Summary
In Swetland, the property owners had contested the valuations by the county but made payment based on the assessed value without properly protesting the payment of the portion sought to be recovered.
Summary of this case from Ginter v. Auglaize Cnty. Bd. of RevisionOpinion
Nos. 28617, 28618, 28619 and 28620
Decided November 19, 1941.
Taxation — Appeal — Board of Tax Appeals to Supreme Court — Section 5611-2, General Code — Evidence not in certified transcript of record and proceedings, not considered — No precedent established when motion to certify record overruled — Payment of taxes in full justifies dismissal of complaint against valuation, when — No tender of payment based on valuation set forth in complaint — Section 5609, General Code — Prerequisites to action to avoid defect of voluntary payment — Written protest specifying illegality claimed and taxpayer's intention to sue — Section 12077, General Code — County board of revision — Valuation or assessment of real estate — Jurisdiction to correct limited to current year stated in complaint — Section 5597, General Code — Revaluation for one year not bar to revaluation for later year, when — Failure to offer evidence on appeal before Board of Tax Appeals — Taxpayer may not complain of lack of opportunity to present evidence below — Appeal from county board of revision — Sections 5610 and 5611-1, General Code — Dismissal by Board of Tax Appeals neither unlawful nor unreasonable — Taxpayer failed to offer evidence and voluntarily paid current taxes — County board of revision a quasi-judicial body — Complaint against assessed value of real estate — Section 5579, General Code — Board may fix valuation as assessed by county auditor in sexennial assessment — Taxpayer failed to attend hearing and offer evidence.
1. Under Section 5611-2, General Code, in a proceeding appealed from the Board of Tax Appeals, this court may not consider any evidence which does not appear in the certified transcript of the record and proceedings of the Board of Tax Appeals pertaining to the decision of which complaint is made.
2. When this court overrules a motion to certify a record, no precedent for the decision of later cases by this court is thereby established.
3. Where a taxpayer filed with the county auditor a complaint against the assessed value of real property and, while such complaint was pending before the county board of revision, paid the taxes for the year complained of in the full amount assessed under the complained-of valuation without first tendering to the county treasurer as taxes an amount computed on the claimed valuation as set forth in the complaint (as provided in Section 5609, General Code), such payment was voluntary and justifies a dismissal of the complaint.
4. Under Section 12077, General Code, to avoid the defect of voluntary payment of taxes or assessments, the taxpayer, at the time of paying the taxes or assessments, must file a written protest as to the portion sought to be recovered, which written protest must (a) specify the nature of the taxpayer's claim as to the illegality thereof and (b) declare the taxpayer's intention to sue under Part III, Title IV, Division VII, Chapter 7, General Code.
5. Under Section 5597, General Code, the jurisdiction of a county board of revision to hear complaints relating to the valuation or assessment of real property is limited to correcting the valuation or assessment of the real property for the then current year set out in the complaint.
6. A revaluation of real property made for any one year in the sexennial period by the county board of revision or the Board of Tax Appeals is not a bar to a revaluation for taxation of the same real property by proper authority for a later year in the same sexennial period.
7. A taxpayer may not complain of any lack of opportunity to present evidence before the county board of revision where, upon appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, the taxpayer fails to offer or tender such evidence at the hearing upon appeal before the Board of Tax Appeals, of which hearing the taxpayer had notice.
8. Where, upon appeal from a county board of revision to the Board of Tax Appeals under Sections 5610 and 5611-1, General Code, the appellant taxpayer fails to offer or tender any evidence sustaining the complaint as to the valuation of real property, and it appears from the record before the Board of Tax Appeals that the taxpayer had voluntarily paid the taxes in full for the then current year complained of, the decision of the board in dismissing the appeal is neither unreasonable nor unlawful.
9. A county board of revision created under Section 5579, General Code, is a quasi-judicial body, and where a taxpayer files a complaint against the assessed value of his real property and thereafter fails to attend a hearing of which he had notice and no evidence in support of such complaint is offered by or on behalf of the taxpayer, a county board of revision is justified in fixing the valuation complained of in the amount assessed by the county auditor in the sexennial assessment.
APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals.
