Opinion
Criminal ID No. 1404018370
10-14-2016
Karin M. Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State. James Daniels, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED AND THE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION SHOULD BE DENIED.
Karin M. Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State. James Daniels, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se. MAYER, Commissioner
This 14th day of October, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and Motion for Discovery and Inspection, it appears to the Court that:
BACKGROUND , FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. On July 21, 2014, Defendant, James Daniels, was indicted for the offenses of Rape First Degree, Rape Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, two counts of Robbery First Degree, one count of Robbery Second Degree and one count of Obscenity.
DI # 2.
2. On May 12, 2015, the Defendant, with the assistance of counsel, filed a Motion to Sever. The Court later issued an Order granting the motion in part and severed Count V (the Obscenity charge) as unrelated to the remaining charges.
DI # 22.
3. On July 8, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to Rape in the Second Degree and two counts of Robbery Second Degree. Defendant was sentenced on December 11, 2015, for the conviction of Rape Second Degree and placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections for 25 years at Level 5, to be suspended after 10 years at Level 5, followed by decreasing levels of probation. The first 10 years of the sentence is a mandatory term of incarceration. Defendant was also sentenced on two counts of Robbery Second Degree which included a term of 5 years at Level 5, suspended for 2 years at Level 3 for each count.
DI # 40. Sentencing continued to address Defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea that was subsequently denied. See DI #34.
See 11 Del. C. §772(c).
4. On January 13, 2016, Defendant, appearing pro se, filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction that was denied by Order dated February 4, 2016. The decision reviewed the circumstances surrounding Defendant's plea, including the fact that the Defendant had been addressed personally in open court and the Court had determined that Defendant understood the nature of the charge to which the plea was offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. The Court also recognized that it had no authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of the sentence.
DI # 41.
5. In addition, on February 1, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion Requesting Production of Discovery. The motion, seeking discovery under Rule 16, but filed after sentencing, was denied as procedurally inappropriate because Rule 16 applies to pre-trial proceedings. Further, as there was no pending post-trial proceeding, there was no basis for the Court to order discovery.
DI # 43.
DI # 45.
6. On February 1, 2016, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Motion argues that (1) the guilty plea was coerced because Defendant's trial attorney failed to advise him of the possible penalty of an adverse verdict and the burden of proof that the state needs to prove its case; (2) Defendant's trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress evidence; and (3) Defendant was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to put sufficient effort into motions.
7. Before ruling on Defendant's Motion, the record was enlarged and Defendant's trial counsel submitted an Affidavit and the State also filed a response to the Motion.
DI # 53.
DI # 54. Defendant did not file a reply brief by the date set by the Court (DI # 51).
8. While the Motion for Postconviction Relief was pending, on May 12, 2016, Defendant filed his second post-sentencing Motion for Discovery and Inspection pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 seeking discovery relating to statements, reports and other evidence in the case.
DI # 52.
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT'S RULE 61 MOTION
9. The procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 must be addressed before considering the merits of any argument. Defendant's motion was timely filed, and to the extent the motion raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Rule 61 motion is the appropriate vehicle for these claims. Defendant has merely re-couched his claims that were previously raised and adjudicated, as ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to file certain motions and to advise him of the possible penalty of an adverse verdict. The latter issue was addressed by the Court by way of the Order dated February 4, 2016, denying the Defendant's Motion for Reduction/Modification of Sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. Even when considered anew though, Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be denied.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
See, Malin v. State, 2009 WL 537060, at *5 (Del. Super., Mar. 4, 2009).
10. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonably professional under the circumstances.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hitchens v. State, 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000); Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997) (citations omitted).
State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Del. Super. 1994) (citations omitted).
