Opinion
W2022-00896-COA-R3-CV
05-04-2023
TORRANCE TAYLOR v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, CITY OF MEMPHIS RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Timothy Taylor and Tess Shelton, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Torrance Taylor. Jennifer Sink, Chief Legal Officer/City Attorney, and Barbaralette G. Davis, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, the City of Memphis.
Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2023
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County No. CH-20-0911-1 Gadson W. Perry, Chancellor
This appeal concerns a Memphis police officer's application for a line-of-duty disability pension. Torrance Taylor ("Taylor") filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Shelby County ("the Trial Court") seeking judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ") for the Board of Administration of the City of Memphis Retirement System denying his application for a line-of-duty disability pension. In 2016, Taylor injured his left knee in the course of his duty while detaining a suspect. Afterwards, Taylor retired from the police force and was recommended for ordinary disability benefits. The ALJ ruled that, based on the opinions of physicians, Taylor's disability stemmed from a chronic condition in his left knee and not from his employment. Thus, the ALJ denied Taylor's application for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Trial Court upheld the ALJ's decision. Taylor appeals to this Court. He argues among other things that, but for his 2016 injury in the line of duty, he would not be disabled. The evidence reflects that Taylor worked without restriction before the injury in 2016, which ended his police career. We find that the ALJ's decision was unsupported by substantial and material evidence. We further find that the ALJ's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Taylor is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed; Case Remanded
Timothy Taylor and Tess Shelton, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Torrance Taylor.
Jennifer Sink, Chief Legal Officer/City Attorney, and Barbaralette G. Davis, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, the City of Memphis.
D. Michael Swiney, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Carma Dennis McGee, J., joined. Jeffrey Usman, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE.
Background
Taylor served as a Memphis police officer for approximately twenty years. Over the years, Taylor dealt with several injuries. In 2003, he underwent surgery on his right knee for repair of the medial and lateral anterior cruciate ligament ("ACL"). Taylor testified before the ALJ that this 2003 injury was job-related. In 2006, Taylor was injured in an off-duty motorcycle accident in which he tore his posterior cruciate ligament, or PCL, in his left knee. In 2012, Taylor was involved in a car accident that resulted in, as pertinent, an injury to his left knee. As found by the ALJ, Taylor's left ACL was torn by 2012. Taylor testified that he was on duty at the time of the 2012 accident. The evidence is uncontested that Taylor's 2012 injury was on-duty. Finally, on July 23, 2016, Taylor injured his left knee yet again, this time while detaining a suspect. Taylor's left ACL was torn. The timing of the tear in Taylor's left ACL is a key point of dispute in this case. A document from 2006 states that Taylor's left knee ACL was "unremarkable" at that time.Dr. Harold Knight ("Knight") was Taylor's treating physician following the 2016 injury. It was Knight's view that Taylor was not permanently and totally disabled from his job. Knight also opined that Taylor's employment with Memphis was not the primary cause of Taylor's diagnosis.
Memphis notes that, apart from a reference to the 2003 incident having occurred, the record contains no medical records specifically addressing either the 2003 or the 2012 incidents.
Another document from 2006 observed that "[t]he anterior cruciate ligament appears intact although there is of course extensive edema in the intercondylar notch."
Following treatment for his 2016 injury, Taylor reached maximum medical improvement. He was released on permanent physical restrictions that left him unable to continue working as a police officer. In October 2016, Taylor filed an application for a line-of-duty disability pension, which Memphis denied. He was recommended for ordinary disability benefits. Taylor appealed to the ALJ.
Physicians Dr. Michael Hood ("Hood") and Dr. Jeffrey Dlabach ("Dlabach") performed independent medical examinations of Taylor. Contrary to Knight's view, it was the view of both Hood and Dlabach that Taylor was permanently and totally disabled from working as a police officer. However, both physicians opined that his disability was not job-related. In his opinion letter, Hood stated in part:
Having reviewed all the previously mentioned records and examining Mr. Taylor and his history, it is my opinion that with regards to his left knee the patient is disable[d] from performing his duties as a police officer safely; however, given that previous MRI findings from 2012 as well as 2006 demonstrated anterior cruciate ligament injuries as well as medial meniscus tears, I cannot relate this disability to his on-the-job injury sustained on July 23, 2016. However, certainly the on-the-job injury dated July 23, 2016 could have aggravated a chronic condition leading to complaints of instability and, therefore, contribute to his inability to return to previous level of work.
Hood also was deposed in this matter. At one point in his testimony, Hood was asked whether Taylor's previous knee injuries had kept him from working. Hood stated, in part:
Q. Okay. Now, pardon me if I sound redundant, but I just want to summarize so I know it's all one place.
So the under -- prior to the date of the injury, the underlying conditions, the ACL tear and the medial meniscus -- excuse me -- the ACL injury and the medial meniscus tear, they did not prevent him from working?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. The increased symptoms of these underlying conditions did prevent him from working once the injury occurred?