The record discloses that on June 12, 1939, appellants filed with the Department of Taxation of Ohio four appeals from the decisions of the Board of Revision of Cuyahoga county in respect of four parcels of real estate located in the city of Cleveland.
Transcripts on appeal were certified by the deputy county auditor, showing the proceedings before the county board of revision, and these were duly filed with the Department of Taxation.
The board of revision transcripts show that on May 19, 1938, appellants' complaints were filed and that various times for hearing such complaints were set between January 17, 1939, and May 10, 1939, all of which hearings, except the last, were continued at the request of appellants. On May 10, 1939, the county board of revision dismissed appellants' complaints. Appellants' complaints had been dismissed on March 20, 1939, and later reinstated.
Excepting the minutes of the advisory committee of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, approved by the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, and a number of letters passing between the assistant secretary of the board of revision and appellants respecting the setting of the matters for hearing and postponements thereof, there appears to have been no evidence offered before the county board of revision. No evidence of any kind was offered before the county board of revision by appellants.
Attached to the transcripts of the proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals filed in this court, appears the following motion:
"Now come the state of Ohio and John A Zangerle, auditor of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, and, making a separate motion in each case, hereby move that each of the following named cases be dismissed, because the taxes therein have been paid in full for the year or years in question; that said payment of taxes was in each case voluntary and without compliance with the statutes relating to payment of taxes under protest; that in no case was any distress imminent where said taxes were paid; and that the only question in any of said cases is a purely moot question. A brief has been filed covering this motion which will apply to all cases. Copies thereof have been mailed to all counsel and/or the taxpayers.
"The list of cases subject to these motions is as follows: [ inter alia, the four cases now under consideration]."
The Board of Tax Appeals transcripts also show that in these four proceedings hearings were held at Columbus on March 29, 1940, with the following opening statement:
"Testimony had before the Board of Tax Appeals, taken at Columbus, Ohio, under date of March 29, 1940, pursuant to an order of hearing duly ordered by the Board of Tax Appeals of the Department of Taxation.
"No appearance for appellant.
"Appearance for Cuyahoga county auditor: Mr. A.F. Smith, Mr. Fred A. Frey."
An employee of the Cuyahoga county auditor and county board of revision was offered as a witness and testified of his own knowledge that the taxes for the year 1937 on the four parcels of real estate here in question had been paid in full. There was also introduced a photostatic copy of a letter on the stationery of The Swetland Company, as follows:
"May 19, 1938.
"Mr. John J. Boyle, County Treasurer, "Cuyahoga County Court House, "Cleveland, Ohio.
"Dear Sir:
"We are tendering the enclosed check in payment of taxes for the first half of the year 1937 upon the premises covered by the attached bill under and by virtue of the privilege granted by Section 5609 of the General Code of Ohio.
"A complaint has been filed with the county board of revision against the valuation placed by the county auditor on the property for which this tender of tax is made. This payment, however, is made under protest and is not to be considered as being a waiver of the objections as to the valuation placed upon said premises and is made by virtue of Section 5609 of the General Code of Ohio, the taxpayer relying upon any adjustment of taxes being made upon such valuation as shall be finally determined pursuant to said Section 5609 and following.
"We are enclosing with this, self-addressed stamped envelope for the return of the receipted bill.
"Yours very truly, "[Signed] R.H. Swetland, Treasurer, "The Swetland Company."
Under the printed instructions on the back of the complaint is to be found the following:
"Taxpayers should appreciate the importance of the board's giving relief only on proper evidence submitted."
The complainants below, appellants herein, offered no evidence before the county board of revision. It is asserted by brief and argument in this court that this was due either to a misunderstanding as to the time of hearing or, as claimed by the appellants, to the fact that the matter was disposed of approximately half an hour before the time set for hearing. Attached to the county board of revision's transcripts as exhibit "P" is the following letter from appellant, The Swetland Company, to the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision:
"May 15, 1939. "Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, "Mr. R.A. Horn, Assistant Secretary, "New Court House, "Cleveland, Ohio.
"In re: Complaint No. 38399 "Arthur N. Pack (Fee) "1022-24 Euclid avenue
"Gentlemen:
"This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 12th which we quote:
" 'In reference to the above matter, please be advised that inasmuch as you have not taken advantage of the many opportunities afforded you to present the evidence in support of your claim of value in this case, the board of revision dismissed your petition.'
