Opinion
Case No. CIV-17-90-PRW
11-12-2019
ROBERT JAMES THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF TODD GIBSON, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In his "Corrected 2nd Amended Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint," Plaintiff sues Sheriff Todd Gibson in his official capacity as Cleveland County Sheriff and the Cleveland County Board of County Commissioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Doc. 117, at 2, 5. Defendant Gibson has moved for dismissal asserting the claim against him in his official capacity is redundant to the claim raised against the Cleveland County Board of County Commissioners. Doc. 120, at 1-2. Plaintiff has responded to the motion to dismiss asserting he objects to "releasing the Sheriff & his office from liability" and from any limits on the "scope of discovery" as a result of the Sheriff's dismissal. Doc. 128, at 2. Defendant Gibson had replied stating his official-capacity dismissal "will not impact the claims asserted against the County or Plaintiff's ability to conduct discovery during this litigation." Doc. 129, at 2. The matter is now at issue. The Court recommends granting Defendant Gibson's motion to dismiss.
An official-capacity suit "'generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). While suing both the official and the entity, as Plaintiff does here, is permissible under § 1983, claims against both are duplicative and unnecessary. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 ("[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity."); Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) ("To the extent Martinez brings a claim against [Sheriff] Beggs in his official capacity, it is the same as bringing a suit against the county."); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 4 ("In all suits or proceedings by or against a county . . . suit may be brought against a county by naming the Board of County Commissioners of the County . . . ."). The undersigned finds, therefore, that the Court should grant Defendant Gibson's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against him as the Sheriff of Cleveland County. See, e.g., Espinosa Hernandez v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Okla. Cty., No. CIV-18-606-R, 2019 WL 3069430, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 12, 2019) (finding official-capacity claim against Sheriff Whetsel was "redundant" to the same claim against the Board of County Commissioners and dismissing the official-capacity claim made against the Sheriff); Chrisman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Okla. Cty., No. CIV-17-1309-D, 2018 WL 4291761, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 7, 2018) (dismissing Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against the Oklahoma County Sheriff and Oklahoma County because they were "duplicative and unnecessary given that Plaintiff ha[d] named the Board [of County Commissioners] as a defendant").
Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons stated, the undersigned recommends the Court grant Defendant Gibson's motion to dismiss. Doc. 120.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by November 26, 2019, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues referred to the Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2019.
/s/_________
SUZANNE MITCHELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE