Opinion
1:23-cv-30
11-17-2023
GREGORY THOMAS, Plaintiff v. SUPERINTENDENT L. OLIVER, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS ECF NOS. 17 AND 34.
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Wellpath [ECF No. 17] and Defendants Berndt, H. Maule, L. Oliver, Pearson, JJ Stagle, P. Thompson, Walters, and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) [ECF No. 34] be granted.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Procedural background
Plaintiff Gregory Thomas, an inmate confined at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCI-Albion), initiated this pro se civil rights action on February 13, 2023. See ECF No. 1. In his complaint, Thomas alleges that Defendants engaged in unlawful retaliation, violated his religious freedoms, subjected him to excessive force, and violated his rights to equal protection and due process. See ECF No. 5. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Thomas exclusively seeks monetary relief. Id. He also asserts a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Id.
B. Factual background
The allegations of Thomas's complaint are accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, but only to the extent they state facts rather than conclusions of law or inferences unsupported by facts. Thomas is a practitioner of Orthodox Islam. He alleges that the DOC has been “chipping away” at his religious rights and “prohibiting [him] from practicing [his] religious obligations” since 2021. ECF No. 5 at 6. Specifically, he maintains that the DOC's religious activity policy, DC-ADM-819, prevents him from practicing the following fundamental precepts of his religion: enjoying conjugal visits; participating in the two Eid feast celebrations; establishing a charity bank for religious affairs; purchasing a computer and accessing pre-recorded religious study lessons online; possessing prayer oil in his cell; purchasing electric trimmers; consuming a Halal diet; wearing a colored kufi; and purchasing a t-shirt to support charity and engage in free speech. Id.
In addition to his religious claims, Thomas maintains that the DOC and Wellpath, the third-party health care provider contracted to provide medical services to DOC inmates, refused to provide him with a bridge for his dentures and necessary dental surgery. Id. at 10. Thomas avers that he is in constant pain and cannot properly digest and chew his food. Id. Thomas believes Wellpath is denying him proper care to save money. Id. He also alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Wellpath is denying him care for a chronic shoulder condition. Id. at 10.
Thomas also asserts several allegations of retaliation. On July 10, 2022, he was handcuffed from behind (contrary to the recommendations of his medical providers) and assaulted by Defendant Walters while Walters and Stagle, along with Berndt and a John Doe officer, broke his typewriter and stole his legal files. Id. at 7. Thomas contends that this was done at the instruction of Oliver in retaliation for his prior lawsuits and “two separate incidents” months before where “officers were fighting inmates” on the other side of the prison and got injured. Id.
Thomas next contends that Thompson retaliated against him for his prior civil lawsuit at Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-230-RAL by “putting] the word out” to remove his single-cell status and “retaliate against [his] property.” Id. Thomas claims Pearson retaliated against him for the same lawsuit by kicking his locker and tossing his legal papers on the floor and destroying them. Id.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Thomas filed Thomas v. Clark, No l:21-cv-230 (W.D. Pa) against four Defendants: Michael Clark, Patricia Thompson, D. Varner, and the Chief of BHCS. Thompson is the only common defendant between the two actions.
As to Maul, Thomas contends that she filed a false misconduct report against him in retaliation for unidentified prior conduct. Id. Maul is also alleged to have engaged in slander and defamation of character by “fil[ing] in [Thomas'] Block Conduct Report that [he] manipulated the librarian to write [him] a pass for work.” Id.
Finally, Thomas references the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses without providing any details as to how either clause was violated.
C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Thomas is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading standards. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).
D. Analysis
1. Claims against the DOC
As an initial matter, Thomas has named the DOC as a Defendant with respect to several of his claims. It is axiomatic, however, that “the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” See, e.g., Morris v. Scheuer, 2023 WL 2088169, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (citing Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981)). As a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the DOC is immune from suit in federal court for monetary relief unless said immunity has been abrogated by Congress or waived by the state. MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell-Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). It has not. See Toth v. California Univ, of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.”) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b)); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979) (noting that Congress did not intend by the general language of Section 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states). Nor is the DOC a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-71 (1989). This principle requires the dismissal of Thomas' claims for money damages against the DOC and its officials and employees in their official capacities.
