McCULLEN, Judge.

This action in forcible entry and detainer was begun in the Magistrate Court of Pike County, Missouri, by respondents as plaintiffs against appellants as defendants to recover possession of certain premises described in the complaint of plaintiffs. The land involved is situated in the Mississippi River Bottoms in south-eastern Pike County. On an application for a change of venue the cause was transferred to the Circuit Court of Pike County, where the judge on his own motion disqualified himself and transferred it to the Circuit Court of Ralls County, Missouri. A trial without a jury, the jury having been waived, resulted in the court finding defendants guilty of forcible entry and detainer as charged in the complaint, and that plaintiffs were entitled to restitution of the premises described. The court adjudged that plaintiffs recover $736 of defendants, being double the amount of $368, which the court found plaintiffs were damaged, and that plaintiffs further recover of defendants at the rate of $20 per month until restitution be made, being double the sum of $10 found by the court to be the monthly rental value of the premises, and that plaintiffs recover costs. In due time defendants filed a motion for a new trial which was overruled by the court and defendants duly appealed to this court.

All of the plaintiffs and both defendants are residents of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Defendants are husband and wife and defendant Henry E. Leicht was, for many years and at the time of the trial, a police officer of the City of St. Louis.

It appears from the evidence that on May 1, 1941, plaintiffs leased from John F. Schultz and his wife a parcel of land 175 feet by 125 feet, being a small part of the Schultz farm in the southeast corner of Pike County, Missouri, about five miles northeast of Elsberry, Missouri. The Schultz farm contained about 60 acres of land. The lease provided for a term of ten years with the right to renew for an additional ten years and for an annual rental at $25 payable in advance.

The lease, which was introduced in evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit E, described the leased premises as follows: "the following described premises in the County of Pike, State of Missouri, to-wit: Starting at the point of 8 Feet East of Trimble Slough on the North Side of Highway P. with a frontage of 175 feet and depth of 125 feet." Said lease was filed for record in the office of the Recorder of Pike County on January 24, 1942.

The lease contained, among others, provisions as follows: "And in case of any forfeiture of this lease, the said lessor or assigns, shall be entitled to and may take immediate possession of said demised premises, any law, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. * * * Any failure to pay each year rent when due, or to keep or perform any of the covenants or agreements herein contained shall produce a forfeiture of this lease, if so determined by said lessor without further demand or notice."

After the lease was executed plaintiffs built a five room club house on the leased lot at a cost of about $3000 and furnished it for living purposes. Plaintiffs all lived in the City of St. Louis and used the club house along with their families throughout the year, particularly on weekends and when not in use the club house was kept locked, each plaintiff having a key.

On March 7, 1946, defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Leicht, purchased from John F. Schultz and Mary Schultz, his wife, the farm property containing, as heretofore stated, about 60 acres of land. The warranty deed from the Schultzes to the Leichts conveying said land was executed May 18, 1946, and filed for record in the office of the Circuit Clerk as ex officio Recorder of Pike County on August 7, 1946. This was the same land on a small part of which Schultz had given plaintiffs the above mentioned lease. It appears that in addition to the club house which was erected by plaintiffs there was another club house and several other outbuildings on the land which, however, are not involved in this suit. The controversy between the parties herein arose out of plaintiffs' claim to the possession of the club house referred to as the "White Club House" located on the lot leased to them by Schultz.

At the trial plaintiffs called as their witness defendant Henry Leicht who testified that prior to May 18, 1946, on which date he received the deed to the farm land from Schultz, he had no knowledge that plaintiffs had a lease on a part of the premises and had never seen plaintiffs' Exhibit E (the lease in question); that Schultz had told him that there was a club house on the place which Schultz had previously leased to another group of men, but Schultz did not specify the particular club house involved herein; that on the day he received from Schultz the deed to the land he, for the first time, learned of plaintiffs' lease and that he asked Schultz about the annual rental; that Schultz told him he had instructed plaintiffs to pay the rent to him (Leicht) as the new owner, and further told him that the rent was due on May 1st and that after plaintiffs failed to pay the same when due the lease was forfeited.

