Summary
during trial for driving while having been adjudged an habitual offender, the defendant may collaterally attack those underlying convictions where he was not represented by counsel
Summary of this case from Morse v. CommonwealthOpinion
86-1051; CA A41770
Argued and submitted April 29, 1987.
Reversed and remanded for new trial September 16, 1987.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Coos County, Robert F. Walberg, Judge.
John P. Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
David Schuman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
Before Richardson, Presiding Judge, and Newman and Deits, Judges.
PER CURIAM
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Defendant appeals his conviction for felony driving while revoked under ORS 811.175. During trial, defendant attempted to challenge a prior judgment declaring him an habitual traffic offender (HTO) collaterally on the basis that, in two of three underlying traffic convictions, he was not represented by counsel. He assigns error to the trial court's refusal to allow him to attack the two underlying traffic convictions.
In State v. Fritz, 85 Or. App. 1, 735 P.2d 1228, rev den 303 Or. 700 (1987), and State v. Hardt, 83 Or. App. 221, 730 P.2d 1278 (1986), rev den 303 Or. 74 (1987), we held that a defendant charged with driving while revoked can go behind the HTO proceeding and collaterally attack the underlying convictions on which his HTO status is based. In the present case, unlike Fritz, the trial court concluded that defendant had no right to challenge the HTO and did not address the merits of his challenge.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.