In contrast to claims for monetary relief, “claims requesting prospective injunctive relief from official-capacity defendants do not run afoul of sovereign immunity.” Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2011). Nor are they treated as actions against the state for purposes of § 1983. Morris, 2023 WL 2088169, at *3 (noting that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.”) (internal quotation and quoting source omitted). Critically, however, Thomas has sought only monetary relief in his complaint. See ECF No. 5 at 5 (requesting “punitive damages . .. compensatory damages. . . and whatever damages the court and law allows”).
2. Equal protection
Thomas' equal protection claim is also quickly dismissed. Although the Complaint briefly references the Equal Protection Clause, it does not include any factual allegations to support the elements of an equal protection claim. Moreover, the only Defendant he identifies for this claim appears to be the DOC - an entity that is immune from § 1983 liability, as discussed above. Dismissal is warranted.
3. Due process
While it is not entirely clear, Thomas next appears to allege that Maul violated his right to due process by filing a false misconduct report accusing him of “manipulating” a librarian to get a work pass. The United States Supreme Court has mandated a two-part analysis of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). First, the reviewing court must determine “whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the . .. protection of‘life, liberty or property.'” Id. If a protected interest is implicated, the court must “decide what procedures constitute ‘due process of law.'” Id. If no protected interest is implicated, however, then “it is unnecessary to analyze what procedures were followed when an alleged deprivation of an interest occurred.” Harris v. Hines, 2017 WL 4119743, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2017).
Apropos to the instant case, it is well-established that “[t]he filing of a false misconduct report does not violate an inmate's due process rights.” Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F.Supp.3d 678, 702 (M.D. Pa. 2015); see also Tolbert v. Ellenberger, 2019 WL 3193678, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2019) (“[A]n inmate cannot state a due process claim based solely on the filing of an allegedly false misconduct report.”) (collecting cases). This is because due process simply requires “the opportunity to be heard and defend against the allegedly false misconduct report.” Tolbert, 2019 WL 3193678, at *2 (citing Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002)). Here, Thomas acknowledges in his complaint that he attended a hearing at which the misconduct issued by Maul “was in fact dismissed with prejudice.” ECF No. 5 at 7. Because Thomas had an opportunity to be heard and defend against the false charge, his due process rights were not violated. Tolbert, 2019 WL 3193678, at *2 (dismissing plaintiffs due process claim based on a fabricated misconduct report as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); Lewis, 153 F.Supp.3d at 702 (dismissing due process claim based on false misconduct report because a “prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”).
4. Retaliation
To establish illegal retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Thomas' claims fail at the third stage. He filed the lawsuit that allegedly motivated Defendants' retaliatory conduct on August 20, 2021. See Thomas v. Clark, No. 1:21-cv-230 (W.D. Pa. 2021). The incident in which Walters, Stagle, and Berndt handcuffed him improperly and destroyed his legal files occurred on July 10, 2022. The incidents with Thompson, Wingard, and Clark occurred “sometime in 2022.” ECF No. 5 at 7. The false misconduct report authored by Maul was issued in April 2022. See ECF No. 5-1 at 8-9. “Courts in civil rights cases have frequently rebuffed speculative efforts to infer causation from temporal proximity when a span of weeks, months or years separated the plaintiffs constitutionally protected conduct from the defendants' alleged acts of retaliation.” Victor, 2012 WL 2564892, at *9. See also Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that a span of six months between protected activity and adverse action is not unduly suggestive and does not sufficiently establish any causal link); Fischer v. Transue, 2008 WL 3981521, *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (temporal proximity of three weeks insufficient to establish causation); Mar v. City of McKeesport, 2007 WL 2769718, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2007) (three months); Killen v. N. W. Human Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2684541, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007) (seventeen days).
Nor has Thomas alleged the existence of “other evidence” of retaliatory animus. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 424 (where temporal proximity is not so close as to be unduly suggestive, the appropriate test is “timing plus other evidence”) (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Throughout his complaint, Thomas states that Oliver “authorized the retaliation against inmates and their property” in response to “two separate incidents” in which “officers were fighting inmates” in another part of the prison. ECF No. 5 at 7. Thomas does not, however, offer any facts connecting his own mistreatment to those incidents. His conclusory averment that Oliver authorized a campaign of retaliation against the entire prison population based on unrelated incidents involving a handful of inmates lacks the level of specificity required to state a claim, even drawing all inferences in Thomas' favor.