"On May 6th this company received a letter from the county board of revision over the signature of R.A. Horn, assistant secretary, referring to the above complaint (in connection with other complaints) as follows:
" 'In reference to the above complaint, please be advised these cases are set for hearing Wednesday, May 10, 1939, at 9:30 a. m. in room 154, court house.
" 'If you have not submitted the data as requested in the complaint form, kindly be prepared to submit this information at the hearing.'
"After a telephone conversation with the office of the county board of revision, the following letter was written on May 8th by the auditor of this company:
" 'Referring to hearing on the above complaint set for Wednesday, May 10, 1939, at 9:30 a. m.
" 'Mr. F.L. Swetland's physician has ordered him to stay away from business for several more days and therefore a further extension of time is respectfully requested.
" 'It is Mr. Swetland's wish that this matter be cleared at the earliest possible moment and he suggests that the hearing be set for Thursday, May 18, 1939, if this date is agreeable to the board.
" 'Please advise.'
"Repeated telephone calls to the office of the board failed to elicit any reply to the above letter of this company requesting the postponement of the hearing, and therefore on May 10th prior to 9:30 a. m., which was the date and hour for the hearing by the board of revision, we called the office of the board and in response to such call and repeated, persistent questioning, we were informed that Mr. Horn, assistant secretary of the board, was in court; that because of the necessity of his being in court, the hearing set for 9:30 a. m. Wednesday, May 10th, had been advanced to an earlier hour, of which no notice was given this taxpayer, and we now learn through your present letter that at this earlier hearing the above complaint was dismissed.
"In filing this complaint, the taxpayer deleted the line and one-half from Form 1-B appearing immediately above the signature of the complainant, which reads as follows:
" 'Notice of hearing on this complaint deposited in the post-office to my address five days prior to such hearing, shall be deemed reasonable notice, and any other further notice is hereby waived.'
"In view of all of the foregoing it is felt that the action of the board in dismissing this complaint was unwarranted and taken without due regard to the rights of the taxpayer, and because of this we request that the board reconsider this action in connection with the above complaint and set a future date for the hearing of the complaint — the taxpayer to be given at least ten days advance notice of the date set for the hearing.
"Yours very respectfully, "The Swetland Company, "By [Signed] R.L. Swetland."
Attached to exhibit "P" is the following memorandum:
"Regarding first paragraph this page —
"Mr. Heckelman called twice on the morning of May 10, 1939. It was not prior to 9:30 but at about 10:00 o'clock a. m.
"The first time I told Mr. Heckelman, Mr. Horn had just gone to court.
"[Signed] Lucy Nickolich."
On June 11, 1940, the Board of Tax Appeals entered an order sustaining the motion filed by the county auditor to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the complainant had voluntarily paid all of the taxes on the property for the year 1937 at the full valuation thereof as assessed by the county auditor, and that the complainant in making payment of taxes did not avail itself of the privilege of tendering the taxes on the property at the valuation claimed by the taxpayer in the complaint filed by it with the county board of revision. Thereafter, the appellant requested a rehearing, which the Board of Tax Appeals granted on July 3, 1940.
Attorneys for both appellants and appellees stipulated and agreed that the rehearing of the motion to dismiss the appeal should be submitted to the Board of Tax Appeals upon briefs and without oral hearing.
On March 17, 1941, the Board of Tax Appeals entered the following order:
"This cause and matter came on for hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals upon the motion filed by the county auditor to dismiss the appeal filed herein by the appellant from a decision and order of the county board of revision on a complaint therein filed by appellant as to the assessed valuation for the year 1937 of original lot 155, sub-lot 59 — 86.43 ft. frontage on Euclid avenue, Cleveland taxing district. Said cause was heard, argued by counsel and submitted to the Board of Tax Appeals, and on June 11, 1940, said board sustained the motion made on behalf of the appellees herein and dismissed said appeal. Thereafter and within thirty days from June 11, 1940, the appellant herein filed a motion for rehearing and upon consideration, said motion was sustained and the entry of June 11, 1940, dismissing said appeal was ordered vacated by said Board of Tax Appeals. Thereafter, the matter was set for hearing and was submitted to the Board of Tax Appeals by agreement, upon briefs of the appellant and the appellees.