A. Yes, subjectively.
Q. Yes. And then the [on-the-job injury] was the primary cause of those increased symptoms?
A. Yes.
The record contains an opinion letter by Dlabach, as well. In Dlabach's opinion letter, he stated in part:
It is in my opinion that Mr. Taylor is disabled from performing his duties as a police officer. I do not relate this disability to the work injury on 07/23/2016. There are medical records from Dr. Harriman pertaining to a motor-vehicle accident in 2012, at which time the MRI was consistent with a left ACL tear and left medial meniscus tear. Going further back, there was another left knee injury related to a motorcycle accident under the care of Dr. George Wood which MRI is consistent with a medial meniscus tear, abnormality of the ACL and questionable abnormality of the PCL. It is in my opinion that the ACL tear and medial meniscus tear of the left knee is chronic as documented by MRIs prior to the date of work-related injury. The
primary cause of his left chronic ACL deficient knee and chronic medial meniscus tear is not related to his employment and injury of 07/23/2016.
Dlabach also was deposed. In his deposition, Dlabach was asked about Taylor's medical history and the cause of his knee instability. Dlabach testified, in part:
Q. In arriving at these opinions, please describe for the record what information and/or records you considered.
A. I had records that were provided for the review regarding Mr. Taylor's left knee dating back as far as 2006. They included MRI in 2006 of that knee and MRI in 2012 of that knee, office records from Dr. Harriman around 2012, and records from Dr. Woods as far as back as 2006. I also had records regarding the care of Dr. Harold Knight for Mr. Taylor since the episode of July 2016.
Q. Would you please indicate the significance of the injury sustained by Mr. Taylor in the motorcycle accident in 2006, vis-a-vis, his current medical pathology and/or diagnosis as it relates to the injury he sustained 7/3/2016.
A. The injury as detailed by the MRI of October 20, 2006 reveal an injury to the ACL as well as the medial meniscus tear. Those were acute findings with edema or fluid around those structures at the time of the MRI that tells us that was an acute injury related somewhere around the time of that MRI.
The MRI of 2016 did not show any edema around those structures telling us that that was a chronic injury. There was no bone contusion, which you would see with an acute injury around that time. And again, the medial meniscus was torn and the ACL was torn. Those are structures that don't heal. Once it's torn it's torn. It can't heal and then retear. The ACL has to be reconstructed.
There are a small percentage of meniscus tears that you can repair surgically that may heal, but in my opinion the MRI of 2016 showed injuries that had been present since the 2006 MRI.
Q. Similarly, please indicate the significance of the injury sustained by Mr. Taylor in the motor vehicle accident in 2012, vis-à-vis his current medical pathology and/or diagnosis as it relates to the injury sustained 7/23/2016.
A. Very similar to the MRI of April 13, 2012, revealed an ACL tear and a medial meniscus tear and those were chronic at that time as well.
Q. So that I can understand what you're saying, the injury in 2016 -- excuse me -- 2006 was a chronic injury and any subsequent injuries would not --strike that.
So once that injury occurred in 2006, it was there?
A. Correct.
Q. In layman's terms. It wasn't going away?
A. Wasn't going away.
Q. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty would you state for the record whether the primary cause of Mr. Taylor's left chronic ACL deficient knee and chronic medial meniscus tear is related to his employment and the injury on 7/23/16?
A. In my opinion it is not related to the injury of 7/23/2016.
Q. Would that be because of your explanation that the injury in 2006 was a chronic injury and was not going away?
A. It was preexisting.
***
Q. Did you see anything in the records indicating that he had any knee instability prior to the OJI date of July 23, 2016?
A. Not in the records other than those two documented events: 2006, 2012.
Q. Could you tell by looking at those documents whether or not Officer Taylor actually had any knee instability at the time either in 2006 or 2012?
A. I believe it was documented in those physicians' exams.
Q. That he had some instability?
A. Yes.
Q. But still the instability was not such that it prevented him from doing his job at full duty?
A. I assume not.
Q. Can you say whether or not -- strike that.
If the incident on July 23, 2016, had not occurred, would you have been able to give any opinion as to when the instability would have reached the point that prevented Officer Taylor from performing his job?
A. No. That would be the crystal ball question, but it would eventually have happened.
Q. It would have eventually happened?
A. Yeah.
Q. But there's no way to tell when?
A. Correct.
Q. He could have gone on for another ten years?
A. Possible. Unlikely, but possible.
Q. But after the OJI he certainly had the instability. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And once again, as far as you can tell from the records you reviewed, the underlying conditions themselves, the ACL tear and the medial meniscus tear, they did not prevent him from working at any time?
A. Not that I saw.
Q. Prior to the injury of July 23, 2016?
A. Correct.
Q. If the OJI had not occurred on 7/23/2016, is there any objective medical evidence that those underlying conditions would have kept him from continuing to work at that time?
A. At that time? Not that I can think of?
Q. I think you said, they may have eventually rendered him unable to work, but as far as when that would have happened --
A. Who knows.
Q. -- you couldn't tell.
In August 2019, the ALJ conducted a hearing on Taylor's appeal. In June 2020, the ALJ entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it upheld the pension administration's decision to deny Taylor a line-of-duty disability pension. The ALJ stated, in part:
1[.] Line of Duty Disability pursuant to the City of Memphis Code of Ordinances is defined as follows
Line of Duty Disability. A physical or mental condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, after he became a participant and while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place without willful negligence on his part which totally and permanently prevents him from engaging in the duties for which he was employed by the city[.] The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two (2) qualified physicians.
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, Section 25(1) (27).
2[.] The City of Memphis Code of Ordinances defines Qualified Physicians as follows.
