Summary
In State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 124 S.W.2d 1072, this court refused to quash the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Wors v. Tarlton, 95 S.W.2d 1199. The plaintiff in that case had been paid compensation under the Compensation Act by his immediate employer.
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. St. Louis Car Co. v. HostetterOpinion
February 7, 1939.
1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION: Award Binding. An award made by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission while acting within the scope of its authority is as binding as a judgment of the court would be in the same circumstances.
2. JUDGMENT: Jurisdictional Question. A court of record will be deemed to have decided a jurisdictional or other question consistently with the judgment rendered, even though there was no express finding thereon, if the decision of such question was necessarily involved in arriving at the conclusion announced.
But where the Supreme Court has not passed upon a question whether that doctrine is applicable to the holdings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal, whose awards are made conclusive by Section 3342, Revised Statutes 1929, it cannot be said that the holding of the Court of Appeals on that subject contravenes decisions of the Supreme Court.
3. CERTIORARI: Conflict: Conclusions of Fact. While the Supreme Court on certiorari to the Court of Appeals is bound by the conclusions on the facts by that court, the Supreme Court is not bound by its legal conclusion on those facts, if such conclusion conflicts with Supreme Court decisions.
When a court's jurisdiction depends upon disputed facts, its findings thereon cannot be questioned collaterally; but when the jurisdictional facts are undisputed the question of jurisdiction becomes a matter of law and may be raised collaterally.
4. CERTIORARI: Conflict: Master and Servant: Res Judicata. Where an employee of a railroad company, while leveling dirt on a car which was being loaded, was injured by an employee of a contractor who was making an excavation for the railroad company and loading the car, and where the injured employee received compensation from his employer, the railroad company, awarded by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, in a subsequent suit by such employee against the contractor doing the excavating and its employee who did the damage, a holding by the Court of Appeals in general terms that the loading and unloading of an interstate shipment was part of interstate commerce does not show a conflict with the Supreme Court decision based on similar facts.
In such suit where the Court of Appeals in affirming a judgment for the defendant quoted from plaintiff's petition to the effect that the loading of dirt in the railroad cars was done independently of the supervision or direction, or right of supervision on the part of the plaintiff's employer, there is no authority from any jurisdiction holding that, under the circumstances, the work of loading would be a part of interstate commerce.
5. MASTER AND SERVANT: Workmen's Compensation Commission: Interstate Commerce: Res Judicata. In an action by an employee of a railroad company for injuries caused by the employee of a contractor with the railroad company, while plaintiff was assisting in loading dirt upon a car which the contractor was to haul, a holding by the Court of Appeals that a decision of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding plaintiff compensation was binding upon and inured to the benefit of the contractor under Section 3308, Revised Statutes 1929, was not in conflict with the ruling of the Supreme Court in any cases cited.
Where the meaning of a statute is debatable the Supreme Court cannot on certiorari overturn a construction of the Court of Appeals thereof because the Supreme Court may think it violates some canon of construction.
Whether the Supreme Court thinks the construction of the Court of Appeals is right or wrong the Supreme Court cannot interfere on certiorari unless it has previously given a different construction to the statute; if the construction turns on its application to specific facts the Supreme Court must have construed it with reference to the same or similar facts.
When a statute can plainly have only one meaning under the canons of construction and the Court of Appeals gives it another meaning, the Supreme Court may interfere because there the necessary effect of such erroneous holding is to violate the canons of construction, but that is not the case under consideration.
On Motion for Rehearing.6. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION: Award. Since the proof in the case is abundant that the final receipt, executed by the plaintiff for compensation awarded by the Compensation Commission, expressly releases the employer from all liability as provided under Section 3333 Revised Statutes 1929, for a compromise lump sum, and where the parties went before the referee and it was again stated that the settlement was final as contemplated by that section, such settlement under that section when approved by the Commission is even more conclusive than an ordinary award by the Commission on disputed evidence, and is irrecovable.
WRIT QUASHED.
Foristel, Mudd, Blair Habenicht for relator.