"Coming now to consider the matter as resubmitted by the appellant and the appellees, the Board of Tax Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence and the briefs submitted herein and being fully advised in the premises, finds that while the original complaint of this appellant was pending before the county board of revision and before said board had acted upon same, the complainant, appellant herein, voluntarily paid all of the taxes on said property for the year 1937 at the full valuation thereof as assessed by the county auditor, which was the valuation complained of in said proceedings before the county board of revision; and said complainant, appellant herein, in making said payment of taxes did not avail itself of the privilege of tendering the taxes on said property at the valuation claimed by said taxpayer in the complaint filed by it with the county board of revision, but paid the full amount of taxes on the property as assessed by the county auditor, as aforesaid.
"The Board of Tax Appeals finds that notwithstanding the fact that the only question before the county board of revision at the time of its decision on said complaint was a moot question, the decision of which in any event as to such decision could not afford any relief to said taxpayer and could not substantially affect the rights and interests of appellant or of the county taxing authorities, parties to said proceedings, the county board of revision acted on said complaint and fixed and determined the valuation of said property both as to land and building valuation at the same figures indicated in the assessed valuation of said land and building made by the county auditor and upon which the appellant paid the taxes for said year as aforesaid.
"Wherefore, the Board of Tax Appeals finds that the appellant was not in point of law aggrieved or in any manner prejudiced by the decision of the county board of revision and that for this reason and for the further reason that by this appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals the only question presented to said board for decision is a moot question with respect to the valuation of this property, as to which the appellant by its payment of taxes thereon has waived its right to complain, and which moot question, if decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, could not afford to the appellant any relief or in any way affect its rights and interests as against the county authorities with respect to the valuation of this property, or otherwise, it is by the Board of Tax Appeals considered and ordered that said motion be, and the same hereby is sustained, and that said appeal be, and the same hereby is dismissed."
Thereafter, appellants perfected an appeal to this court in each of the four cases, and by stipulation the parties agreed that the four appeals should be beard and decided upon the record and briefs in cause No. 28617.
Messrs. Snyder, Seagrave, Roudebush Adrion and Mr. Myron W. Ulrich, for appellants.
Mr. Thomas J. Herbert, attorney general, Mr. Frank T. Cullitan, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Frederick W. Frey, for appellees.
Some preliminary observations are in order. It should need no citation of authority to convince that this court will not go outside of the record in the consideration of facts in appealed causes.
No consideration will be given to Section 5609-2 or 5609-3, General Code (119 Ohio Laws, —), which were not in effect at the time of the decision of these appeals by the Board of Tax Appeals. Neither will any attention be paid to amendments of the General Code which became effective after these appeals became pending proceedings upon complaint being filed with the county auditor, except such as are embraced within the provisions of Section 1464-11, General Code, effective May 15, 1939 (118 Ohio Laws, 351), which provides in part:
"All proceedings of whatsoever character, pending before the Tax Commission of Ohio or a commissioner or member thereof at the time said commission and said offices of commissioners or members thereof, shall, by the provisions of this act, be abolished, and all proceedings pending in any court, in which the Tax Commission of Ohio or a commissioner or member thereof is a party shall continue to completion under this act." (Italics ours.)
These appeals were presented in oral argument and briefs upon a statement of facts, a part only of which facts are to be found in the transcripts of the record and the proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals.
Section 5611-2, General Code, as amended in 118 Ohio Laws, 355, provides in part:
"The Board of Tax Appeals, upon written demand filed by an appellant, shall, within thirty days after the filing of such demand, file with the Supreme Court a certified transcript of the record of the proceedings of the Board of Tax Appeals pertaining to the decision complained of, and the evidence considered by the board in making such decision.
"If upon hearing and consideration of such record and evidence the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals appealed from is reasonable and lawful it shall affirm the same, but if the Supreme Court is of the opinion that such decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is unreasonable or unlawful, it shall reverse and vacate same or it may modify same and enter final judgment in accordance with such modification." (Italics ours.)
