Summary
In State v. DiLosa, 94-2903 (La. 11/27/95), 662 So.2d 1040, where the defendant averred that he learned of a possible Brady claim after obtaining documents under the Public Records Act, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the defendant proved or the state conceded that his claim rested on facts unknown to him or his counsel, and if so, whether the state suffered prejudice.
Summary of this case from State v. ChapmanOpinion
No. 94-KK-2903
November 27, 1995
IN RE: DiLosa, Douglas A.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Writ of Prohibition, Writ of Mandamus; Parish of Jefferson 24th Judicial District Court Div. "E" Number 87-0105; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number 94-KW-0699.
Granted with order. See per curiam.
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
Writ granted in part; denied in part; case remanded.
Relator alleges that one of his present constitutional claims (that the state suppressed material exculpatory evidence at trial in violation of the principles set out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and its progeny) rests on facts not known to him or his attorney and which did not become known to him until he obtained portions of the district attorney's case file after proceedings initiated pursuant to the Public Records Act. La.R.S. 44:3(A)(4);Lemmon v. Connick, 590 So.2d 574 (La. 1991); State v. Shropshire, 471 So.2d 707 (La. 1985). Relator therefore appears to have raised a claim which falls under La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1), which provides an exception to the three-year time limit for filing applications for post conviction relief. Accordingly, the district court is ordered to hold a hearing pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1) and (B) at which it will determine (1) whether relator has proved, or the state concedes, that his Brady claim rests on facts not disclosed to him or his attorney; and (2) if so, whether the state has been prejudiced in its "ability to respond to, negate, or rebut the allegations of the petition . . . by events not under control of the state which have transpired since the date of [relator's] original conviction . . ." If the state shows that relator's delay has prejudiced it, the court should dismiss the application; if the state does not make such a showing, the court must proceed to an adjudication on the merits of relator'sBrady claim. In all other respects, the application is denied.