MILLER, J.

Joshua Eckhardt appeals from the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea and conviction for homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6(A) (1999). He argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing a term of incarceration rather than ordering placement in a residential correction facility and probation. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On April 8, 2001 various witness observed Joshua Eckhardt driving at an excessive rate of speed and almost collide with several other vehicles. The witnesses estimated his speed at between fifty and eighty miles per hour in a thirty-five to forty-five mile per hour zone. As Eckhardt approached an intersection, he sped through a red light and crashed into a car driven by Jarrid Mills. Cristal and Jada Wilson were passengers in Mills's vehicle at the time of the accident. Jada was the twenty-two month old daughter of Jarrid and Cristal. Jada died as a result of the collision.

Eckhardt was charged by trial information on June 7, 2001 with involuntary manslaughter (Count I), homicide by vehicle (Count II), reckless driving (Count III), disobedience to a traffic control device (Count IV), and disobedience of a speed restriction (Count V). Eckhardt entered into a plea agreement with the State which provided that in exchange for a plea of guilty to the homicide by vehicle charge the State would dismiss the remaining counts, recommend probation conditioned upon the successful completion of a residential correction facility (RCF) program, and the imposition of a $150,000 civil judgment. Concurrence of the court was not a condition to the acceptance of the plea. Eckhardt pled guilty to homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6(A)(2)(a) pursuant to the plea agreement. When the court accepted the plea it informed Eckhardt that the sentencing judge would be the person determining his sentence and he or she did not have to follow the recommendation for the RCF program and probation. Eckhardt stated to the court that he understood this fact.

At the sentencing hearing an RCF counselor testified and recommended probation for Eckhardt conditioned upon the successful completion of the RCF program. The sentencing judge reviewed the presentence investigation (PSI) report and considered the entire file. The PSI report recommended probation, conditioned on successful completion of the RCF program. It stated that Eckhardt was seeing a psychiatric social worker and had recently been prescribed an anti-depressant, but needed to see a psychiatrist.

Contrary to the recommendations of the State, the RCF counselor, and the PSI report, the court sentenced Eckhardt to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years. Eckhardt appeals from this sentence contending the sentencing judge abused his discretion in ordering incarceration instead of probation and completion of the RCF program. More specifically, Eckhardt alleges the court's statement of reasons for the sentence shows the court gave no meaningful consideration to his chances for rehabilitation or reform, it speaks only to the nature of the offense, and the sentence was motivated solely by retribution.

II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). We review for an abuse of discretion or for defects in the sentencing procedure. State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995). A sentence will not be upset on appeal unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as the court's consideration of impermissible factors. State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000); State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1998).

III. MERITS

Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in the their favor. Where, as here, a defendant does not assert that the imposed sentence is outside the statutory limits, the sentence will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found only when the sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.

Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225 (citations omitted).

When a sentence is not mandatory, the district court must exercise its discretion in determining what sentence to impose. The district court must demonstrate its exercise of discretion by stating upon the record the reasons for the particular sentence imposed. The sentencing court, however, is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing options.

Id. (citations omitted).

In applying discretion, the court should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual.

State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (citing State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)).

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)( d) requires a sentencing court to "state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence." Failure to state on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed requires the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for amplification of the record and resentencing. State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 589 (Iowa 1980); State v. Freeman, 404 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987). In considering sentencing options the court is to determine, in its discretion, which of the authorized sentences will provide both the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others. Iowa Code § 901.5.

At the sentencing hearing the court stated the following reasons for sentencing Eckhardt to a term of incarceration rather than the RCF program and probation:

The reasons for the sentence are these: . . . the enormity of the tragedy caused by this man, who has absolute irresponsibility to the safety of the public, resulting in a death of a child, is such that punishment is appropriate. There are also rehabilitative processes within the justice system in the Department of Corrections just as there are here locally. I recognize that he does not have a long criminal history, but the nature of this offense is so serious that incarceration is appropriate. He's a young man. It won't do him in. Most people survive it. It's clearly within the parameters of the law. The offense is, of course, aggravated. There is an opportunity for rehabilitation within the Department of Corrections. There's some specific deterrence in it, and there's a little bit of general deterrence, I hope.

