ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.

This is an original action to determine the constitutionality of those parts of 1995 Wis. Act 27, the budget bill, which created a state Education Commission, a state Department of Education (DOE), and the position of state Secretary of Education (SOE). By this act, the non-partisan elected state Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) is made the chair and a member of the new Education Commission. We conclude that 1995 Wis. Act 27 unconstitutionally gives the former powers of the elected state Superintendent of Public Instruction to appointed "other officers" at the state level who are not subordinate to the superintendent. We therefore hold the education provisions of 1995 Wis. Act 27 void.

On June 29, 1995, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted 1995 Wis. Act 27. Among other provisions, the act created a new state department, the Department of Education; a new Education Commission, which supervises the DOE; and a new office, the Secretary of Education. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 177m. The Secretary of Education administers the DOE and is appointed by the Governor. Id. The Secretary of Education serves at the pleasure of the Governor. Id. The Education Commission does not have the authority to remove the Secretary of Education.

Since Wisconsin achieved statehood in 1848, the administration at the state level of public education in Wisconsin has been the duty of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who is elected in a non-partisan statewide election pursuant to Article X, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Under 1995 Wis. Act 27, the SPI is the chair and a member of the new Education Commission. The voting members of the Education Commission, with the exception of the SPI, are appointed as follows: two members appointed by the Governor; two members appointed by the senate majority leader; two members appointed by the speaker of the assembly; one member appointed by the senate minority leader; and one member appointed by the assembly minority leader. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 177m. 1995 Wis. Act 27 gives the authority to perform many functions related to education in Wisconsin, including some of the former duties of the SPI, to the new Secretary of Education and the Education Commission. See id. §§ 3846-3854, 3859-3861, 3863-3866, 3871, 3873-3874, 3882-3884, 3886-3889, 3894-3899, 3901, 3907.

Respondents claim that 1995 Wis. Act 27 strips the Superintendent of Public Instruction of his power, under Article X, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, to supervise education in Wisconsin. Legislative acts are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging a legislative act must prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. Wisconsin Bell, 155 Wis.2d 184, 192, 454 N.W.2d 797 (1990). All doubts as to an act's constitutionality must be resolved in favor of upholding the act. Id.

This court interprets provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution de novo. Polk County v. State Pub. Defender, 188 Wis.2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994). In interpreting a constitutional provision, the court turns to three sources in determining the provision's meaning: the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following adoption. Id.; State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).

We thus first examine the plain meaning of the language in Article X, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, within the context of the document and its amendments. As first adopted in 1848, Article X, § 1 provided:

The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent, and such other officers as the legislature shall direct. The state superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state, in such manner as the legislature shall provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be prescribed by law. Provided, that his compensation shall not exceed the sum of twelve hundred dollars annually.

In 1902, Article X, § 1 was amended to read:

The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct; and their qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation shall be prescribed by law. The state superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at the same time and in the same manner as members of the supreme court, and shall hold his office for four years from the succeeding first Monday in July. The state superintendent chosen at the general election in November, 1902, shall hold and continue in his office until the first Monday in July, 1905, and his successor shall be chosen at the time of the judicial election in April, 1905. The term of office, time and manner of electing or appointing all other officers of supervision of public instruction shall be fixed by law.

Some cosmetic changes were made to Article X, § 1 by amendment in 1982. The word "his" was deleted before the word "office" in the second sentence; the word "four" was changed to "4"; and the sentence discussing the 1902 and 1905 elections for state superintendent was deleted.

Petitioner, Governor Thompson, argues that the plain meaning of Article X, § 1 allows the legislature to allocate the power of supervision of public education between the elected SPI and the "other officers" that the Article mentions. In support of this argument, Petitioner points to the first sentence of Article X, § 1, which provides that "[t]he supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct"; Petitioner argues that the conjunctive "and" in this phrase must mean that the power of supervision is shared by the SPI and the "other officers." Petitioner also notes that the 1902 amendment to Article X, § 1 refers to "other officers of supervision," which, according to Petitioner, shows that "other officers" are intended to possess supervisory power along with the SPI, and not to be subordinate. Finally, Petitioner notes that the phrase "his powers, duties, and compensation" was replaced with the phrase "their qualifications, powers, duties, and compensation," which, Petitioner argues, shows that the legislature possesses the ability to establish the functions and authority of both the SPI and the "other officers."