Defendant Leicht further testified that plaintiff, Peter Haselhorst, called him by telephone on May 17, 1946, and asked him if he had taken title to the Schultz property; that he told Haselhorst that he had not but that he would take title to it at eight o'clock the next day, May 18, 1946, and suggested to Haselhorst that he meet Leicht at the Schultz home; that on May 19th, he, defendant Leicht, met plaintiff, William Hediger, and demanded the rent for the club house premises from him; that he had a discussion with Hediger about the overdue rent and about plaintiffs' rights as well as the rights of defendants; that he complained to Hediger about plaintiffs' hunting and shooting on other parts of the farm outside their club house premises and told him that some arrangement should be made about such matters; that Hediger concluded the discussion by telling defendant Leicht "to go to Hell," and said further to Leicht "We will do as we damn please. We will go where we want and you ain't stopping us, or no one else." However, Hediger also told Leicht he would get his rent.

Defendant Henry Leicht further testified that following the above described conversation between him and Hediger, defendant immediately drove to his home in St. Louis, which took about two hours, where he called plaintiff Haselhorst on the telephone and told Haselhorst that he had "a little difficulty with William Hediger when I asked him for the rent"; that he requested Haselhorst to bring his entire group to Leicht's house to "straighten this thing out"; that Haselhorst told him: "Leicht forget the whole thing, just forget about it." Leicht further testified that the next thing he did was to see Mr. Kretschmer, a lawyer in the Pierce Building in St. Louis.

As a result of defendant Leicht's visit to Kretschmer, the lawyer, a written notice on the lawyer's letterhead signed by defendant Henry Leicht dated May 21, 1946, was mailed to each of the plaintiffs and addressed to all of them, notifying them that the lease and any rights they had thereunder were forfeited and cancelled for the failure to pay the rent which was due in advance on May 1, 1946. Said notice contained a request that plaintiffs peacefully vacate the premises. The notice was introduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibit 4.

Plaintiff Haselhorst testifying for plaintiffs admitted that he received by registered mail on May 22, 1946, the letter, defendants' Exhibit 4, addressed to him and his associates and signed by Henry Leicht notifying them that the lease on the lot of land 175 x 125 feet was cancelled and forfeited for the failure to pay the rent due and requesting them to vacate the premises. Said plaintiff Haselhorst also admitted that the first money order for the rent which he sent to Leicht on May 22, 1946, was returned to him by Leicht because the money order was defective. He testified that on May 27, 1946, he mailed a second money order for payment of the rent which also was returned to him by Leicht.

Thereafter defendant Henry Leicht received a letter from plaintiff, William Hediger, informing defendant "in no uncertain terms" that plaintiffs would not vacate the property. The rent was at that time long past due but was not paid.

John F. Schultz, the former owner of the land in question, was called as a witness for plaintiffs and testified that before he transferred the farm to defendants he told Henry Leicht about the lease he had given on the land in question and told Leicht about the amount of the yearly rental.

The evidence shows that plaintiff, Peter Haselhorst, on April 27, 1946, had met Schultz and offered him $25 in cash for the annual advance rental which was due on May 1, 1946. Schultz refused to take the money from Haselhorst, saying that he was selling the farm and that plaintiffs should pay the rent to the new owner.

Defendant Leicht also testified that he received from plaintiff Haselhorst on May 22, 1946, a money order which was defective in that it had been written for $25 in figures but for $20 in longhand for payment of the annual rent, but he returned it to the sender with a letter stating that the lease had been forfeited as of May 21, 1946, for nonpayment of the rent due.

The evidence shows that on August 27, 1946, defendant Henry Leicht, his two sons, along with two movers from Elsberry, Missouri, and two more men from St. Louis went to the back door of the club house in question, which they found locked by a key on the inside of the door; that Henry Leicht with a piece of wire worked the key out of the keyhole onto the floor inside of the building, then pulled the key out under the door and unlocked the door; that Leicht and those assisting him then moved out the furniture belonging to plaintiffs that was in the club house and put a new lock on the door; that on August 28, 1946, the next day following the removal of plaintiffs' furniture from the club house the defendants Leicht executed and through a process server served on plaintiffs a notice referred to as plaintiffs' Exhibit G, notifying plaintiffs that defendants had taken full and complete possession of the club house and that they had moved plaintiffs' furniture and effects therefrom and had stored them in a building described in the notice as being on the south side of Highway P about one-half mile west of the Mississippi River on land owned by defendants which was described at length in the notice and informing plaintiffs that they could take possession of the stored property on or before September 10, 1946, and that defendants would charge storage on the same after that date at the rate of $15 per month payable in advance.

