Summary
examining Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 526-528 and other cases and explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by jail officials of a pretrial detainee's cell for security or other legitimate purposes but it is implicated where the search of a pretrial detainees' cell is not initiated by jail officials for legitimate objectives, but rather, is undertaken at the behest of the prosecution to bolster the State's case against the defendant
Summary of this case from State v. WrightOpinion
I.D. 0006003916
Submitted: July 30, 2001
Decided: August 14, 2001
On Defendant's Motion for Suppression of Evidence. Denied.
Daniel Miller, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the State.
John P. Deckers, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant, Terrell Twyman, has been indicted for Murder, First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, stemming from events alleged to have occurred on June 6, 2000. Twyman currently is incarcerated by the Department of Correction ("DOC") in lieu of bail, pending trial.
Twyman has filed a Motion for Suppression of Evidence, asking that the Court suppress any and all evidence seized by DOC officials during the search of his jail cell on April 19, 2001. The Court held a hearing to consider Defendant's motion on July 3, 2001. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court asked the parties to submit memoranda on certain issues involved in the motion.
The facts surrounding Twyman's motion are not disputed by the parties. Briefly, the State obtained information that Twyman was violating DOC rules by communicating in writing with another inmate. The State provided this information to the DOC, which then conducted an administrative search of Twyman's jail cell, seizing letters and other documents. The State concedes that the DOC's review of those documents and papers did not yield any evidence that Twyman had violated correctional rules.
The State has since returned to Twyman materials seized from his cell that are protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the remaining paperwork seized from Twyman's cell remains in possession of the DOC. The State has announced its intention to review those documents further. The State argues that the paperwork may contain evidence that Twyman has violated DOC rules that has not yet been discovered and that the State has the right to use any incriminating information it discovers during a review of those documents against Twyman at trial in the above-captioned charges.
The procedural posture of this motion is unusual because Twyman does not seek to suppress incriminating evidence against him already in possession of the State. Rather, Twyman seeks to prevent any further review by the prosecution of the materials already seized from his cell. Candidly, Twyman's counsel stated at the suppression hearing that the motion might be more accurately described as a, "motion to preclude the State from rummaging through the Defendant's effects." Twyman asks that the Court prevent the State from further reviewing Twyman's letters and paperwork and to facilitate their return to Twyman.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners are not afforded the same reasonable expectation of privacy while incarcerated as other individuals. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-528 (1984). However, Hudson stressed that "prisoners are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. No 'iron curtain' separates one from the other." Id. at 523 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974)). Rather, prisoners must be "accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration." Id.
Hudson held that "society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell." Id. at 526. Hudson explained that, "the recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions." Hudson identified several such objectives, including ensuring the safety of prison staff, visitors, and inmates, exclusion of drugs and contraband, the detection of escape plots, and maintenance of a sanitary environment. Id. at 526-527.
The Court notes that Hudson addressed only the Fourth Amendment right to privacy of convicted inmates and did not expressly state that its holding applied to pre-trial detainees, such as Twyman. However, Hudson references Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in which the Court assumed, without deciding, that pre-trial detainees retained some expectation of privacy, albeit an expectation that was substantially diminished due to the responsibility of prison officials to manage detention facilities to ensure security and order. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), issued on the same date as Hudson and citing Bell, upheld irregular searches of the jail cells of pre-trial detainees by prison officials. Reading Hudson, Bell, and Block together, the Court finds that, although pre-trial detainees retain some expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by jail officials of a pre-trial detainee's cell for security or maintenance purposes.
Other jurisdictions have determined that the Fourth Amendment is implicated where the search of a pre-trial detainee's cell is not initiated by jail officials for legitimate objectives, but rather, the search is undertaken at the behest of the prosecution "solely to bolster the prosecution's case against a pre-trial detainee awaiting his day in court." United States v. Cohen, 2nd Cir., 796 F.2d 20, 23 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986) and 479 U.S. 1055 (1987). In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the initial search of Twyman's cell was not undertaken solely to bolster the State's case or to uncover incriminating evidence against him. Rather, the DOC was informed that Twyman was possibly violating DOC rules by corresponding with another inmate and searched the cell to determine whether Twyman was indeed in violation of those rules. As a result, the Court finds that Twyman's Fourth Amendment right to privacy was not implicated by the DOC's search of Twyman's cell or its subsequent seizure of papers from the cell.
Having determined that the initial search and seizure by the DOC did not violate Twyman's constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the Court must now determine whether the State may review the seized materials further. Twyman argues that the DOC has completed its investigation by reviewing Twyman's papers and determining that he did not violate DOC rules. Twyman argues that, as a result, his property should be returned to him and that any further review of those documents would constitute a second, separate search. Twyman concludes that in order to undertake such a search, absent a legitimate institutional security interest, the State must first obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause.
The Court cannot conclude that review by the State of the materials already validly seized by the DOC would constitute a new search. As set forth above, the materials to which the State seeks access are the results of a validly executed search and seizure. The Court cannot find any authority to prevent the DOC, having seized those materials from Twyman's cell validly, from making them available for the State's review. As a result, the Court must DENY Twyman's Motion for Suppression of Evidence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.