(1) The court erred in holding that relator by his act in applying to the Compensation Commission for compensation against his employer, the Terminal Company, and accepting compensation under such award became estopped to pursue his common-law action against Midwest as a third person, and in so holding, the court, in its opinion is in conflict with the last controlling decision of this court, to-wit Gieseking v. Railroad Co., 94 S.W.2d 375. (2) The court erred in holding that although Midwest was not a party to the proceedings before the Compensation Commission, yet the award of the Commission was res adjudicata and conclusive against relator on the issue whether, at the time of his injury, he was engaged in interstate commerce, and in so holding the court conflicted with the following decisions: Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; National, etc., Co. v. Lbr. Co., 325 Mo. 807; Summett v. City Realty Co., 208 Mo. 501; State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 330 Mo. 608; Hauser v. Hoffmann, 32 Mo. 334; Cooley v. Warren, 53 Mo. 169. (3) The court in its opinion construed Section 3308 as creating a secondary liability of Midwest for the injuries of the plaintiff and that that in turn brought Midwest into such privity with the Terminal Company, with respect to relator's injuries, as made the award binding against plaintiff on the issue whether he was, at the time of his injury, engaged in interstate commerce. In such construction of the statute the opinion conflicts with the following controlling decisions of this court: Meyering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 892; State ex rel. v. Caulfield, 333 Mo. 277; O'Malley v. Life Ins. Co., 75 S.W.2d 839; Bowers v. Mo. Mut. Assn., 333 Mo. 505; Cummins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 684; Thompson v. Lamar, 17 S.W.2d 968; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 329 Mo. 500; St. Louis v. Senter Comm. Co., 337 Mo. 247; State ex rel. v. Haid, 332 Mo. 704. (4) Where the facts upon which jurisdiction depends are agreed upon, or undisputed, the question of jurisdiction becomes a matter of law and may be urged in a collateral proceeding. State ex rel. v. Falkenhainer, 309 Mo. 224; State ex rel. v. Homer, 249 Mo. 65. (5) A judgment as respects its conclusive effect must bind both parties or it binds neither. Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; Henry v. Woods, 77 Mo. 281; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 69 Mo. 76.
Anderson, Gilbert, Wolfort, Allen Bierman for respondents.
(1) There is no conflict with the Supreme Court of Missouri or the Supreme Court of the United States in holding that the finding under Workmen's Compensation Act, unappealed from, is conclusive. State v. Mo. W.C.C., 8 S.W.2d 899; Railway v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757. The latter case holds that even where two proceedings are pending, one under Workmen's Compensation laws, and the other for recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that the first proceeding finally determined bars the other; that final determination that the injury was one covered by Workmen's Compensation Act barred claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Railway v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757. Even where a person may have two courses open to pursue remedy for an injury, if he follows one to judgment that bars the other, even though the parties suable are not the same. Smoot v. Judd, 184 Mo. 508. By accepting the award relator is precluded from disputing the jurisdiction and finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission that his injury was one covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 334. (2) It was not necessary for Midwest Industrial Development Company to be formally made a party to the proceeding before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Relator could have made it a party defendant with the Illinois Terminal Company. As between the Illinois Terminal Company and the Midwest Industrial Development Company, the Illinois Terminal Company was liable over to the Midwest Industrial Development Company, hence the judgment against the Illinois Terminal Company and the acceptance of the money by the relator discharged all liability of the Midwest Industrial Development Company. Long v. Mason, 273 Mo. 266, 200 S.W. 1062; Kansas City to use of Mo. Pac. Railroad Co. v. So. Sur. Co., 203 Mo. App. 148, 219 S.W. 727; Stearn Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 399, 32 L.Ed. 788. Wors, Midwest Industrial Development Company and Illinois Terminal Company all elected to come under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, and hence were bound by its terms as a matter of contract. Daggett v. Steel Co., 65 S.W.2d 1041. Under the election of Wors, Illinois Terminal and Midwest Industrial Development Company, all were privies by virtue of the contract terms of the act and adjudication is binding on privies. Summet v. Brokerage Co., 208 Mo. 501, 106 S.W. 614; State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 330 Mo. 617, 51 S.W.2d 13. After injury the only question to be determined was whether the injury was one covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. On Wors' application this was determined, and it was held that the injury was covered by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. There is nothing in the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act that authorizes an employee to split his right to recover under the Act. When he begins a proceeding under that act everything that can be determined in that proceeding must be determined, and the determination is conclusive. The question whether the injury was one to which the Compensation Act applied was one question which had to be adjudicated. Every question is considered as adjudicated which could have been adjudicated. City v. Powell, 73 S.W.2d 412. And a finding that as to one primarily liable precludes a dispute of the same question as to one secondarily liable, or jointly liable. Stevens v. Oberman Mfg. Co., 70 S.W.2d 899; McGinnis v. Railroad Co., 200 Mo. 347. And this is the rule not only in Missouri, but in other states also. Moore v. Ry. Co., 109 S.W. 497; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98; Jenkins v. Ry. Co., 71 S.E. 1012; Sonnentheil v. Moody, 56 S.W. 1001; Williams v. McGidde, 13 Minn. 53; Eastland County v. Davidson, 13 S.W.2d 673. Liability cannot exist as to Illinois Terminal Company because under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, and as to the Midwest, because the injury was not under the act. Maurice J. O'Sullivan and Leo T. Schwartz, amici curiae; J. Francis O'Sullivan of counsel.