Qualified physician[.] For purposes of administering this chapter a person who is licensed to practice medicine by the State of Tennessee and designated and reasonably compensated in the sole discretion of the board to make a medical determination of line-of-duty or ordinary disability or other physical or mental condition, provided, such person shall
not be an interested party to the outcome of such determination, shall not be a participant and shall not have served the city or county in any elected, appointed or salaried position within five (5) years of the date he is asked to make any such medical determination[.]
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, Section 25(1) (36)[.]
3. The Court finds based on the evidence adduced during the hearing and on the record that Petitioner sustained an injury to his left knee during the course and scope of his employment as a City of Memphis police officer on July 23, 2016[.]
4. According to the two qualified physician's opinions, Dr[.] [Hood] and Dr. Dlabach, Petitioner is totally and permanently disabled and unable to perform his employment as a Memphis Police Officer. However, both physicians further opine that the disability is not based on Petitioner's employment with the City of Memphis.
5. Both qualified physicians agree and the Court finds that Petitioner's disability, the ACL tear and medial meniscus tear of the left knee, is chronic as documented by MRIs prior to the date of work-related injury.
6[.] The Court finds that Petitioner's disability did not result from his job as a City of Memphis Police Officer as defined by City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, as a direct and proximate result of his July 23, 2016 work-related injuries while in the actual performance of his duties, without willful negligence on his part, and while a participant in the City of Memphis Pension Plan[.]
7[.] Therefore, Petitioner's disability is not work-related and his application for Line of Duty Disability benefits pursuant to the City of Memphis Pension Ordinance should be denied[.]
8[.] The decision of the City of Memphis Pension Administration denying Line of Duty disability benefits to Petitioner is upheld[.]
In July 2020, Taylor filed a petition in the Trial Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-322 and 27-9-114. In May 2022, the Trial Court heard Taylor's petition. In June 2022, the Trial Court entered its final order in which it affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Trial Court attached its oral ruling to its final order. In its oral ruling, the Trial Court explained its reasoning as follows:
All right. I, as a matter of common sense, as a nonmedical professional, side completely with Mr. Taylor. I will tell you that right now. When I read these papers, as a nonmedical -- as a nonmedical person -- and
perhaps were I reviewing this evidence in the first instance, I would side with him.
But I think the standard at issue here is, is there substantial and material evidence in the record to go the other way? I think there is. I don't like some of it, right? I don't like Dr. Knight's opinion. I don't like it, but I'm not a medical professional, and I don't think, in this posture, I can re-weigh it.
I think weighed against the testimony from Dr. Dlabach and Dr. Hood, both of whom raise -- the testimony of whom raises some question as to causation -- and I'll highlight specifically Dr. Dlabach's testimony -- that the instability that Mr. Taylor's currently experiencing in his left knee could eventually have happened anyway -- which, again, I -- it could've happened anyway, right? And so perhaps the instability doesn't happen on July 23, 2016, but maybe it happened on July 23, 2017, or 2018 or 2019, all of which would've been before Mr. Taylor was eligible for the full retirement.
And even if I would weigh that evidence differently in the first instance, I think I'm constrained here by the statute to say, is there substantial and material evidence going the other way? I think there is. And I -- given that there is substantial and material evidence going the other way, I cannot find that there is clear error in deciding it that way, even, again, if I -- were I reviewing this information in the first instance -- even if I would decide it differently.
And so I think the petition has to be rejected, no matter how I might feel about it personally or how I might have decided it in the first instance, because I don't think either of those things is the appropriate standard of review.
Taylor timely appealed to this Court.
Discussion
Although not stated exactly as such, Taylor raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Trial Court erred in upholding the ALJ's denial of Taylor's application for a line-of-duty disability pension.
We review the ALJ's decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101, et seq.; see Marino v. Bd. of Admin. City of Memphis Ret. Sys., No. W2015-00283-COA-R9-CV, 2015 WL 7169796, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015), no appl. perm. appeal filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 provided:
(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.
(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).
The General Assembly amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5), with the amendment applicable "to disciplinary actions taken or information first received on or after the effective date of" May 18, 2021. Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 461, § 6. This followed the conclusion of the administrative proceedings below and the filing of Taylor's petition in the Trial Court. Neither party contends that the amended version of the statute applies or that it would affect the outcome if it did. We apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) as it read prior to the effective date of the 2021 amendment.
The term "substantial and material evidence" has been defined as "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration.'" Papachristou v. Univ. of Tennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Clay Co. Manor, Inc. v. State, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tenn. 1993)). This Court has also described it as requiring "'something less than a preponderance of the evidence ... but more than a scintilla or glimmer.'" Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 15 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Wayne Co. v. State Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). Judicial review of an administrative agency's decision under the "substantial and material evidence" standard, however, subjects the agency's decision to close scrutiny. Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. State Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1995).
When reviewing a trial court's review of an administrative agency's decision, this Court essentially is to determine "whether or not the trial court properly applied the ... standard of review" found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Papachristou, 29 S.W.3d at 490 (citations omitted). This Court addressed its judicial review of evidence contained in the administrative record as follows: "While this Court may consider evidence in the record that detracts from its weight, [this] [C]ourt is not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence...." Gluck, 15 S.W.3d at 490 (citations omitted); see also McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ., 921 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that this Court "is not at liberty to reevaluate the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder") (citation omitted). In short, the applicable standard is quite limited. However, courts reviewing administrative decisions are not utterly passive in their deference. Our Supreme Court has discussed:
In Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 876 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals confirmed the limited nature of review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. That court observed that only those agency decisions not supported by substantial and material evidence qualified as arbitrary and capricious but determined that even those decisions with adequate evidentiary support might still be arbitrary and capricious if caused by a clear error in judgment. Id. at 110. Our Court of Appeals warned against a mechanical application of the standard of review under subsections (4) or (5):
In its broadest sense, the standard requires the court to determine whether the administrative agency has made a clear error in judgment. An arbitrary [or capricious] decision is one that is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or one that disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion.
Likewise, a reviewing court should not apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-[5]-322(h)(5)'s "substantial and material evidence" test mechanically. Instead, the court should review the record carefully to determine whether the administrative agency's decision is supported by "such relevant evidence as a rational mind might accept to support a rational conclusion." ... The evidence will be sufficient if it furnishes a reasonably sound factual basis for the decision being reviewed.Id. at 110-111 (citations omitted).
By virtue of these guidelines, our review is confined to whether the decision of the Commission qualifies as either arbitrary or capricious or, in the alternative, has insufficient support in the evidence. While the Chancellor, in this instance, appropriately recognized the principle that an administrative decision should not be disturbed when there is substantial or material evidence to support one of two results, it is our conclusion that even under a limited scope of review, these facts warrant a result contrary to that of the Commission. See Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that rejection of an administrative agency's factual findings is appropriate "if a reasonable person would necessarily draw a different conclusion from the record").City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316-17 (Tenn. 2007). In addition, regarding a board's responsibility to ultimately make the decision on whether to award a pension based upon the medical evidence before it, this Court has stated:
As to petitioner's contention that the last sentence of section 25-1(27) dictates that both the diagnosis and the award of a line-of-duty disability should be left solely to the discretion of the two examining physicians, we find this contention to be without merit. It is the responsibility of the board to make the decision whether to award a pension based upon the medical evidence presented.Splain v. City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9511-CH-00259, 1996 WL 383297, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 1996), no appl. perm. appeal filed.
Taylor makes several arguments in support of his contention that the Trial Court erred in upholding the ALJ's decision to deny him a line-of-duty disability pension, to wit: that it was only after his 2016 injury that he no longer could work as a police officer; that his previous injuries did not in and of themselves render him disabled; that a tear in the ACL of his left knee is the underlying basis of his disability but the evidence shows that the earliest such tear stemmed from his 2012 on-duty injury, not his 2006 off-duty injury; and that the only rational conclusion is that his 2016 injury caused his disability. Taylor asserts that the ALJ's decision was unsupported by substantial and material evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. For its part, Memphis states that the physicians' opinions constitute substantial and material evidence sufficient to uphold the ALJ's decision. Memphis also observes that, under the applicable standard, courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the ALJ.
To review, the ALJ found as relevant: that "[Taylor] sustained an injury to his left knee during the course and scope of his employment as a City of Memphis police officer on July 23, 2016[.]"; that "[a]ccording to the two qualified physician's opinions, Dr[.] [Hood] and Dr. Dlabach, [Taylor] is totally and permanently disabled and unable to perform his employment as a Memphis Police Officer."; that "[b]oth qualified physicians agree and the Court finds that [Taylor's] disability, the ACL tear and medial meniscus tear of the left knee, is chronic as documented by MRIs prior to the date of work-related injury."; that "[Taylor's] disability did not result from his job as a City of Memphis Police Officer as defined by City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, as a direct and proximate result of his July 23, 2016 work-related injuries while in the actual performance of his duties…."; and that "[Taylor's] disability is not work-related and his application for Line of Duty Disability benefits pursuant to the City of Memphis Pension Ordinance should be denied[.]".
As pointed out by Taylor, there is a contradiction in the evidence concerning when he first tore the ACL in his left knee, the timing of which was a major pillar of the physicians' opinions and the ALJ's ultimate decision. A medical document from 2006, when Taylor was injured in an off-duty motorcycle accident, reflects that Taylor's left knee ACL was "unremarkable." A torn ACL would warrant more of an observation than "unremarkable." The ALJ specifically found that Taylor's 2006 injuries consisted of "fractures of C6 through 7 transverse process fractures, Sternal fracture, right 2nd rib fracture, left 1-7 rib fracture…, left pneumothorax/hemothorax, grade III splenic laceration and a posterior cruciate injury to the left knee[.]". (Emphasis in original). Despite the medical documentary evidence showing no sign of an ACL tear in his left knee before 2012 when Taylor testified that he was injured in an on-the-job accident, Hood and Dlabach concluded that Taylor tore his left ACL sometime before 2012. It is not entirely clear in each instance whether the physicians' opinions as to the origin of Taylor's left ACL tear were based upon their review of written MRI reports or from their independent examination of MRI images. Dlabach testified, for instance, that "[t]he injury as detailed by the MRI of October 20, 2006 reveal an injury to the ACL as well as the medial meniscus tear." In any event, the MRI images themselves are not in the record. Meanwhile, the medical documentary evidence in the record shows that Taylor's left knee ACL was "unremarkable" in 2006, seemingly contradicting Hood's and Dlabach's statements. This contradiction is significant because the ALJ characterized Taylor's disability as "the ACL tear and medial meniscus tear of the left knee, is chronic as documented by MRIs prior to the date of work-related injury." (Emphasis added). We are unable to determine from their testimony whether the physicians simply made a mistake in their timeline of the medical history or whether they independently concluded, despite the medical documents, that Taylor tore his left ACL in 2006. The medical documentary evidence does not support the latter and tends to fairly detract from the weight of the physicians' accounts. Additionally, the ALJ ignored that the 2012 injury occurred on the job. The physicians also ignored or never were informed that the 2012 injury was on the job. To the extent that the 2012 injury contributed to Taylor's disability, then it too must be regarded as in the line of duty, further undercutting the ALJ's decision. In view of these inherent contradictions concerning when Taylor first tore his left ACL, we find that the ALJ's decision lacks substantial and material evidence in the light of the entire record. In so finding, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. However, the relevant evidence upon which the ALJ based its decision was less than a scintilla or glimmer.