Petitioner also claims that the 1902 amendment, which deleted the comma from the original first sentence of Article X, § 1, results in an unambiguous sentence granting the legislature the ability to determine how the power to supervise education should vest in both the SPI and the "other officers." Article X, § 1 formerly read: "The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent, and such other officers as the legislature shall direct." We agree with Respondents, however, that the sentence does not unambiguously convey this meaning; in fact, the sentence may have the same meaning either with or without the comma. Furthermore, the comma may have been deleted merely for stylistic reasons. We are not persuaded that this change of punctuation was intended to alter the meaning of the statute, or did result in any alteration. See Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428, 434 (1875), rev'd on other grounds, 154 U.S. 626 (1877) ("In giving construction to a statute the punctuation is entitled to small consideration, for that is more likely to be the work of the engrossing clerk or the printer, than the legislature."). However, Petitioner correctly observes that Article X, § 1 does use the term "other officers" and not the term "inferior officers," which appears in Article IV, § 28 of the 1848 constitution.

Respondents argue that the plain meaning of "supervision" and "vested" in the context of the writing of our state constitution, supports their reading of Article X, § 1. Respondents note that Article X, § 1 is one of only four articles in the Wisconsin Constitution referring to power being "vested": in addition to Article X, § 1, Article IV, § 1 vests legislative power in the Senate and Assembly; Article V, § 1 vests executive power in the Governor; Article VII, § 2 vests judicial power in the court system. Respondents quote the definition of "superintend" and "superintendent" from Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (new rev. ed. 1847-50):

To have or exercise the charge or oversight of; to oversee with the power of direction; to take care of with authority; as an officer superintends the building of a ship or construction of a fort. God exercises a superintending care over all his creatures.

Superintendent: one who has the oversight and charge of something with the power of direction.

Respondents claim that Article X, § 1 can have meaning within these definitions only if the SPI is the sole supervisor of public education, the person "in charge"; thus, the "other officers" must be inferior, or they would interfere with the SPI's power of supervision. This court in State ex rel. Raymer v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892), reached a similar conclusion regarding the language of Article X, § 1:

[The section] expressly declares that "the supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent, and such other officers as the legislature shall direct." Sec. 1, art. X. This left the legislature free to prescribe such assistants and clerks as may be deemed essential.

Id. at 48.

There remains, however, the equally plausible reading advocated by Petitioner: that, whatever "supervision" entails, the power of supervision may be allocated by the legislature between the SPI and the "other officers" because Article X, § 1 vests supervision in the SPI and the "other officers." We cannot conclude that the plain meaning of Article X, § 1 requires the SPI, and the SPI alone, to be the ultimate supervisor of public education in Wisconsin. The section is ambiguous, in that it can be read either as granting the power of supervision solely to the SPI, or as granting power to both the SPI and the "other officers" referred to in the section. However, under our analysis of a constitutional provision, we also examine the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitutional provision, and the interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the laws passed following the adoption of the constitution. Polk County, 188 Wis.2d at 674.

The debates at the 1846 and 1847-48 Wisconsin constitutional conventions show that the drafters of the Wisconsin Constitution intended the public schools to be under the supervision of the SPI, and that the SPI was to be an elected, not appointed, public official. What is now Article X, § 1, was first created in the 1846 constitution. The provision, as originally proposed, read:

The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature may direct. The state superintendent shall be chosen by the electors of the state once in every two years. The legislature shall provide for filling vacancies in the office of state superintendent and prescribe his powers and duties.

Journal of the Convention, reprinted in The Convention of 1846 538 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1919) [hereinafter The Convention of 1846]. A delegate at the 1846 convention offered to amend the first sentence to read "the supervision of public education shall be vested in such officers as shall hereafter be created by law." Id. at 568. This change would have removed the office of superintendent of public instruction. The delegates of the 1846 convention, after substantial debate, retained the position of SPI, although the article on education as finally adopted stated that the SPI "shall be elected or appointed in such manner and for such term of office as the legislature shall direct." Id. at 743-44.