Where an owner having work done in the usual course of business on its premises carries workmen's compensation insurance, and requires all subcontractors to carry such insurance on their employees, and pays the premium therefor by inclusion in the contract price, may an employee of one of its subcontractors prosecute an action at common law against said owner on the theory that it is a "third party," under the compensation act? The controlling statute is Section 3308, Revised Statutes 1929. The Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted for the general economic betterment of labor and in the interest of the general public, to promote the continued life and earning power of the individual, for the prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime. Such legislation bears so close a relation to the protection of lives and safety of those concerned that it is considered as coming within the category of police regulations. The objects and purposes sought to be accomplished have been comprehensively stated many times, so we deem repetition unnecessary. For the legislative history, analysis of the situations producing the legislation, consideration of the economic and social conditions and the evils sought to be remedied, reference is made to the following cases: N.Y. Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667, L.R.A. 1917D 1, Ann. Cases 1917D, 629; Solvuca v. Ryan Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 912; Stone v. Blackmer Post Pipe Co., 224 Mo. App. 319, 27 S.W.2d 460. On the ground of natural justice, it was deemed not unreasonable for the State to relieve the employer from responsibility for damages measured by common-law standards, and in lieu thereof to require him to contribute a reasonable amount and according to a reasonable and definite scale by way of compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it might chance to fall — that is, upon the injured employee or his dependents. The system was substituted to provide a definite and easily ascertainable compensation to supplant the former system under which an employee often assumed the risk of injury and in others had the right to recover an amount more or less speculative only upon proof of negligence, which in many cases was difficult to establish.
Jacob M. Lashly for Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, amicus curiae.
(1) Court of Appeals in deciding and construing certain sections of the Compensation Act (Secs. 3308-3309, R.S. 1929) to mean that an owner of premises on which work is carried on or a remote contractor remains at all times a "statutory employer" of all employees of a subcontractor or a contractor who has contracted with such owner or remote contractor to carry on certain work thereon regardless of whether the injured or complaining employee is insured by his immediate employer; and further that such an owner or remote contractor is entitled to all the benefits and immunities accorded any other employer under the provisions of the Compensation Act, and is not a "third person" within the meaning of said Section 3309, authorizing a common-law action for damages against a "third person" where liable to the employee or his dependents for the injury or death of said employee does not conflict with any previous decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri. (2) Because a decision and opinion of a Court of Appeals in construing certain sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act is as much within the province of the Court of Appeals as of the Supreme Court and cannot be called in question by certiorari where (as here) this court has never given the same sections of the statute a definite construction on the question involved. State ex rel. Superior Mineral Co. v. Hostetter, 337 Mo. 718, 85 S.W.2d 743; State ex rel. Arndt v. Cox, 327 Mo. 790, 38 S.W.2d 1079; State ex rel. Ott v. Trimble, 28 S.W.2d 75. (3) Because the Court of Appeals in its opinion and ruling did not fail to adhere to general rules of statutory construction laid down by this court, but, on the contrary, explicitly followed all cardinal rules of statutory construction heretofore expressed in the previous decisions of this court by giving effect to the Legislature's intent so as to promote the manifest purpose of the statute when considered historically. Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 272, 66 S.W.2d 920; White v. Macomber Co., 244 Mass. 195, 138 N.E. 239; State ex rel. Huber v. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52; McEvilly v. Myers Co., 211 Ky. 31, 276 S.W. 1068.
Cliff Langsdale for Missouri State Federation of Labor, Kansas City Building Trades Council and Kansas City Central Labor Union and Bartley Mayfield for St. Louis Building Trades Council and St. Louis Central Trades and Labor Union, amici curiae.
