Opinion
Def. ID# 0802023870 (R-2)
02-01-2019
RE: State of Delaware v. David R. Wright
RICHARD F. STOKES JUDGE David R. Wright
SBI# 00158184
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19977 Dear Mr. Wright:
Pending before the Court is the second motion for postconviction relief which David R. Wright ("defendant") has filed in this matter. The motion is summarily dismissed. Because it is summarily dismissed, defendant is not entitled to the appointment of counsel.
A jury trial was held in this matter in November, 2008, and defendant was found guilty of the charges of robbery in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, kidnaping in the second degree, wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 372 (Del. 2009).
On March 11, 2010, defendant filed his first motion for postconviction relief. The Superior Court summarily dismissed this motion. Defendant appealed and the Supreme Court remanded the matter for an expansion of the record on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Upon considering the expanded record and the arguments on the motion, the Superior Court denied the postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
State v. Wright, 2010 WL 975577 (Del. Mar. 17, 2010).
Wright v. State, No. 175, 2010 (Del. Oct. 13, 2010) (ORDER).
State v. Wright, 2011 WL 664124 (Del. Super. Feb. 22, 2011).
Wright v. State, 21 A.3d 598, 2011 WL 2020812 (Del. May 23, 2011) (TABLE).
On his appeal and in his first motion for postconviction relief, defendant did not raise the issues he has raised in his second motion for postconviction relief, which he filed on December 17, 2018. In this subsequent postconviction motion, defendant maintains that his fourth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights were violated. The source of this argument is based on the following scenario. Guards at Sussex Correctional Institution conducted a shakedown of his cell the first day of his trial and seized his writings, legal work, discovery, notes and probably correspondence from his attorneys. Although defendant maintains this action was taken at the direction of the prosecutor, the record does not support that assertion. The only information in the record is that a prison employee conducted a shakedown to see if defendant was having contact with a potential State of Delaware ("State") witness. The Court instructed the State to return the materials. The State informed the Court that the materials had been returned to him. Defendant's counsel asserted that a large part of the materials remained missing. The issue was not addressed again during the trial.
Transcript of November 12, 2008, Proceedings at B-30.
Transcript of November 13, 2008, Proceedings at C-163; C-165
Transcript of November 12, 2008, Proceedings at B-30.
Transcript of November 12, 2008, Proceedings at B-30-31.
Id. at B-31.
Defendant argues that the State's actions, his counsel's failure to object, and the trial court's failure to act constituted violations of his fourth (right to be free from unreasonable search), sixth (right to counsel) and fourteenth (due process right) amendment rights. He argues these violations were so egregious that the trial was structurally defective and consequently, the Court must vacate his conviction.
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2), the Court must summarily dismiss defendant's second, and extremely untimely, motion unless defendant pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that he is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted or he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to his case and renders the conviction invalid. Defendant does not attempt to meet the requirements of this provision.
This portion of Rule 61(d) provides:
(2) Second or subsequent postconviction motions. -- A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion either:
(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or
(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.
It appears the impetus for the pending motion was the Superior Court's decision in State v. Robinson, to which defendant cites. In Robinson, the defendant's attorney-client correspondence was seized at the direction of the prosecutor without the State first obtaining an order from the Court or a search warrant. The Superior Court ruled defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated and dismissed the charges against defendant due to the prosecutor's behavior. An appeal of that decision is pending before the Supreme Court.
2018 WL 2085066 (Del. Super. May 1, 2018) ("Robinson").
That defendant's fourth amendment rights may have been violated is not a newly recognized constitutional right. The same holds true for his sixth amendment rights. The Robinson case does not recognize a new rule of constitutional law; it merely applies long-established law to the facts before it. Furthermore, even if Robinson did establish a new rule of constitutional law, the Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed the issue and has not made any ruling retroactive.
State v. Twyman, 2001 WL 946525 (Del. Super. Aug. 14, 2001) (examining Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 526-528 (1984) and other cases and explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by jail officials of a pretrial detainee's cell for security or other legitimate purposes but it is implicated where the search of a pretrial detainees' cell is not initiated by jail officials for legitimate objectives, but rather, is undertaken at the behest of the prosecution to bolster the State's case against the defendant).
Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1083-84 (Del. 1987).
For the foregoing reasons, Rule 61(d)(2) requires defendant's motion to be summarily dismissed. Defendant is not entitled to the appointment of counsel because defendant did not meet the elements of Rule 61(d)(2).
In Rule 61(e)(5), it is provided:
(5) Second or subsequent motions. -- For an indigent movant's second or subsequent postconviction motion, the judge may appoint counsel for an indigent movant only if the judge determines that the second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/
Richard F. Stokes cc: Prothonotary's Office
Melanie Withers, Esquire
Office of the Public Defender