BARBERA, J.

Respondent, James Earl Goldsberry, Jr., was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and convicted of second degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit second degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He appealed the judgments of conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, where he raised a number of claims. The Court of Special Appeals, finding merit in some of those claims, reversed the convictions. The court remanded the case for a new trial on the charges of attempted armed robbery and use of a handgun, but not the charges of second degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder. Goldsberry v. State, 182 Md.App. 394, 957 A.2d 1110 (2008).

We granted the parties' respective petitions for certiorari to consider whether: (1) the trial court violated Goldsberry's right under the Sixth Amendment to representation by his counsel of choice, by disqualifying one of Goldsberry's three privately retained attorneys; (2) the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury regarding unanimity; and (3) the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Goldsberry was improperly convicted of the "nonexistent" crime of second degree felony murder predicated on attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court violated Goldsberry's right to counsel of choice and the inter-mediate appellate court erred in its holding regarding the felony murder conviction. Because our disposition entitles Goldsberry to a new trial, we do not address the propriety of the court's unanimity instruction.

I.

Goldsberry and his co-defendant, James Myers, Jr., were tried jointly on charges arising from the homicide of Vincent Chamberlain. As explained in more detail infra, the jury found that Goldsberry and Myers attempted to rob Chamber-lain of his marijuana, and while doing so, Myers shot Chamberlain in the head, killing him.

Goldsberry hired attorneys Andrew Jezic, Joseph McKenzie, and John Giannetti, each of a different law firm, to represent him at trial. Before trial, Myers filed a motion to sever his trial from that of Goldsberry. At the hearing on that motion, Myers, through his counsel, Janet Hart, informed the court that attorney McKenzie had spoken previously to Myers regarding the facts of the case. Ms. Hart was not certain of the exact date on which the conversation took place, the purpose of the conversation, whether McKenzie by that time had entered his appearance on behalf of Goldsberry, and whether Myers was represented by counsel at the time. Hart nevertheless alleged that the conversation between her client and McKenzie posed possible violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18 (pertaining to an attorney's duties to prospective clients) and 4.2 (concerning attorney communications with a person already represented by counsel). Hart further explained that McKenzie informed her that, after the conversation with Myers, he called the District Court and learned that there was no line of appearance filed on behalf of Myers. Hart noted, however, that the District Court computer system "very often" does not reflect accurately the correct date of the line of appearance.

Hart argued to the trial court that McKenzie's actions prejudiced her client in two ways. First, Myers would be assessing throughout trial whether to testify, and the possibility of McKenzie's cross-examining him would "affect[] [Myers's] ability to make a clear, unencumbered decision." Second, if Myers testified and McKenzie cross-examined him, it would "look[] wrong" because McKenzie had already discussed the facts of the case with him.

In response, attorney Jezic explained that McKenzie had not entered his appearance for Goldsberry when he spoke with Myers and McKenzie never represented to Myers that he was a "disinterested person." Jezic also noted that the conversation took place before Myers's preliminary hearing date and, after McKenzie informed Jezic of the conversation with Myers, the two took several actions to mitigate any possible rule violations. First, McKenzie, upon learning that Myers was unrepresented, called the District Court and attempted to obtain counsel for Myers. And, second, Jezic and McKenzie never discussed "anything that Mr. Myers said." McKenzie supplemented Jezic's representations, adding that, although he had discussed the facts of the case with Myers, at no time during the conversation did Myers make any admissions. McKenzie also confirmed Jezic's representation to the court that the conversation with Myers took place prior to the indictments of Goldsberry and Myers.

After hearing from both parties on the issue, the trial court found as a fact that the conversation between Myers and McKenzie took place before Myers was indicted. And, based on Jezic's and McKenzie's representations, the court further found that "Mr. McKenzie did not convey to Mr. Jezic the sum and substance . . . or any summary, for that matter, of any conversation [Mr. McKenzie] had with Mr. Myers." The court stated: "It's clear that Mr. McKenzie did not know that anybody was representing Mr. Myers when he talked to him, and the reality is there's absolutely nothing wrong with an attorney, who may be representing a co-defendant, trying to communicate with the other defendant if that defendant is not represented." The court denied the motion for severance and, instead, imposed restrictions on McKenzie's involvement in the trial. The court stated:

Very simply, Mr. Jezic, you represent [Goldsberry], and Mr. McKenzie is not representing him anymore. The reality is that there's been absolutely no prejudice to [Goldsberry], but the reality is that — you can and, Mr. McKenzie, you can step back from the trial table, but the reality is — and you can consult with Mr. Jezic during the course of the trial, but we're going to keep this trial going forward wherein there's no taint whatsoever.

Jezic objected. He argued that, because Goldsberry desired McKenzie's continued presence at the trial table, the restriction on McKenzie's involvement violated Goldsberry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. The court then modified its ruling, explaining that McKenzie could remain at the trial table, but was not to reveal to Jezic anything related to his conversation with Myers.

At that point, the State brought to the trial court's attention a second potential conflict, one that involved McKenzie and Ms. Tawanna Davis, who was scheduled to testify as a State's witness. Ms. Davis, according to the State, had testified before the grand jury that she was "coached" by Goldsberry and McKenzie. The State advised the court that, if Davis "somehow chang[ed] her testimony from what she had told the grand jury," "there might come a point in time where I'm going to ask her if she was coached by an attorney." The court, on hearing that, ruled:

That's all the more reason [to disqualify McKenzie]. McKenzie put himself in the position of being a possible witness in this case. So with that in mind, the Court is even more comfortable now than it was two minutes ago with telling Mr. McKenzie that he can't participate in this trial. So we're not going to take any chances. Mr. McKenzie will not now be sitting at the trial table, not because [Goldsberry] does not want him to, but the reality is he could potentially be a witness in this case.

(Emphasis added.)