(1) Practically every compensation action in the United States has some provision similar to Section 3308 of the Missouri Act insofar as it is sought by workmen's compensation legislation to prevent the fraudulent sub-letting of work by the real employer for the purpose of escaping his liability to his employees under such acts. Two distinct and different methods have been adopted by the various State Legislatures in accomplishing that purpose. (2) Some of the states have made the principal or general contractor primarily liable for the payment of compensation to the employees of his subcontractors. Under the acts of those states the subcontractor's injured employee can proceed against the principal or general contractor as though he were his real employer. Because of the relationship created by those acts in making the principal or general contractor the real employer of the employees of his subcontractors for all purposes of the Compensation Act, and compelling him to carry compensation insurance on the employees of his subcontractor, the high courts of those states have held that an employee of a subcontractor injured through the negligence of the principal or general contractor cannot sue the principal or general contractor as a "third person" for damages. (3) Legislatures of other states (including Missouri) have sought to accomplish that purpose by requiring the principal or general contractor to compel his subcontractors to carry compensation insurance on their own employees. Where the subcontractor has insured his liability to his employees under the Workmen's Compensation Act, those acts exempt or relieve the principal or general contractor from all liability to pay compensation to the injured employees of the subcontractors. In all states having such provisions the high courts have ruled that an employee of a subcontractor injured through the negligence of the principal or general contractor can sue said principal or general contractor for damages as a "third person." In Mr. Jacob M. Lashly's brief filed in this case he quoted at length from a case which he described as "White v. George B.H. Macomber Co., 244 Mass. 1, 114 N.E. 829 (1923)." There is no such case at either the Massachusetts or the Northeastern citation. At the Northeastern citation is to be found the case of White v. George A. Fuller Co. The case of White v. George B.H. Macomber Co., may be found in 244 Mass. at page 195. The quotation set out in the brief cannot be found in the opinion of either case. Mr. Lashly has evidently quoted from some other Massachusetts case which quoted from the opinions of both the Fuller and the Macomber cases. It is held by the opinions in those cases that the principal or general contractor cannot be sued as a third person for damages for his negligence in injuring the servant of one of his subcontractors. The Massachusetts statute falls within the first classification above described in this brief. It makes the principal or general contractor primarily liable to the injured employees of his subcontractors for the payment of compensation, and requires him to carry compensation insurance to protect such employees. The section of the Massachusetts act which was construed by the opinion quoted from by Mr. Lashly is as follows: "Sec. 18, Chap. 152, General Laws of Massachusetts, 1921. Mr. Lashly refers to the case of State to the use of Hubert v. Benjamin F. Bennett Building Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52 (1928) as announcing the same rule as the Massachusetts cases. The Maryland statute is quite similar to the Massachusetts statute. The section construed in the above case is as follows: "Art. 101, Sec. 62, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1924.
Certiorari to the St. Louis Court of Appeals bringing up the record in Wors v. Tarlton et al., 95 S.W.2d 1199, a suit at common law for $7500 damages for personal injuries. In addition to the briefs for the relator and the respondents, we are favored with four briefs filed by amici curiae: Mr. Cliff Langsdale, representing the Missouri State Federation of Labor, the Kansas City Building Trades Council and the Kansas City Central Labor Union; Messrs. Bartley and Mayfield, representing the St. Louis Building Trades Council and the St. Louis Central Trades and Labor Union; Mr. Jacob M. Lashly, representing the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company; and Messrs. Maurice J. O'Sullivan and Leo T. Schwartz, who are defending in the Jackson County Circuit Court suits involving the main questions raised in the instant proceeding.
We shall give only a sketchy review of the facts, as they are rather fully stated in the reported opinion of BECKER, J., in the record under review. The Midwest Industrial and Development Company (hereinafter called the Midwest Co.) was engaged in erecting a building on land owned by it in St. Louis, Missouri. It entered into a contract with G.L. Tarlton to do the excavating but reserved to itself the control and supervision of the work, as a consequence of which, it may be said for the purposes of this proceeding, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies between the Midwest Co., and the employees of Tarlton. The Midwest Co. entered into a further, separate contract with the Illinois Terminal Company (hereinafter called the Terminal Co.) to build certain temporary railroad tracks to and upon the premises, and to transport the excavated material to Venice, Illinois, thereby involving a movement in interstate commerce. On March 31, 1931, the relator, Wors, an employee of the Terminal Co., was "trimming" or leveling off the dirt in a railroad car as it was being loaded, when a steam shovel operated by one of Tarlton's employees dumped a shovel full of dirt against him and injured him.
All of the four parties mentioned were under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. Two weeks after sustaining the injuries aforesaid, Wors began to receive partial compensation therefor from his immediate employer, the Terminal Co., on a claim he filed with the Compensation Commission, based upon a temporary agreement made with the company. Being unable to agree as to the full amount of compensation due him, he filed a formal claim with the Commission in September, 1931, to which the Terminal Co. filed answer. Evidence was heard, and the Commission made a temporary or partial award. The cause was called for further hearing on December 5, 1933, and, on appearance of the parties and their counsel, by stipulation a final and conclusive total award was entered in favor of Wors for $2276.62 for compensation and medical aid, under Section 3333, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8267). There was, of course, no appeal from that award. Tarlton and the Midwest Co. were not made parties to that proceeding and the defense was not interposed before the Workmen's Compensation Commission that Wors was engaged in interstate commerce when he was injured. While the Compensation proceeding was pending, Wors brought suit in the circuit court, as aforesaid, in August, 1931, against Tarlton and the Midwest Co., for damages for the same injuries. His immediate employer, the Terminal Co., was never joined as a party to that suit, and it was undetermined when Wors obtained his aforesaid final award in December, 1933.