. . .

I might just mention one other thing: That this sentence is a rejection of the plea agreement between the parties, but fortunately, I see that Judge Darbyshire was wise enough not to bind the Court to the plea agreement, and that gave the Court, then, the power that it should always keep to make what it thinks is the appropriate disposition. It's important that we hear what both parties recommend, but in the final analysis, the Court makes the judgment. I think this is the appropriate judgment under all of the tragic facts and circumstances.

The court also gave reasons for the sentence in its written judgment and sentence.

The reasons for this sentence are as follows: Defendant is twenty-one years of age and has minimal criminal history. However, based on the aggravated and serious nature of this offense, which resulted in the death of a child, punishment is clearly appropriate. Due to the tragic facts and circumstances in this case, the Court denies the request of both parties that probation be granted. This sentence provides for punishment by separation from the community, both specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation, if the Defendant will take advantage of what is offered in the Institution.

Based on the reasons given by the court as set forth above, we conclude the court thoroughly considered the pertinent factors in sentencing Eckhardt and did not abuse its discretion in electing to impose a term of incarceration rather than the RCF program and probation.

First, it is clear from the judge's statement of reasons for Eckhardt's sentence that he took into account the nature of the offense. The court noted the serious and aggravated nature of the crime and the fact it resulted in the death of a child. Second, the court considered Eckhardt's age, character, and propensities in recognizing Eckhardt was a young man of twenty-one and did not have a long criminal history. The court also stated it had reviewed the PSI report as well as the whole court file. Thus, the court clearly knew Eckhardt had several convictions for traffic violations over the prior four years, including previous speeding violations, a failure to obey a traffic control device, a failure to stop violation, and an open container charge. Eckhardt's criminal record, although perhaps minimal, did show his propensity to commit the very types of violations which caused the serious accident in the case at hand and the court was well aware of these offenses.

Third, the court did consider Eckhardt's need for rehabilitation, protection of the community, and deterrence. The court recognized that there is a rehabilitative process in the Department of Corrections and thus there is a possibility for rehabilitation in prison just as there would be with RCF and probation. The court further stated that the sentence would provide both general and specific deterrence and considered separation of Eckhardt from the community, presumably both for the effect it would have on Eckhardt and for the protection of the community.

Finally, the court specifically recognized it was rejecting the recommendation that was part of the plea agreement and, having reviewed the PSI report and heard the testimony of the RCF counselor, clearly knew it was not accepting other recommendations as well. After noting this, however, the sentencing court went on to find, in its discretion, that under all of the facts and circumstances of the case incarceration was the appropriate sentence. The mere fact the court decided to reject the recommendations for probation does not mean it abused its discretion or sentenced Eckhardt purely for reasons of retribution. See State v. Taylor, 490 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Iowa 1992) (holding that imposition of a more severe sentence than is recommended in PSI report does not constitute abuse of discretion); State v. Beyer, 258 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Iowa 1977) (same).

Eckhardt argues the court's repeated emphasis on the severity of the crime and the fact it was a "tragedy" demonstrates that the court's sentencing decision was motivated purely by retribution. We disagree. This was in fact a very serious crime which resulted in the death of a twenty-two month old child and seriously injured two adults. The court's reference to such things during sentencing only demonstrates it was taking into account the nature of the crime and the surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, the court also noted and considered Eckhardt's age and minimal criminal history, thus properly balancing the relevant sentencing factors in deciding to sentence him to incarceration rather than the RCF program and probation. The fact the court mentioned the tragic or serious nature of the crime does not show it failed to take other relevant factors into consideration. See State v. Dicks, 473 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991) ("Although the court stated its disgust for defendant, we think the record demonstrates that the court also appropriately weighed a number of factors in reaching its decision.").

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Eckhardt to a term of imprisonment rather than to the RCF program and probation. The court properly considered all pertinent and relevant factors. The sentence it imposed was not based on grounds or reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.