Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Victoria L. Voight, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender James R. Grant, for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Michelle Lynn Bailey (“Defendant”) appeals from three orders entered by the trial court upon modification of her probation. The violations admitted by Defendant and found as fact by the trial court constitute sufficient “good cause shown” to extend Defendant's period of probation under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) (2013). We affirm the trial court's orders.

I. Background

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of sale or delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance on 29 May 2012. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of twelve to fifteen months, suspended the sentences, and placed her on supervised probation. In two of the judgments, the trial court imposed a probation period of thirty-six months. The third judgment imposed thirty-nine months of probation.

A probation officer accused Defendant of violating multiple conditions of her probation in violation reports dated 27 February 2014. In 14 CRS 816 and 817, the officer alleged four violations: (1) testing positive for opiates on three occasions; (2) making no payments toward the monetary conditions of probation, resulting in an arrearage of $677.92; (3) knowingly associating with known users, possessors, or sellers of controlled substances on two occasions; and (4) being charged with a criminal offense. The violation report filed in 14 CRS 818 alleged the three non-monetary violations also alleged in 14 CRS 816–17. Defendant's probation officer filed addenda to these violation reports on 4 March 2014 and 11 April 2014, alleging that Defendant had been charged with additional crimes.

At a hearing on 22 May 2014, Defendant admitted to willfully violating the conditions of probation as alleged in “all paragraphs” of the 27 February 2014 violation reports, “except the new charges.” The State advised the trial court that the criminal charges alleged in the addenda had yet to be resolved. Based on the violations admitted by Defendant, the trial court modified the conditions of her probation as follows:

In each case I'm going to modify the terms and conditions of probation and order that she serve three months in the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections [sic] as a split. They will run consecutive one to another....

As it relates to the judgment in 14–CRS–816, I'm going to modify that in two ways. I'm going to modify the initial term of the probation to being thirty-six months because th[e]re's no finding by the Court that any longer period of probation is necessary. I think it would be necessary for thirty-nine months. But in each case, then, I'm going to extend her probation for a term of twelve months. She will be subject to the same terms and conditions of the original judgment.

SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1343.2(d)(4) (2013) (capping the original period of probation for a felony at 36 months, “[u]nless the court makes specific findings that [a] longer ... period of probation [is] necessary).

The trial court entered three “Order[s] on Modification of Probation” on 22 May 2014. The orders entered in 14 CRS 817 and 818 require Defendant to serve 90 days of special probation in the North Carolina Division of Adult Correction and extend Defendant's thirty-six month probation period by twelve months.

In 14 CRS 816, the order imposes another 90 days of special probation, reduces Defendant's original thirty-nine month probation period to thirty-six months, and extends this period of probation by twelve months. In accordance with the ruling announced in open court, the orders require Defendant to serve her three periods of special probation consecutively.

Defendant filed timely notice of appeal from the trial court's orders.

II. Issues

Defendant claims the trial court erred in extending her probation period without finding that there was “good cause” for an extension as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d). The State has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the extension of Defendant's probation by twelve months constitutes neither the activation of her sentence nor the imposition of a special probation so as to give her a statutory right of appeal under N.C. Gen. § 15A–1347(a) (2013).

III. Analysis

A. Right of Appeal

We hold Defendant's appeal is properly taken. Under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27, a right of appeal lies directly to this Court “[f]rom any ... order or judgment of the superior court from which an appeal is authorized by statute.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b)(4) (2013).

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347 provides that, “[w]hen a superior court judge, as a result of a finding of a violation of probation, activates a sentence or imposes special probation,... the defendant may appeal under G.S. 7A–27.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347(a) (2013) (emphasis added). Each of the orders sub judiceimposes special probation as a result of a superior court judge's finding of a violation of probation. Therefore, Defendant “may appeal under G.S. 7A–27.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347(a) (2013).

While Defendant's appeal does not challenge the trial court's imposition of special probation, we read N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347(a) as triggering a general right of appeal, not as limiting the issues that may be raised therein. CompareN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1347(a) (defining “[w]hen” a defendant “may appeal under G.S. 7A–27 ”) withN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1444(a1), (a2), (e) (2013) (limiting scope of appeal following a guilty plea). The State's motion to dismiss is denied. We also dismiss as moot Defendant's alternative petition for writ of certiorari.