Jezic renewed his earlier objection, arguing once again that the restriction on McKenzie's ability to represent Goldsberry violated Goldsberry's Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel. The court responded that it believed "there's an exception if [McKenzie is] going to be a witness."

Trial commenced on January 31, 2007. It is unnecessary, for purposes of the issues we decide here, to recount all that occurred at trial. To set the factual context within which those issues arose, we shall rely on the summary of the underlying facts set forth in the Court of Special Appeals' opinion.

Wendy Braxton, an acquaintance of both Goldsberry and the victim, Vincent Chamberlain, and the sole witness to the attempted robbery and shooting of Mr. Chamberlain, gave an uncontradicted account of the events at trial. Ms. Braxton testified that sometime in March 2006, while visiting Goldsberry, she received a call from Mr. Chamberlain inviting her and Goldsberry to come to Mr. Chamberlain's house to smoke marijuana.

On arriving at the house, Mr. Chamberlain handed Ms. Braxton some marijuana to roll and while doing so, she heard Goldsberry and Mr. Chamberlain discuss selling Mr. Chamberlain's marijuana. The three then proceeded to a field behind the house to smoke some of the marijuana. Ms. Braxton again observed Goldsberry and Mr. Chamberlain conversing as they returned from the field. Ms. Braxton then departed with Goldsberry and dropped him off at his apartment.

Ms. Braxton further testified that Goldsberry called her later that evening to ask questions about Mr. Chamberlain. He asked, in particular, "how long she knew Mr. Chamber-lain" and if "he was cool and stuff." Ms. Braxton subsequently received a call from Mr. Chamberlain asking if she wanted to play cards and requesting that she pick him up. On arriving at Mr. Chamberlain's home at approximately 10:00 p.m., Ms. Braxton testified that she saw Goldsberry and another individual parked in front of the house. Goldsberry exited the car and spoke with Mr. Chamberlain outside the house. Ms. Braxton further testified that Golds-berry left in his car, after stating that he had to "go get something." On returning, Goldsberry proceeded with Mr. Chamberlain to a shed attached to the rear of the house.

Ms. Braxton got out of her car several minutes later and went to the shed to ask Mr. Chamberlain if she could use the bathroom. While at the rear of the house near the shed, Ms. Braxton saw Goldsberry walk towards the front of the house and return with Mr. Myers. Ms. Braxton testified that as Goldsberry and Mr. Myers entered the shed and approached the door leading to the house, Goldsberry drew a gun on Mr. Chamberlain, pointed the gun at Mr. Chamberlain's face, and said "give me the stuff." She then observed Mr. Myers pull a gun from his pocket. Goldsberry repeated "give me the stuff."

Ms. Braxton ran to hide behind a tree in the backyard, where she observed Mr. Myers chasing Mr. Chamberlain. She testified that prior to hearing the gun shot, she saw Mr. Myers pointing the gun at Mr. Chamberlain's head. Ms. Braxton then saw Goldsberry run out of the shed, Mr. Myers run around to the front of the house, and Mr. Chamberlain fall to the ground. After Mr. Myers and Goldsberry fled the scene, Ms. Braxton ran to Mr. Chamberlain and saw blood coming from his head. Unsure of what to do, Ms. Braxton got in her car and left the scene.

As Ms. Braxton was "driving around," Goldsberry called her, asked if she had gone to the police, and requested that they meet. When Ms. Braxton told Goldsberry "I'm not going to meet up with you so that you can kill me like you did Vincent," Goldsberry told her that "I didn't Mil him. I didn't know that was going to happen. I just went there to rob him, and James got scared and he killed him." Golds-berry warned her that "snitches get stitches." Ms. Braxton also testified that Goldsberry offered her money, discussed the need "to make up a story," and told her to tell police he was not at the scene.

Fearing for her safety, Ms. Braxton went to stay with a friend. Over the next 72 hours, she was called by Goldsberry "four or five times a day." During those conversations, Goldsberry asked repeatedly where she was and if she had spoken with the police. Ms. Braxton's family, upon being told by her of what she had witnessed, convinced her that she must inform the police. Three days after the incident, Ms. Braxton went to the police station, where she identified Myers as the "person who shot" Chamberlain and Goldsberry as having been present at the shooting.

Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 400-02, 957 A.2d at 1114-15.

At the close of the State's case, Goldsberry moved for a mistrial, raising once again the Sixth Amendment counsel of choice argument, and noting that "Mr. McKenzie has not been able to participate in the entire trial" and had been "outside of the courtroom the entire case." The court denied Goldsberry's motion for a mistrial, stating: "I have allowed [] Mr. McKenzie to communicate with you [Mr. Jezic] and Mr. Giannetti in terms of representing [Goldsberry]. The fact that he's outside of the courtroom doesn't mean he couldn't communicate, and, obviously, I take note that, apparently, he has been communicating with you." The court further stated that Goldsberry had not been prejudiced during the trial by Mr. McKenzie's absence. Mr. Jezic reminded the court that, because McKenzie had been subject to the rule on witnesses, neither Jezic nor Giannetti had discussed with McKenzie anything related to the evidence adduced at trial. The court replied: "That's not what the Court ruled though. I said he could go ahead and communicate with you. The only thing he couldn't do was tell you what his conversations were with Mr. Myers." The court evidently forgot its earlier admonition to defense counsel that Mr. McKenzie has "got to go outside because he may be a potential witness."

At the close of all the evidence, the court gave the following instructions concerning felony murder:

Question number two reads — and this is what we call felony murder. It's different from first degree premeditated murder. Felony murder can be divided into two different degrees. Question two deals with first degree felony murder. That means that each defendant is charged with the crime of felony murder. If your verdict is not guilty on question one [first degree premeditated murder], then you go onto two.

In order to prove the elements of question two, the State must prove that the defendant, or another participating in the crime with that defendant, committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony. The underlying felony in this case is question five, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon. So that's a precursor to question two.

Number two, the second element, is that the defendant, or another participating in the crime, killed the victim, in this case Mr. Chamberlain. That the defendant, or another person participating in the crime, killed the victim.

