliberately indifferent toward the pervasive pattern and practice of violence perpetrated by the ERT at the Westchester County Jail, and thus Amendment of the Complaint to add him as a defendant should be granted." Id. Therefore, as a result of recent discovery and investigation by plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff requests that this Court grant him permission to amend his complaint as justice requires to name the defendants previously identified as John Does and to supplement the allegations regarding his claim for supervisor liability.

On a motion for leave to amend the complaint, this Court must review the proposed amended pleading for adequacy, and need not allow the filing of the amended complaint if it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, et al., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991). To judge the adequacy of the proposed amended complaint, this Court must use the same standard governing a filed pleading requiring that plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff is not require to "prove his case at the pleading stage." Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (citingRicciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, et al., 941 F.2d 119, 123-4 (2d Cir. 1991)). His complaint "need not state 'facts' or 'ultimate facts' or 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action"' under the liberal theory of notice pleading. Wade v. Johnson Controls, 693 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1982).

This standard is "designed to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery." Ricciuti, 941 F.2d at 123. Leave to amend should not be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Moreover, "[t]his principle should be applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff seeks to file an amended complaint charging a violation of his civil rights." Id. In other words, the amendment should be denied if the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Milanese v. Rust-oleum Corp., 2001 WL 197950 (2d Cir. March 1, 2001).

Defendants assert that this Court should deny plaintiff's motion to name all seven ERT members as defendants as futile because "plaintiff fails to allege that all seven members of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) assaulted him, plaintiff's motion to add all seven members as direct defendants should be denied." Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion ("Def. Mem.") at 1. While "'futility is a valid reason for denying a motion to amend, this is true only where it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Defendants argue that plaintiff has asserted "mere physical presence" of defendant ERT members as the basis for liability, and that this assertion is not cognizable as a matter of law. Def. Mem. at 2-3. Furthermore, defendants states that plaintiff "does not allege specific facts which show that any proposed defendant exhibited deliberate indifference through inaction that goes beyond mere negligence." Def. Mem. at 2.

Upon a review of plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, this Court finds that plaintiff alleges more than "mere physical presence." In fact, he alleges actual involvement of all ERT members. Plaintiff alleges "[a]ll of the ERT officers then rushed Mr. Thrower, who was still sitting on his bed. . . . The ERT team struck him many times on his body." Notice of Motion, Exhibit 1 "Proposed Amended Complaint" § 23. Furthermore, "[a]ll members of the ERT present during the incident in Mr. Thrower's cell, including Sergeant Gilliam, were responsible for his injuries, either by their use of force against him, or by their acquiescence and personal involvement." Notice of Motion, Exhibit 1 "Proposed Amended Complaint" § 26. Therefore, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against all seven defendants. See e.g., Jackson v. C.O. Johnson, 1990 WL 170412, *4 (S.D.N.Y. October 26, 1990) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when plaintiff's amended complaint "alleged presence and activities at the site of the incident [which] would permit an inference of acquiescence and personal involvement.") Since discovery has yet to be conducted on these new allegations, the plaintiff should have the opportunity investigate these allegations through the tools available to him. Therefore, justice requires that this Court permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to name these additional defendants.

Defendants further argue that plaintiff's motion to add Associate Warden William DeCiuceis as a defendant should be denied as futile because he has failed to allege how the proposed defendant was "directly and personally responsible for the purported unlawful conduct." Def. Mem. at 4. Moreover, defendants argue that "[p]laintiff fails to allege any specific facts that would put DeCiuceis on notice of the alleged pervasive pattern and practice of excessive force used against inmates by ERT. The complaint contains nothing that would support a claim that DeCiuceis knew or should have known of a practice of excessive force." Def. Mem. at 5-6. However, in this Circuit, personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be established "by evidence that: (1) the [official] participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the [official], after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the [official] created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the [official] was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the [official] exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of [others] by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring."Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School District, 239 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)). In plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, he alleges that, among other things, the supervisory defendants, failed to adequately train the ERT in the use of force, that they failed to adequately review and correct reported instances of unlawful use of force by the ERT, that they should have known that the ERT was engaging in a pervasive pattern and practice of intimidation and violence against inmates in Westchester County Jail, that they were personally involved in the deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to take action to remedy the pervasive pattern and practice of excessive force used against inmates by the ERT, and that they knew or should have known about this pervasive pattern and practice of excessive force. See Notice of Motion, Exhibit 1 "Proposed Amended Complaint" §§ 30-37. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim, and therefore, this Court finds that plaintiff must be allowed to amend his complaint to add Associate Warden William DeCiuceis as a defendant.

Defendants also contend that the Westchester County Attorney is neither authorized nor appointed to accept service for the proposed defendants, and that such service is not authorized by federal or state law. Therefore, defendant argues "[p]laintiff is obligated to effect proper service on each proposed defendant as a prerequisite to the District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the proposed defendants." Def. Mem. at 7. Counsel for plaintiff has indicated that they will effect service themselves, so long as they are provided with present or last known addresses and other identifying information for the newly named defendants. Plaintiff represented that he requested this information of the defendants by interrogatory in November 2000. Defendants should provide this information if the Westchester County Attorney will not accept service on the newly named defendants' behalf. If defendants object to providing this information, they should raise this objection with the Court. Plaintiff is ordered to serve the newly named defendants within 45 days of the date of this opinion.

