Opinion
CD-CR-16-1233
01-11-2016
STATE OF MAINE v. THURLOW MASON, Defendant
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
Robert E. Mullen, Deputy Chief Justice Maine Superior Court
This matter came before the Court on 9/27/16 with respect to the Defendant's Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder pursuant to Rule 8(d) of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the Defendant seeks to sever Count II of the indictment charging Defendant with OUI Class D from Count I charging Defendant with Domestic Violence Criminal Threatening Class C and Count III charging Defendant with Criminal Mischief, Class D. The three offenses all occurred on the same date in Augusta, Maine. The alleged victim in Counts I and III presumably will be called as a witness concerning Defendant's sobriety on the night in question, whether Defendant was operating a motor vehicle, etc., with respect to Count II.
For the reasons articulated below the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Relief From Prejudicial Joinder:
1. On the one hand, the rule governing joinder of charges is construed broadly, and the Law Court has held it will uphold joinder if the offenses charged are connected in any reasonable manner. M.R.Crim. P. 8(c); State v. Lemay, 2012 ME 86.
2. On the other hand, the Law Court has also held that the rule permitting severance of charges for which joinder is otherwise appropriate is to be construed liberally in order to adequately protect a defendant from undue prejudice. Id.; M.R. Unified Crim. P. 8(c).
3. The undersigned is supposed to balance the advantages that result from joinder--namely, judicial economy and swift resolution for the defendant--against the potential for prejudice for the defendant. State v. Pierce, 2001 ME 14.
4. Three specific types of prejudice have been recognized resulting from a joinder of charges: (1) the defendant may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) proof that the defendant is guilty of one offense may be used to convict him of a second offense, even though such proof would be inadmissible in a separate trial for the second offense; and (3) a defendant may wish to testify in his own behalf on one of the offenses but not another, forcing him to choose the unwanted alternative of testifying as to both or testifying as to neither. United States v. Jordan/112 F, 3d 14 (1st Cir. 1997),
5. The sheer number of charges or the possibility of juror confusion is not inherently prejudicial, State v. Brown, 1998 ME 129.
6. The Court finds that there is a very substantial connection between Counts I and 111 and Count II. A limiting instruction can be given to the jury that would mitigate the potential for prejudice. See State v. Lenxty, 2012 ME 86.
7. The Court also finds that Defendant has made an insufficient showing of any of the specific types of prejudice outlined above that would justify the Court to sever Count II from the other two Counts, and accordingly the Motion should be, and is denied.
See Instruction § 6-3, Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual (2014).