Appellants state the question of law here involved as:
"The sole question involved in this appeal is — Does payment of taxes during the pendency of an appeal from the appraisal of real estate by the county auditor to the county board of revision and then to the Board of Tax Appeals before said boards have acted on said appeal, and where the valuation is for a period of six years under Section 5548, General Code, abate the appeal, and leave only a moot question for decision?"
While we shall answer the question as propounded, we do not agree that it is the sole or controlling question in this case.
Proceeding to a discussion of appellants' law question as stated, we are not unmindful that a motion to certify was overruled in the case of Heuck, Aud., v. Devou, 49 Ohio App. 478, 197 N.E. 374, wherein it was held by the Court of Appeals that "a property owner's right to appeal from an appraisal of real property by a county auditor, where the valuation is for a period of six years under Section 5548, General Code, is not abated by the payment of taxes for one year during the pendency of the appeal."
As was said by Judge Jones in the case of Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 352, 190 N.E. 766:
"We have heretofore announced that, in cases knocking at our door for certification, the refusal of a motion to certify, even if the same legal question is decisively involved, does not furnish an adjudication of the question by this court as an established precedent for future cases."
See, also, concurring opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42, 59, 183 N.E. 873, 92 A. L. R., 15.
Besides, as we have observed and will give the reasons therefor later, we do not think that the question decided in Heuck, Aud., v. Devou, supra, is decisive of the appeals here in question.
Under the provisions of Section 5597, General Code, a county board of revision is limited to hearing complaints relating to the valuation and assessment of real property "as the same appears upon the tax duplicate of the then current year." (Italics ours.) The Board of Tax Appeals has no greater jurisdiction upon appeal.
We are of the opinion that neither the revaluation by the county board of revision under Sections 5597 and 5602, General Code, nor a revaluation by the Board of Tax Appeals under Section 5610 et seq., General Code, freezes the valuation of the real property in question for any part of the sexennial period except the year specifically complained of. The correctness of the valuation for the then current year complained of is the only question which either the county board of revision or the Board of Tax Appeals has the authority to determine. A review of our tax-assessment laws shows that the sexennial valuation is tentative or prima facie and may be increased or decreased from year to year dependent upon the surrounding circumstances obtaining for the year in which the correction is made. A correction by either the county board of revision or the Board of Tax Appeals merely substitutes for the then current year complained of a valuation which is binding only for the year in question. While such corrected valuation may stand for the balance of the sexennial period, there is no provision of law preventing further correction of the valuation for any later year.
While appellants state the sole question of law as set forth supra, yet as a part of their argument to show that the question before the Board of Tax Appeals was not moot, appellants claim that their payment of taxes for the year 1937 was not voluntary and that upon a correction of the valuation by the Board of Tax Appeals any overpayment might be recovered under Section 12077, General Code.
So far as is shown by the transcript of the record before the county board of revision the proceedings were dismissed by that board solely because the complainants (appellants here) failed to produce any evidence in support of their complaint of the valuation for the year 1937.
As stated by the Board of Tax Appeals in its decision: "However, the county board of revision instead of dismissing the complaint, considered and determined the same and fixed the taxable valuation of the property, both as to the land and the improvements thereon, at the same figures indicated in the assessment made by the county auditor."
While the letter of protest under date of May 19, 1938, which accompanied the check for the payment of taxes for the first half of 1937 was before the Board of Tax Appeals no evidence of a reference to any similar letter accompanying the payment of taxes for the last half of 1937 is to be found in the record. Upon the record before it, the Board of Tax Appeals found:
"However, it further appears that this taxpayer paid the taxes on this property for the last half of the year 1937 at the full assessed valuation thereof without protest or objection of any kind; and, as above noted, this voluntary payment of taxes for the last half of the year 1937, which constituted a full payment of all of the taxes then due and payable for said year on the valuation thereof as assessed by the county auditor, was made while the taxpayer's complaint was pending before the county board of revision and before said board had acted upon such complaint."
This finding of the Board of Tax Appeals is justified by the record.