The delegates at the 1847-48 convention largely followed the wording of the earlier constitution's article on education. The original draft of the provision, while keeping the position of state Superintendent of Public Instruction, differed from the 1846 article in one important respect. Instead of an elective office, it proposed that "[t]he state superintendent shall be nominated by the governor, and by and with the advice of the senate appointed for such term of office and with such powers, duties, and compensation as shall be prescribed by law." Journal of the Convention, reprinted in The Attainment of Statehood 481 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1928) [hereinafter The Attainment of Statehood]. This provision was amended to make the office elective, reading "[t]he state superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state, in such manner as the legislature shall provide; his powers, duties, and compensation shall be prescribed by law." See id. at 559-62; Wis. Const. art. X, § 1 (1848). This amendment, and the amendment to the education article in 1846 discussed above, show that the framers of our state constitution considered and rejected the very framework proposed by 1995 Wis. Act 27. The position of Superintendent of Public Instruction was a necessary position, separate and distinct from the "other officers" mentioned in the article, as shown by the 1846 amendments. The SPI was to be elected, not appointed by the Governor, as shown by the 1847-48 amendments.

We discern nothing in the 1846 and 1848 debates which supports Petitioner's contention that the SPI and the "other officers" were intended to be coequal. In fact, the recorded debates discuss only the SPI, the duties and powers of the position, and the type of person required in the office in order to further the cause of education. See The Convention of 1846, supra, at 568-75, 615-16; The Attainment of Statehood, supra, at 559-62. Completely absent is any discussion of the role or powers of the "other officers." This certainly supports Respondents' argument that the "other officers" are subordinate. If they were meant to be equal to the SPI, then it seems strange, to say the least, that their role, which would presumably have been of equal importance, was not discussed along with that of the SPI.

Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that 1995 Wis. Act 27 is still in keeping with the original intent of the framers, in that it grants the SPI the powers of an advocate for education, which Petitioner argues was the role envisioned for the SPI in 1846 and 1847-48. Examination of the debates at the two constitutional conventions, however, shows that Respondents correctly argue that the SPI was intended to have a more direct role in advancing education.

For example, the comments of a delegate opposing the amendment of 1846, which would have eliminated the position of SPI and replaced it with appointed officers, were reported as follows:

Mr. [Wallace Wilson] Graham said, if the objection . . . is that the superintendent is made elective, he was not at all particular to the mode, but he considered that officer indispensable. There could be no uniform system without him. There must be an annual report of the state of schools throughout the state. There could be none, said he, so satisfactory as from a man whose entire business it is to visit and know of all the schools. He considered it a matter of the greatest importance that the legislature have all this information. He mentioned Michigan, who had such a provision in her constitution.

The Convention of 1846, supra, at 568. Another delegate, Marshall M. Strong, noted that the SPI was needed "to travel over the state, organize the system, and awaken the people to the importance of [education.]" Id. The delegate John Hubbard Tweedy's remarks were reported as:

For his part, he considered that this system of superintendence was the foundation, the life of progressive education. He believed that a constant and vigilant watch should be kept over our schools; that a state superintendent was necessary, a man of eminent learning and ability, who should devote his whole time and attention to education in our state — instituting normal schools for the education of teachers, appointing local superintendents, and visiting every county . . . .

Id. at 570-71. The delegate Lorenzo Bevans stated:

All admit that the children of the state are to be instructed in political economy and in the various branches of science. How is it to be accomplished? Is it by striking the word "superintendent" from the first section of the article, by dispensing with this state officer, who alone can give uniformity, energy, and efficiency to the system?

Id. at 573-74. We note two consistent themes from these statements of the delegates: first, that the system of education required uniformity; second, that the SPI was to provide this uniformity in an active manner by implementing the system of education. The statements are entirely consistent with Respondents' position.