Finally, courts have consistently rejected retaliation claims against one defendant based on protected activity directed at another individual for lack of retaliatory motive. Victor v. Lawler, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 Fed.Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2014). As explained by one court, “there is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against others.” Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009). See also Royster v. Beard, 308 Fed.Appx. 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant who was not the target of his protected activity); Horan v. Collins, 2016 WL 5030468, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016) (drawing no inference of causation where plaintiffs protected activity was not directed at any defendant). Thomas' attempt to infer retaliatory animus on the part of Defendants based on protected activity directed at other individuals is similarly flawed.
5. Medical Indifference
Thomas next contends that Wellpath, a private corporation that provides health care services to DOC inmates, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by displaying deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for nonmedical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that entities contracted by a state to provide medical services to state prison inmates act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988). Such entities, however, “cannot be subjected to liability solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, they can only be held liable under § 1983 if a plaintiff can establish that he or she suffered a constitutional injury that directly resulted from a policy, custom, or practice. See, e.g., Callahan v. Clark, 2023 WL 5596269, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2023) (“[A] private corporation performing a government function is liable under § 1983 only if it had a policy, custom, or practice that caused the plaintiffs constitutional injury-in this context, a policy, custom, or practice exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.”) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). In other words, Thomas must establish both that “there was a relevant [Wellpath] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Policy is made “when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481(1986)), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072, § 102. A “custom” arises when a course of conduct not expressly authorized by law becomes “so permanent and well settled” as to virtually constitute law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In establishing either a policy or a custom, “it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,737 (1989)). The “policymaker” is the person who “has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action,” as determined by reference to state law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481; Perez v. Larson, 2020 WL 5507227, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,2020).
Although Thomas alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Wellpath denied him health care treatments “to save money,” he has failed to allege that those decisions stemmed from the implementation of a policy or custom. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480. Nor has he identified the relevant Wellpath policymaker allegedly responsible for that custom or policy. See, e.g., Brower v. Corizon Heath Services, Inc., 2016 WL 2346754, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 2016) (dismissing Monell claim for failing to identify “who the policymaker is”). Each of these deficiencies is fatal to his claim.
In addition, the Court takes judicial notice of Thomas' prior lawsuit in Thomas v. Wetzel, 2018 WL 2273173 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 18, 2018). In that case, filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania, Thomas alleged - as in the instant case - that he had no lower bridge for a denture because a prison dentist pulled out his lower teeth by hand sometime prior to 2014. See ECF No. 32-2. He also claimed - again, as in the instant case - that this caused pain, difficulty chewing and digesting, and the need for dental surgery to build a lower bridge so that he could get a lower denture. Id. The state courts rejected his claim, noting that Thomas' objection to the lack of dental surgery amounted to nothing more than a “disagreement over the treatment plan.” Thomas, 2018 WL 2273173, at *7.
As noted above, Thomas' dental-related claims in the instant case are identical to those asserted in the prior action. This undermines his suit against Wellpath in several ways. Initially, it establishes that Thomas was aware of the ineffective dentures and need for dental surgery no later than 2016, when he filed that lawsuit, and more likely in 2014, when the extractions occurred. Under such circumstances, his claims against Wellpath are plainly time-barred. See Kach V. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Pennsylvania is two years).
Secondly, to the extent that the same parties appear in both actions, Thomas' claims may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata See, e.g., Russo v. City of Philadelphia, 819 F.Supp.2d 405, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“The doctrine of res judicata requires that federal courts “give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that the issuing state courts would give them”). Moreover, courts have consistently dismissed “duplicative and repetitive” claims of this nature as frivolous or malicious, even in the absence of preclusion. Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”)); Holmes v. Veith, 2022 WL 16927752, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2022) (same). The Court should reach the same conclusion here.
Under Pennsylvania law, res judicata “bars a later action on all or part of the claim which was the subject of the first action.” Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995)). For the doctrine to apply, “Pennsylvania courts require that the two actions share the following four conditions: (1) the thing sued upon or for; (2) the cause of action; (3) the persons and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued.” Id. (citing Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. 1974)).
6. First Amendment religious expression
Thomas next contends that DOC policy DC-ADM-819 prevents him from enjoying conjugal visits, participating in the two Eid feast celebrations, establishing a charity bank for religious affairs, purchasing a computer, and accessing pre-recorded religious study lessons online, possessing prayer oil in his cell, purchasing electric trimmers, consuming a Halal diet, wearing a colored kufi, and purchasing a t-shirt to support charity and engage in free speech. Thomas maintains that each of these is a vital precept of his Islamic faith.