See Opinion on Motion for Rehearing.
The defendant Midwest Co. thereupon interposed the plea of res judicata in the damage suit, claiming the compensation award to Wors barred his action against it, although it was not a party to the compensation proceeding. Wors answered: (1) that the Workmen's Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction to make the award in view of Section 3310, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8245), since his injuries were received in interstate commerce and governed exclusively by the Federal Employers' Liability Act; (2) that even if the compensation proceeding and award otherwise would operate as an estoppel, it could not do so in this case against the Midwest Co. because that company was not a party to the compensation proceeding, and was not bound by it; (3) that he (Wors) had the right to maintain the damage suit against the Midwest Co. as a "third party," independent of the Compensation Act, because his immediate employer, the Terminal Co. carried compensation insurance, in consequence of which the Midwest Co. was exempted from compensation liability and became a stranger to the employment under the last sentence of subsection (d) of Section 3308, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8242). It is unnecessary to state the issues as to the defendant Tarlton since he later dropped out of the case so far as concerns the controversy here.
The circuit court upheld the contentions of both Tarlton and the Midwest Co., whereupon the plaintiff Wors took an involuntary non-suit with leave to move to set the same aside. The motion when filed was denied and judgment was entered for both defendants. The respondent judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant Midwest Co., but reversed it and remanded the cause as to the defendant Tarlton. Wors, as relator here, contends that ruling as to the Midwest Co. contravenes controlling decisions of this court.
He first asserts the ruling of the respondent judges that the Workmen's Compensation proceeding barred his damage suit against the Midwest Co., contravenes our holdings in Gieseking v. Litchfield Ry. Co., 339 Mo. 1, 5, 94 S.W.2d 375, 376(1); State ex rel. Ward v. Trimble, 327 Mo. 773, 778, 39 S.W.2d 372, 374 (8); State ex rel. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Falkenhainer, 309 Mo. 224, 230-1, 274 S.W. 758, 760 (3-5). This is on the broad theory that the Workmen's Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction of his claim, and the same was governed solely by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, since he was engaged in work directly connected with interstate commerce when injured.
Section 3310, supra (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8245), in the Compensation Act provides: "this chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law. (Italics ours.) Further, Section 55 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (U.S.C.A., Title 45) denounces "any contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter" and makes it to that extent void. The Gieseking case holds the Federal Employers' Liability Act is exclusive in the field of interstate transportation; and that the acceptance of benefits under a State Compensation Act therefore will not bar a suit for damages for the same personal injuries brought under the Federal act, if they were in fact received while engaged in interstate commerce. The case goes on to say: "at least the United States Supreme Court has never yet ruled" to the contrary.
Counsel for respondents distinguish the Gieseking decision, arguing there was no determination by the Compensation Commission (of Illinois) in that case that the injuries for which benefits were received came within the State Compensation Act and were not inflicted in interstate commerce. We think that is correct. The Gieseking opinion speaks only of the "acceptance of benefits" by the plaintiff and says nothing about any decision by the Illinois Industrial Commission of the question whether the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce when injured. And an examination of the record in the cause shows that all the plaintiff there did was to accept benefits according to a schedule fixed by the Illinois Act. There was no arbitration or review by the Industrial Commission — no judgment or decision of any sort. So we conclude the Gieseking case is not controlling authority on the question whether a final determination by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission that a claimant's injuries were received in intrastate commerce will operate as an estoppel by judgment, and bar the prosecution of a suit brought by him under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages for the same injuries — though it may be authority to the effect that the acceptance of benefits will not operate as an estoppel by contract, or conduct.
On the other hand, the opinion of the respondents in the Wors case cites State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, 898, 900, 8 S.W.2d 897, 899, 900. This case holds that an award made by the Commission while acting within the scope of its authority "determines the rights of the parties as effectually as a judgment secured by regular legal procedure, and is as binding as a judgment, until it is regularly set aside or its validity questioned in a proper manner." While this case does not discuss the particular question here involved, it is authority at least to the general effect that an award by the Compensation Commission is as binding as the judgment of a court would be in the same circumstance. This is in line with Section 3342, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8275), which provides that: "the final award of the commission shall be conclusive and binding unless either party to the dispute shall within thirty days from the date of the final award appeal to the circuit court. . . ."
