From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Steele v. Oklahoma

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Mar 21, 2017
No. CIV-17-186-D (W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2017)

Opinion

No. CIV-17-186-D

03-21-2017

MICHAEL STEELE, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., Defendants.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a state pretrial detainee/prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). An initial review of the sufficiency of the cause of action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) has been conducted, and based upon this review and the findings set forth herein the undersigned recommends that the cause of action be dismissed without prejudice upon filing.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

Federal district courts must screen complaints filed by pretrial detainees or prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis the court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) In this initial review, the court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).

To survive this review, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court "review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009)(quotations and citation omitted). In applying this standard, the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, "bare assertions" consisting of "nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional . . . claim are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55).

Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-1174 (10th Cir. 1997). See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2008)(court reviewing pro se complaint does not "assume the role of advocate")(quotations and citation omitted). Also subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) are frivolous claims that "lack[ ] an arguable basis either in law or in fact" or are "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).

II. Plaintiff's Complaint

In his Complaint filed February 21, 2017, Plaintiff has named the State of Oklahoma, the F. Dewayne Beggs Detention Center, and Cleveland County as Defendants. Plaintiff states that he is both a "[c]onvicted and sentenced state prisoner" and a "[c]ivilly committed detainee," but he provides no additional facts from which to determine the true foundation for his current detention in the Cleveland County Detention Center.

In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges the following: "My Constitutional Rights have been violated. I have been denied medication prescribed to me by a doctor." Complaint (Doc. # 1), at 7. As supporting facts for this claim, Plaintiff asserts only that he has not received "my medication even after my perscription [sic] was verified as up to date [and] valid." Id. at 8. With respect to this claim, Plaintiff names all three Defendants and requests damages of $265,000.00.

In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges only "civil rights [and] constitutional rights" have been violated. With respect to this claim, Plaintiff requests to "have all cases thrown out/exponged [sic] and/or run CC [sic]." Id. at 6.

III. Legal Entity Capable of Being Sued Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Municipal Liability

Plaintiff has named Cleveland County and the F. Dewayne Beggs Detention Center, both local government entities, as Defendants. In Oklahoma, each organized county has the capacity to sue or be sued, and a lawsuit against a county in Oklahoma must be brought against the Board of County Commissioners for the particular county. Okla. Stat. tit. 19, §§ 1, 3, 4. A county jail in Oklahoma, which operates as a subdivision of the county in which it is located, has no separate legal identity under Oklahoma law. Thus, both Defendant Cleveland County and Defendant F. Dewayne Beggs Detention Center cannot be sued in this Court. See Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. App'x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007)(unpublished op.)(affirming dismissal of entities with "no apparent legal existence," including Carter County Sheriff's Department); Aston v. Cunningham, 2000 WL 796086, *4 n. 3 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000)(unpublished op.)("Dismissal against [Salt Lake County jail] was also required because a detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued.").

Even assuming Plaintiff had named the proper defendant - the Board of County Commissioners for Cleveland County - Plaintiff's claims would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a viable claim upon which relief may be granted.

For a municipality or local government to be liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation." Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged that a policy or custom of the Board of County Commissioners for Cleveland County caused the constitutional deprivations asserted in the Complaint. See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010)(recognizing Supreme Court has imposed liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon municipalities only "when the enforcement of their policies or customs by their employees causes a deprivation of a person's federally protected rights").

Consequently, Plaintiff's cause of action seeking damages against Defendant Cleveland County and Defendant F. Dewayne Beggs Detention Center should be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IV. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

States, state officials named in their official capacities, and state agencies considered "arms of the State" are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment unless the State has waived its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)(holding neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)(holding "the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power," but that a State's sovereign immunity may be waived by an unequivocal expression of waiver). Although in some circumstances Congress may abrogate a State's sovereign immunity by legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of a State. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)( § 1983 does not waive States' sovereign immunity). Oklahoma has not consented to Plaintiff's suit against the State of Oklahoma. See Ramirez v. Okla. Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1994)("Oklahoma has not waived sovereign immunity against § 1983 claims in federal district court."). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's §1983 action seeking damages from Defendant State of Oklahoma. Defendant State of Oklahoma should therefore be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

V. Habeas Relief

With his vague claim in ground two and as a form of requested relief, Plaintiff seeks the dismissal of pending criminal charges and ultimately his release from confinement. However, "[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus." Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006)(quotations marks and citation omitted). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 82 (2005)(reaffirming that "a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement" and claims seeking a prisoner's "immediate or speedier release" from confinement must be brought under federal habeas statute)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to his request to have pending criminal charges dismissed and to be discharged from jail. As Plaintiff has not stated any grounds for habeas relief with respect to his conviction and sentence, the Complaint should not be construed as one brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended that Plaintiff's cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed without prejudice upon filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff is notified that a dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b) or §1915(e)(2)(B) may constitute one "strike" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g) upon affirmance or waiver of his opportunity to appeal. Plaintiff is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 10 , 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States of America, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not addressed herein is denied.

ENTERED this 21 day of March, 2017.

/s/_________

GARY M. PURCELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


Summaries of

Steele v. Oklahoma

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Mar 21, 2017
No. CIV-17-186-D (W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2017)
Case details for

Steele v. Oklahoma

Case Details

Full title:MICHAEL STEELE, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., Defendants.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Date published: Mar 21, 2017

Citations

No. CIV-17-186-D (W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2017)