Of the many deficiencies in Thomas' religious expression claims, the most critical is that they are exclusively asserted against the DOC. As noted above, the DOC cannot be sued in a § 1983 action for monetary damages. See, e.g., Morris, 2023 WL 2088169, at *3. In the absence of a viable defendant, Thomas' claims must be dismissed.
Additionally, the Court notes that at least two of Thomas' religious expression claims were fully litigated in his prior lawsuit in Huntingdon County. See Thomas, 2018 WL 2273173. These include his requests to purchase a laptop computer to “advance his religious studies and communicate with his family” and an electric razor “to shave his private parts and other parts of his body” to prevent skin keloids and exercise his faith. Id. These claims cannot be relitigated in the instant action. Banks, 568 F.Supp.2d at 589. See also Hoye v. Allegheny County Medical Department, 2023 WL 7124580, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2023) (dismissing complaint that raised “virtually identical claims” as those brought in prior litigation).
Finally, many of Thomas' claims fall short of alleging a constitutional violation, at least as currently pled. See, e.g., Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison's decision to provide vegetarian meals rather than meals with Halal meat did not violate Muslim inmates' right to free exercise); Marshall v. Corbett, 2022 WL 875609, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2022) (noting that courts have upheld limitations on the type of headgear worn by inmates including limiting religious headgear to white or brown kufis because other colors could be affiliated with gangs) (citing Scott v. Erdogan, 2015 WL 1405445, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015)); Ealy v. Keen, 2015 WL 1471577, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31,2015) (decision to ban prayer oils in cells “was clearly permissible as it was security driven and had no basis in the free exercise of religion”); AU v. Carney, 2020 WL 7335466, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2020) (collecting case for the proposition that inmates have no constitutional right to conjugal visits). To state a viable claim for relief with respect to any of these allegations, Thomas would, at a minimum, need to plead his claims with far greater specificity.
7. RLUIPA
Thomas maintains that the same prison policy cited above violated his rights under RLUIPA. While the DOC is a proper defendant in a RLUIPA action, it is axiomatic that RLUIPA does not allow for the recovery of money damages. Banks v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 601 Fed.Appx. 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2015). The only potential relief available to Thomas for his RLUIPA claim is injunctive or declaratory, neither of which Thomas requests. Id. Dismissal is warranted.
8. Slander
Finally, Thomas attempts to state a defamation claim against Maul based on the contents of the allegedly false misconduct report. Because Thomas does not articulate whether he is asserting this claim pursuant to the United States Constitution or Pennsylvania state common law, the Court will address each source.
Turning first to federal law, the United States Supreme Court has made clear “that federal courts are not to view defamatory acts as constitutional violations.” Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). In other words, Thomas “cannot plead a slander claim as a § 1983 claim because it is not cognizable under § 1983.” Page v. Doyle, 2018 WL 2976374, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2018) (citing Boyanowski, 215 F.3d at 401). See also Karolski v. City of Aliquippa, 2016 WL 7404551, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2016) (noting that, “[b]ecause there is no federal constitutional right to reputation,” “violations of state law, including defamation, are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983”) (quoting Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1468 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Alternatively, to the extent that Thomas may have intended to assert his slander claim pursuant to state tort law, it is well-established that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects “state corrections officers . . . from intentional tort claims, such as defamation.” Muhammad v. DeBalso, 2019 WL 2501467, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2019). As one court recently explained:
“[D]efamation is an intentional tort in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 959 A.2d 322, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). “Pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,... the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. “The Pennsylvania legislature has not chosen to waive this immunity for intentional torts.” Wicker v. Shannon, 2010 WL 3812351, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2010) (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522).Id. Due to the protections afforded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Thomas' defamation claim must be dismissed.
III. Leave to amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, amendment would plainly be futile as to Plaintiffs claims against the DOC and the claims raised in his prior lawsuit in Huntingdon County, including his allegations that Wellpath denied him appropriate dental care. Accordingly, the DOC and Wellpath should each be dismissed from this action, with prejudice.
Because it is not clear that amendment would be futile as to Plaintiffs other claims, however, it is recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint within a specified time period following dismissal. Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motions to dismiss [ECF Nos. 17 and 34] be granted, but without prejudice to Thomas' ability to file a curative amendment within a reasonable time following the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.
V. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007)