Summary
holding that a juvenile-court judge's broad discretion to retain or relinquish jurisdiction included discretion to order the transfer of a 15–year–old male with no prior criminal record, no major disciplinary issues at school, and no psychiatric disorder because he had beaten another juvenile to death with a tree limb
Summary of this case from State v. AalimOpinion
No. 88-1897
Submitted October 17, 1989 —
Decided December 20, 1989.
Criminal law — Juvenile law — Bindover of juvenile as adult — Juvenile court may consider seriousness of alleged offense when determining if juvenile is "not amenable to care or rehabilitation" in the juvenile justice system.
O.Jur 3d Criminal Law § 668. O.Jur 3d Family Law §§ 409, 410.
In deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction over a child, a juvenile court may consider the seriousness of the alleged offense when determining, pursuant to Juv. R. 30(C)(1), if the juvenile is "not amenable to care or rehabilitation" in the juvenile justice system.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-870554.
Appellant, Anthony Watson, was tried as an adult and convicted of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery for the 1986 beating death of Robert Cooley. Appellant was fifteen at the time of the conduct charged. In this appeal, we consider whether the juvenile court properly relinquished jurisdiction over appellant pursuant to Juv. R. 30.
In the early evening hours of July 25, 1986, Robert Cooley was playing video games in a downtown Cincinnati arcade. Robert had just been given thirty dollars by his sister, Nina, as payment for babysitting Nina's son during the week.
Later, appellant entered the arcade with a group of four other boys, Dante Hill, David Johnson, Leandre Watson, and Terrence Watson. In a confession given to the police, appellant said that he and his companions noticed Robert's money when he was pulling it out of his pocket to get change. Appellant, Dante, David and Terrence decided to take the money. David took the money from Robert's pants pocket and ran, pursued by Robert. Appellant and his companions followed Robert out of the game room, onto the Skywalk, and into another building. During the chase, David threw the money away.
Appellant and his companions found Robert holding David by the back of his neck and looking for his money. Dante told Robert to let David go, and they would all search for the money. Appellant then told Robert that Leandre, who was on the street below the Skywalk, had the money. The boys chased Leandre along Richmond Street.
When the boys got to Richmond Park, appellant picked up a tree limb which was about two and one-half to three feet long and at least two inches in diameter. He came up behind Robert and hit him on the back of the head. Robert fell to the ground. As he lay there, Terrence, David, and Dante punched him. Robert attempted to get up, but appellant hit him on the head again. Dante then went through Robert's pockets. Robert tried to get up a third time and a fourth time, and appellant hit him twice more with the limb, once on the head and once on the back.
Robert Cuthbertson, while walking through the area with friends, saw appellant hitting Robert with the limb. Dante was also striking Robert. Cuthbertson shouted at the attackers, and they fled. Cuthbertson and his friends came to Robert's assistance. Two of the group went to get help. While waiting for the police to arrive, Cuthbertson saw appellant and Dante coming back to the park. Cuthbertson and his companion chased the two boys to appellant's grandmother's house and then returned to the park.
Robert was taken to the hospital, where, on July 27, 1986, he died from his injuries. The deputy coroner testified that the cause of death was "blunt trauma or blunt impacts to the head." The coroner stated that any one of the multiple impacts could have been fatal.
Appellant was taken into custody by the juvenile authorities. On August 6, 1986, the juvenile court held a hearing, pursuant to Juv. R. 30(A), to determine if there was probable cause to believe that appellant had committed an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult. The court found that probable cause existed, and ordered an investigation pursuant to Juv. R. 30(B).
Dante Hill, David Johnson, and Terrence Watson were adjudicated delinquent by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court, and the finding was affirmed by the court of appeals. Motions for leave to appeal by Terrence Watson and David Johnson were granted in case Nos. 88-1470 and 88-1476, respectively. See In re Watson (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 548 N.E.2d 210.
On August 15, 1986, the court held a "bindover hearing" to determine if it should relinquish jurisdiction and allow appellant to be tried as an adult. At the hearing, the court clinic psychiatrist, Dr. Patrick Lagan, testified that appellant showed "no evidence of any psychiatric disorder." Appellant presented testimony from his junior high school principal, two teachers, and the school guidance counselor that he was an average student who had not caused major discipline problems. A senior director of the West End YMCA testified that appellant was "very responsible and reliable." Appellant's aunt and his grandmother also testified to his good character. The court noted that appellant had no record of trouble with the juvenile authorities.
In an opinion from the bench at the close of the bindover hearing, the juvenile judge found that appellant "would not be amenable to the juvenile justice system for the reason that the safety of the community may require his retention beyond the age of majority, and that the statute in Ohio requires that the Department of Youth Services relinquishes its jurisdiction upon the age of twenty-one * * *." The court essentially repeated this finding in a written opinion. The case was transferred to the general adult division of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County.
The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted appellant for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. Appellant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Appellant moved to dismiss or amend the indictment on the ground that the juvenile court had not properly applied the standards of Juv. R. 30(C) at the bindover hearing. The court "declined to sit in Appellate Review of the Juvenile Court" and denied the motion.
The jury found the appellant not guilty of aggravated murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. He was also found guilty of aggravated robbery. He was given a ten to twenty-five year sentence on the manslaughter count and a five to twenty-five year consecutive sentence on the aggravated robbery count. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions.
This cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., prosecuting attorney, and Christian J. Schaefer, for appellee.
James M. Carroll and Brian J. Anten, for appellant.
The question before us is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over appellant pursuant to Juv. R. 30. For the reasons which follow, we find that it did not.
Juv. R. 30 provides in pertinent part:
"(C) The proceedings may be transferred [to the general division of the common pleas court] if the court finds there are reasonable grounds to believe:
"(1) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision and rehabilitation of delinquent children; and
"(2) The safety of the community may require that the child be placed under legal restraint for a period extending beyond the child's majority.
"* * *
"(E) In determining whether the child is amenable to the treatment or rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile court, the court shall consider:
"(1) The child's age and his mental and physical health;
"(2) The child's prior juvenile record;
"(3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;
"(4) The child's family environment; and
"(5) School record."
Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred by considering the safety of the community as a factor bearing on his amenability to treatment. He asserts that amenability to treatment is to be determined solely by reference to the five factors listed in Rule 30(E). Those factors, he claims, were favorable to appellant. Thus, he contends that his amenability to treatment was affirmatively established and "a bindover is contra-indicated."
The purpose behind Juv. R. 30, and its statutory counterpart, R.C. 2151.26, is "the assessment of the probability of rehabilitating the child within the juvenile justice system." State v. Douglas (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 20 OBR 282, 284, 485 N.E.2d 711, 713; State v. Adams (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 123, 23 O.O. 3d 164, 167, 431 N.E.2d 326, 329. In making this assessment, the juvenile court enjoys wide latitude to retain or relinquish jurisdiction, and the ultimate decision lies within its sound discretion. State v. Carmichael (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 64 O.O. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; see, also, Douglas, supra, at 36-37, 20 OBR at 284-285, 485 N.E.2d at 713. There is no requirement that each, or any, of the five factors in Rule 30(E) be resolved against the juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment. Douglas, supra, at 37, 20 OBR at 285, 485 N.E.2d at 713, citing State v. Oviedo (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 5 OBR 351, 450 N.E.2d 700.
Rule 30 calls for a broad assessment of individual circumstances. Mechanical application of a rigidly defined test would not serve the purposes of the public or the juvenile. Further, reduction of the bindover decision to a formula would constrain desirable judicial discretion. We agree with appellant that Rule 30(E) requires consideration of all the listed factors, but we discern nothing in the rule, or in the policy it serves, which prohibits consideration of other relevant factors.
The seriousness of the alleged act is relevant to "the assessment of the probability of rehabilitating the child within the juvenile justice system" for a number of reasons.
As the juvenile court noted in its opinion, the Department of Youth Services cannot retain custody of a delinquent child beyond age twenty-one. R.C. 2151.355(A). A juvenile who has demonstrated the ability to commit a major felony may require more time for rehabilitation than one whose offenses are less serious. Because of a juvenile's age, there may not be sufficient time remaining for rehabilitation to take place before the twenty-first birthday, even though the juvenile is otherwise amenable to rehabilitation. This factor falls within the requirement of Rule 30(E) that the age of the juvenile be considered.
Further, the nature of the alleged act is usually relevant to the child's mental health, a factor which the court must also consider under Rule 30(E)(1). Generally the greater the culpability of the offense, the less amenable will the juvenile be to rehabilitation. In making the bindover decision, it would not be logical, or consistent with Rule 30(E), to consider the juvenile's past record but ignore the act which has brought the juvenile to court. Accordingly, we hold that in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction over a child, a juvenile court may consider the seriousness of the alleged offense when determining, pursuant to Juv. R. 30(C)(1), if the juvenile is "not amenable to care or rehabilitation" in the juvenile justice system.
Although we have found that the juvenile court properly considered the nature of the offense, this does not end our inquiry. We must still determine if the court soundly exercised its discretion. See Carmichael, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. In the instant case, appellant was the principal actor in a scheme with several other boys to beat and rob the victim, Robert Cooley. Appellant attacked Robert from behind with a tree limb, knocking him to the ground, and continued to hit him while he was down. These blows were delivered with sufficient force that any one could have been fatal. The appellant was fifteen years old and the time available to accomplish his rehabilitation was less than six years. Balancing these facts against the admittedly favorable testimony which appellant presented at the bindover hearing, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that appellant would not be amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.
Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court properly relinquished jurisdiction over appellant and affirm the appellate court below.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and RESNICK, JJ., concur.