Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0074
07-08-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Steven Anaya, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20164016001 The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Judge Vasquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge O'Neil and Judge Kelly concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VASQUEZ, JUDGE
¶1 Following a jury trial, Steven Anaya was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to a combination of concurrent and consecutive prison terms, the longest of which is natural life. On appeal, Anaya argues there was insufficient evidence to support the state's felony murder theory and the court therefore erred by denying his motions for acquittal under Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P.For the following reasons, we affirm.
Because Anaya does not challenge his convictions and sentences for attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, we affirm them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(6), (7) (appellate opening brief must contain "statement of issues presented for review" and argument containing "contentions with supporting reasons for each contention" with appropriate citations to supporting legal authority and references to the record on which appellant relies); cf. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) ("Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim.").
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 "We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts." State v. Miles, 211 Ariz. 475, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). In August 2016, A.G. and F.G. had driven up from Mexico in F.G.'s four-door pickup truck to retrieve a quad that F.G. had purchased and for A.G. to buy a Honda engine he found on the internet for $650.
¶3 The following day, A.G. and F.G. picked up Anaya, who needed a ride to "take his daughter to an appointment." Anaya got into the passenger side backseat of the truck at approximately 4:32 p.m. At 4:38 p.m., a surveillance camera showed F.G. running away from his parked truck into the desert.
¶4 In the less than six-minute time span between Anaya getting into the truck and F.G. running away, Anaya shot A.G. twice in his back through the passenger seat and once in his head, killing him. F.G. then veered off the road and, as he tried to exit the truck, Anaya shot F.G. in the arm and tried to shoot him in the head but failed when the gun malfunctioned, allowing F.G. to escape.
¶5 When Tucson Police detectives found the truck later that evening, A.G.'s body was still buckled in the passenger seat. They later learned that A.G.'s gold necklace that he "never took off" was missing, as was the $650 cash to purchase the Honda motor. The next day, Anaya pawned A.G.'s necklace for $300. When Anaya was arrested several weeks later, police recovered the handgun that was used to kill A.G. and shoot F.G.
¶6 A grand jury indicted Anaya for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited possessor. After a seven-day trial in 2018, a jury found Anaya guilty on all counts. Anaya appealed. This court affirmed Anaya's prohibited possessor conviction and sentence but vacated all other convictions and remanded for a new trial. State v. Anaya, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0225 (Ariz. App. Apr. 23, 2021) (mem. decision).
¶7 Anaya was tried again in January 2023. At the close of the state's case-in-chief and again at the close of evidence, Anaya moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20, arguing there was insufficient evidence to prove armed robbery as a predicate for felony murder. The trial court denied both motions. The jury found Anaya guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Discussion
¶8 Anaya argues the trial court erred by denying his Rule 20 motions for acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support the state's theory that he committed armed robbery as a predicate to felony murder. We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011).
¶9 "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)). We will reverse only if no substantial evidence supports the conviction. State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 7 (App. 2005). "Substantial evidence is such proof that 'reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Sharma, 216 Ariz. 292, ¶ 7 (App. 2007) (quoting Mathers, 165 Ariz. at 67)). Substantial evidence includes both circumstantial and direct evidence. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16. "[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence," State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Carriger, 123 Ariz. 335, 339 (1979). "To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury." State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316 (1987).
¶10 Here, the state was required to prove that Anaya committed or attempted to commit armed robbery and, in the course of that offense, he caused A.G.'s death. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). Under A.R.S. § 13-1902(A), a person commits robbery if "in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property." The offense is elevated to "armed robbery" when the person uses a deadly weapon while committing the offense. A.R.S. § 13-1904(B). Robbery may be established "when the use of force precedes the actual taking of property, so long as the use of force is accompanied with the intent to take another's property." State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 421 (1990).
¶11 On appeal, Anaya argues there was "no evidence and no testimony" to prove he shot A.G. "in furtherance of a previously formulated plan to obtain money and a gold chain from him," nor that he "engaged [A.G.] with a weapon with the intent to rob him." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding Anaya's conviction, as we are required to do, the record is sufficient here. See West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16. At trial, Anaya testified that he was in F.G.'s truck on the date of the incident with a gun he had procured from a prior prison cellmate. Phone logs, surveillance videos, and F.G.'s trial testimony established that the entire incident lasted approximately six minutes. F.G. also testified that he saw Anaya "shoot[] [A.G.] in the head" before turning the gun on F.G. and firing it at him. DNA evidence confirmed that Anaya had handled the gun, and a detective testified that the trajectory of the shots fired at A.G. came from where Anaya had been sitting in the truck. Anaya testified that he had A.G.'s gold necklace after the shootings, and admitted to pawning it the following day. Anaya had the gun in his possession when he was arrested two weeks later. He also admitted to cleaning the gun and altering his appearance after the incident.
¶12 Although Anaya does not dispute this evidence, he nevertheless maintains the state failed to prove he had the requisite intent to support an armed-robbery conviction and, thus, failed to establish he committed felony murder. Relying on State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258 (1988) and State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362 (1986), Anaya argues that for the offense of robbery to be committed, "the intent to take a victim's property must motivate a defendant's use or threat of force, but deciding to take a person's property after the use of violence or intimidation has ended constitutes theft." He maintains that "the takings" in this case did not amount to armed robbery because he had "absolutely no intent to take the necklace during the altercation" and there was "no evidence to contradict [his] accidental possession of the necklace."
However, Anaya testified that a fourth man was sitting next to him in the back seat and the shots were fired after the man had threatened him with the gun and Anaya tried to take it away. He further testified that after he successfully got the gun, he shot F.G. in the arm in an attempt to get F.G. to stop the truck so he could escape from what he believed was a kidnapping.