Upon a review of plaintiff's pro se complaint, this Court finds that plaintiff has raised colorable claims, and he should therefore be given an opportunity to pursue these claims with the assistance of his appointed pro bono counsel. This Court has also reviewed plaintiff's proposed amended complaint and finds that, despite defendants' objections, justice requires that this Court allow plaintiff to amend his complaint accordingly.

II. Defendants' Motions

Defendants submitted motions to this Court requesting that this Court order separate trials of plaintiff's claims against the individual ERT members and plaintiff's Monell claims against the supervisory defendants pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that this Court stay discovery on the Monell claims pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that this Court transfer the case to the White Plains Division of the Southern District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and (b) and Rule 21(a) of the Rules for Division of Business Among District Judges, and that this Court order a second deposition of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

a. Motion for Bifurcation

Defendants move for bifurcation of the claims against the ERT members and the Monell claims against the supervisory defendants pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in pertinent part "[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy may order a separate trial of any claim, issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. . . ." The Second Circuit grants the district courts broad discretion in determining whether to order separate trials. Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 2000 WL 423517, *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2000) (citing Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988). Regardless of the latitude given to district courts in their decision to bifurcate trials, separate trials remain the exception, rather than the rule. Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., 826 F. Supp. 233, 245 (S.D.N Y 1993). As noted by the Supreme Court, "[i]n actions at law the general practice is to try all the issues in a case at one time; and it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials." Lewis, 2000 WL 423517 at *2 (quoting Miller v. American Bonding Co., 257 U.S. 304, 301 (1921)).

The party moving for bifurcation bears the burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is warranted. Agron v. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, 1997 WL 399667, * 1 (S.D.N.Y 1997). Additionally, the factors that a Court must consider in deciding whether to grant a motion for bifurcation are: (1) whether the issues sought to be separately tried are significantly different from one another; (2) whether the issues are triable by a jury or the Court; (3) whether the posture of discovery as to the respective issues suggest that they should or should not be tried together; (4) whether the separate trial issues require the testimony of different witnesses and documentary proof, and (5) whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted. Reading Indus., Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

In the instant case, defendants argue that bifurcation is warranted because plaintiff must prove that the individual defendant members of the ERT committed a battery upon him before introducing evidence regarding any purported unlawful county policy. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require that an employee's personal liability be established before considering whether a Monell claim lies against a municipal employer.See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, New York, 170 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must plead and prove under color of some official policy, the municipality caused an employee to violate another's constitutional rights. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). In other words, "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694.

Defendants argue that separate trials are warranted for various reasons. First, to avoid prejudice to the individual defendants, because evidence that is introduced regarding prior ERT misconduct might prejudice the jury against these individual defendants in this case. Additionally, separate trials would also avoid jury confusion in sorting out which evidence goes towards which claim. Second, defendants argue that there would be no prejudice to plaintiff because he could avoid the extensive discovery and trial proof associated with the Monell claims and would therefore most likely have a trial on the claims against the individual defendants much sooner. Finally, defendants argue that bifurcation will promote judicial economy because if the jury finds that no battery was committed by the individual defendants, a trial on theMonell claims would be obviated. While each of these arguments may have merit at a later point in this proceeding, they are premature at this time.

The individual defendants in this action have not yet been served with process, therefore, they have not stated their position to this Court regarding bifurcation. Additionally, only minimal discovery has occurred between the parties, therefore, the defendant is not in a position at this point to request bifurcation without development of a factual record. "The continuing development of the factual record in this case may well affect the issues to be tried and the presentation of those issues in the Joint Pretrial Order." Krueger v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 448 (S.D.N Y 1995). Therefore, this Court finds no compelling reason to bifurcate this trial and the motion to bifurcate is denied without prejudice to renew at a later time.

b. Motion to Stay Discovery

Defendants also request that discovery on the Monell claims be stayed until resolution of the claims against the individual defendants. Defendants argue that judicial economy will be promoted if this Court allows the plaintiff to pursue his claims against the individual defendants before pursuing his Monell claims because there are significantly different issues which require different testimony and proof. Plaintiff, however, contests this assertion, and argues that there will be significant overlap in discovery and therefore discovery on both claims should be conducted simultaneously.

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the district court to stay discovery upon a showing of "good cause." Siemens Credit Corp. v. American Transit Ins. Co., 2000 WL 534497, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2000). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for the granting of such a protective order. Moore v. Painewebber, Inc., 1997 WL 12805, *1 (S.D.N.Y. January, 14, 1997) (citing Dove v. Atlantic Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(d) also allows this Court, by order, to control the sequence and timing of discovery. Based on these provisions, district courts may stay discovery when resolution of a preliminary matter may dispose of the entire case. See Association Fe Y Allegria v. The Republic of Ecuador, et al., 1999 WL 147716, *1 (S.D.N Y March 16, 1999).

In the instant case, this Court finds that defendants have demonstrated good cause to stay discovery on the Monell claims in this action. If the parties proceed with limited discovery, they will have the opportunity to reassess the case once discovery on the threshold issues are completed. At that point, the parties may wish to file dispositive motions, or proceed with the case. Given that discovery on the claims against the individual defendants is much more limited, efficiency will best be served if the discovery on the claims against the supervisory defendants is stayed pending completion of discovery on the claims against the individuals.

c. Motion to Transfer this Case to White Plains

Defendants request that this Court transfer this case to White Plains pursuant to Rule 21(a) and Rule 22 of the Rules for Division of Business Among District Judges. Rule 21(a) states in pertinent part that "[a] civil case shall be designated for assignment to White Plains if: (i) The claim arose in whole or in part in the Counties of Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan and Westchester (the "Northern Counties") and at least one of the parties resides in the Northern Counties." Defendants argue that since this action arose out of an alleged assault by the ERT in the Westchester County Jail, the incident about which plaintiff complains arose in Westchester County. Additionally, defendants argue that all of the Westchester County defendants are residents of the Northern Counties, thereby satisfying the two requirements of Rule 21(a) for designation of a case for assignment to the White Plains Courthouse. Accordingly, defendants request that this action be reassigned to the White Plains Courthouse pursuant to Rule 22, which provides that "[t]he attorney for any other party may move for the reassigned of the case to the other place of holding court. . . in the interest of justice or sound judicial administration."

Defendants' arguments are inapplicable to the instant issue before this Court. Defendants have failed to cite Rule 25 of the Rules for Division of Business Among District Judges, which is entitled Prisoner Civil Rights Actions and Habeas Corpus Petitions and states in pertinent part that "[c]ases from the prisoner petitions wheel. . . including prisoner civil rights cases, are assigned proportionately to all judges of the court, whether sitting at White Plains or Foley Square." Defendants argue that a White Plains designation is mandated by the Local Rules, however, upon the filing of his case, plaintiff could not have designated the White Plains Courthouse, even if he thought that was the appropriate forum for his dispute. The majority of prison facilities are located in the Northern Counties, therefore if prisoner civil rights cases were assigned pursuant to Rule 21, an overwhelming number of these cases would be assigned to the White Plains Courthouse. Rule 25 provides for proportional allocation of prisoner civil rights and habeas corpus petitions. If this Court were to reassign every prisoner civil rights case to the White Plains Courthouse in every instance in which the claim arose out of incidents that occurred in the Northern Counties, and at least one party resided in the Northern Counties, the policy of proportional assignment of these types of cases would be completely undermined. See e.g., Muhammad v. C.O. Catletti, et al., 2000 WL 1641246, *3 (S.D.N.Y. October 31, 2000) ("Because the vast majority of prison facilities in this district are located in the northern counties, proportional assignment would be impossible if cases from the northern counties assigned to district judges in lower Manhattan were to be reassigned every time the convenience of the parties and the witnesses augured in favor of such a transfer.") Moreover, defendants do not have a right to have this case heard in the White Plains Courthouse because "[t]he [Local] Rules do not vest the individual parties with any substantive rights; as stated in the introduction of the Rules: "[t]hese rules are adopted for the interior management of the caseload of the court and shall not be deemed to vest any rights in the litigants or their attorneys." Tiffany v. Tartaghone, 2001 WL 15677, *2 (S.D.N.Y. January 5, 2001) (citations omitted). Therefore, defendants request for reassignment pursuant to Rule 21 is denied.

Defendants further argue that this case should be transferred to White Plains pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) which states that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a District Court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." This statute is also inapplicable to defendants' motion. This Court must determine whether reassignment is appropriate under the rules governing the Division of Business Among District Judges, not the statute that applies to change of venue. The White Plains Courthouse is neither a different district, nor a different division of the Foley Square Courthouse. The counties that comprise the Southern District of New York are defined in 28 U.S.C. § 112, which also states that the Court for the Southern District "shall be held at New York and White Plains, and in the Middletown-Walkill area of Orange County or such nearby location as may be deemed appropriate." This description of the Southern District of New York is different from the description of other districts that have separate divisions. Muhammed v. C.O. Catletti, 2000 WL 1641246, *3 (S.D.N.Y. October 31, 2000). Additionally, this district has never created divisions pursuant to local rule. Id. (citing 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3809 (1986)). Since there are no divisions in the Southern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 does not apply in an action to transfer a case from the Foley Square Courthouse to the White Plains Courthouse. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's application to transfer this case to the White Plains Courthouse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is denied.

d. Motion to Compel Second Deposition of Plaintiff

The supervisory defendants request that this Court order a second deposition of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The only claims asserted against these defendants areMonell claims and this Court has stayed discovery relating to those claims. Supra at 12-16. Accordingly, there is no need for these defendants to further depose plaintiff at this time. Defendants' motion to compel a second deposition of plaintiff is denied without prejudice to renew at a later date.