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In Worsham, the second circuit affirmed the eighteen-year-old first felony offender's seven-year hard labor sentence for committing carnal knowledge of a thirteen-year-old.
Summary of this case from State v. BienvenuOpinion
No. 32,670-KA.
February 1, 2000.
APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF BOSSIER, STATE OF LOUISIANA, TRIAL COURT NO. 89,261, HONORABLE DEWEY E. BURCHETT, JR., JUDGE.
MICHAEL O. CRAIG, Counsel for Appellant.
RICHARD IEYOUB, Attorney General, Counsel for Appellee.
JAMES M. BULLERS, District Attorney.
MICHAEL A. PITMAN, Assistant District Attorney.
Before BROWN, KOSTELKA, DREW, JJ.
Christopher Brian Worsham ("Worsham") pled guilty as charged to one count of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, La.R.S. 14:80. After the denial of a timely motion for reconsideration, Worsham appealed his seven-year hard labor sentence as excessive. We affirm.
The trial court initially and correctly advised Worsham during the guilty plea colloquy that the maximum sentence was ten years. However, at sentencing the court inexplicably stated its intent to impose the maximum sentence of seven years.
On March 14, 1998, Worsham, age eighteen, committed oral sexual battery upon and engaged in sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl at a residence in Haughton, Louisiana. Worsham readily confessed when confronted.
Worsham argues that the trial court failed to consider this was his first felony offense and was not the victim's first sexual encounter and evidence of the victim's behavior after the incident.
After reviewing the trial court's articulation of reasons and the sentence imposed in accordance with the jurisprudential analysis set forth in State v. McKinney, 31,611 (La.App. 2d Cir. 02/24/99), 728 So.2d 1009, we affirm the sentence.
At the original sentencing hearing, the court stated for the record that it had considered a presentence investigation report which reflected Worsham's first felony status. Moreover, the trial court considered evidence at the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence regarding the victim's sexual history and actions after the event.
Considering all of the circumstances, including Worsham's first felony status, we do not find this moderate sentence to be shocking to the sense of justice nor constitute an abuse of discretion of the trial court's broad discretion. Worsham gained a substantial reduction in sentencing exposure through the plea agreement; the state agreed not to charge Worsham with other counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile arising from these facts. The seriousness of this offense is escalated by the four-year age difference between the victim and Worsham. Moreover, we note Worsham's continued efforts to reduce his culpability through the victim's reputation. On the showing made, we do not find the seven-year sentence to be constitutionally excessive.
Upon error patent review, we note that the Boykin colloquy fails to inform Worsham of his right to a trial by jury. However, the supplemented appeal record shows that at Worsham's arraignment the trial court not only set the case for jury trial, but also advised him of his rights to a jury trial and the waiver of the right to a jury trial. Under these circumstances, we find that Worsham's guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. Any omission in the Boykin colloquy was cured by the information of rights at arraignment.
The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.