The debates at the 1847-48 constitutional convention further support Respondents' arguments. In debating whether the office of SPI should be elective, delegate Louis P. Harvey argued for an appointed position. Harvey's description of the requirements of the position, however, shows that the SPI was not intended to be simply an advocate, but an officer with the ability to put plans into action:

Mr. Harvey said he thought the plan recommended by the committee the best. Of late years, both in Europe and in this country, the subject of common school education had received great attention, and information on the subject was anxiously sought for. Many men of the best minds had made the subject their particular study . . . . In this way the study and practice of public instruction had come to assume somewhat the rank of a profession. We wanted a professor of that kind for superintendent — one who knows what has been done in other states and countries — what has worked well and what ill — and who has practical good sense enough to select and put in operation what has been found by experience to be the best . . . . An acquaintance with the particular subject of public instruction, with the peculiar qualities requisite for putting a system in operation with life and energy, was what was wanted.

The Attainment of Statehood, supra, at 560-61.

Similarly, the comments of delegate Orsamus W. Cole, speaking in favor of making the office of SPI elective, show the position's importance:

A superintendent . . . should have the most particular knowledge of the character, wants, and capacities of the people among whom he was to labor. He should, moreover, feel some state pride and patriotism — feel that he is not a mere hired laborer to illustrate theories, but that he is charged with an important duty in which his children, his friends, and all he holds dear are deeply interested in common. He thought a stranger could not do this as well as a citizen. Moreover, persons taken from abroad would be more apt to have different systems, different books, etc., and each one would seek to carry out his peculiar theories, and thus create confusion.

Id. at 562. The 1846 and 1847-48 debates demonstrate that the position of the SPI was intended as a crucial position, distinct from the "other officers," and possessing the ability to do more than merely act as an advocate for education.

As already noted, Article X, § 1 was amended in 1902. Petitioner argues that this amendment specifically allows the creation of "other officers," with powers equal to or greater than the SPI, by the legislature. Petitioner claims that, by this amendment, the drafters of the 1902 amendment created a "hybrid" system dividing power between the SPI and the "other officers."

The purpose in construing a constitutional amendment is to give effect to the intent of the framers and to the persons who adopted the amendment. Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis.2d 718, 729, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967) (citing State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 204 N.W. 803 (1925)).

But the intent [of a constitutional amendment] is to be ascertained, not alone by considering the words of any part of the instrument, but by ascertaining the general purpose of the whole, in view of the evil which existed calling forth the framing and adopting of such instrument, and the remedy sought to be applied; and when the intent of the whole is ascertained, no part is to be construed so that the general purpose shall be thwarted, but the whole is to be made to conform to reason and good discretion.

Ekern, 187 Wis. at 184 (citation omitted).

The 1902 amendment was drafted by the then-Superintendent of Public Instruction, Lorenzo Dow Harvey. See Conrad Patzer, Lorenzo Dow Harvey 95 (1936) (unpublished manuscript, Wisconsin State Historical Society Archives). Respondents contend that one of Harvey's purposes in drafting the 1902 amendment was to change the method of selecting county school superintendents. See id. at 93. At the time of the amendment, Article VI, § 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution required county superintendents to be elected for two-year terms. Harvey believed that the office of county superintendent had become a political "stepping-stone," and that the positions were being filled by persons more interested in political advancement than in furthering the cause of education. Patzer, supra, at 93. Harvey thus drafted the 1902 amendment to allow the legislature to replace the elected county officials with appointed officials. Respondents argue that the phrase "other officers of supervision" in the 1902 amendment was directed at these county officials. Respondents point to several of Harvey's letters written in reference to the amendment, including one letter in which Harvey states:

As you know in some cities the superintendents are elected by popular vote, in others by the common council, in others by the school board, and I think in some cases they are appointed by the mayor. One of the reasons for the last clause in the present amendment was to put without question this whole matter in the hands of the legislature, so that there would be no constitutional bar to prevent action by that body.

Letter from L.D. Harvey to Pres. Albert Salisbury (Oct. 16, 1902).

Petitioner, however, points to another letter of Harvey's, in which he writes:

The last sentence, the one complained of, gives the legislature power at any time in the future, to entirely remodel the superintendency system if it sees fit to do so. For instance, if the time should come when the township system of school organization were in effect . . . this sentence of the amendment would give the legislature full power to make whatever provision might at the time be necessary.