Taylor argues further that the ALJ's decision was arbitrary and capricious. We agree. Even if we err and the ALJ's decision had sufficient evidentiary support, the fact remains that Taylor was working normally until he was injured while detaining a suspect in 2016. After his 2016 injury, Taylor was recommended for an ordinary disability pension and had to retire. In other words, there was a distinct before and after. Hood testified that Taylor's 2016 injury had the effect of aggravating damage already done to his left knee. Even still, whether couched as 'aggravating' or a totally new injury, Taylor's 2016 injury was the seminal turning point beyond which he no longer could work as a police officer. It was a sharp dividing line. Before the 2016 injury, he was working normally. Even if Taylor tore his left ACL in 2006, he still worked as a police officer for another decade. In his deposition testimony, Dlabach stated that he could not say exactly when Taylor's knee instability would have reached a point where he no longer could do his job. Asked if it might have been another ten years, Dlabach said that this was possible but unlikely. We need not rely on hypotheticals. Regardless of whether Taylor eventually would have had to retire because of instability in his left knee at some indeterminate future point, he indisputably injured his knee in 2016, and that injury abruptly marked the end of his police career. The direct and proximate causal relationship of the 2016 injury to Taylor's retirement is clear. Taylor went from working normally as a police officer without any medical restrictions to being disabled and having to retire. The plainly identifiable turning point was his 2016 on-the-job injury. A reasonable person could reach no other conclusion based on this evidence. Accepting Memphis' argument would mean accepting that Taylor was working normally as a police officer as he had for years, injured his left knee in 2016, and then coincidentally had to retire due to instability in his left knee right after the injury. That defies common sense. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h), the standard of review is very narrow, but it does not totally insulate the ALJ's decision. Respectfully, the ALJ's conclusion that Taylor's disability was not the result of his employment as a police officer was a clear error of judgment. We find that the ALJ's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
In summary, Taylor injured his left knee in 2016 while detaining a suspect in the actual performance of his duty. The incident took place at a definite time and place. No willful negligence on Taylor's part is alleged. There is no dispute that Taylor was a participant in the Memphis pension plan. After this 2016 incident, Taylor was permanently and totally disabled from resuming his work as a police officer. The only reasonable conclusion in light of the entire record is that Taylor's 2016 injury in the line of duty rendered him disabled. Taylor's 2016 injury was the direct and proximate cause of his career-ending disability regardless of his previous injuries, none of which left him disabled and permanently unable to return to work as the 2016 injury did. Taylor has met all of the criteria entitling him to a line-of-duty disability pension. The ALJ's determination that Taylor's disability did not result from his employment as a Memphis police officer, and that consequently he was not entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension, is unsupported by substantial and material evidence in the light of the entire record. In addition, or alternatively, the ALJ's decision was arbitrary and capricious, and based on a clear error of judgment. Taylor is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Trial Court is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellee, the City of Memphis.
JEFFREY USMAN, J., dissenting.
The majority thoughtfully examines the evidence in the present case and may even have reached a better understanding of the actual cause of Officer Torrance Taylor's injury than was arrived at by the City of Memphis Pension Board and the hearing officer. However, in its analysis, the majority has engaged, at least in my view, in a reweighing of the evidence that exceeds the scope of this court's authority when reviewing such decisions under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The City of Memphis Pension Board concluded that Officer Taylor was entitled to an ordinary disability retirement rather than a line-of-duty disability. The relevant Memphis ordinance defines line-of-duty disability as follows:
Line-of-duty disability means a physical or mental condition arising as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained by a participant, after he or she became a participant and while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place without willful negligence on his or her part which totally and permanently prevents him or her from engaging in the duties for which he or she was employed by the city. The determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians, one of whom may be the physician who makes disability determinations as to such participant for purposes of worker's compensation claims.
City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27).
Three physicians, Officer Taylor's treating physician Dr. Harold Knight, and two independent medical examiners, Drs. Michael Hood and Jeffrey Dlabach, offered their expert opinions as to whether Officer Taylor was "permanently and totally disabled from his job" as a police officer as "a result of his employment (>51%) at the City of Memphis." All three concluded that he was not. While Drs. Hood and Dlabach, unlike Dr. Knight, concluded that Officer Taylor was totally and permanently disabled from his job as a police officer, both physicians determined that this disability was not a result of his employment.
The majority concludes the physicians were mistaken as to the cause of Officer Taylor's injury. In support of this conclusion, the majority observes that the medical records reflect that Officer Taylor's anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) was not torn in 2006, that his 2012 injury was an on-the-job injury, and that he worked effectively as a police officer until his 2016 on-the-job injury.