Counsel for respondents in their brief further cite C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757, 56 Sup. Ct. 420, decided in 1926 — this anent the statement in the Gieseking case, supra, decided ten years later, that the United States Supreme Court had never yet ruled the acceptance of benefits under a state compensation act would bar a damage suit for the same personal injuries brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Respondents thus refer to this Federal case on the theory that the Gieseking case was endeavoring to follow the United States Supreme Court, thereby making it proper to invoke the Schendel case even on the question of conflict, in this certiorari proceeding.
There was one opinion in the Schendel decision, covering two cases. Hope and Elder, both employees of the Railway Co. in Iowa, were injured in an accident, the former fatally. Hope's administrator, Schendel, and Elder sued the Railway Co. in Minnesota under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Railway Co. instituted proceedings as to both employees in Iowa under the Compensation Act of that state. Elder and Hope's widow challenged the jurisdiction of the Iowa Industrial Commission in both proceedings on the ground that the two employees were engaged in interstate commerce when injured. An arbitral board held Hope was engaged in intrastate commerce and awarded compensation to the widow. She appealed to the Commissioner, who found the same, and thence to the Iowa District Court, where upon a like finding the award was affirmed. This fact was then pleaded by the Railway Co. in invoking the defense of res judicata in the Minnesota damage suit, but the Minnesota District and Supreme Courts ruled adversely thereon, and the cause was taken to the United States Supreme Court on certiorari. That court reversed the Minnesota courts, holding that the Iowa District Court had jurisdiction to decide in the compensation proceeding whether Hope was engaged in intrastate commerce when injured; and that since it had decided he was so engaged, before the Minnesota courts ruled to the contrary, its judgment was controlling.
The Elder proceeding was submitted to an Iowa deputy commissioner, who found that Elder, also, was engaged in intrastate commerce. But an application for review by the Industrial Commissioner was filed by Elder under the Iowa statute, and the matter had not been finally determined when the judgment in the Minnesota damage suit was rendered. In view of the fact that the Iowa proceeding was in fieri, the United States Supreme Court refused to decide what the effect of a decision by the Iowa Industrial Commissioner would have been if it had ripened into an enforceable award, and affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota courts in that case.
But it is to be noted that in this Schendel decision the issue whether the employees were engaged in interstate commerce was squarely presented to and decided by the Iowa tribunals, whereas in the instant case no such issue was presented to the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission. The respondents' opinion states the record of the Commission shows only that Wors was "'working on a flat car leveling off dirt'" when injured. Relator says that deprives the Commission's decision of any effect as an estoppel on the question of interstate commerce; respondents say it does not. They point out in their opinion that the Commission's final award of compensation found Wors was entitled to recover for his accident "'as provided in the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Law,'" and declare the Commission therefore must have resolved the question of its jurisdiction in its own favor, i.e., must have found Wors was engaged in intrastate, not interstate, commerce when injured.
This latter view accords with the doctrine of decisions of this court wherein it is held that a lower court (of record) will be deemed to have decided a jurisdictional or other question consistently with the judgment rendered, even though there was no express finding thereon, if a decision of such question was necessarily involved in arriving at the conclusion announced; State ex rel. Loving v. Trimble, 331 Mo. 446, 453, 53 S.W.2d 1033, 1036 (6); State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 317 Mo. 1078, 1089 (d), 298 S.W. 83, 88 (6); State ex rel. Gordon v. Trimble, 318 Mo. 341, 348, 300 S.W. 475, 478. We have not, however, so far as the writer is aware, passed either way on the application of that doctrine to the holdings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal whose final awards are made conclusive by statute, Section 3342, supra. It was ruled in Hoffman v. N.Y., N.H. H. Railroad Co., 74 F.2d 227, 230(3) that no such "presumption of regularity" accompanies the findings of a Compensation Commission. But since this court has not ruled on the point we cannot say the holding of the Court of Appeals contravenes our decisions.
On authority of State ex rel. Ward v. Trimble, supra, and State ex rel. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Falkenhainer, supra, the relator further contends that even if the Workmen's Compensation Commission had general jurisdiction to pass on the question whether Wors was engaged in intrastate commerce, and did find he was so engaged, yet it had no jurisdiction to make that finding in the particular case below because all the evidence showed he was engaged in interstate commerce; and the respondent judges should have ruled accordingly. The Ward case, 327 Mo. l.c. 778, 39 S.W.2d l.c. 374 (8), holds that while we are bound, on certiorari, by the Court of Appeals' conclusion on the facts, yet we are not bound by its legal conclusion on those facts if it conflicts with our decisions. The Falkenhainer case, 309 Mo. l.c. 230-1, 274 S.W. l.c. 760 (3-5) holds that when a court's jurisdiction depends upon disputed facts, its findings thereon cannot be questioned collaterally; but when the jurisdictional facts are undisputed, the question of jurisdiction becomes a matter of law and may be raised collaterally.