Letter from L.D. Harvey to Karl Mathie (Oct. 15, 1902). Petitioner claims that this and other statements show that the 1902 amendment was broadly drafted with the intent of facilitating future changes, such as the changes proposed by 1995 Wis. Act 27.

We disagree with the Petitioner's interpretation of the purpose of the 1902 amendment. The context of the 1902 amendment, along with the stated intentions of Lorenzo Dow Harvey, demonstrates that the "other officers" mentioned in the amendment are solely local officials, subordinate to the SPI. It is one thing to say that the amendment was intended to facilitate changes in the educational system by the legislature, which the amendment certainly did, but quite another thing to say that the amendment allows for the creation of officials who would replace the SPI. Another purpose of the 1902 amendment was to strengthen the position of the SPI by making the office non-partisan, see Patzer, supra, at 97, and thus the changes supported by Petitioner would be contrary to the general purpose of the amendment. We are to construe amendments to effect their general purpose. Kayden, 34 Wis.2d at 729-30.

After our examination of the debates and history surrounding the creation of Article X, § 1 and its amendment, we are also to examine "the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the earliest law passed following the adoption of the constitution." Polk County, 188 Wis.2d at 674.

An act approved on August 16, 1848, was the first law passed by the legislature setting forth the duties of the SPI. See Laws of 1848, at 127-29. Section 3 of the act provided in part:

The superintendent shall have a general supervision over public instruction in this state, and it shall be his duty to devote his whole time to the advancement of the cause of education, and for that purpose to visit as far and as often as practicable, every town and school in the state for the purpose of inspecting the schools and diffusing as widely as possible by public addresses . . . and personal communication with school officers teachers and parents, a knowledge of existing defects and desirable improvements in the administration of the system, and the government and instruction of the schools: To recommend the introduction and use of the most approved text books, and to secure as far as practicable uniformity in education throughout the state: . . . To recommend the establishment of school libraries and to advise in the selection of books for the same: To collect such information as may be deemed important in reference to common schools in each county, town precinct and school district: . . . to ascertain the condition of all the school funds in this state with the amount of the school funds due to each township from lands or other sources: to propose suitable forms and regulations for making all reports and conducting all necessary proceedings under this act: to adjust and decide all controversies and disputes arising under the school lands without costs to the parties: . . . to perform such other duties as the legislature or governor of this state may direct . . . .

Laws of 1848, at 128-29. Petitioner argues that this act shows that the SPI's duties in 1848 were "exhortatory," or directed towards encouraging education through, for example, public speaking or visits to schools, but not actual administration. While some such duties are listed under the act, the act also listed several duties which clearly include supervisory or administrative powers. The SPI was required to apportion school funds between townships, to propose regulations for making reports and conducting proceedings under the act, and to adjudicate controversies arising under the school lands. Petitioner's claim that the SPI was limited to merely serving as an advocate for education is belied by the administrative and supervisory duties included in this first act.

This first act also gave several duties to the SPI, including the authority over school libraries, the authority to resolve disputes arising under school lands, and the authority over state funds for education, which 1995 Wis. Act 27 transfers from the SPI to the new Secretary and Department of Education. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 97, 180, 3926-3930 (SOE and Education Commission given authority over school district boundary appeal board and school district reorganization); id. §§ 4031, 4073 (granting DOE power to withhold state aid); id. §§ 1968, 1970-1973 (DOE shall plan and supervise school libraries, and Education Council shall advise SOE on library-related programs).

The first law passed relating to education did not provide for the "other officers" mentioned in the constitution. The laws relating to such officers were approved shortly afterwards, in two acts signed into law on August 21, 1848. See Laws of 1848, at 209-26, 226-47. The acts created the elected office of "town superintendent of common schools," whose duties included certifying teachers. See Laws of 1848, at 219. The acts required the creation of districts within each town, and for district officers to perform reporting and financial functions within each district. See Laws of 1848, at 226-35. Respondents argue that these educational officers were subordinate to the SPI, while Petitioner claims that the other officers, such as the town superintendents of common schools, "actually operated and controlled the schools in each town." However, the Laws of 1848 clearly make the town superintendents of common schools subordinate to the state Superintendent of Public Instruction. Chapter X, § 4, of the act creating the municipal office of town superintendent of common schools provided:

SEC. 4. The superintendant of common schools shall in all cases be under the control and direction of the state superintendant of public instruction and shall whenever called on by the state superintendant give any information in his possession relating to the several schools in his town.