Turning to the assessment of the independent medical examiners, Dr. Hood determined that Officer Taylor suffered from a chronic left ACL deficient knee and chronic left medial meniscus tear. As a result, the condition of his left knee was such that he was unable to perform his duties as a police officer. Dr. Hood, however, concluded that Officer Taylor's July 23, 2016 injury was not the cause of these injuries. To the contrary, Dr. Hood observed that "MRI findings from 2012 as well as 2006 demonstrated anterior cruciate ligament injuries as well as medial meniscus tears." According to Dr. Hood, Officer Taylor "has a known chronic anterior cruciate ligament deficient knee since 2006."
Like Dr. Hood, Dr. Dlabach also concluded that Officer Taylor was suffering from a chronic left ACL deficient knee and chronic left medial meniscus tear that left him, without surgery, unable to perform his duties as a police officer. Dr. Dlabach explained as follows:
I do not relate this disability to the work injury on 7-23, 2016. There are medical records from Dr. Harriman pertaining to a motor-vehicle accident in 2012, at which time the MRI was consistent with a left ACL tear and left medial meniscus tear. Going further back, there was another left knee injury related to a motorcycle accident under the care of Dr. George Wood which MRI is consistent with a medial meniscus tear, abnormality of the ACL and questionable abnormality of the PCL. It is my opinion that the ACL tear and medial meniscus tear of the left knee is chronic as documented by the MRIs prior to the date of the work-related injury. The primary cause of his left chronic ACL deficient knee and chronic medial meniscus tear is not related to his employment and injury of 07/23/2016.
Both doctors further elaborated on their conclusions in their depositions. In response to an inquiry, Dr. Hood agreed that Mr. Taylor "had both this ACL injury and medial meniscus tears in 2012 and then going back to 2006." Asked to address the significance of Officer Taylor's non-work-related 2006 motorcycle injury, Dr. Dlabach stated the following:
The injury as detailed by the MRI of October 20, 2006 reveal[s] an injury to the ACL as well as the medial meniscus tear. Those were acute findings with edema or fluid around those structures at the time of the MRI that tells us that was an acute injury related somewhere around the time of that MRI.
Dr. Dlabach contrasted the 2006 MRI with the 2016 MRI as follows:
The MRI of 2016 did not show any edema around those structures telling us that that was a chronic injury. There was no bone contusion, which you would see with an acute injury around that time. And again, the medial meniscus was torn and the ACL was torn. Those are structures that don't heal. Once it's torn it's torn. It can't heal and then retear. The ACL has to be reconstructed.Addressing the 2012 MRI, Dr. Dlabach indicated that the 2012 MRI "revealed an ACL tear and a medial meniscus tear and," like the 2016 MRI, "those were chronic at that time as well." In other words, prior to the 2012 MRI, Officer Taylor's ACL and medial meniscus tears were already chronic, having been in existence for some time prior to the 2012 accident. Dr. Dlabach indicated that once the 2006 injury occurred, it essentially remained in existence. He agreed that the ACL and meniscus tears were "present as far back as 2006." He further indicated that, based on the MRI, an acute injury had occurred within six months of the time of the taking of the 2006 MRI. This timeline corresponds with Officer Taylor's off-duty motorcycle accident. In contrast, the 2016 MRI demonstrated that the injuries to the ACL and medial meniscus were old injuries. There were none of the indicators of a recent acute injury in the 2016 MRI.
Asked if the 2016 injury could have led to the instability in Officer Taylor's left knee, Dr. Dlabach stated the following:
Unlikely. The instability is chronic. It's one of the unfortunate things with the more time we spend on the planet that we lose muscle mass. So we see a lot of patients in their 20s and early 30s who are able to compensate because of strength around the joint that has instability issues and as we age that the instability just becomes progressively worse.Even without the 2016 injury, Dr. Dlabach indicated that at some point the instability in Officer Taylor's knee was going to prevent him from being able to continue working as a police officer. Dr. Dlabach asserted that this unfortunate reality was set in motion, caused by, the 2006 injury to Officer Taylor's knee.
Testifying before the hearing officer, Officer Taylor described the 2006 accident as the "real crucial accident for myself." He noted that, in addition to other broken bones that he suffered in the motorcycle accident, he had also injured his left knee. He had been hospitalized at the Regional Medical Center at Memphis ("the Med") in connection with his motorcycle accident from August 23 until September 3. After his release from the hospital, Officer Taylor was seen on more than one occasion in 2006 through Campbell Clinic Orthopaedics in connection with pain and soreness in his left knee. In late September, he went to Campbell Clinic Orthopaedics because of complaints regarding his left knee which had "been giving way and bothering him." A new MRI was performed. According to a report from Dr. George Wood, the following was revealed:
There is marked thickening and abnormality signal throughout the posterior cruciate ligament compatible with tear. The anterior cruciate ligament appears intact although there is of course extensive edema in the intercondylar notch. There is also complete disruption of the proximal medial collateral ligament with extensive surrounding edema/soft tissue swelling. Fibular collateral ligament appears grossly intact. There is some minimal edema in its most proximal fibers, but there is no ligaments discontinuity.
A small oblique tear is present involving the inferior articular surface antic posterior horn of the medial meniscus near its periphery. Remainder of the medial meniscus is normal. The lateral meniscus is intact. There is focal chondromalacia with subchondral cystic formation in the central trochlear sulcus. The patellar articular cartilage appears intact. Some mild marrow edema is noted in the lateral femoral condyle above the joint line. This may be related to a direct contusion. There is no evidence of disruption of the extensor mechanism/patellar retinacula. No additional sites of marrow pathology are noted. Small joint effusion is noted with a small popliteal fossa cyst.
