Opinion
No. CR 94-0464797
March 17, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
On April 8, 1998, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. The defendant was sentenced on July 7, 1998, by the court (Barry, J.) to a tern of fifty years imprisonment.
By motion dated August 20, 2008, and an addendum to the motion dated January 28, 2009, the defendant requests that the court set aside his judgment of conviction. The defendant contends that at the time of his criminal trial the Hartford Police Department and Assistant State's Attorney committed fraud in that they deceived his defense counsel, Attorney Martin Zeldis, concerning the identification of the alleged murder weapon. The defendant further asserts that Attorney Zeldis entered into a stipulation with the state as to the weapon's "chain of custody" based on this deception. The state filed a motion to dismiss on October 9, 2008, in which the state asserts that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion. A hearing on the matter was held on October 16, 2008.
For the reasons set forth below, the court dismisses the motion to set aside the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment of conviction. "Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153 (2007). Our Supreme Court has long held that at least as a general matter, "[i]n a criminal case the imposition of sentence is the judgment of the court . . . When the sentence is put into effect and the [defendant] is taken in execution, custody is transferred from the court to the custodian of the penal institution. At this point jurisdiction of the court over the [defendant] terminates." State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 775 (2006). In other words, the trial court "must recognize society's interest in the finality of judgments . . . and the concept of inspiring confidence in the integrity of our procedures . . . Consistent with that principle, in the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to vacate or to modify a criminal judgment after the execution of a sentence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 84 Conn.App. 429, 434-35 (2004).
In the defendant's case, judgment became final upon sentencing on July 7, 1998. It was at that time the trial court's jurisdiction over the defendant ended — unless the state legislature or constitution expressly confers upon the trial court continuing jurisdiction. See State v. Reid, supra, 277 Conn. 775. The defendant asserts a four-part claim in his effort to demonstrate that such continuing jurisdiction exists here. First, the defendant cites to General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 — provisions which permit a civil judgment to be set aside if a motion to set aside is filed within four months after the date judgment was rendered. Second, he claims that State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417 (1986), holds that these provisions apply with equal force to criminal cases and afford a defendant a right to seek to set aside a criminal conviction. Third the defendant argues that because these civil provisions apply in the criminal setting so, too, should the common-law rule that permits a party at any time (and as an exception to the four-month rule contained in General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4) to set aside a civil judgment which was obtained by fraud. Fourth, and finally, the defendant argues that, because he alleges his conviction was obtained by fraud, Wilson allows him to seek to reopen his judgment of conviction, notwithstanding the passage of over a decade since it was entered. The court, however, rejects the defendant's broad reading of Wilson, as well as his assertion that Wilson applies here. Because Wilson does not apply to this case, this court concludes that it is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant's present motion.
Section 52-212a provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise provided by law, and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment . . . may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered . . ."
Section 17-4 provides in relevant part: "(a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except in cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment . . . may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent."
Given this conclusion, the court need not determine whether, if Wilson did apply, the common-law rule permitting claims of fraud to be raised at any time would apply as well. See State v. Smith, 19 Conn.App. 646, 650 n. 4, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 806 (1989).
The defendant is correct that the Wilson court applied the so-called four-month rule within the context of a criminal case. At issue in Wilson was the amendment of a memorandum of decision on a motion to suppress. State v. Wilson, supra, 199 Conn. 430-33. The trial court had amended its original written memorandum of decision in response to a motion for articulation filed by the state more than three years after the judgment of conviction. Id., 432-33. Applying Practice Book § 326 (now § 17-4), the court held that "a criminal judgment may not be modified in matters of substance beyond a period of four months after the judgment has become final"; State v. Wilson, supra, 199 Conn. 437; and on that basis ordered the trial court's amended memorandum of decision to be stricken from the record.
The fact that the four-month rule was applied to the factual question at issue in Wilson does not mean however, as the defendant asserts, that Wilson applies to all criminal cases generally or to this case specifically, or that it creates a broad right to reopen criminal judgments after sentencing. Wilson stands only for the proposition that "a criminal trial court could not revise its factual findings, as expressed in its original memorandum more than four months after the defendant was sentenced." State v. Smith, 19 Conn.App. 646, 650, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 806 (1989). Wilson did not address the issue in this case: whether a defendant, merely by asserting an allegation of fraud, has a right to return to the original trial court at any time after sentencing — even years or decades later, and long after all of his appeals have been exhausted — to seek to have his criminal conviction set aside. This court concludes that Wilson does not afford a defendant that right.
In reaching this conclusion, the court finds instructive the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Smith, supra. The defendant in Smith sought to withdraw his guilty plea eleven months after he had been sentenced, and, like the defendant here, to reopen and set aside his criminal conviction. Also like the defendant here, the defendant in Smith based his argument on Practice Book § 326 (now § 17-4), the decision in State v. Wilson, supra, and on the common-law exception to the four-month rule pertaining to judgments obtained by fraud.
In a decision authored by then Judge Borden, the Smith court pointed out that Wilson involved a trial court's effort to revise its earlier factual findings, not a defendant's effort to set aside his criminal conviction. State v. Smith, supra, 19 Conn.App. 650. The court also noted that to apply Practice Book § 326 and Wilson to the facts at issue in Smith would "eviscerate" and "obliterate" specific rules and procedures which governed and restricted a criminal defendant's right to seek to set aside a conviction after sentencing. State v. Smith, supra, 19 Conn.App. 650. Seeing "nothing in Wilson to support such a reading, and no reason or policy to so hold"; id.; the Smith court concluded that Wilson did not apply where a defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea and to set aside his conviction.
As in Smith, the defendant here seeks not merely to strike a trial court's revised factual findings but to set aside his criminal conviction long after he was sentenced. Smith makes clear, however, that the procedural mechanism the defendant attempts to employ in order to secure this relief cannot be used for this purpose. Stated simply, this court concludes that neither General Statutes § 52-212a nor Practice Book § 17-4 — even read in the light of Wilson — afford the present defendant any right to set aside his conviction, regardless of the nature of his claim and whether it does or does not assert an allegation of fraud. For this reason, this court "ha[s] no authority to grant his motion [or even to] hold an evidentiary hearing on the factual claims raised by his motion." State v. Smith, supra, 19 Conn.App. 647.
Admittedly, General Statutes § 52-212a was not addressed in Smith. The relevant language of Practice Book § 326 (now § 17-4) is nearly identical, however, to that of General Statutes § 52-212a. Thus, this court concludes that, insofar as the matter now before the court is concerned, it is appropriate to treat the two provisions in the same manner, and that the reasoning of Smith controls the resolution of the instant motion, notwithstanding the instant defendant's reference to the statute as well as the practice book.
This does not mean that the defendant is without a forum within which to present the claim he seeks to advance here. Like the defendant in Smith, "[t]he defendant [here] may, of course, raise his claims by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [because] [t]hat is his proper remedy." State v. Smith, supra, 19 Conn.App. 650. In this regard, there can be little doubt that the defendant is well aware of his right to pursue habeas relief. The defendant previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; see Meikle v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Number CV 01-447385 (May 9, 2003, Robinson-Thomas, J.); raising claims separate and distinct from the claims presented here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that it is without jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to set aside his judgment of conviction. The defendant's motion is therefore dismissed.