¶13 In Lopez, the defendant killed the victim and then took the victim's billfold and car in order to flee the scene, destroy evidence, and delay identification of the body. 158 Ariz. at 264. Our supreme court determined there was no evidence to show that Lopez had "'lured' [the victim] to the site of the killing for the purpose of robbing him," nor that he "had an intent to commit a robbery while [he was] using force against [the victim]." Id. Because the defendant's decision to take property occurred after the murder, which was committed for purposes unrelated to taking the property, the court found insufficient evidence to sustain a charge for armed robbery and, therefore, reversed the defendant's conviction. Id.
¶14 In Wallace, the defendant and his girlfriend, S.I., had an argument during which she told the defendant to move out. 151 Ariz. at 364. The defendant killed S.I. and her two children the following day. Id. After the murders, the defendant took $10 from S.I.'s wallet and drove her truck to the liquor store, because he "needed to . . . get drunk." Id. at 364, 365-66. Our supreme court noted the evidence showed that the defendant's decision to take the money "occurred only after [S.I.] was dead," and that his use of force was not "intended to 'coerce surrender' of her money and truck." Id. at 366. The court therefore concluded that the record "lacked sufficiently 'strong evidence'" to prove armed robbery. Id.
¶15 Lopez and Wallace are distinguishable. In those cases, the defendants formed the intent to take property after committing murder, and for purposes other than possession of the property itself. In contrast, Anaya admitted at trial "there's no doubt he took [the necklace]" and that he pawned it the following day for $300. He also admitted to a history of committing burglary and trading drugs for tools, which he would then pawn for money. Anaya claimed he acquired the necklace accidentally and pawned it the next day out of some sense of "poetic justice" over a purported altercation with A.G. leading to the shots being fired. See State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556-57 (1974).
Anaya also asserts the state's argument that he took the $650 was "pure speculation," but F.G. testified that A.G. was carrying at least that much money to "buy the engine that he needed, and for expenses." The money was not recovered from A.G.'s body. It is exclusively the province of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony. State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556-57 (1974).
Specifically, Anaya testified that he did not "recall grabbing" A.G.'s necklace, claiming instead that the 24.8-gram chain must have inadvertently "attached to [his] clothing in some way" and that he only realized it was in his possession later as he pulled his phone out of his pocket and the necklace suddenly appeared "on [his] lap." Anaya relies solely on this part of his own testimony to counter the state's theory of intent. Again, however, the jury was not obligated to accept Anaya's testimony. See Clemons, 110 Ariz. at 556-57.
To the extent Anaya suggests there was no armed robbery because A.G. was dead at the time Anaya took his necklace, we reject this argument. See Lopez, 158 Ariz. at 264 (armed robbery is taking property against a victim's will, and "it may be presumed that a taking is against a victim's will when the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim had not consented to the taking and was physically unable to do so, whether from voluntary or involuntary causes.").
¶16 Criminal "intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence, as a defendant's state of mind 'is seldom, if ever, susceptible of proof by direct evidence.'" State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, ¶ 13 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. Lester, 11 Ariz.App. 408, 410 (1970)). When a person has not made an "outright admission regarding his state of mind, his mental state must necessarily be ascertained by inference from all relevant surrounding circumstances." In re William G., 192 Ariz. 208, 213 (App. 1997). The state established a timeline of events that, when combined with the witness's testimony and Anaya's conduct after the shooting, provided ample evidence that Anaya intended to take A.G.'s gold necklace, and that he killed A.G. in furtherance of that robbery. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1105(A)(2), 13-1902(A), 13-1904(B). To the extent Anaya's testimony suggests a different version of events, it is solely "for the jury to weigh [conflicting] evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). This principle applies equally to testimony of a defendant, which the jury has the right to believe in whole, in part, or not at all. Clemons, 110 Ariz. at 557.
Among other inconsistencies, Anaya testified that after he was picked up, F.G. drove to a stash house a "few minutes away" where they stopped for five-to-ten minutes. The state's evidence, on the other hand, showed that A.G. was shot within about six minutes after Anaya got into F.G.'s truck.
¶17 Our reasoning is supported by Comer, 165 Ariz. 413. There, the defendant killed a man from a neighboring campsite and then stole money and supplies from the victim. Id. at 416-17. The defendant argued there was no evidence of intent to commit a robbery because he took the victim's property after his death. Id. at 421. Citing the defendant's financial condition and the fact that he took property from the victim's campsite "as soon as practicable following the shooting," our supreme court determined "the only reasonable inference based on the evidence" was that the defendant shot the victim "in furtherance of his previously formulated plan to obtain money and supplies." Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that armed robbery requires coexistence of the use of force and the taking of property, confirming instead that armed robbery can be proven where the use of force is accompanied with the intent to take another's property. Id. at 420-21; see also Lopez, 158 Ariz. at 264 (killing victim does not immunize defendant from robbery conviction).
¶18 In sum, the state established that the entire incident- including the murder, the attempted murder, and the taking of property- occurred within a six-minute time span. When combined with eye-witness testimony, DNA analysis, ballistics, and Anaya's actions after the shootings, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded that Anaya intended to take A.G.'s necklace, and that he killed A.G. and attempted to kill F.G. in furtherance of that robbery. See State v. Miguel, 125 Ariz. 538, 541 (App. 1980) (Arizona's robbery statute "makes clear that the threats or force may be directed against 'any person,' not necessarily only against the person dispossessed of the property" at issue (quoting § 13-1902(A))). The trial court did not err in denying Anaya's Rule 20 motions.
Disposition
¶19 Anaya's convictions and sentences are affirmed.