And, number three, that the act resulting in the death of the victim occurred during the commission of the underlying felony. In this particular case, the underlying crime is the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon. So if the murder occurred during the course of the attempted robbery, that satisfies that element, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is not necessary for the State to prove that the particular defendant intended to kill the victim. So in the felony murder, the intent to kill is not necessary to prove.

Now, that would be the definition of first degree felony murder, question number two.

If your verdict is not guilty of question number two, then you would go to question number three, which is second degree felony murder. Second degree felony murder means that the defendant, or another participating in the crime with the defendant, committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony, again, question five, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon.

Element number two, that the way in which the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was committed or attempted under all circumstances created — and here's the distinction between first degree felony murder and second degree. In second degree felony murder, that attempted robbery with a deadly weapon created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or serious physical injury likely to result in death. So that act created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or serious physical injury likely to result in death.

The third element is that, as a result of the way in which the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was committed, Mr. Chamberlain was killed. That distinguishes second degree felony murder from first degree. But remember, the intent to kill doesn't have to be present for either one.

The court's instruction on the requirement of unanimity was as follows:

Your verdict as to each and every charge, as to each defendant, must be unanimous. Anything short of a unanimous verdict is not acceptable. Unanimous means a 12 to nothing vote. Our two alternates do not deliberate.

During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court, stating: "[c]ould you please clarify the difference between first and second degree felony murder." The court repeated the basic elements of first degree and second felony murder, then stated, in pertinent part:

Now, here's where the difference comes in. This is the second element of second degree, and this makes it different from first degree. That the way in which the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon — your question five — was committed — or in this case attempted — under all the circumstances, under all the circumstances [sic], created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or of serious physical injury likely to result in death.

I'll repeat that one more time. That the manner in which the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon was committed, under all circumstances, created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or of serious physical injury likely to result in death.

Thereafter the jury convicted Goldsberry of second degree felony murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, Goldsberry moved for a new trial. Goldsberry repeated his previous argument that Maryland law does not recognize second degree felony murder based upon the underlying felony of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. Thus, in Goldsberry's view, the second degree felony murder conviction could not stand. The court rejected Goldsberry's contention as contrary to Maryland law and denied the motion.

The Court merged the conviction of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon with the second degree felony murder conviction, and sentenced Goldsberry to a 30-year term of imprisonment for second degree felony murder, a 20-year consecutive term of imprisonment for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and a 30-year concurrent term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

The Appeal

Goldsberry raised five claims of error before the Court of Special Appeals. See Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. 394, 957 A.2d 1110. Of relevance to the issues before this Court, Goldsberry contended that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) disqualifying McKenzie from representing Goldsberry in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; (2) submitting to the jury the charge of second degree felony murder; and (3) instructing the jury that only a unanimous verdict was acceptable. Id. at 400, 957 A.2d at 1114.

With regard to the first of those contentions, the Court of Special Appeals, relying on its interpretation of Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), concluded that "the trial court's ruling properly balanced [Goldsberry's] qualified right to counsel against competing factors that weighed against continued unrestricted representation by Mr. McKenzie." Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 421, 957 A.2d at 1124. The court reasoned that McKenzie's conduct posed two potential ethical violations: McKenzie "could have violated [Rule of Professional Conduct] 1.18" when he spoke with Myers; and there was a "potential violation of [Rule of Professional Conduct] 3.7" ("Lawyers as Witness"), given the State's representation that led the trial court to believe McKenzie could be called as a witness if Tawanna Davis testified at trial, as the State anticipated she might, in a manner inconsistent with her testimony before the grand jury that she had been "coached" by McKenzie. Id. at 420, 957 A.2d at 1126. The Court of Special Appeals, though acknowledging that Davis ultimately did not testify, reasoned that the trial court "did not have the benefit of hindsight when it made its ruling." Id. at 420, 957 A.2d at 1126.

The Court of Special Appeals also emphasized that Golds-berry was not deprived of his counsel of choice when the court disqualified McKenzie because Goldsberry was still represented by attorney Jezic (and attorney Giannetti), whom he had selected. Id. at 421, 957 A.2d at 1126. The court therefore held that the trial court was within its discretion "in determining that [Goldsberry's] right to counsel of choice was outweighed by the countervailing interests of fairness, maintaining ethical standards, and avoiding conflicts of interest." Id. at 420, 957 A.2d at 1126.

As for the second contention, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Goldsberry that second degree felony murder predicated upon attempted armed robbery is a "nonexistent" crime under Maryland law. Id. at 402, 957 A.2d at 1116. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second degree felony murder and, presumably, sending that charge to the jury. The Court of Special Appeals held that the second degree murder conviction must be reversed without the possibility of a retrial on the charge of felony murder. Id. at 400, 957 A.2d at 1115.

The Court of Special Appeals began by explaining, in reliance on Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706 (2001), that the purpose of Maryland's statutory scheme, which divides murder into degrees, is to differentiate severity of punishment. Id. at 404-05, 957 A.2d at 1116. The Court then noted the distinction between first and second degree felony murder. First degree felony murder, explained the Court, requires a homicide that occurs in the commission, or attempted commission, of one of the felonies listed in Maryland Code (2002 Repl.Vol, Supp. 2009), § 2-201 of the Criminal Law Article ("CrL") (providing in (a), inter alia, that "[a] murder is in the first degree if it is . . . (4) committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate: . . . (ix) robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article[,]" and providing in (b) that the punishment, generally, "shall be . . . imprisonment for life"). Second degree felony murder is predicated upon a felony that, although not listed in CrL § 2-201 (a)(4), is by its nature or the way in which it is perpetrated sufficiently dangerous to life. Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 407, 957 A.2d at 1117 (citing Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005)); see also CrL § 2-204(a), (b) (providing that "[a] murder that is not in the first degree under § 2-201 of this subtitle is in the second degree[,]" punishable by "imprisonment not exceeding 30 years"). The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, because armed robbery with a dangerous weapon is listed in CrL § 2-201(a)(4)(ix) as a predicate for first degree felony murder, it "may not also support a charge of second degree felony murder, regardless of the circumstances or manner of its commission." Id. at 407, 957 A.2d at 1118. The Court therefore concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the charge of second degree felony murder.