It appears from the evidence that before plaintiffs instituted this suit they employed W. G. VanCleve, of St. Charles, Missouri, who is a surveyor and registered engineer, and pointed out to VanCleve the club house tract which they claimed and that VanCleve, on December 12, 1948, made measurements of the land in question from which he prepared a plat which was introduced in evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit H. Said plat shows the location of "Highway P" mentioned in the evidence. Then, reading from west to cast, it shows the "Mississippi River Levee," then "Trimble Slough," then the tract of land 175 feet by 125 feet on the north side of the highway with the club house thereon, and then the "Mississippi River." It appears from the evidence that said plat (plaintiffs' Exhibit H) and the field notes of witness VanCleve were used to describe the land in plaintiffs' complaint in this suit. The description of the land in the complaint of plaintiffs is somewhat lengthy, being much more comprehensive as to details of distances from the beginning point to nearby objects such as the Mississippi River Levee and the Mississippi River than in plaintiffs' lease, but it follows the description contained in plaintiffs' lease to the extent that it uses the same beginning point on the north side of Pike County Highway P, "eight feet East of Trimble Slough." As asserted by plaintiffs the description in the complaint "ties down" that beginning point by courses and distances from that point to two other landmarks, namely, where the highway crosses the Mississippi River Levee to the west and where it meets the Mississippi River to the east.

Plaintiffs also introduced in evidence Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which were identified by witnesses for both parties as photographs of the club house in controversy and surrounding land.

The body of water shown in said last mentioned exhibits as being immediately next to the club house in question was referred to by John F. Schultz, former owner of the land, in his testimony as "Trimble Slough." He said that the old natives always called it "Trimble Slough."

Defendant Henry Leicht said that the description of the land in his notice (Exhibit G) namely, "starting at the point of eight feet east of Trimble Slough" referred to the club house in controversy.

Harry L. Gray testified on behalf of defendants that he had 17 years experience with the United States Engineering Department of the Army; that the St. Louis District of said Department has been engaged in surveys of all lands connected with the Mississippi River above the mouth of the Missouri River including certain dams which he named. The witness identified defendants' Exhibit 7 as a map published by the United States Geological Survey showing the area of Pike and Lincoln Counties, Missouri, and Calhoun County, Illinois, and showing the area of land owned by defendants Leicht.

Defendants' Exhibit 8 introduced in evidence was an enlargement of a part of the United States Geological Map mentioned above as Exhibit 7. Said Exhibit 8 was prepared by the United States Geological Survey, Department of Interior. These maps and enlarged area photographs introduced in evidence in combination as defendants' Exhibit 9, as well as the testimony of the witnesses show the location of "Trimble Slough" which, however, is referred to in said map exhibits as "Tremell Slough." Said map exhibits show "Prairie Slough" as located to the west of "Tremell Slough."

Defendants contend that the court did not obtain jurisdiction of defendant Henry E. Leicht for the reason that said defendant was never properly served in accordance with the statute. It is not disputed that defendant, Alvina Leicht, was served by the Sheriff and that the writ for service on defendant, Henry Leicht, was returned showing that defendant was not found.

Section 2838, R.S.Mo. 1939, Mo.R.S.A. as re-enacted by Laws of Mo. 1945, page 1091, which provides for the serving of summons and publication of notice in actions of forcible entry and detainer in Magistrate Courts is in part as follows: "* * * if the officer shall return that the defendant is not found, * * * and if the plaintiff has stated in his complaint, under oath or by separate affidavit, the last known address of the defendant, the magistrate shall make an order for service by mail * * *. If the last known address of the defendant is not given, it shall be the duty of the magistrate before whom the proceedings is commenced to make an order directing that notices shall be set up for ten days in four public places in the township, ward or district where the property is situated." (Emphasis ours.)

It appears from the record in this case that the address of defendant Henry Leicht was "not given" in the complaint nor in a separate affidavit. The magistrate, therefore, followed the only course left open to him under the statute, which was to order the posting of notices. The notices were posted as required by the statute, supra. We find nothing in Section 2838, supra, requiring a plaintiff to swear to a defendant's address in bringing an action in forcible entry and detainer even if he knows such address. We hold that the court did not err in overruling defendants' motion to quash the return of service herein.