Conceding these general propositions for the purpose of discussion, we are unable to see that they help relator for he has not referred us to any decision of this court, based on facts like or similar to those here involved, holding the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. The authorities he does cite are these. He calls attention to decisions such as Harris v. Mo. Pac. Railroad Co., 342 Mo. 330, 114 S.W.2d 988, 991, declaring we must follow the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in applying the Federal Employers' Liability Act; and then cites B. O.S.W. Ry. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540, 544, 68 L.Ed. 433, 44 Sup. Ct. 165, holding in general terms that the loading or unloading of an interstate shipment by employees of the carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as to be practically a part thereof. This appears to us to be a criticism of respondents' opinion on its merits, and not a showing of conflict with our decisions based on similar facts, which, alone, would justify us in overturning the opinion on certiorari.
Furthermore, respondents' opinion states facts which put the case below outside the ruling even in the Burtch case decided by the United States Supreme Court. Respondents quote relator's petition in his damage suit as alleging the work of loading the dirt into the railroad cars "was done independently of any supervision or direction, or right of supervision or direction on the part of" the Terminal Co., and that the work "was done under the sole and exclusive direction, supervision and control of the defendants" — Tarlton and the Midwest Co. We have, then, a case in which the employee of the carrier was doing the loading under the exclusive control of the shipper; and it is said in 10 Corpus Juris, section 309, page 225, "Delivery cannot be complete if anything remains to be done by the shipper before the goods can be sent on their way." We are cited to no authority from any jurisdiction holding that in these circumstances the work of loading would be a part of interstate commerce.
The second point of conflict urged by the relator is that even if the Workmen's Compensation Commission had jurisdiction to find and did find he was engaged in intrastate commerce when injured, still that decision could not bind the Midwest Co. because it was not a party to the compensation proceeding; and since it did not bind the Midwest Co. it could not bind him, Wors, for the reason that a judgment must be binding on both sides of a litigated controversy in order to bind either and to operate as an estoppel by judgment (citing cases). In other words relator urges he is not estopped from prosecuting the damage suit against the Midwest Company on an interstate commerce theory, merely because he prosecuted the compensation proceeding against another party, the Terminal Co., on an intrastate theory. Respondents answer that contention in their opinion by saying the decision in the compensation proceeding was binding upon and inured to the benefit of the Midwest Co. as a quasi privy, in view of the provisions of Section 3308, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8242).
This brings us to relator's third assignment of conflict, which is so closely related to the second, just outlined, that the two must be considered together. The relator denies there was privity between the Midwest Co. and the Terminal Co. in the compensation proceeding, and insists that while subsection (a) and the first part of subsection (d) of Section 3308, supra, made the Midwest Co. liable for compensation to Wors as an employee of its subcontractor, the Terminal Co., yet the last sentence of said subsection (d) completely exempted the Midwest Co. from all liability and made it a suable "third party," because the Terminal Co. carried insurance covering its immediate liability to Wors. This sentence says: "No such (remote) employer shall be liable as in this section provided, if the employee was insured by his immediate or any intermediate employer."
Relator declares in his brief: "This Court, so far as we have been able to find, has never construed subsection (d) of 3308 with respect particularly to the effect of the concluding or insurance clause thereof, upon the relations and respective liabilities prescribed in the preceding portions of this section." He then goes on to say: "Conflict therefore must be found in the failure of the (respondents) to follow the general rules and principles of law for the construction of statutes as laid down by this Court." We are then referred to a number of decisions of this court announcing general rules and principles of law for the construction of statutes.
We cannot consider any of these. Where the meaning of a statute is debatable we cannot on certiorari overturn a Court of Appeals' construction thereof merely because we may think it violates some general canon of construction recognized in our decisions. If it were otherwise we could be asked to review their rulings on all the statutes, bonds, insurance policies, wills, deeds, contracts and other written instruments, that come before them, for all would hinge on some general rule of construction. We have held repeatedly that the Courts of Appeals have the same right we have (within the range of our respective jurisdictions) to construe statutes. Whether we think their construction is right or wrong, we cannot interfere on certiorari unless we have previously given a different construction to the statute. If the construction turns on its application to specific facts, we must have construed it with reference to the same or similar facts. [State ex rel. Arndt v. Cox, 327 Mo. 790, 797, 38 S.W.2d 1079, 1082; State ex rel. Superior Mineral Co. v. Hostetter, J., 337 Mo. 718, 725, 85 S.W.2d 743, 744.] Of course, when a statute plainly can have only one meaning under canons of construction established by this court, and a Court of Appeals gives it another meaning, we may interfere because there the necessary effect of such erroneous holding is to violate the canons of construction — as much so as if they were expressly denounced. But that is not the case here and seldom occurs.