11. Although no motion to suppress was filed, Defendant has failed to offer any basis for the Court to believe that such a motion (or any other motions) had merit or would have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice, rather, a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice. A failure to state with particularity the nature of any prejudice experienced is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant simply argues generally that a motion should have been filed but fails to provide any additional details in support. Defendant's former counsel attests that he did not file a motion to suppress evidence as lacking merit. Great weight and deference are given to tactical decisions by the trial attorney and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue motions that lack merit. Further, by pleading guilty, Defendant waived the right to challenge the State's evidence. In consideration of the facts and circumstances herein, Defendant has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of reasonable professional conduct under the circumstances.
Younger, 580 A.2d at 556.
Hoskins v. State, 2014 WL 4722716, at *3 (Del., Sept. 22, 2014), quoting Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
State v. Miller, 2013 WL 871320, at *4 (Del. Super., Feb. 26, 2013).
State v. Matthews, 2016 WL 354875 (Del. Super., Jan. 27, 2016) (denying motion for postconviction relief when defendant pled guilty and later attacked lack of chemical test report).
12. With respect to the argument that the plea was "coerced," a review of the transcript from the hearing does not support this argument. During the plea colloquy, in response to questions from the Court, Defendant acknowledged the Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing form, indicated he was satisfied with his counsel's representation, and acknowledged that by pleading guilty he was waiving certain rights including the right to a trial. Thereafter, the Defendant pled guilty to Rape in the Second Degree and two counts of Robbery Second Degree.
July 9, 2015 Transcript of Plea Colloquy (hereinafter "Tr. at ___").
Tr. at pgs. 5-6.
Tr. at pg. 6. Notably, if Defendant had not pled guilty he would have been facing significant additional charges including Rape First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and two counts of Rape First Degree.
13. The Court engaged in a detailed colloquy with the Defendant and confirmed that it was made knowingly and voluntarily. The plea colloquy, the Plea Agreement, the Truth-in-Sentencing Form, and counsel's Affidavit, reflect Defendant's awareness of the terms of the plea, the mandatory minimum penalty and the possible maximum penalty. Moreover, Defendant acknowledged that he fully understood the charges against him and that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant has provided no basis to deviate from the Court's decision to accept the plea and he has offered no facts or circumstances to support coercion. The guilty plea colloquy was thorough and covered all necessary aspects of the waiver of Defendant's rights. Defendant has thus failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was coerced.
See Tr. at pg. 5-6:
THE COURT: Do you understand that you could be sentenced up to 35 years in prison?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand the first ten years are mandatory?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
The Truth-in-Sentencing form indicates a minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years and a total consecutive maximum penalty of 35 years.
Tr. at pgs. 6-7.
Windsor v. State, 2015 WL 5679751 , at *3 (Del., Sept. 25, 2015) (holding that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, defendant is bound by his sworn statements).
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION
14. The recently filed Motion for Discovery and Inspection is duplicative of the motion filed on February 1, 2016, that was denied by the Court as improperly submitted after sentencing. Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 applies to pre-trial discovery and does not afford relief to a Defendant post-sentencing. However, this Court possesses the "inherent authority under Rule 61 in the exercise of its discretion to grant particularized discovery for good cause shown." The defendant will not be permitted to engage in a "fishing expedition" but rather must present a compelling reason for the discovery. Defendant has not articulated any reasonable grounds or legal basis, let alone "good cause" or a "compelling reason" for the discovery. Rather, Defendant merely signed a form version of the standard Rule 16 request that is typically issued by the defense to the State. It is also evident from the record that on several occasions, the State sent discovery materials to Defendant's counsel prior to the guilty plea having been entered. Defendant did not argue that the information/documentation had not previously been provided nor did he argue a basis to allow the discovery at the postconviction stage. Therefore, the motion should be denied.
See Motion Requesting Production of Discovery, DI # 45 and Order, DI # 45.
State v. Rivera, 2014 WL 2538678, at *1 (Del. Super., June 4, 2014), quoting, State v. Jackson, 2006 WL 1229684, at *2 (Del. Super., May 3 2006).
Id.
See e.g. DI #s 8, 11, 15, 21. --------
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief should be DENIED and the Motion for Discovery and Inspection should be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
Commissioner Katharine L. Mayer