Defendants-appellants next contend that the action of plaintiffs cannot be maintained against them for the reason that these defendants were not in possession of the premises at the time the action was brought. Many cases are cited to support this contention. Defendants did not include this point in their motion for a new trial. The point is, therefore, not preserved for review by this court. Our new Civil Code provides that "Apart from questions of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and questions as to be the sufficiency of pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or a legal defense to a claim, no allegations of error shall be considered in any civil appeal except such as have been presented to or expressly decided by the trial court." Laws Mo. 1943, Section 140(a) page 395, Mo.R. S.A. § 847.140(a). (Emphasis ours.)

Furthermore, Supreme Court Rule 3.23 provides that: "Allegations of error, in order to be preserved for appellate review, must be presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial; except questions of jurisdiction over the subject matter * *." (Emphasis ours.) In view of the above mentioned statute and rule we hold that said point is not before us for review.

Defendants next contend that the description of the land contained in the complaint of plaintiffs and in the judgment of the court based upon the description in the complaint is so indefinite and uncertain as to be fatally defective. Defendants point out that the evidence shows that plaintiffs arrived at a starting point in the description of their land by setting out the course and distance from the Mississippi River Levee and by setting out the course and distance from the Mississippi River and also by reference to a body of water called Trimble Slough. Defendants argue that the survey relied on by plaintiffs, not having commenced from a corner established by the Government or, if lost, re-established in accordance with the Sections 13222 and 13221, R.S.Mo. 1939, Mo.R.S.A. Sections 13222 and 13221, have no probative value or force and, therefore, the description is insufficient.

In opposition to the contention of defendants plaintiffs contend that Section 2836, R.S.Mo. 1939, Mo.R.S.A., under which this action was brought, merely provides that the complaint be sworn to "specifying the lands, tenements or other possessions so forcibly entered and detained, or unlawfully detained * * *."

We are of the opinion that the law does not call for the same degree of accuracy in describing lands in such a case as the one at bar as is required in a boundary dispute, arising out of the subdivision of sections of land. The case at bar is not a dispute involving boundary lines of a section or boundary lines of subdivisions of sections of land. Hence, the statutes, Sections 13222 and 13221, supra, relied on by defendants, which deal with the establishment and perpetuation of section corners of land by county surveyors have no application to this case. This is merely a forcible entry and detainer suit. It does not involve title to land. The general rule is that title to property is not involved and cannot be inquired into in an action of forcible entry and detainer except as an incident tending to show the right of possession where such right is involved. 36 C.J.S., Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 6, page 1148.

Our courts have held in numerous cases that great strictness and accuracy of description of property is not required in complaints in forcible entry and detainer. See Fink v. Schmidt, Mo.App., 245 S.W. 566, 567, and cases cited therein. The description contained in a complaint in forcible entry and detainer is sufficient if it is such as "to apprise defendant of the particular premises, the possession of which he is charged with unlawfully withholding from complainant; and the description should be such as to be a guide in executing a writ of restitution." Del Commune v. Bussen, Mo.App., 179 S.W.2d 744, 747. See also Allen v. Jackson, Mo.App., 216 S.W. 539; Esker v. Davis, Mo.App., 207 S.W.2d 798, 801; Avero v. Wells, Mo.App., 216 S.W. 802.

The defendants, although admitting that the evidence concerning Trimble Slough is somewhat in conflict, nevertheless earnestly insist that the maps introduced as exhibits by them, showing certain surveys of the area made by the United States Government, disclose that there are two bodies of water within the area in this controversy, one designated as Prairie Slough and the other as Tremell Slough, and that Prairie Slough is west of Tremble Slough, "according to the evidence," as they say. Defendants argue that the land upon which they are charged to have forcibly entered lies some distance west of Tremble Slough and is close by and immediately east of Prairie Slough. It is true there is confusion in the references to Trimble Slough. Some of the witnesses called it "Trimble Slough." It was also referred to as "Tremble Slough" and defendants' own maps and enlarged aerial photograph exhibits refer to it as "Tremell Slough." Regardless, however, of the confusion as to the name, whether it be Trimble, Tremble or Tremell, there is no confusion as to the fact that there are two sloughs in the area mentioned, and that Prairie Slough is west of the other slough no matter what may be the correct name of such other slough. The relative positions of both sloughs were shown by the testimony of the witnesses for both parties as well as by the maps (defendants' Exhibit 9) that were introduced in connection with the testimony of defendants' witness Gray of the United States Engineers.

