JOHN M. MEAGHER, Judge.

This matter comes before the court upon defendant Ray C. Gowdy's motion that the mandatory license suspension required by R.C. 2925.03(M) not be imposed.

The defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the offense of complicity to commit aggravated trafficking in drugs, a violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and 2925.03(A)(1). Pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(M), suspension of the defendant's driver's license is required as part of the defendant's sentence. The defendant now seeks to avoid the revocation, claiming that the mandatory provision is unconstitutional.

The defendant presents two main arguments: first, that the provision is an unconstitutional exercise of the police power, violating the defendant's right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; second, that the mandated suspension violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

Generally, laws enacted by the General Assembly are entitled to strong presumptions of constitutionality. State v. Dent (Sept. 28, 1993), Washington App. No. 92-CA-29, unreported, 1993 WL 405485, citing State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 566 N.E.2d 1224. Any exercise of the police power will be valid "'if it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary.'" Id. at 170, 566 N.E.2d at 1225. This determination is initially committed to the judgment and discretion of the General Assembly. Id.

Addressing the defendant's second argument first, the court finds that the sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. As the Twelfth District Court of Appeals has stated, "It is well-established law in Ohio that a punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment unless it is so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community." State v. Fields (Nov. 29, 1993), Clermont App. No. CA93-04-025, unreported, 1993 WL 489731, citing State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 17, 59 O.O.2d 51, 53, 282 N.E.2d 46, 49. This court fails to see how the loss of driving privileges for a period of time could be found so "shocking" to the community's sense of justice as to render the punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.

However, the court does find that the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment argument is valid. The court finds the Illinois case of People v. Lindner (1989), 127 Ill.2d 174, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829, very persuasive. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a statute strikingly similar to the statute at issue here. The Illinois statute provided for the mandatory license suspension of defendants convicted of various felonies, including sex and drug offenses. Applying the "rational relationship" test, the court concluded that the means chosen by the Illinois legislature — license suspension — was not a reasonable method to accomplish the goal of the specific statute — the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.

A significant factor in both this court's and the Illinois court's decisions is that the statutory provisions do not require the use of a vehicle in the commission of the offense as a prerequisite for the suspension. The provisions bear little, if any, relationship to the apparent goal of the statute.

It is the decision of this court that the statutory provision mandating license suspension for drug offenses does not bear a reasonable relationship to the statute's purpose of providing for the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.

Therefore, this court finds that R.C. 2925.03(M), mandating license suspension for certain offenses, is unconstitutional.

Motion granted.

So ordered.