Laws of 1848, at 219. The first "other officers" created by the legislature following the writing of the constitution were plainly subordinate to the state Superintendent of Public Instruction. It is clear that the "other officers" were intended by the framers of the constitution as subordinate officials, and that the power of supervision of public instruction was not vested equally in the SPI and the "other officers."

Similarly, the first law passed after the 1902 amendment to Article X, § 1 demonstrates that the amendment was not intended to give both the SPI and the "other officers" equal powers of supervision. An act adopted on March 27, 1903, titled "An Act relating to the duties, qualifications and salary of the state superintendent" included the following provisions:

Supervisory duties generally. SECTION 2. [The state superintendent of public instruction] shall have general supervision over the common schools of the state . . . .

Chapter 37, § 2, Laws of 1903. This act also gave the SPI the power to "revise, codify, and edit the school laws"; to prescribe regulations for district libraries; to resolve appeals from school district decisions; and to apportion the school fund income. Id. Just as in the laws passed following the first constitution in 1848, this act did not provide for any "other officer" with supervisory powers superior or equal to the SPI.

Petitioner also points to previous legislative enactments which have placed the power of supervision of education in persons or bodies other than the SPI. Petitioner notes that the University of Wisconsin was not placed under exclusive control of the SPI, see Laws of 1848, at 37-40, and that the legislature has placed the supervision of vocational education in a Board of Industrial Education, see ch. 494, 583, 675, Laws of 1917. However, such legislative enactments do not conflict with the role assigned to the SPI from the very beginning of the position: "general supervision over the common schools" in Wisconsin. Wis. Stat ch. 9, § 47 (1849). The SPI still retained general supervision over the "common schools," or public education from kindergarten through high school, after the legislative acts Petitioner discusses, and the acts thus do not support Petitioner's contention that the legislature may give the power of supervision of public education at the state level to a person or entity other than the SPI.

Both Petitioner and Respondents cite cases from other jurisdictions supporting the general theory of their respective positions. Because these cases arose under differently worded constitutions with different histories of interpretation, we do not find them particularly helpful. We conclude that the surest guides to a proper interpretation of the role of the SPI are the constitutions of 1846 and 1848, the 1902 amendment, the accompanying debates, our legislature's first laws following adoption, and this court's prior interpretation of Article X, § 1. Our review of these sources demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the office of state Superintendent of Public Instruction was intended by the framers of the constitution to be a supervisory position, and that the "other officers" mentioned in the provision were intended to be subordinate to the state Superintendent of Public Instruction. Because the education provisions of 1995 Wis. Act 27 give the former powers of the elected state Superintendent of Public Instruction to appointed "other officers" at the state level who are not subordinate to the superintendent, they are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. If changes such as those proposed in 1995 Wis. Act 27 are to be made in the structure of educational administration — and we express no judgment on the possible merits of the changes — they would require a constitutional amendment.

We note, however, that the constitutional difficulty with the education provisions of 1995 Wis. Act 27 is not that it takes power away from the office of the SPI, but rather that it gives the power of supervision of public education to an "other officer" instead of the SPI. As this court has previously stated, the plain language of Article X, § 1, makes the powers of the SPI and the other officers subject to limitation by legislative act:

Article X, sec. 1, explicitly provides that the powers and duties of the school superintendent and other officers charged by the legislature with governing school systems "shall be prescribed by law." Because the constitution explicitly authorized the legislature to set the powers and duties of public instruction officers, Article X, sec. 1 confers no more authority upon those officers than that delineated by statute.

Fortney v. School Dist. of West Salem, 108 Wis.2d 167, 182, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982). Under our holding in the present case, the legislature may not give equal or superior authority to any "other officer." This case does not require us to decide the extent to which the SPI's powers may be reduced by the legislature, and we reserve judgment on that issue.

For the reasons above stated, we declare the education provisions of 1995 Wis. Act 27 void.

By the Court. — Rights Declared.