The complaint of plaintiffs may be open to the charge of redundancy, but we are unable to agree with the contention of defendants that the description therein of the land was uncertain or insufficient. On the contrary, we agree with the finding of the court that the description contained in plaintiffs' complaint which was filed in the Magistrate Court "is adequate and sufficient in law to identify it as the club house site and premises which the Court finds was well known to all of the parties hereto and said description was sufficient 'to apprise defendants of the particular premises, the possession of which they are charged with forcibly entering and withholding and is also an adequate description as to guide an officer in executing a writ of restitution.'"

A reading of the complaint of plaintiffs shows that they described the land by metes and bounds running 175 feet by 125 feet from a beginning point on County Highway P which was the same beginning point designated by all the parties themselves in their dealings. This beginning point was further described in the complaint of plaintiffs by its distance along the highway from two landmarks, namely, the levee in one direction and the river in the other. VanCleve, the engineer, witness for plaintiffs, testified that he measured these distances and showed them on the plat which was introduced in evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit H. This showed the location of County Highway P running through the tract from the levee on the west to the river on the east. It also showed, beginning on the west and going eastwardly, the Mississippi River Levee, the 175 foot lot with the club house located thereon adjoining the body of water designated as Trimble Slough. Then to the east is shown the Mississippi River. Prairie Slough is not shown on the plat made by witness VanCleve, but the plat clearly shows that the club house on the parcel of land in question is located on the east side of and adjoining Trimble Slough. The correctness of the plat showing the location of the club house on the land in the question in relation to said slough was not disputed by any witness. We are of the opinion that the court did not err in holding that the complaint of plaintiffs and the evidence to support it were sufficient.

Defendants next contend that plaintiffs having failed to pay the rent when due, defendants had the option to re-enter and resume possession in their own right and close the term. We are unable to agree with defendants' contention. It must be remembered that plaintiffs were in lawful and peaceable possession of the premises by virtue of their lease. It is true the rent was not paid on or before the due date. However, the evidence shows without any dispute whatsoever that plaintiffs attempted to pay the rent on April 27, 1946, four days before it was due, but were told by Schultz, the then owner, that he would not accept it and that plaintiffs should pay it to the new owner. Defendants as the new owners actually did not get title to the property until May 18, 1946, when the warranty deed was delivered to them by Schultz, and they did not record it until August 7, 1946. It cannot justly be said that plaintiffs failed or refused to pay the rent during that 18 day interim because defendants as new owners could not give them a lawful receipt for such payment until Schultz delivered the warranty deed to the defendants. Any number of things could have happened during that 18 day period to prevent the completion of the transfer of the property. Either Schultz or the defendants or both might have decided not to go through with the sale.

Defendants upon receiving their warranty deed from Schultz did not notify plaintiffs after the actual change in the ownership of the property and give them a reasonable time to pay the rent, but almost immediately, namely, on May 21, 1946, sent their letter to plaintiffs, not demanding the rent, but declaring a forfeiture and cancellation of the lease for failure to pay the rent due May 1, 1946, a date on which the old owner would not accept it and the new owners could not legally do so because the warranty deed had not at that time been delivered to them. On the following day, May 22, 1946, plaintiffs sent a money order to defendants for payment of the rent. The money order was defective and was returned by defendants but plaintiffs within a few days again sent defendants a money order for payment of the rent. This also was returned by defendants. The belligerent behavior and attitude of William Hediger as related by defendant Henry Leicht, even if taken as true, did not justify defendants in failing to give plaintiffs a reasonable time to pay the rent after the actual transfer of ownership took place. It is a well established principle that the law does not favor forfeitures and certainly will not and should not enforce a forfeiture on such unreasonable grounds as are shown by the evidence in this record.