In connection with Officer Taylor following up with Campbell Clinic Orthopaedics in November 2006, again because of continuing knee pain and soreness, Dr. S. Carrey Canale performed further tests. In the associated medical records, Dr. Canale observed that "[t]he films reveal a PCL tear, a high-grade MCL tear, oblique inferior articular surface tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, mild bone contusion of the lateral femoral condyle and focal to high grade chondromalacia in the trochlear sulcus centrally."
In discounting the conclusions of Drs. Dlabach and Hood regarding the import of the 2006 injury, the majority places significant weight upon a statement appearing in an earlier 2006 MRI administered while Officer Taylor was still a patient at the Med that describes the ACL as unremarkable. The same report, however, also notes that its findings are "[l]imited due to the patient's motion" and a "low field magnet." In terms of the weight of a finding that the ACL is unremarkable, it is worth noting that the same report similarly described the medial menisci as unremarkable while failing to note an oblique inferior articular surface tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, which was discovered in subsequent 2006 testing. Additionally, there is no discussion in this MRI report of what would later be found in 2006 in connection with the ACL that "[t]he anterior cruciate ligament appears intact although there is of course extensive edema in the intercondylar notch." Most importantly, Drs. Dlabach and Hood indicated that they had reviewed the medical records including the MRIs themselves from 2006, 2012, and 2016, providing a basis for their own conclusions as to what the MRIs revealed.
II.
I agree with the majority that the record offers conflicting information that creates confusion as to the timing of Officer Taylor's left knee ACL tear. Did the ACL tear occur in 2006, 2012, or sometime between these dates? There is also uncertainty as to the relationship between the ACL tear that appears in the 2012 MRI and the 2006 knee injury that Officer Taylor suffered. Reviewing the depositions of Drs. Dlabach and Hood, Officer Taylor's counsel appears to have been operating on an understanding when deposing these critical witnesses that Officer Taylor's unrepaired ACL tear in his left knee had occurred in 2006 but that the timing of the tear was immaterial because Officer Taylor was able to work until 2016 when the 2016 injury caused complications that prevented Officer Taylor from continuing to serve as a police officer. In these depositions, counsel for Officer Taylor did not appear to attempt to draw meaningful distinctions between the extent of the knee injuries that existed in 2006 and 2012. At the time of the depositions, the theory being developed in support of a line-of-duty injury appears to have been tied to the 2016 injury as the causal injury rather than an amalgamation of the 2012 and 2016 injuries. Essentially, the theory seems to have been that whatever the status of Officer Taylor's knee in terms of preexisting conditions, he had, nevertheless, suffered an on-the-job injury in 2016 that prevented him from working as a police officer and that constituted a line-of-duty injury.
This understanding is further reflected in a statement from Officer Taylor's counsel at the August 28, 2019 hearing that in the weeks prior to the hearing, counsel had reviewed the 2006 medical records and reached the conclusion that there is no evidence therein of an ACL tear in 2006. He attributed an earlier contrary understanding to the power of suggestion, noting that "there was some suggestion in some of the other reports and before the pension office that there was an ACL tear in 2006." The depositions of Drs. Hood and Dlabach had been taken months earlier, in November 2018 and March 2019 respectively. In other words, the independent medical examiners had been deposed long before counsel came to appreciate potential areas for exploration in showing deficiencies in Drs. Hood and Dlabach's testimony regarding the timing of the ACL injury. These deficiencies or inconsistencies are understandably the central focus of the majority's analysis in this case. They are also only thinly developed in the medical testimony due to the timeline of the evolution of Officer Taylor's theory of the case.
Drs. Dlabach and Hood reviewed the medical records and the MRIs. They both testified that serious damage occurred to Officer Taylor's knee, including the ACL, in 2006 from an off-duty motorcycle injury. Both doctors reached the conclusion that Officer Taylor's inability to work in 2016 can be traced back to that 2006 injury. Dr. Dlabach indicated that it was simply a matter of time before Officer Taylor's unrepaired knee was going to give out.
The majority also notes that, if the 2016 injury is not the cause of Officer Taylor's disability, then the 2012 injury was undisputedly an on-the-job injury that then would be the cause of the disability. Undermining this conclusion, Dr. Dlabach stated in his deposition that the 2012 MRI reflected that the ACL injury was already chronic by 2012.
The majority reverses the Shelby County Chancery Court's affirmance of the judgment of the hearing officer based upon a lack of substantial and material evidence to support the hearing officer's decision and the hearing officer having issued an arbitrary and capricious ruling. Both are certainly grounds for reversing when reviewing under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). The problem is that our review is more narrowly limited and modest in scope than what the majority has engaged in in reaching these conclusions.
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, "[i]n determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (h)(5)(A)(ii). "Substantial and material evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion' and to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the decision under consideration." City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of City of Memphis, 238 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quotation omitted)). To meet this standard, the evidence need not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence but must be more than a scintilla or glimmer of evidence. StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tenn. 2016). Black's Law Dictionary defines "scintilla" as "a spark or trace." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
The majority characterizes the evidence upon which the hearing officer relied as being less than a scintilla. I disagree with this conclusion. The hearing officer was presented with testimony from both independent medical examiners attributing the cause of the injury to a 2006 non-work-related motorcycle accident. Neither physician believed, in his expert opinion, that the 2016 injury was causal. With regard to the amalgamation of the 2012 and 2016 injuries as the cause of Officer Taylor's disability, Dr. Dlabach indicated in his deposition that the 2012 MRI reflected that Officer Taylor's injuries were chronic by 2012.
