Opinion
No. 07-1021.
Filed April 15, 2008.
Beaufort County No. 06CRS051607.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 19 March 2007 by Judge Christopher B. McLendon in District Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 March 2008.
Kimberly T. Edwards and Seth H. Edwards, for the State. Watsi M. Sutton for surety.
In determining whether a defendant or surety is entitled to relief from a final judgment of forfeiture, the trial court "need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters." Here, the State of North Carolina argues that the trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact as to the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to set aside the final judgment of forfeiture. Because the trial court's order does not contain appropriate findings and conclusions indicating the requisite "extraordinary circumstances" to set aside the judgment, we remand.
State v. Rakina, 49 N.C. App. 537, 540-41, 272 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1980), disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 221, 277 S.E.2d 70 (1981).
On 21 April 2006, Defendant Christopher Credle was released from jail on a $5,000 bond executed by surety Joseph Boston. Defendant was scheduled to appear for a hearing in Beaufort County District Court on 1 June 2006, but he failed to appear when he was called in open court. On 13 June 2006, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the appearance bond, and Mr. Boston was served with notice of forfeiture on that date. On 1 July 2006, Defendant was arrested by the Washington Police Department. On 10 July 2006, Defendant's case was transferred from District Court to Superior Court because the crime was a felony.
Mr. Boston failed to file a motion to set aside the forfeiture within 150 days from the date of the notice of forfeiture. Accordingly, final judgment of forfeiture was entered on 10 November 2006. On 8 December 2006, Mr. Boston filed a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment of Forfeiture, arguing that extraordinary circumstances existed, as the case had been disposed of on 10 July 2006, according to a record check of Defendant that Mr. Boston attached to his motion.
Mr. Boston's motion was heard on 2 March 2007, and on 19 March 2007, the trial court entered an order remitting $2,000 of the bond to Mr. Boston.
On appeal, the State of North Carolina argues the trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact or conclusions of law as to the existence of extraordinary circumstances. Once a final judgment of forfeiture has been entered, a defendant or surety is only entitled to relief from the judgment if "the person seeking relief was not given notice . . ." or "[o]ther extraordinary circumstances exist that the court, in its discretion, determines should entitle that person to relief." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.8(b) (2005).
In the context of bond forfeitures, the term "extraordinary circumstances" has been defined as "going beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary[;] of, relating to, or having the nature of an occurrence or risk of a kind other than what ordinary experience or prudence would foresee." State v. Edwards, 172 N.C. App. 821, 825, 616 S.E.2d 634, 636 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 69, 623 S.E.2d 776 (2005). We review whether the evidence rises to the level of "extraordinary circumstances" for an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only "upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact regarding extraordinary circumstances, we have held that under Rule 52 of our Rules of Civil Procedure, "the court need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters." State v. Rakina, 49 N.C. App. 537, 540-41, 272 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1980), disc. review denied, 302 N.C. 221, 277 S.E.2d 70 (1981). "A finding of such essential facts as lay a basis for the decision is sufficient." Id. Here, the State of North Carolina argues that in the trial court's order, it neither mentioned extraordinary circumstances nor made any findings of fact or conclusions of law as to the existence of extraordinary circumstances. We agree.
The trial court made the following findings of fact in its order:
3. The Surety presented evidence that the defendant in this matter, Christopher Michael Credle, was tried and convicted in the Beaufort County Courts on 2006, which date was less than two (2) months after the Order for Arrest was issued, and was within the One Hundred and Fifty days after notice of the forfeiture had been issued.
4. The Surety would have been entitled to relief from the final judgment, if a motion to set aside the forfeiture had been filed after the defendant['s] . . . case was disposed of on July 27, 2006.
. . .
7. That the court in its discretion, in the interest of justice, and as a matter of equity, finds that part of the bond forfeiture previously entered should be remitted.
Although the trial court's findings of fact would be sufficient to set aside a forfeiture pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5, the 150-day period during which the court could set aside the judgment because all charges had "been finally disposed" of had expired. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5 (2005); see State v. Moore, 57 N.C. App. 676, 679, 292 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1982) ("The 90 day period during which the court could set aside the judgment `in the interest of justice' pursuant to G.S. 15A-544(e) had expired."), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 628, 315 S.E.2d 694 (1984). On the 150th day after Mr. Boston was given notice of Defendant's forfeiture, the forfeiture became a final judgment which could only be overturned upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-544.6,-544.8.
Pursuant to section 15A-544.5: "[a] forfeiture shall be set aside for any one of the following reasons, and none other . . . (2) All charges for which the defendant was bonded to appear have been finally disposed by the court other than by the State's taking dismissal with leave, as evidenced by a copy of an official court record, including an electronic record." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-544.5(b).
Here, the order does not contain appropriate findings and conclusions indicating that the requisite "extraordinary circumstances" to set aside the judgment have been shown. See Moore, 57 N.C. App. at 680, 292 S.E.2d at 156 (vacating and remanding the trial court's order for entry of appropriate findings where the order did not contain appropriate findings and conclusions of "extraordinary cause"). Because the trial court failed to make any findings or conclusions regarding extraordinary circumstances, we cannot effectively review its decision. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for it to review the evidence of record, make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter an order supported by the conclusions of law. See State v. Lanier, 93 N.C. App. 779, 781, 379 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1989) (remanding the case to the trial court where it failed to apply the requisite "extraordinary cause" test in its findings of fact and conclusions of law).
Because this matter must be remanded to the trial court for it to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether "extraordinary circumstances" are shown, we do not reach the remaining issues.
Remanded.
Judges BRYANT and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).