Writ application granted. See per curiam.

Weimer, C.J., would deny.

Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

PER CURIAM

Writ granted. Under the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the written, joint motion to continue filed 10 days before trial. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 707 et seq . ; see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 713 cmt. a. The trial court's ruling is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings, including the matters previously scheduled for June, 2022.

CRAIN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I dissent and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny the joint motion to continue.

Code of Criminal Procedure art. 712 provides that "[a] motion for continuance, if timely filed, may be granted, in the discretion of the court, in any case if there is good ground therefor." Code of Criminal Procedure art. 713 provides "A motion for continuance based upon peremptory grounds as provided by law shall be granted." The Code of Civil Procedure does not define or provide examples of "peremptory grounds." To include a joint motion to continue within the scope of that definition, the majority relies on comment (a), which states, "This article negates the idea that when both parties agree to a continuance the court may nevertheless refuse it." This comment is a holdover from the pre-amendment language of the statute, which provided, "A continuance shall be granted when the state and the defendant both request it , or as otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added). The article was amended in 1982 to delete the italicized language. When the legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to have intended a change in the law." Borel v. Young , 07-0419 (La. 11/27/07), 989 So. 2d 42, 48, on reh'g (July 1, 2008). While the comment remains, that is not evidence the legislature desired to maintain this portion of the law. Comments are not the law. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. , 10-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 312. Thus, it is no longer the law that a continuance must be granted simply because the parties agree to it.

In the administration of justice, a trial judge has the critical task of controlling his docket. La. C. Cr. P. art 17 ("A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders.... It has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that justice is done.") (emphasis added). A prosecutor's authority includes charging the defendant, not controlling the timing of a scheduled case. La. C. Cr. P. art. 61 ("[T]he district attorney has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute."). This authority ceases once the case is put on a judge's docket. Thus, once the charge is filed and the case is assigned, the trial judge controls the proceedings, subject to review for an abuse of discretion.

This matter was set for trial on October 26, 2021 with the May 2, 2022 trial date being selected. The parties knew of the trial date for over six months and waited to seek a continuance just days before the trial. The state represented it had been preparing for another trial and the defense argued there was a possible question as to whether his current counsel would continue representing him. The trial court considered and rejected those grounds, finding the state's competing trial did not proceed as scheduled and there was no immediate end to defense counsel's representation. I find no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. Criminal dockets are back-logged due to the pandemic-induced interruption to jury trials. The only way to clear these backlogs is to try cases, which this judge was attempting, and entitled, to do. I dissent.