Appellants complain because a hearing was denied the taxpayer before the county board of revision and no opportunity was afforded them to place in the record the letter sent with the second installment of 1937 taxes. The record fails to substantiate appellants' claim that they were denied such hearing or opportunity seasonably requested. The record does not disclose any profert of such evidence before either the county board of revision or the Board of Tax Appeals. The only information concerning the letter accompanying the payment of taxes for the last half of 1937 is contained in appellants' brief, and is as follows:
"In October, 1938, the appellant paid the last half of the year 1937 taxes on the assessed valuation of the property and again the check was drawn to the county treasurer containing the identical language set forth above, with the exception that the last half of the year was indicated as being paid instead of the first half. Also a similar letter was sent with the said check, excepting that the last half of the year 1937 was indicated instead of the first half." (Italics ours.)
Appellants then claim that "Section 12077, General Code, provides the method of paying the full taxes assessed without waiving the right to sue under Section 12075, General Code, for the return of taxes illegally collected."
Assuming, but not deciding, that the remedy under Section 12077, General Code, would be available to appellants in the event of a reduction of the challenged valuation, there are not sufficient facts disclosed by the record in this case to show a substantial compliance with that part of Section 12077, General Code, which provides: "If a plaintiff in an action to recover back taxes or assessments or both alleges and proves that he or the corporation or a deceased person whose estate he represents, at the time of paying such taxes or assessments, filed a written protest as to the portion sought to be recovered, specifying the nature of his claim as to the illegality thereof, together with notice of his intention to sue under this chapter, such action shall not be dismissed on the ground that the taxes or assessments, sought to be recovered, were voluntarily paid." (Italics ours.)
While The Swetland Company's letter of May 19, 1938, introduced before the Board of Tax Appeals, makes the claim that the tender of the check in payment for the taxes for the first half of the year 1937 was in accordance with the privilege granted by Section 5609, General Code, yet that tender fails to comply with the terms of Section 5609, General Code, which provides in part as follows:
"Complaint against any valuation or assessment as the same appears upon the tax duplicate of the then current year, may be filed on or before the time limited for payment of taxes for the first half year, or at any time during which taxes are received by a county treasurer, without penalty for the first half year. * * * Each complaint shall state the amount of overvaluation, undervaluation, or illegal valuation, complained of; and the treasurer may accept any amount tendered as taxes upon property concerning which a complaint is then pending, and computed upon the claimed valuation as set forth in complaint, and if such tender is not accepted no penalty shall be assessed because of the non-payment thereof." (Italics ours.)
The so-called protest and procedure thereunder do not comply with either Section 5609 or Section 12077, General Code.
We conclude that the Board of Tax Appeals was right in holding that the payment of the 1937 taxes in full was voluntary and that the question before the county board of revision was moot.
Coming now to what we hold to be dispositive of these cases.
The record affirmatively shows that the complainants (appellants here) offered no evidence in support of their complaints before either the county board of revision or the Board of Tax Appeals. Section 5579, General Code, provides for county boards of revision to hear complaints and revise assessments of real property for taxation. "The county board of revision is a quasi-judicial body." 38 Ohio Jurisprudence, 1056.
The record shows that the county board of revision set these complaints down for hearing on a number of occasions, but that the complaining taxpayers failed to appear. Even after one dismissal of the complaints by the county board of revision, appellants here failed to appear or offer evidence before such board. Under such circumstances the county board of revision was justified in determining and fixing the taxable valuation of the property both as to the land and improvements at the same figure indicated in the assessment made by the county auditor.
Under the provisions of Section 5610, General Code, "The Board of Tax Appeals may order the appeal to be heard upon the record and the evidence certified to it by the county board of revision or it may order the hearing of additional evidence, and it may make, or cause to be made, such investigation with respect to the appeal as it may deem proper." (Italics ours.)
The record shows that notice of a hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals was given and that appellants did not appear and that no evidence was offered on behalf of appellants.
While appellants claim they were denied the opportunity to place in evidence before the county board of revision the letter sent with the second installment of taxes, no complaint is made of any lack of opportunity to offer this letter or any other facts before the Board of Tax Appeals either before or after its decision.
As there was no evidence in the transcript from the county board of revision offered before the Board of Tax Appeals upon which to fix a valuation different from that fixed by the county auditor, the Board of Tax Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeals irrespective of any reason given for such action.
There is nothing in the record submitted which would justify an opinion of this court that the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals herein appealed from are unreasonable or unlawful.
Therefore, the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in each of the cases here under consideration should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
Decisions affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., WILLIAMS, MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN and BETTMAN, JJ., concur.