McHUGH, Chief Justice.

Petitioners herein, twenty-two West Virginia workers' compensation claimants, invoke this Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to W. Va. Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and W. Va.Code, 51-1-3 and seek a writ of mandamus against respondent Andrew N. Richardson, Commissioner of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Employment Programs (hereinafter "Commissioner"). Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of Enrolled Senate Bill 250 (hereinafter "S.B. 250"), which amended the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.

The haste with which this comprehensive legislation was enacted is revealed by the sequence of legislative events. S.B. 250 was introduced on February 2, 1995 and received final legislative approval eight days later, on February 10, 1995. The provisions of S.B. 250 became effective on date of passage, the legislature having voted to override the ninety-day waiting period between passage and date of effect. See W. Va. Const. Art. VI, § 30 ("[N]o act of the legislature . . . shall take effect until the expiration of ninety days after its passage, unless the legislature shall by a vote of two thirds of the members elected to each house . . . otherwise direct." Id., in part.) See also Perry v. Barker, 169 W. Va. 531, 533 n. 1, 289 S.E.2d 423, 425 n. 1 (1982) (The purpose of the ninety day period "is to provide a sufficient period of time to give notice to the public of the contents of the new law, and to provide government officials sufficient time to perform the duties contemplated by the law.")

I

Prior to the introduction and enactment of S.B. 250, the Workers' Compensation Fund (hereinafter "the Fund") was commonly perceived to be in dire financial straits. See generally Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers' Compensation Reform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers' Compensation Legislation, 98 W. Va.L.Rev. 23 (1995). Despite the general consensus that the fiscal integrity of the Fund was clearly threatened, there remains considerable debate as to what actually propelled the Fund to its precarious position.

Petitioners maintain that two primary developments in West Virginia contributed most significantly to the Fund's financial fragility. Petitioners first point to the decline in employment in certain industries, such as coal mining, which traditionally have high injury rates and high wages. Quoting Emily A. Spieler, Social Welfare Policy in the Context of Economic Restructuring: Lessons from the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Programme, 30 Urban Studies 351, 357-58 (1993), petitioners maintain that "`[d]isplaced workers from these industries filed large numbers of claims for disabilities arising from their prior work. During critical years, the premium rates charged to those industries were far too low, resulting in inadequate revenue to the fund. With the decline in payroll in those industries, it is now impossible to fund the cost of those prior injuries with premiums collected from the same industry[.]'" Id.

The second development, according to petitioners, was that of "`political manipulation of the [workers' compensation] programme, particularly an unjustifiable, and probably illegal, decision by the former Governor of West Virginia [Arch Moore] to reduce employers' premium rates below sound financial levels. Effective 1 July 1985, these rates were reduced by 30 percent for every industry, against the advice of the consulting actuarial expert[.]'" Id. As a result, petitioners argue, the Fund began losing money "`on a cash basis, as well as an accrual basis; that is, the revenue collected each year not only failed to fund the future costs of injuries which occurred in that year, but actually was less than the money that was paid out in that year.'" Id. Finally, petitioners maintain that the Fund's past failure to aggressively collect workers' compensation premiums from employers who were in default also contributed to the Fund's financial crisis.

The Commissioner, on the other hand, maintains that the Fund's imminent insolvency is rooted primarily in the legislative and judicial liberalization of permanent total disability (PTD) eligibility, resulting in awards of PTD benefits to West Virginia claimants in numbers far higher than the national average. Liberally conferring these awards, argues the Commissioner, also served as an incentive for claimants with slight medical impairments to apply for lifetime PTD awards instead of returning to work or to a vocational rehabilitation program. See, e.g., Cardwell v. State Workmens' Compensation Comm'r, 171 W. Va. 700, 301 S.E.2d 790 (1983). The Commissioner additionally points to the state's poor economy, the failure to provide incentives to employers to encourage safety and accident prevention, the failure of the benefit structure to encourage vocational rehabilitation and return to work incentives for drawn out litigation within the workers' compensation system, and administrative inefficiencies as having contributed to the Fund's financial difficulties.