Perhaps, Drs. Dlabach and Hood were mistaken or insufficiently attentive to the matter before them as independent medical examiners. In other words, the majority may be right that this was a line-of-duty injury and that the hearing officer reached the wrong conclusion. This court, however, may reject a determination based on a lack of substantial and material evidence "only if a reasonable person would necessarily arrive at a different conclusion based on the evidence." City of Memphis, 238 S.W.3d at 243. Regardless of whether the conflicting evidence is sufficient to support a preponderance of the evidence determination, it is far beyond a scintilla. Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable person could arrive at a different conclusion than has been reached by the majority in the present case.
III.
As noted above, the majority also reverses the Shelby County Chancery Court's affirmance of the hearing officer's decision based upon its conclusion that the hearing officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The majority's analysis on this point focuses on the common sense perception of the circumstances surrounding Officer Taylor's injury. Officer Taylor was able to continue to serve as a police officer even after the 2006 and 2012 injuries, doing so until the 2016 injury. There is no question that the 2016 injury was an on-duty injury, and the only reasonable conclusion in the majority's view is that the 2016 injury caused Officer Taylor's disability.
There is significant appeal in the majority's analysis. In addition to being supported by the common sense understanding set forth by the majority, this conclusion finds further traction in Dr. Hood's medical opinion, which can be understood as consistent with viewing the 2016 injury as aggravating a pre-existing condition. Under such a view, the circumstances of the present case offer an interesting and important area for potential exploration of legal questions related to how aggravation of pre-existing injury fits within the parameters of the Memphis line-of-duty ordinance.
Ultimately, however, resolution of these legal quandries is unnecessary in the present case for the same reason that the hearing officer's decision was not arbitary and capricious. In addressing the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Tennessee Supreme Court has noted the following:
A decision is arbitrary or capricious if it is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or . . . disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion. If there is room for two opinions, a decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is made honestly and upon due consideration, even though [a reviewing court] think[s] a different conclusion might have been reached.StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669-70 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Memphis line-of-duty ordinance provides that "[t]he determination of the line-of-duty disability of a participant shall be made on medical evidence by at least two qualified physicians ...." City of Memphis Code of Ordinances, § 25-1(27). To qualify for a line-of-duty disability, the condition must arise "as the direct and proximate result of an accident sustained . . . while in the actual performance of duties for the city at some definite time and place." Id. Both independent medical examiners testified that the 2016 injury was not the cause of Officer Taylor's permanent disability. Expert medical testimony established that the 2016 MRI revealed no recent acute injury; to the contrary, the 2016 MRI revealed chronic injuries to Officer Taylor's left knee arising from earlier incidents. While Dr. Hood's medical opinion offers support for Officer Taylor's aggravation theory for finding a line-of-duty injury, Dr. Dlabach's medical opinion offers opposition.
Dr. Dlabach indicated that Officer Taylor's inability to continue working as a police officer, his permanent disability, was attributable to instability in his left knee. Asked if the 2016 injury could have led to the instability in Officer Taylor's left knee, Dr. Dlabach rejected the contention, explaining as follows:
Unlikely. The instability is chronic. It's one of the unfortunate things with the more time we spend on the planet that we lose muscle mass. So we see a lot of patients in their 20s and early 30s who are able to compensate because of strength around the joint that has instability issues and as we age that the
instability just becomes progressively worse.
For Dr. Dlabach, Officer Taylor's left knee was essentially a ticking time bomb that was going to go off at some point as the muscle mass was no longer able to adequately make up for the structural deficiencies in Officer Taylor's knee. The injuries that prevented Officer Taylor from working had been already previously suffered.
I am in full agreement with the chancellor as to the merits of this appeal of the hearing officer's decision. Like the chancellor, while I am not certain that I would have reached the same decision as the hearing officer in the present case, I cannot conclude that the hearing officer's decision was arbitrary or capricious. The hearing officer's decision is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Dlabach, who offered a reasoned explanation for why the 2016 injury was not causal of Officer Taylor's disability. While I find the majority's analysis appealing, I cannot say that there is no room for two opinions. A reasonable person could look at the expert testimony and conclude that Officer Taylor's left knee was a ticking time bomb that was going to fail because of declining muscle mass as he aged. Under such a view, the cause of the disability was not the 2016 injury, which according to the 2016 MRI did no further damage, but instead the impact of the previous injuries combining with the loss of muscle mass as a natural result of the aging process. Officer Taylor's knee failed with the 2016 injury, but according to Dr. Dlabach, that was not the actual cause of his disability. While Dr. Hood's testimony offers a potential counter to this analysis, Dr. Dlabach's testimony is consistent with the above-described analysis. I cannot conclude that the hearing officer acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in understanding the nature of Officer Taylor's knee injury in a manner consistent with Dr. Dlabach's reasoned expert testimony.
V.
Given the limited scope of this court's review of decisions such as the one at issue in the present case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, I cannot concur in the majority's opinion. In my view, the Shelby County Chancery Court ruled correctly in affirming the decision of the hearing officer. For the reasons set forth above, while I find the majority's analysis to be a thoughtful exploration of the evidence in the present case, I must respectfully dissent.