The Court of Special Appeals found additional error in the trial court's re-instruction on the subject in response to the jury's request for further instruction distinguishing first from second degree felony murder. The trial court instructed that the difference between the two degrees was whether "the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon created a reasonably foreseeable risk of death or of serious physical injury likely to result in death." Citing Fisher, 367 Md. at 250, 786 A.2d at 706, the Court of Special Appeals explained that the instruction was improper because a reasonably foreseeable risk of death is required for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable in the first place and thus has "no bearing on the degree of punishment." Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 407, 957 A.2d at 1118.

The Court of Special Appeals also agreed with Goldsberry that the trial court's jury instruction regarding unanimity was coercive and erroneous. Id. at 417, 957 A.2d at 1124. We need say nothing more about that holding because, as we mentioned at the outset, the State's challenge to that holding, though one on which we granted certiorari, does not need to be addressed in light of our disposition of this appeal.

The State petitioned this Court for further review of the judgment, as did Goldsberry, by way of cross-petition. We granted the State's petition to address two questions:

To the extent preserved, did the Court of Special Appeals err in reversing and remanding for a new trial on the ground that the trial court's modified unanimity instruction could have coerced the deliberative process?

Did the Court of Special Appeals err by ruling that the trial court should not have given the pattern jury instruction on second degree felony murder when the felony underlying the murder is an attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon?

We granted Goldsberry's cross-petition to address the following question:

Did the lower courts deprive Goldsberry of his constitutional right to counsel of his choice by effectively disqualifying one defense attorney?

We hold that Goldsberry is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the trial court violated Goldsberry's right under the Sixth Amendment to his counsel of choice by disqualifying attorney McKenzie from the defense team. We further hold, for reasons we shall explain, that the State may retry Golds-berry on the charge of felony murder subject to the limitations (which we shall outline) that are demanded by the peculiar circumstances of this case.

II. The Sixth Amendment Claim A.

The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The right to counsel includes the right of a defendant, who does not require court-appointed counsel, to select the counsel of his or her choosing. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692; Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 530, 970 A.2d 908, 916 (2009); McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 400, 89 A. 1100, 1103 (1914). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ("It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.").

The right to counsel of choice, however, is qualified. It is subject to the trial court's "independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692; accord Moore v. State, 390 Md. 343, 405, 889 A.2d 325, 362 (2005) (stating that a defendant's right to counsel of choice "will not be permitted to frustrate[] the [ethical and] orderly administration of criminal justice"). This right to counsel, though protected by a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice, can be overcome. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The presumption can be over-come if, for example, the defendant's attorney "has a previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing party." Id. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692. And it can be overcome, "not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict." Id. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692.

The facts of Wheat presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to explicate these principles. The Court had before it the question whether the federal district court had erred in refusing to permit Wheat to waive his right to conflict-free counsel and obtain representation by an attorney who represented several co-defendants. 486 U.S. at 154, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Wheat and numerous co-defendants had been charged with participating in a drug distribution conspiracy. Two of those co-defendants, Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo, were represented by attorney Eugene Iredale. Iredale had obtained on behalf of Gomez-Barajas an acquittal with respect to the drug distribution charges and a subsequent plea deal on unrelated charges that, at the time of the relevant events in Wheat's case, had not yet been accepted by the district court. Iredale also negotiated a plea deal for Bravo. Id. at 155, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Wheat, evidently impressed by those results, contacted Iredale to request his representation. At the conclusion of Bravo's guilty plea proceeding, Iredale informed the district court of Wheat's request to have Iredale represent him at his upcoming trial. Id.

The district court, prompted by the Government's suggestion that the proposed representation would pose a potential conflict, conducted a hearing to decide the issue, one day before Wheat's trial was scheduled to commence. The Government objected on two grounds to Iredale's representation of Wheat at his trial while the plea deal for Gomez-Barajas remained pending. Id. First, the dual representation posed a potential conflict given the possibility that Gomez-Barajas's plea would be rejected by the district court, resulting in a trial during which Wheat might be called by the Government to testify against Gomez-Barajas. Id. at 155, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Should that happen, ethical strictures would prevent Iredale from cross-examining Wheat, thereby rendering Iredale's representation of Gomez-Barajas ineffective. Second, the dual representation posed a separate potential conflict because, as part of Bravo's plea deal, he agreed to testify against Wheat at Wheat's trial. Id. at 156, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Given the Rules of Professional Responsibility, Iredale would be unable to cross-examine Bravo, rendering ineffective his representation of Wheat.

Wheat responded that his right under the Sixth Amendment to counsel of his choice entitled him to waive his right to conflict-free counsel. He disputed the Government's concern as posing "highly improbable" conflicts that were "manufactured" to disqualify Iredale. Wheat also noted that he, Gomez-Barajas, and Bravo all had waived any potential claims of conflict of interest. Id. at 156-57, 108 S.Ct. 1692.

The district court denied Wheat's request for substitution of Iredale as his counsel on the ground that the joint representation would pose an irreconcilable and un-waivable conflict. Wheat proceeded to trial, represented by his original counsel, and was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and related offenses. Wheat appealed, arguing, among other claims, that the district court's ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel of choice. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgments. United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court began its analysis with the recognition that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to choose one's own counsel. The Court explained that "the essential aim" of the Sixth Amendment is to "guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The right to choose one's counsel nevertheless may be circumscribed by a trial court when necessary to uphold "the ethical standards of the profession" and to ensure that "legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692. In other words, the right to choice of counsel is not absolute: one may not select an unbarred advocate or an attorney about whom a "court justifiably finds an actual [or a serious potential for a] conflict of interest[.]" Id. at 162., 108 S.Ct. 1692

It is in the latter context, noted the Supreme Court, that the "likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict," requiring the trial court to act without the benefit of a fully developed record produced at trial. Id. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. For this reason, the trial court is afforded "substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interests." Id. at 163, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The Court determined that the proper balance is struck when "the district court [] recognizee] a presumption in favor of [the defendant's] counsel of choice," which "may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a shomng of a serious potential for conflict." Id. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (emphasis added).

Courts applying Wheat have grappled with what that case requires of a trial court in making the important and weighty assessment presented by a choice of counsel issue. United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2006) is illustrative. In that case, Nolen, a persistent "tax protestor," was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas with three counts of willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes. See id. at 369. After being represented by several different attorneys throughout pre-trial proceedings, Nolen hired John Green to represent him. See id. at 370. Green was admitted pro hac vice.

In a motion for continuance, Green referred to the magistrate judge, who had presided over preliminary matters in which Green was not involved, in a manner that, in the district court's view, implicated Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.02. Nolen, 472 F.3d at 370. The district court ordered a show cause hearing and, at that proceeding, revoked Green's pro hac vice admission. Id. Nolen was later convicted of willful tax evasion.

On appeal, Nolen argued successfully that the district court committed reversible error by failing to "to balance the need to enforce [ethical rules] against Nolen's Sixth Amendment Right to counsel of choice." Id. at 371. The Fifth Circuit explained that a criminal defendant's choice of counsel may be disqualified for an ethical violation only if, "`in light of the interests underlying the standards of ethics, the social need for ethical practice outweighs the party's right to counsel of his choice.'" Id. at 375 (quoting United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1979)). Therefore, "[c]onducting such a balancing test is thus a prerequisite to disqualifying counsel of defendant's choice, and explicating the process on the record is a pre-requisite to appellate review." Nolen, 472 F.3d at 375 (emphasis added). Turning to the district court's order revoking attorney Green's pro hac vice admission, the Nolen Court found no indication that the district court had conducted the necessary balancing test and, accordingly, concluded that the district court abused its discretion in revoking Green's admission. Id. at 376.

Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989) is to like effect. Fuller was convicted of various drug-related offenses following a trial before the New Jersey Superior Court. In a pre-trial motion, Fuller requested, through local counsel, that he be represented pro hac vice by two out-of-state attorneys. Id. at 605. That request was denied based on the trial court's belief that local counsel was competent, the "case was going to be hotly contested," and the out-of-state attorneys would create "probable delay . . . so grave as to overcome the unfettered right of a defendant to counsel of his own choosing" Id. at 605-06. In his collateral attack of the convictions, Fuller maintained that the trial court arbitrarily denied him the constitutional right to counsel of choice. Id. at 606.

The Third Circuit agreed. That court noted that a trial court, when confronted with a choice of counsel issue, must conduct a hearing to "`make specific findings of fact consistent with the evidence[.]'" Id. at 608 (quoting United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that district court's summary denial of defendant's requested counsel violated right to counsel of choice)). Looking to the trial court's denial of Fuller's request for counsel pro hac vice, the Third Circuit concluded that "the trial court's wooden approach and its failure to make record-supported findings balancing the right to counsel with the demands of the administration of justice resulted in an arbitrary denial of the right to choice of counsel. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 611. The Fuller Court was careful to explain, though, that its holding did not "militate" against the broad discretion afforded a trial court as discussed in Wheat, but, instead, simply made plain that only "[u]pon obtaining sufficient information" is the court equipped to exercise its discretion, "instinct[,] and judgment based on experience." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Other courts have addressed with specificity the steps to be undertaken by a trial court in assessing choice of counsel issues. The Illinois Supreme Court did so in People v. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d 354, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d 496 (2004). In Ortega, the facts of which are irrelevant for present purposes, the Supreme Court of Illinois suggested the following framework, based on Wheat: The trial court must first determine whether there is "actual or serious potential for conflict." Ortega, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d at 502. If the court finds a conflict, it must then determine whether the presumption favoring one's counsel of choice is overcome by the interests of fairness and maintenance of ethical standards implicated by the conflict. Id. (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). In conducting this balancing test, the court may consider the following, among all other factors relevant to the conflict: the likelihood that defense counsel will have divided loyalties; the State's right to a fair trial; the appearance of impropriety should the jury learn of the conflict; and the likelihood that defense counsel's continued representation will provide grounds for overturning the conviction. Id. Connecticut follows an approach similar to that of the Illinois Supreme Court. See State v. Peeler, 265 Conn. 460, 828 A.2d 1216, 1225 (2003) (citing Fuller for this proposition and stating that "the trial court cannot vitiate [the right to counsel of choice] without first scrutinizing closely the basis for the claim").

We adopt the approach to this issue taken by the Illinois and Connecticut courts, as it is well-grounded in the principles announced in Wheat and applied in Nolen and Fuller. We hold that, before a trial court is permitted to disqualify a criminal defendant's privately obtained counsel (regardless of whether counsel is the defendant's only attorney or one of several on the defense team), the court must conduct a hearing on the matter, "scrutinize closely the basis for the claim," Peeler, 828 A.2d at 1225, and make evidence-based findings to determine, based on factors such as those outlined in Ortega, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d at 502, whether there is "actual or serious potential for conflict" that overcomes the presumption the defendant has to his or her counsel of choice. The record must reflect that the trial court contemplated relevant factors in conducting the test that balances the right to one's counsel of choice against the necessity to uphold "the ethical standards of the profession" that ensure that "legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692; Fuller, 868 F.2d at 608, 611. With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments.

B.

Goldsberry argues that the evidence of the two purported ethical conflicts relied upon by the trial court to disqualify McKenzie — his conversation with Myers before trial and McKenzie's alleged coaching of Davis — "was too sketchy" to justify disqualification under Wheat and its progeny. Goldsberry first directs us to the record pertaining to McKenzie's conversation with Myers, which Myers's counsel suggested posed potential violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 and 1.18. Goldsberry maintains that the evidence presented to the court did not support a finding of a potential violation of either rule of professional conduct.

Goldsberry points out that Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney, while engaged in the representation of a client, from "communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a person who the lawyer knows is represented in the matter by another lawyer "He argues, based on the representations made to the trial court, all of which indicated that Myers was not represented by counsel at the time he spoke with McKenzie, that the record does not support a potential transgression of Rule 4.2.

Turning to Rule 1.18, Goldsberry emphasizes that the Rule applies only to a "prospective client," defined as "[a] person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. . . ." Goldsberry contends that there is no indication in the record that Myers and McKenzie discussed anything that would implicate Rule 1.18. To the contrary, argues Goldsberry, the only representations made to the trial court on this point indicate that McKenzie and Myers discussed only the facts of the case and Myers made no admissions to McKenzie.

Goldsberry next attacks the Court of Special Appeals' determination that there was "a potential violation of [Rule] 3.7," given the State's representation that Tawanna Davis (a potential State's witness) had testified before the grand jury that McKenzie had "coached" her. Rule 3.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in a trial in which the attorney is "likely to be a necessary witness" Goldsberry asserts that there was insufficient information presented to the trial court to allow the court to determine "a compelling need" for McKenzie to testify. Goldsberry argues that "any scenario by which Mr. McKenzie could have become a `necessary witness' [] as a result of `coaching' Ms. Davis was a remote and speculative one." According to Goldsberry, the record before the trial court lacks the sort of inquiry necessary to decide, with regard to Rule 3.7, whether to honor a defendant's choice of counsel. Other than the "conclusory" representation made by the State, argues Goldsberry, there was no proffer made nor testimony taken to indicate what, if anything, McKenzie said to Davis. Moreover, the trial court did not require the State either to proffer what McKenzie's testimony would be if called as a witness or to demonstrate that "there was no feasible alternative to calling Mr. McKenzie to the stand." Goldsberry suggests that, had the trial court required the State to make these showings, the parties could have fashioned an alternative to McKenzie's being called as a witness, such as a stipulation concerning the conversation between McKenzie and Ms. Davis. Goldsberry alleges that the trial court made its decision based on a "purely hypothetical change in [Ms. Davis's] testimony."

Goldsberry refers us to various cases, the notable ones of which we have discussed at length above, in support of his argument that the trial court failed to employ the analysis required when confronted with the decision whether to deprive a defendant of his or her chosen counsel. Goldsberry contends, in particular, that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient threshold level of evidentiary inquiry into the alleged conflicts, which, if undertaken, would have enabled the proper balancing of Goldsberry's right to counsel of choice on the one hand, and the interests of fairness, avoidance of conflicts, and maintenance of ethical standards on the other. Because the trial court failed to conduct such an inquiry, contends Goldsberry, the presumption of counsel of one's choice was not overcome, and McKenzie's disqualification constituted structural error under United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (holding that the denial of counsel of choice is structural error such that prejudice is presumed).

The State, not surprisingly, urges us to affirm the Court of Special Appeals' holding on this issue. The State contests Goldsberry's characterization of the record as "sketchy." In the State's view, the record "adequately established the potential conflicts of interest and ethical violations committed by Mr. McKenzie prior to trial." The State argues that, consistent with the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, the trial court was well within its considerable discretion in finding that McKenzie's conduct posed "a serious potential for conflict." (Quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692).

Turning to McKenzie's conversation with the co-defendant Myers, the State contends that, given the breadth of conduct prohibited by Rule 1.18, there was a sufficient showing of a potential violation of that Rule. This is so, argues the State, even though the record "does not disclose the substance of that conversation." The State explains that, pursuant to Rule 1.18, a prospective client includes a person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming an attorney-client relationship with respect to a matter. The State, though it does not expressly say so, presumably contends that, based on the representations made by attorneys Hart, Jezic, and McKenzie, there was enough in the record to afford Myers the protections provided to prospective clients.

The State implies that prospective-client status for Myers would be significant for two reasons. First, under Rule 1.18(a), even though McKenzie and Myers never formed an attorney-client relationship, McKenzie is prohibited from using any information he learned during the consultation with Myers, absent Myers's informed consent or an applicable exception to confidentiality. Second, Rule 1.18(c) and (d) are implicated because McKenzie, who presumably obtained information harmful to Myers during their conversation, would be representing Goldsberry, whose interests are "materially adverse" to Myers.

With regard to McKenzie's alleged "coaching" of the potential State's witness, Tawanna Davis, the State concedes "that the record does not disclose the substance of that conversation [between McKenzie and Davis]." The State notes, however, that the prosecutor's representation to the trial court ( i.e., that Davis testified before the grand jury that she was coached by McKenzie), suggests that McKenzie told Davis "how to testify, including what to say and what not to say." The State contends that this representation, in and of itself, made McKenzie a potential witness in the case. For these reasons, the State argues that there was "a firm foundation for [the trial court's] decision to exclude Mr. McKenzie."

C.

We conclude that Goldsberry has the better part of the argument on this issue. The State grounds its argument on the Supreme Court's decision in Wheat. Though Wheat indeed supports the State's contention that a trial court is afforded discretion in deciding whether a criminal defendant's selection of counsel is permissible given a purported conflict of interest, that discretion does not excuse the trial court's failure to conduct a threshold level of inquiry to determine whether there was a "serious potential," Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, that the asserted conflicts existed or would arise.

Moreover, the sparse record in the present case stands in sharp contrast to the facts in Wheat suggesting the serious potential for a conflict of counsel. In approving of the district court's exercise of discretion in Wheat, the Supreme Court noted that the district court had been confronted, as a result of Wheat's desired substitution of counsel one day before trial, with the proposed representation of "three conspirators of varying stature in a complex drug distribution scheme." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Furthermore, the Government advised the district court that, at Wheat's trial, the Government intended to (and in fact did) call Bravo as a witness. Id. And, the district court was informed that, should Gomez-Barajas's plea deal collapse, Wheat would "probab[ly]" be called upon to testify at the trial. Id. In either of the latter two circumstances, attorney Iredale's joint representation and corresponding ethical obligations to each client would preclude effective representation of all. Id. For these reasons, all of which were revealed to the district court at the "conflict" hearing, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly denied Wheat's choice of counsel.

Here, the trial court, prompted by representations made first by attorneys Hart, Myers, and Jezic, and then by the State, determined sua sponte to deny Goldsberry's choice of counsel. Contrary to the "serious," if not near-certain, potential for conflict posed by Iredale's representation in Wheat, the record here of a potential conflict posed by McKenzie's continued representation of Goldsberry is, using his language, "sketchy" at best.

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that McKenzie's conversation with Myers "could have" violated Rule 1.18. See Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 420, 957 A.2d at 1126. But the record developed at trial, upon which the trial court rested its decision, does not come close to revealing the "serious potential for conflict," that Wheat requires be established before the trial court may exercise its discretion to deprive a defendant of his or her counsel of choice.

At the hearing on Myers's motion to have his trial severed from Goldsberry's, the trial court was presented with imprecise assertions from Myers's counsel about McKenzie's conversation with Myers. We have mentioned that there were no facts indicating that, at the time of the conversation, Myers was represented by counsel. Moreover, the only information before the trial court concerning the content of the conversation came from McKenzie's representation to the court that Myers related to him only the "facts" of the case, and made "no admissions." The trial court did not ask of McKenzie his intentions in meeting with Myers, Le., whether he sought Myers to solicit him as a client. Nor did the trial court request from Myers's counsel a proffer concerning the nature of the conversation. Indeed, Myers's counsel, who presumably would have put forth her strongest arguments in an attempt to sever the trials, could only say "I don't know if the purpose of the meeting involves Rule 1.18 and whether it was an attempt to speak with a prospective client or whether it was to interview a co-defendant regarding facts of the case."

Likewise, though Rule 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a person whom the lawyer "knows is represented in the matter by another attorney," was not specifically mentioned by the trial court in its decision to disqualify McKenzie, the court explicitly rejected the possibility of the rule's violation when it found that McKenzie "did not know" whether Myers was represented by counsel. The trial court stated:

It's clear that Mr. McKenzie did not know that anybody was representing Mr. Myers when he talked to him, and the reality is there's absolutely nothing wrong with an attorney, who may be representing a co-defendant, trying to communicate with the other defendant if that defendant is not represented.

We consider, too, the State's representation to the trial court that the potential State witness, Ms. Tawanna Davis, had testified before the grand jury to being "coached" by McKenzie. The trial court, relying solely on that representation, inferred that McKenzie could be called by the State as a witness. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the allegations may have implicated Rule 3.7. But we cannot conclude, based on the record before the trial court, that there was a showing of "serious potential" that McKenzie would be called as a witness. Put simply, the trial court failed to demand of the State the requisite showing to support such a finding, before relying on it as grounds for disqualifying McKenzie. At a minimum, the court, prior to disqualifying McKenzie, should have conducted an in camera hearing to determine the likelihood that the State would be calling Ms. Davis as a witness; and, in that event, whether she would in fact testify to having been "coached" by McKenzie and, if so, what she meant by the term "coach."

To be sure, the trial court's decision to remove attorney McKenzie from the defense team was made, not with "the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly[,]" at which time, "[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. It remains, though, that the record provides no basis upon which to assess the legal correctness of the court's ultimate decision to disqualify McKenzie, because the court did not conduct an adequate threshold inquiry into the circumstances underlying the purported conflicts in order to assess whether there was a serious potential for conflict. See Fuller, 868 F.2d at 611; Ortega, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d at 502; Peeler, 828 A.2d at 1225.

We therefore hold that the court's failure to develop a factual record that supports its decision to take the undeniably drastic action of disallowing McKenzie as one of Goldsberry's defense attorneys denied Goldsberry his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. That constitutional violation entitles Goldsberry to a new trial. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (holding that, when the court wrongly denies the defendant the "right to be assisted by counsel of one's choice," structural error results and prejudice is presumed).

III. The Unanimity Instruction

Our holding that Goldsberry is entitled to a new trial on the ground that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice obviates the need to address the State's challenge to the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the court erred in giving a coercive jury instruction on the requirement of jury unanimity. See Goldsberry, 182 Md.App. at 416-17, 957 A.2d at 1123-24. We therefore decline to address that contention.

IV. The Felony Murder Conviction

The State's remaining contention, that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Goldsberry was convicted of a "non-existent" crime, i.e., second degree felony murder based on the crime attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon (hereafter attempted armed robbery), is a different matter. See id. at 407-08, 957 A.2d at 1117. If the State is correct that the Court of Special Appeals erred in any aspect of that holding, then the State is not foreclosed from retrying Goldsberry for felony murder. We therefore shall address the contention.

The State's argument, in a nutshell, is: (1) the General Assembly's legislative determination that killing a victim during the commission of an attempted armed robbery supports a conviction of first degree (not second degree) felony murder did not foreclose the jury in this case from finding Goldsberry guilty of felony murder; because (2) the identity of the underlying felony, once proven, relates only to whether the maximum sentence is life (if a first degree felony murder), or thirty years' imprisonment (if second degree felony murder); and therefore (3) the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing, without the possibility of retrial, Goldsberry's conviction of what that court characterized as the "non-existent crime[]" of second felony degree murder predicated on attempted armed robbery.

We begin our analysis of this contention with what is essentially uncontested: The parties seem to agree that the trial court ought not have instructed the jury on the crime of second degree felony murder and sent that charge to the jury, because the facts developed at trial make out what the General Assembly has characterized as first degree felony murder, i.e., a criminal homicide that occurred during commission of an attempted armed robbery. The parties also agree that the elements of felony murder are determined by Maryland's common law; and that CrL § 2-201 (first degree felony murder) and CrL § 2-204 (second degree felony murder), at least in the present context, have "identical elements." Where the parties part company is on the effect of the jury's finding Goldsberry not guilty of the charge of first degree felony murder and guilty of the charge of second degree felony murder.

The State argues that, under the circumstances of this case, the jury's finding Goldsberry guilty of second degree murder, when, if anything, he should have been found guilty of first degree felony murder, does not absolve him of guilt of felony murder. Citing Fisher, 367 Md. at 250, 786 A.2d at 725, the State emphasizes that "the common law of Maryland alone defines the elements of felony murder" and "alone imposes culpability for felony murder." The State points out the broad description we accorded the offense in Roary, 385 Md. at 226, 867 A.2d at 1100, where we said that a person commits felony murder when the person's "conduct [brings] about an unintended death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony" Id. (Quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(a) (2d ed. 2003)).

The State asserts that the General Assembly's division of common law felony murder into first degree and second degree felony murder creates nothing more than a "penalty scheme." In support of that assertion, the State directs us to Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442, 451 (1855), where we stated: "The design [of Chapter 138, § 3 of the 1809 Act] was to discriminate in awarding the punishment" for the various forms of murder. The State also reminds us of our predecessors' description of the General Assembly's purpose in enacting the 1809 Act:

"Murder" is here recognized as a general denomination, including offenses differing from each other in their degrees of atrocity, but not in their nature or kind; no attempt is made to explain or modify its meaning or abridge its range. Its common law sense is left unimpaired; the measure of punishment only is sought to be graduated according to the circumstances under which it was committed.

. . . . This Act of Assembly, now codified, does not create a new crime; it neither adds to nor diminishes the class of cases which constituted murder at common law; nor does it increase the punishment.

Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 374 (1874). The State argues that more recent precedent of this Court, citing, inter alia, Fisher, also mandates its requested result. The State asserts: "This Court has explained that the felony-murder doctrine operates independently to elevate an unintentional killing to murder, only after which do Sections 2-201 and 2-204 [of the CrL] operate to assign a penalty[.]"

The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals' decision is contrary to the General Assembly's intent to impose a "comprehensive scheme" mandating punishment for all felony murders; moreover, the decision is illogical, because it conflicts with the commonsensical notion that an offense that warrants a greater punishment can also warrant a lesser punishment. In that regard, the State points out the "catchall" quality of CrL § 2-204(a), which provides: "A murder that is not in the first degree under [CrL § 2 — 201] of this subtitle is in the second degree." Finally, the State concedes that the jury in the present case, by its verdict, limited the court to imposition of a penalty for Goldsberry's crime of felony murder that was not anticipated by the General Assembly. That, however, argues the State, should have only the effect of punishing Respondent to a lesser degree and not of erasing Goldsberry's culpability for the crime.

Goldsberry responds that we should affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. He agrees with that court's conclusion that the statutory scheme created by Chapter 138, § 3 of the Acts of 1809 imposed two "mutually exclusive" categories of felony murder. He emphasizes that the plain language of CrL §§ 2-201(a) and 2-204(a) provides that certain underlying felonies serve as predicates for first degree felony murder, and that all other felonies, inherently dangerous in nature or by way of commission, support felony murder in the second degree.

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that, when, as here, the facts make out only a charge of first degree felony murder, a trial court errs in instructing the jury on the crime of second degree felony murder. A trial court further errs, as the court did here, by sending the jury to its deliberations with a verdict sheet that presents the jury with the option of finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder. We do not agree, however, that the trial court's errors in the present case, and the jury's verdict flowing from them, lead ineluctably to the conclusion that Goldsberry cannot be retried on a charge of felony murder.

The State correctly identifies the effect the General Assembly's enactment of Chapter 138, § 3 of the Act of 1809 had on the common law crime of felony murder. That legislative decision, as we said as early as in Weighorst, 7 Md. at 451, and as recently as in Roary, 385 Md. at 230-31, 867 A.2d at 1102-03, did not abrogate the common law crime of felony murder. Rather the Act divided the single, common law offense into two degrees of culpability, for penalty purposes only, dependent solely on the severity of the underlying felony. See also, e.g., Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 436, 408 A.2d 711, 715 (1979) (stating that "[t]he doctrine has not been abrogated by statute in this State. The Maryland statutes with respect to murder do not create any new crime, but merely classify murder, as it was known at common law, into degrees [T]he common law sense is left unimpaired; the measure of punishment only is sought to be graduated according to the circumstances under which it was committed") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Abbott v. State, 188 Md. 310, 312, 52 A.2d 489, 490 (1947) (same). Accord Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 138, 857 A.2d 88, 100 (2004) (noting that "[t]he crime of murder in Maryland remains a common law offense"); Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 146, 767 A.2d 844, 853 (2001) (same); Fisher, 367 Md. at 247-54, 786 A.2d at 723-27 (reviewing the history of CrL §§ 2-201 and 2-204 and concluding that the statutes created only different grades of punishment).

The extensive authority on the subject leads us to conclude that, notwithstanding the errors the court committed in its instructions and on the verdict sheet, the jury's finding that Goldsberry is guilty of felony murder should stand. The verdict unequivocally reflects the jury's finding that Chamberlain was killed during Goldsberry's commission of an attempted armed robbery. Those facts make out the crime of felony murder, and Goldsberry does not argue to the contrary. The only windfall to which Goldsberry is entitled is that, at retrial, should the jury once again find him guilty of felony murder, the court is bound to impose a sentence no greater than 30 years' imprisonment, the statutory maximum sentence for second degree felony murder.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.

MURPHY, J., Concurs and Dissents.