Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Decided Aug. 28, 1990.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (Sacramento); Raul A. Ramirez, District Judge, Presiding.
E.D.Cal.
AFFIRMED.
Before WALLACE, ALARCON and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Pammie Sue Stratton (a.k.a. Darral Eugene Stratton), a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stratton argues that inadequate medical care was given in prison and that the denial of hormone therapy was in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
On February 8, 1988, Stratton filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Solano County Superior Court. It contained allegations that can best be interpreted as a contention that the failure to continue the hormone treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment which would violate eighth amendment rights as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. On April 19, 1988, the superior court issued its order dismissing the petition. The court found that the decision to discontinue Stratton's hormone treatment was medically appropriate because it appeared that Stratton had dangerously high estrogen levels, a life-threatening condition. The court also held that the prison was under no constitutional obligation to provide Stratton with hormone treatment. Stratton did not appeal this decision and it became final.
Stratton filed his section 1983 action at the same time that he sought habeas corpus relief in the state courts. He alleged the same constitutional violation in his section 1983 action as in his state habeas corpus petition. On November 23, 1988, the district judge granted summary judgment, ruling that, due to the finality of the state habeas corpus decision, Stratton's section 1983 action was barred by res judicata.
As stated in the magistrate's opinion, adopted by the district court,
[f]or purposes of issue or claim preclusion, it is well established that the first decision rendered in two simultaneous actions is to be given preclusive effect. See C. Wright & A. Miller, 18 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4404 (1981). In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court held that issues decided in state criminal proceedings are to be given res judicata effect in subsequent proceedings under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 brought in federal court. Although Allen involved a state ruling during a suppression hearing, the Ninth Circuit has applied the same rationale to decisions made in state habeas corpus proceedings. In Silverton v. Department of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.) [, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981) ], the court held that
"because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent Section 1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity [ ] for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards."
Id. at 1347.
A federal court will accept a state court judgment on the merits of a claim as a bar to subsequent action on the same claim. Warren v. Lawder, 343 F.2d 351, 357-58 (9th Cir.1965). In California, a dismissal can be a final judgment for purposes of res judicata if it is intended to dispose of the merits of a claim. Olwell v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.2d 147, 149 (1946) (Olwell ). In dismissing Stratton's habeas corpus petition, the superior court made findings which disposed of the petition on its merits. The court found that Stratton suffered from dangerously high estrogen levels, that the discontinuance of treatment was medically necessary, and that there were no constitutional rights violated. Because the decision was on the merits, the dismissal bars Stratton's section 1983 action and summary judgment was properly granted.
Stratton argues that, before the dismissal of his state habeas corpus petition, Stratton was not permitted an evidentiary hearing, which denied a full and fair opportunity to be heard. This argument is that the merits of his claim were not actually reached. The lack of evidentiary hearing does not disturb the fact that the state court dismissed Stratton's petition on its merits. If Stratton was dissatisfied because there was no evidentiary hearing, that issue should have been appealed after the dismissal of the state petition. Id. at 152. Once the decision became final, res judicata applied. Id. That the state court's decision may have been wrong is irrelevant. "[T]he res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong...." Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); see also Olwell, 28 Cal.2d at 152.
AFFIRMED.
Note: This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the Courts of this Circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.