Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4917-10T3
03-01-2013
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPH L. WILSON, a/k/a CHRISTOPE WILSON, CHRISTOPHER L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Keenan, of counsel and on the brief). Jeffrey P. Mongiello, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. Mongiello, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and Waugh.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. 09-05-00414.
Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Keenan, of counsel and on the brief).
Jeffrey P. Mongiello, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. Mongiello, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Christopher Wilson appeals his conviction, following a guilty plea, for one count of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with the intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. His appeal is premised on his argument that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.
On January 15, 2009, Officer Kevin McDonough and approximately six other police officers went to Wilson's apartment on the second floor of a building on Magnolia Avenue in Elizabeth to execute a no-knock search warrant, which included the apartment and Wilson's person. When McDonough and the other officers entered the apartment, they found Wilson in a bedroom. McDonough detained Wilson and handcuffed him. Although Wilson had not been formally placed under arrest, McDonough acknowledged that he was not "free to leave."
McDonough then informed Wilson of his Miranda rights, which Wilson indicated he understood. McDonough testified that he did not seek a Miranda waiver from Wilson because "he was clear that he didn't want to speak." McDonough nevertheless asked Wilson if there were any narcotics in the apartment, and Wilson replied "no."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
As the police officers were searching the apartment, Detective Athanasios Mikros told Wilson that if he had drugs there, "just let us know because we're searching this place and we're going to find them." Wilson subsequently showed the officers where the drugs had been hidden, which was behind the molding above the inside door frame of a bedroom closet.
Wilson was indicted in May 2009. In addition to the offense to which he pled guilty, he was indicted for third-degree possession of a CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), third-degree possession of a CDS with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), and second-degree possession of a CDS with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1.
Wilson moved to suppress the drugs seized during the search. The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on April 1, 2010. McDonough and Mikros testified for the State. Wilson and another individual found in the apartment with him testified that Wilson was not given Miranda warnings. In his oral decision, the judge denied the motion. He found that the police witnesses were credible and that Wilson and his witness were not. He concluded that Wilson had received the Miranda warnings, understood them, and implicitly waived his rights by disclosing the location of the drugs. The judge further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the police officers would have found the drugs without assistance from Wilson.
Wilson entered his guilty plea in May, and was sentenced to incarceration for seven years, with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility, in July. This appeal followed.
II.
Wilson raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING WILSON'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE FAILED TO SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR WILSON'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT WHEN THEY CONTINUED QUESTIONING HIM DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AFTER HE MADE IT "CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SPEAK."
POINT II: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE DRUGS WERE ADMISSIBLE BASED ON THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE POLICE WOULD HAVE FOUND THEM WITHOUT WILSON'S ASSISTANCE.
The Supreme Court has explained the standard of review applicable to an appellate court's consideration of a trial judge's fact-finding on a motion to suppress as follows:
[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." [State v. Elders, 386 N.J. Super. 208, 228
(App. Div. 2006)] (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)); see also State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 13 (1979) (concluding that "there was substantial credible evidence to support the findings of the motion judge that the . . . investigatory search [was] not based on probable cause"); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 562-64 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that standard of review on appeal from motion to suppress is whether "the findings made by the judge could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record" (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 164 (1964))).
An appellate court "should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161. An appellate court should not disturb the trial court's findings merely because "it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal" or because "the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side" in a close case. Id. at 162. A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken "that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Ibid. In those circumstances solely should an appellate court "appraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions." Ibid.
[State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007).]
State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011), outlines a different standard for cases involving videos of police interrogations. Because there were no videos in this case, that standard is not applicable.
--------
Our review of the trial judge's legal conclusions is plenary. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005); State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 78 (2011).
In reviewing a trial judge's ruling on a Miranda motion, we analyze police-obtained statements using a "searching and critical" standard of review to ensure that "constitutional rights have not been trampled upon." State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 43 (App. Div.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003). We generally defer to the trial judge's credibility findings. State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div. 2000). A trial judge will admit a confession into evidence only if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the suspect's waiver of rights was "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Patton, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 42.
If an accused invokes the right to consult with an attorney or to remain silent "in any manner and at any stage of the process," all questioning must cease. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707. The right to remain silent must be "scrupulously honored." State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 282 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 321 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A custodial interrogation may be resumed after the invocation of the right to remain silent only if a new set of warnings is administered. Ibid.; see also State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 267 (1986) (stating that administration of fresh Miranda warnings is "indispensable to a permissible resumption of custodial interrogation of a previously-warned suspect"). "Any words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss his case with the police are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988).
In this case, in explaining his failure to get a written waiver of Miranda rights from Wilson, McDonough testified that Wilson "was clear that he didn't want to speak." McDonough clearly understood that Wilson was invoking his right to remain silent. Because neither McDonough nor Mikros administered the new set of Miranda warnings required by Johnson and Hartley, Wilson's subsequent statements in response to further questioning were obtained in violation of the officers' duty scrupulously to honor Wilson's earlier invocation of his rights. Johnson, supra, 120 N.J. at 282. The trial judge's contrary determination was incorrect as a matter of law.
However, we reach a different conclusion with respect to the judge's determination concerning the doctrine of inevitable discovery. That doctrine carves out an exception to the exclusionary rule, permitting unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted in a criminal case when the State can show that discovery of the evidence by lawful means was inevitable. State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 361-62 (2003). The rule recognizes that "the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule are not served by excluding evidence that, but for the misconduct, the police inevitably would have discovered." State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985). Its underlying rational is that where police would have acquired the evidence "lawfully and properly without the misconduct, exclusion of the evidence would put the prosecution in a worse position than if no illegality had transpired." Ibid. In New Jersey, the State must show inevitable discovery by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 240. The trial judge's factual findings were specifically made using that standard.
At least seven Elizabeth police officers went to Wilson's apartment with a no-knock warrant for the specific purpose of searching for drugs. This is not a case in which there was no knowledge of drug involvement until it came to light during an illegal interrogation. Nor is this a case in which drugs had been secreted outside of the residence, in a location for which the police did not have a search warrant, and defendant revealed the remote location during such an interrogation. Relying on the testimony of the officers whom he found credible and applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, the judge concluded that the police officers would have conducted a search thorough enough to discover the area where the drugs were actually found.
The judge's factual findings are fairly supported by evidence in the record, including McDonough's testimony that the location used by Wilson was "a common hiding place" and Mikros's testimony that he had encountered that type of hiding place before. Our appellate role permits us to "disturb" a trial judge's findings of fact "only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162). Based on the record before us, there is no basis for us to intervene.
Consequently, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and Wilson's resulting conviction.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION