PER CURIAM.

Appeal from Reno District Court; Trish Rose, Judge.
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., MALONE and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Contending the court ignored the law limiting consecutive sentences, Aron Pritchard appeals his sentences for child abuse and aggravated endangerment of a child. The court imposed the maximum presumptive sentence for each of Pritchard's two crimes and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Then, in an attempt to impose a departure sentence, the court doubled the aggregate sentence. The sentencing statute, K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4), explicitly limits the total criminal sentences imposed in multiple conviction cases to twice the base sentence. Because the sentencing court here did not first impose a departure sentence for either of Pritchard's crimes, our Supreme Court has ruled K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4) controls. Accordingly, since the aggregate sentence imposed here exceeded twice the base sentence, we hold the court imposed an illegal sentence. We vacate Pritchard's sentence and remand the matter to the district court for resentencing in conformity with our holding.

A brief review of the case history provides a context for our decision.

Pritchard was charged and convicted of child abuse after he put a child he was babysitting in a clothes dryer as a form of punishment. The child received second-degree burns over 5 percent of his body. Pritchard did the same to another child he was babysitting but she was not injured, and Pritchard was convicted of aggravated child endangerment. State v. Pritchard, No. 100,416, 2010 WL 1687849, *l–2 (Kan.App.2010) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011).

After the convictions, the district court held a sentencing departure proceeding where the jury considered and found the following aggravating factors: (1) A fiduciary relationship existed between Pritchard and the victims; and (2) Pritchard's conduct manifested excessive brutality to the child who was burned, in a manner not normally present in the offense. The district court sentenced Pritchard to the aggravated range for both his child abuse conviction and the aggravated child endangerment conviction, 55 months and 7 months respectively, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The district court then doubled the sentence for a controlling prison term of 124 months in prison. 2010 WL 1687849, *7–8.

On appeal, a panel of this court upheld Pritchard's convictions, but held the district court erred by allowing a physician to testify during the sentencing phase regarding the dearth of information in medical journals concerning child abuse committed by means of a clothes dryer. The panel found this evidence was admitted in violation of K.S.A. 21–4718(b)(5) (requiring the State to inform the defendant of evidence it intends to present prior to a departure sentencing proceeding), and the physician's testimony was likely prejudicial as to the factor of excessive brutality not normally found in child abuse offenses. 2010 WL 1687849, *8–9.

Even though the panel determined it could uphold Pritchard's departure sentence based solely on the aggravating factor of a fiduciary relationship, Pritchard convinced the panel that the district court may have imposed a lesser sentence had this been the sole aggravating factor. Accordingly, the panel remanded the case to the district court for resentencing without considering the excessive brutality factor. 2010 WL 1687849, *8–9.

Upon the case's return to district court, that court found there was a sufficient basis for a sentencing departure without the excessive brutality factor that this court had rejected. The court imposed the same upward durational departure sentence of 124 months.

Pritchard is precluded from raising an issue concerning the fiduciary relationship.

Pritchard contends the jury finding of a fiduciary relationship did not constitute a substantial and compelling basis for a departure sentence because such a relationship is typical in the commission of these crimes. Pritchard maintains his fiduciary relationship with the children did not make him “substantially more culpable than that of a typical offender in such cases.” The trouble with this argument is that it should have been raised in his appeal of the merits of his conviction.

Pritchard could have raised this issue in his first appeal but did not. This court considered upholding Pritchard's departure sentence based on a fiduciary relationship alone, but that panel agreed with Pritchard's argument that the district court might have imposed a lesser sentence if its departure was based on that sole aggravating factor. When remanding the case to the district court for resentencing, that panel stated that eliminating the “excessive brutality” factor “leaves for the district court's consideration, the jury's finding of the fiduciary relationships.” 2010 WL 1687849 at *9.

The rule on res judicata is quite clear. When an appeal is taken from a conviction or sentence imposed, the judgment of the appellate court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised, and issues that could have been raised are deemed waived. Drach v. Bruce, 281 Kan. 1058, 1079, 136 P.3d 390 (2006), cert. denied549 U.S. 1278 (2007); State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, 140–41, 795 P .2d 362 (1990). Pritchard could have raised this issue in his first appeal and did not. It is waived and, by virtue of res judicata, it cannot be raised in this sentencing appeal. We turn now to an analysis of the sentence itself.

The sentence exceeded the limit for consecutive sentences.

Pritchard contends K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4) applies to limit his total sentence to twice his base sentence of 55 months. In opposition, the State argues that the “double-double” rule applies because the law permits a court to double a departure sentence. Because the court here never imposed a departure sentence, the double-double rule is inapplicable. Pritchard is correct because the 124–month sentence he received exceeds twice the base sentence.

The parties agree the panel can consider this illegal sentence issue according to K.S.A. 22–3504(1). That statute gives the appellate courts the jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at any time. A sentence that does not conform to the statutory provisions is an illegal sentence. State v. Neal, 292 Kan. 625, 630, 258 P.3d 365 (2011). Pritchard's argument also concerns interpretation of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. Whether a sentence is illegal and the interpretation of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act are both questions of law. See State v. Spencer, 291 Kan. 796, 820, 248 P.3d 256 (2011); State v. Howard, 287 Kan. 686, 690–91, 198 P.3d 146 (2008).

The formation of a criminal sentence is strictly controlled by the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. K.S.A. 21–4720 controls sentencing in multiple conviction cases. When the district court imposes consecutive sentences in a multiple conviction case, K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4) limits the total sentence to “twice the base sentence .”

K.S.A. 21–4720(c) controls consecutive departure sentences:

“(1) The court may depart from the presumptive limits for consecutive sentences only if the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure sentence for any of the individual crimes being sentenced consecutively.

“(2) When a departure sentence is imposed for any of the individual crimes sentenced consecutively, the imprisonment term of that departure sentence shall not exceed twice the maximum presumptive imprisonment term that may be imposed for that crime.

“(3) The total imprisonment term of the consecutive sentences, including the imprisonment term for the departure crime, shall not exceed twice the maximum presumptive imprisonment term of the departure sentence following aggravation.”

Contrary to the State's assertion, K.S.A. 21–4719 is not the “double-double” rule. K.S.A. 21–4720(c)(3) is the “double-double” rule. See State v. Horn, 291 Kan. 1, 3, 238 P .3d 238 (2010); State v. Peterson, 22 Kan.App.2d 572, 575, 920 P.2d 463,rev. denied 260 Kan. 1000 (1996); Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Desk Reference Manual, pp. 63–64 (2010).

It is important at this point to recount exactly what happened when this sentence was imposed. At Pritchard's first sentencing, and after the district court determined a departure sentence was warranted, the court imposed the aggravated term of 55 months' imprisonment on the child abuse conviction and the aggravated term of 7 months on the aggravated endangering a child conviction. The district court ordered these two sentences to be served consecutively. The district court then doubled the aggregate sentence, imposing a total sentence of 124 months.

On remand, when Pritchard was resentenced, the district court stated, “I will make the finding that there is a sufficient basis without the factor that the Court of Appeals rejected and impose or grant the State's request for departure and impose the aggravated sentence that was previously imposed which is to double the underlying sentences for these crimes.” Although this statement suggests the court was departing by doubling each individual sentence, when the State asked for clarification the district court stated, “I'm imposing the exact same sentence.”

This exact procedure has been rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, 340–42, 144 P.3d 729 (2006), disapproved on other grounds State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765–67, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). In Snow, the district court granted the State's motion for an upward durational departure sentence. The district court imposed the aggravated presumptive sentence for the defendant's base sentence of 23 months and imposed the aggravated presumptive sentence for the defendant's remaining counts, ordering all of the sentences to run consecutively to each other. The total sentence for all of the defendant's felony counts was 187 months. The district court then indicated the maximum sentence allowed under the “double-double” rule would be 92 months. 282 Kan. at 328, 341.

The Supreme Court determined that under the circumstances, K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4) limited the total sentence in a multiple conviction case to twice the base sentence. In Snow's case, twice his base sentence would be 46 months. The Supreme Court found K.S.A. 21–4720(c)(3) would have allowed Snow's total sentence to be twice the “maximum presumptive imprisonment term of the departure sentence following aggravation” or 92 months as the district court initially determined, but for the fact there was no departure sentence to double. (Emphasis added.) The district court did not impose a departure sentence of 46 months for Snow's base sentence. The Supreme Court held Snow's sentence did not conform to the statutory provision and thus, was illegal. We note that Snow has been followed by a panel of this court in State v. Register, No. 92,122, 2006 WL 90077, *7–8 (Kan.App.2006) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 281 Kan. 1381(2006).

Applying that reasoning here, we see clearly that because the district court in Pritchard's case did not depart on his individual counts, the total sentence was limited to double the base sentence of 55 months.

The importance of State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765–67, 267 P .3d 751 (2012), becomes manifest at this point. Guder's case was remanded to the district court for resentencing of the primary crime of manufacturing a controlled substance to conform with State v. McAdam, 277 Kan. 136, 83 P.3d 161 (2004). The district court properly reduced Guder's sentence for manufacturing, but then ordered another conviction that previously ran concurrent to the manufacturing conviction to run consecutively. Guder again appealed. This court, relying on Snow and State v. Woodbury, 133 Kan. 1, 298 Pac. 794 (1931), determined the district court properly resentenced Guder on all counts. 293 Kan. at 765.

At this point, the Supreme Court determined the Woodbury rationale has been superseded by the Sentencing Guidelines Act and statutory changes to the jurisdiction of district courts to modify sentences. The Supreme Court noted K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(5) specifically states that when the conviction designated as the primary crime is reversed on appeal, upon resentencing the court shall follow the provisions concerning sentencing in multiple conviction cases. 293 Kan. at 766. Guder's sentence for manufacturing was vacated but his conviction was not. Thus, the Supreme Court found that modification of Guder's other sentences was an illegal sentence modification. 293 Kan. at 767.

Obviously, Pritchard's conviction has not been overturned even though his sentence has been vacated. Under the reasoning of Guder, on remand, the district court is directed to follow the sentencing rule in K.S.A. 21–4720(b)(4) and limit Pritchard's sentence to twice his base sentence (110 months).

Pritchard's sentence is vacated, and this case is remanded with directions to comply with the provisions of this opinion.