JOSEPH, C.J.

Affirmed.

Richardson, P.J., dissenting.

JOSEPH, C.J.

Defendant appeals his conviction for driving while suspended. Former ORS 811.175 (1)(a). He contends that the initial stop of his vehicle was unlawful and that, therefore, the evidence obtained after the stop should be suppressed. He also contends that the court erred in rejecting his defense that he had not received notice of the suspension. We affirm.

The arresting officer followed defendant's vehicle after he had received a radio report concerning it. The record does not disclose the substance of the report. While following the vehicle, the officer ran a radio check on its Washington license plate number. The response was "unable to locate." He stopped defendant's vehicle, because that response indicated that the vehicle might not be properly registered. After obtaining defendant's identification, he made additional radio checks and discovered that the vehicle was properly registered but that defendant's Oregon driving privileges had been suspended. Defendant was not given a citation for improper registration but was cited for driving while suspended.

On the first assignment, about the legality of the stop, defendant agrees that an officer may stop a motorist if he sees the commission of a traffic infraction. Citing State v. Hart, 85 Or. App. 174, 735 P.2d 1283 (1987), and State v. Stoner, 77 Or. App. 389, 713 P.2d 637 (1986), he argues that the officer's belief that a traffic infraction has been committed in his presence does not authorize a stop under ORS 810.410, if the infraction is later shown not to have occurred. In each of those cases, the facts observed by the officer, even if true, did not constitute a violation of any traffic law. In Hart, the defendant was stopped after turning left from a left turn lane without waiting for a green signal. The signal light had malfunctioned and was not lighted. In Stoner, the defendant was stopped after he drove about one block in a center left hand turn lane.

Here, the information that the officer had just before the stop gave him a reasonable basis for a belief that defendant's vehicle was not properly registered. That would be a violation of ORS 803.300, a Class C traffic infraction. Only after that lawful stop did the officer learn that the vehicle was properly registered and, at the same time, that defendant's license was suspended. The stop was valid, and the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant's other assignment is that the court erred by rejecting his affirmative defense that he had not received notice of the suspension. ORS 811.180 (1)(b). Under ORS 811.180 (2)(b) the defense is not available to a "defendant [who has] failed to comply with the requirements under ORS 807.560 to notify [MVD] of a change of address or residence." Defendant argues that, because he had permanently moved to Washington, he was not required to notify MVD of his new address and is not foreclosed from the affirmative defense.

Defendant would have the benefit of the defense (and the dissent says that he ought to have that benefit), even though he admits that he did not even attempt to comply with ORS 807.560. He (and the dissent) read Pelay v. Ploog, 281 Or. 59, 573 P.2d 1229 (1978), to say that every person who has permanently moved from Oregon gains permanent immunity from the Oregon law against driving while suspended or revoked, ORS 811.175, just because he failed to notify MVD of his new address. Pelay cannot be read that broadly.

In Pelay the plaintiff had secured a default judgment in a personal injury action. The defendant got the judgment set aside under former ORS 18.160 on the ground of excusable neglect. On appeal the plaintiff contended that the trial court had abused its discretion in setting aside the judgment. The defendant, identified by the court as "a Minnesota resident, [who] came to Portland in 1969 to attend a Baptist seminary," was involved in an accident with the plaintiff in 1971. He finished his schooling and returned to Minnesota in 1972, without any specific or general intention of exercising privileges accorded him by Oregon in granting him a driver's license. The plaintiff sued him in Oregon in 1973 and served him through the Motor Vehicles Division. Defendant had obtained an Oregon driver's license while he was in school, and he did not notify MVD of his change of address when he returned to Minnesota. The plaintiff took a default judgment; more than two years later the defendant found out about the judgment and immediately moved to set it aside.

In challenging the trial court's action, the plaintiff argued that the judge had no discretion, because the defendant had failed to give MVD notice of his change of address pursuant to former ORS 482.290 (2); he had therefore committed a misdemeanor under former ORS 482.990 (1) and, as the court stated the plaintiff's theory, "an act which constitutes a misdemeanor can [n]ever be excusable * * *, because such a conclusion would nullify the statute."

The court rejected the theory, because

"[t]he language of the statute supports the position that the statute was intended to apply only to residents who plan to continue to use their Oregon driver's license and not to holders of Oregon licenses who permanently leave the state. The last sentence of [former ORS 482.290 (2) ] indicates that upon receiving the change of residence from a licensee, the Division should issue a new license with the correct address on it. The sentence indicates an intent to issue a new license after a change of address, and since one who has permanently moved from the state no longer needs an Oregon license, it would be illogical to conclude that the legislature intended the statute to apply to residents who have permanently left the state. We conclude that it does not." 281 Or at 63. (Footnote omitted.)

The court then went on to say that, on the facts in the record, aside from the defendant's failure to give the notice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment.

Pelay does not control this case, because the facts and the statute involved here are different. The defendant there was treated by the Supreme Court as having only been in Oregon "temporarily" when he acquired his license. When he left, after finishing school, it was to return to his permanent home. He had no intention of driving in Oregon again. In those circumstances, the Pelay court reasoned, a holder of an Oregon license has no need for an Oregon license, and a change of address notification would be a needless formality that the legislature would not have intended. Pelay does not, by its language, apply to holders of Oregon licenses or residents of Oregon who intend to use their Oregon licenses or to exercise Oregon driving privileges after moving from the state. Defendant here was stopped while he was driving in Oregon, and it is a fair inference from the record that he presented an Oregon license to the officer. The facts here are wholly unlike those in Pelay, and the reason for letting the defendant there "off the hook" is wholly lacking here.

Moreover, the precise statutory scheme involved in Pelay no longer exists. The legislature adopted a new Motor Vehicles Code in 1983. Or Laws 1983, ch 338. Present ORS 807.560 incorporates only the penal portion of former ORS 482.290 (2), which was involved in Pelay. Because the dissent ignores post- Pelay legislative changes and fails to compare the new statute with former ORS 482.290 (2), ORS 807.560 is set out in the margin. The 1983 recodification separated the two subjects that former ORS 482.290 (2) had covered: the offense of failing to give notice of a change of address and issuance of new licenses, which is now governed by ORS 807.160. Separation of the subjects separated the duties. ORS 807.560 presently requires notice of an address change from any "person to whom a license or driver permit is issued." ORS 807.160 (1)(b) now separately details the procedure for obtaining a replacement license. Thus, the statutory basis on which the reasoning in Pelay rests is different. That is, the only relevant statute no longer says a word about issuing a new license after a change of address notice.

Both ORS 807.560 and ORS 811.180 (2) say very explicitly what they include, control and mean, and we cannot say that they do not mean what they say. See State v. Straley, 78 Or. App. 526, 717 P.2d 638, rev den 301 Or. 338 (1986). Even someone who moves away from Oregon permanently and never drives in the state again could commit the offense, but that has nothing to do with the matter at hand. Defendant wants to assert a defense for which he has failed to secure a foundation. The trial court properly denied him that.

Affirmed.