Amici curiae have cited numerous cases from other states bearing pro and con on the construction of the statute. Obviously, we cannot consider them on a question of conflict. The argument is advanced that since our Compensation Act is a composite, a merger of provisions borrowed from like acts of other states, therefore we should construe it in the light of interpretative court decisions from those states. That would be true if we were construing the act independently; but here we are determining whether the St. Louis Court of Appeals opinion contravenes any ruling of this court. Incidently we may say the court en banc has recently ruled in Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153, that subsection (d) of Section 3308 of the Compensation Act will not bear the construction put upon it by relator. It is the first decision by this court on the question and and was decided after the trial of this case below. We refer to it only as an expression of our views on the proposition that no general rules and principles of law for the construction of statutes recognized by this court were violated in respondents' opinion.
Finding no conflict, our writ of certiorari is quashed. All concur, except Douglas and Clark, JJ., not voting because not members of the court when cause was submitted.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
Relator raises a new point in his motion for rehearing. He contends the final award made to him by the Workmen's Compensation Commission on December 5, 1933, cannot operate as an estoppel by judgment on the issue of interstate commerce vel non, because the award was not fixed and determined by the Commission but was based on a compromise and stipulation between the parties, made under Section 3333, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8267). The mere approval by the Commission of this voluntary settlement was not a "jurisdictional" determination thereof, says the relator. He relies on State ex rel. Saunders v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 333 Mo. 691, 697, 63 S.W.2d 67, 69, to sustain his contention, and says respondents' opinion contravenes that decision.
Section 3333 provides that nothing in the Compensation chapter shall be construed as preventing parties to claims thereunder from entering into voluntary agreements in settlement thereof; but that no such agreements shall be valid until approved by the Commission; and that the Commission shall not approve such settlements unless they are in accord with the rights of the parties under the chapter. A later section, Section 3340, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8273), permits the Commission to review "any award" theretofore made, on the ground of a change in condition of the injured employee.
In the Saunders case an injured employee made a temporary agreement with his employer for partial compensation, and thereafter filed a "Final Receipt for Compensation" acknowledging receipt of a stated sum in consideration of which he released the employer from all liability under the Compensation Act by reason of the accident involved, " subject to review as provided in said act." (Italics ours.) The settlement was approved by the Commission, apparently on mere inspection. Over four years later the employee filed with the Commission an application for review on the ground of a change in his condition. The Commission refused to consider the application, on the theory that it was without jurisdiction because the execution and approval of the foregoing Final Receipt for Compensation operated as a complete and final settlement of the employers' liability, under Section 3333, supra. Thereupon the employee brought mandamus in this court to compel the Commission to accept jurisdiction of his application for review.
The court en banc in a unanimous opinion conceded Section 3333 does authorize "a final settlement of all liability subject to the approval of the commission," which is not subject to review under Section 3340, notwithstanding the use of the words, "any award" therein; but held the Final Receipt for Compensation there in evidence "was not a settlement under Section 3333, and therefore was subject to review on the ground of changed condition, pursuant to Section 3340" (or would have been if the application had been filed in time). The main reason for this holding was that the final receipt expressly recited it was "subject to review as provided in said act." But the opinion took notice of another case: Brown v. Corn Products Refining Co. (Mo. App.), 55 S.W.2d 706, where a receipt containing the same words was nevertheless treated as final because of other evidence showing it was intended to be so.
In the instant case the proof is abundant that the final receipt executed by relator Wors was intended to be conclusive. In the first place, the receipt expressly releases the employer from all liability "as provided under Section 3333, Revised Statutes 1929, for compromise lump-sum settlement." Further when the parties went before the referee, it was again stated the settlement was final as contemplated by Section 3333, and the referee asked Wors this question: "Mr. Wors, you have heard this stipulation and do you understand by entering into this compromise lump-sum settlement that closes your case forever under the Compensation Act and that you cannot under any circumstances reopen the case?" And relator Wors answered: "Yes." Thereafter the award based on the stipulation was made by the Commission.
There is nothing in the Saunders case holding such a settlement under Section 3333 is not a final award. The effect of the decision is to the contrary. A settlement under the section, when approved by the Commission, is even more conclusive than an ordinary award made by the Commission on disputed evidence, because the latter is subject to review on the ground of change in condition, whereas the former is irrevocable. Under the express terms of Section 3333 the approval of the Commission is necessary to make the settlement valid. And when so executed and approved there is no reason why it should not be the basis of a claim of res judicata or estoppel by judgment.