Quite aside, however, from the reasons we have just discussed, there is another reason which compels us to hold against defendants on this point. The procedure of defendants in forcibly entering the premises in August 1946, and removing therefrom the property belonging to plaintiffs was clearly erroneous and wrongful. As was held in Beeler v. Cardwell, 33 Mo. 84, loc. cit. 86, the plaintiffs, if in actual, peaceable possession, could not be legally ejected by force. If the defendants had superior right to the possession, the law provides ample means for enforcing it, and defendants were clearly wrong in taking the law into their own hands. However, the question of right does not arise in this action of forcible entry and detainer and the defendants cannot set up their supposed right as a defense for their forcible entry. In the action of forcible entry and detainer the question to be determined is merely whether there has been a forcible entry upon plaintiffs' possession by one who detains the possession from him. The rule has been clearly declared by our courts as follows: "It is immaterial in what capacity or relation a plaintiff is in possession, whether as owner, tenant, agent, or otherwise. If he is in fact in peaceful possession, then, no matter what may be the defendant's right to possession, the law does not permit the latter to indicate his right or redress his grievance by force; and, if he does so, the law will restore the original status and compel the defendant to assert his right by legal proceedings. The purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statute is to preserve peace and prevent the use of force and violence in asserting one's supposed right to the possession of real property. See Craig v. Donnelly, 28 Mo.App. 342; Sitton v. Sapp, 62 Mo.App. 197; Purcell v. Merrick, 172 Mo.App. 412, 158 S.W. 478." (Emphasis ours.) Fink v. Schmidt, Mo.App., 245 S.W. 566, 567.

Defendants next contend that plaintiffs at the most were entitled only to nominal damages. The statute, Section 2850, R.S.Mo. 1939, Mo.R.S.A. as re-enacted in Laws Mo. 1945, pp. 1089-1092, specifically provides that if the verdict of the jury or finding of the court be for the complainant in an action of forcible entry and detainer, he shall recover of defendant double the sum assessed by the jury or found by the court for his damages and also double the sum found to be the value of the monthly rents and profits of the property detained. The evidence of plaintiffs in the case at bar showed that the property had a rental value of $12.50 per month. The trial court found the rental value to be $10 per month. Under the statute, supra, it was mandatory upon the court to double the amount of damages found. Feedler v. Schroeder, 59 Mo. 364. We rule against defendants on this point.

Defendants next contend that Alvina Leicht was not a necessary or proper party defendant herein and that the judgment against her is error. We are of the opinion that the court committed no error by including defendant Alvina Leicht in the judgment. The evidence shows that the property in question was jointly owned and jointly operated by both defendants Henry Leicht and his wife, Alvina Leicht. In giving her own testimony Alvina Leicht referred to her husband and herself as the owners and as the actors in the transactions with plaintiffs. Mrs. Leicht admitted that she and Mr. Leicht purchased the property in question from Schultz. Referring to plaintiffs Haselhorst and Schlueter, Mrs. Leicht testified concerning a visit by Haselhorst and Schlueter to defendants' house saying: "we asked him — we wanted to come to some kind of an agreement and straighten this out, and they came to the house." Referring to their meeting with William Hediger, Mrs. Leicht testified that she and her husband complained to Hediger that plaintiffs had "run all over the place and they had been shooting terrifically about there. We said we didn't like that, and that we didn't want that on our premises." Referring to their effort to get plaintiff Haselhorst to come to defendants' house to talk over the matter of the settlement of their differences, Mrs. Leicht testified: "Q. Did he come to the house after that? A. No, he didn't. He didn't come until after we forfeited the lease, the paper, so-called lease."

Defendant Henry Leicht's own testimony was to the effect that on August 27 he and his two sons, two mover men from Elsberry, and two more men from St. Louis went to the premises in question and removed property of plaintiffs from the premises. The next day Mrs. Leicht joined with her husband in signing a notice declaring that they had jointly taken possession of the property and had jointly moved it and were jointly holding it. While Mrs. Leicht did not herself take part in the unlocking of the door for the purpose of entering the club house, she was there with her husband and the party at the club house and helped to remove the property of plaintiffs. We believe the evidence shows clearly that Mrs. Leicht was an active participant with her husband in the forcible entry and detainer. The general rule is that "Where forcible entry and detainer constitute the joint act of both husband and wife, both are proper parties to an action to recover possession." 36 C.J.S., Forcible Entry and Detainer § 34, page 1173. We hold that the court did not err in including defendant Alvina Leicht in the judgment along with her husband, Henry Leicht.

It is true, as pointed out by defendants, this case was tried before the court without the aid of a jury and, therefore, this court is not bound by the judgment but is required to make its own finding on the evidence. Laws Mo. 1943, section 114(d), p. 388, Mo.R.S.A. § 847.114(d). We have considered the entire evidence in the record and find that it leads inescapably to the same conclusion reached by the trial court. Furthermore, section 114(d), supra, of the statute further provides. "The judgment shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." We cannot say that the judgment herein was "clearly erroneous" but, on the contrary, we believe it was the only correct judgment that could be rendered on the evidence.

The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

ANDERSON, P. J., and BENNICK, J., concur.