B. Good Cause Shown

Defendant asserts N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) requires a finding of “good cause shown” in order to extend a period of probation. Defendant argues the trial court neither announced a finding of good cause at the violation hearing, nor checked the box on the AOC–CR–609 form order to indicate that the extension of her probation was “for good cause shown, pursuant to G.S. 15A–1344(d).” Defendant argues the trial court failed to provide any reason for its decision.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) provides that

[a]t any time prior to the expiration or termination of the probation period or in accordance with subsection (f) of this section, the court may after notice and hearing and for good cause shown extend the period of probation up to the maximum allowed under G.S. 15A–1342(a) and may modify the conditions of probation.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) (2013).

[T]he clear language of the statute requires that (1) defendant be notified that a hearing will take place, (2) a hearing actually take place at which defendant is present or has failed to appear after a reasonable effort to notify him, and (3) good cause be shown for the modification.

State v. Willis, 199 N.C.App. 309, 310, 680 S.E.2d 772, 774 (2009). We find no prior authority interpreting N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) to require the trial court to make a written finding of “good cause” when extending the term of a defendant's probation in response to one or more violations.

The decision cited by Defendant, State v. Love,involved the requirements of a different statute, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1343.2(d), which provides as follows:

Unless the court makes specific findings that longer or shorter periods of probation are necessary,the length of the original period of probation for offenders sentenced under Article 81B shall be as follows:

(1) For misdemeanants sentenced to community punishment, not less than six nor more than 18 months.

State v. Love, 156 N.C.App. 309, 317, 576 S.E.2d 709, 714 (2003) (emphasis added).

In Love,this Court held that “the trial court violated this statutory mandate by sentencing Mr. Love to twenty-four months supervised probation without making specific findings of fact that a longer period of probation was necessary.” Id.We remanded for resentencing and explained “[t]he trial court must reduce defendant's probation to the statutory period of [six to eighteen months] or enter appropriate findings of fact that a longer period of probation is necessary.” Id.at 318, 576 S.E.2d 709, 576 S.E.2d at 714 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Sale,–––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 754 S.E.2d 474, 476 (2014).

Unlike the statutory language at issue in Love,N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) mandates no “specific findings” or “findings” of any kind. Rather, it requires only “notice and hearing” and “good cause shown” before a court may extend or modify a defendant's probation. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) (2013) (emphasis added).

By contrast, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(f) allows the court to alter probation after the expiration of the probation period only if the court “findsfor good cause shown and statedthat the probation should be extended, modified or revoked.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(f)(3) (2013) (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court announced the following basis for its decision to modify Defendant's probation:

I'll find she's willfully violated the terms and conditions of her probation set forth in Paragraphs, 1, 2 and 3 on the probation-violation report dated February 27, 2014. The State is not proceeding on any of the other violations on the report or addendum. The defendant, by and through counsel, stipulated those violations were willful and without justifiable excuse.

The trial court found Defendant had willfully violated her probation, as alleged in the 27 February 2014 violation reports. These violations provide sufficient cause for extending her probation under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d). While Defendant notes the trial court's failure to check the box for “good cause shown” on the order form, this box serves to provide a basis for the trial court's decision to extend the probationary period in the absence of a found violation. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) (2013). Each of the orders from which Defendant appealed includes a finding of multiple violations by Defendant.

IV. Conclusion

“[A] grant of probation is a privilege afforded by the court and not a right to which a felon is entitled. In view of this fact, the court is given considerable discretion in determining whether good cause exists for modifying the terms of probation.” State v. Coltrane, 58 N.C.App. 210, 212, 292 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.C. 511, 299 S.E.2d 199 (1983). Given the trial court's broad discretion in reviewing and responding to violations of probation, we decline to incorporate into N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1344(d) an additional fact-finding requirement that is not found in the plain text of the statute. The orders appealed from are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judges BRYANT and DIETZ concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

Opinion

Appeal by defendant from orders entered 22 May 2014 by Judge Gary Gavenus in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April 2015.