Though the parties herein differ as to the causes of the Fund's financial plight, they agree that the state of the Fund warranted legislative change. They further agree that it is clearly within the legislature's authority to enact legislation such as S.B. 250, as its power is almost plenary. The legislature's power will not be negated by this Court unless the legislative enactment violates constitutional guarantees. Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 185 W. Va. 684, 690, 408 S.E.2d 634, 640 (1991) ("`The Constitution of West Virginia being a restriction of power rather than a grant thereof, the legislature has the authority to enact any measure not inhibited thereby.' Syl. Pt. 1, Foster v. Cooper, 155 W. Va. 619, 186 S.E.2d 837 (1972)"); Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r, 161 W. Va. 299, 315, 242 S.E.2d 443, 452 (1978) (the legislature is vested with the authority to modify this State's workers' compensation system as it sees fit so long as no constitutional provision is infringed).

Accordingly, when this Court is called upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute, we are guided by the following restraints imposed upon our judicial powers:

`"In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches. [ W. Va. Const. Art. V, § 1.] Every reasonable construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt." Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).' Syl. Pt. 2, West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System v. Dodd, 183 W. Va. 544, 396 S.E.2d 725 (1990).

Syl. pt. 1, Lewis, supra. See syl. pt. 4, Donley v. Bracken, 192 W. Va. 383, 452 S.E.2d 699 (1994); syl. pt. 1, O'Dell v. Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W. Va. 596, 425 S.E.2d 551 (1992); syl. pt. 3, Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept., 186 W. Va. 336, 412 S.E.2d 737 (1991).

Thus, this Court is not concerned with the legislative policy which motivated the enactment of S.B. 250, nor do we "sit as a superlegislature, commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic or scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation. It is the duty of the legislature to consider facts, establish policy, and embody that policy in legislation." Boyd v. Merritt, 177 W. Va. 472, 474, 354 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1986). It is the duty of this Court, however, to determine the constitutionality of the legislation. Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).

II.

It has been well established in this jurisdiction that entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus requires three fundamental elements:

`Before this Court may properly issue a writ of mandamus three elements must coexist: (1) the existence of a clear right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) the existence of a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing the petitioner seeks to compel; (3) the absence of another adequate remedy at law.' Syllabus Point 3, Cooper v. Gwinn, 171 W. Va. 245, 298 S.E.2d 781 (1981).

Syl. pt. 1, Meadows v. Lewis, 172 W. Va. 457, 307 S.E.2d 625 (1983). See also syl. pt. 3, Halstead v. Dials, 182 W. Va. 695, 391 S.E.2d 385 (1990); syl. pt. 1, Trumka v. Moore, 180 W. Va. 284, 376 S.E.2d 178 (1988); syl. pt. 1, W. Va. Citizens Action Group, Inc. v. Daley, 174 W. Va. 299, 324 S.E.2d 713 (1984); syl. pt. 1, McMellon v. Adkins, 171 W. Va. 475, 300 S.E.2d 116 (1983); syl. pt. 1, Smith v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 170 W. Va. 593, 295 S.E.2d 680 (1982); syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W. Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969).

In their petition to this Court, the petitioners challenge the application of eighteen separate provisions of S.B. 250 to preexisting workers' compensation claims as unconstitutional violations of the certain remedies clause of W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 17, and the due process clause of W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10. In their petition, however, they acknowledge that only ten of these provisions actually affect their particular claims. Moreover, our careful review of the petition reveals that the claim of only one of the twenty-two petitioners had been sufficiently affected by one of the provisions of S.B. 250 at the time the petition was filed to warrant constitutional scrutiny. As noted, mandamus relief cannot be awarded in the absence of the existence of a clear legal right in the petitioner and a clear duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act sought to be compelled. Consequently, we are constrained to address only a limited number of issues presented by the claim of only one of the twenty-two petitioners.

Gerald Ullom, whose work-related injury was sustained in March of 1988, filed his request for reopening for consideration for permanent total disability on February 13, 1995, three days after the passage and effective date of S.B. 250. Petitioner Ullom's request was denied by order dated March 13, 1995 on the grounds he did not meet the requirements of W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] in that he had received a total of 32% whole man impairment. W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] provides, in relevant part:

Other than for those injuries specified in subdivision (m) of this section, in order to be eligible to apply for an award of [PTD] benefits for all injuries incurred and all diseases, including occupational pneumoconiosis, with a date of last exposure on and after [February 2, 1995], and for all requests for such an award pending before the division on and after [February 2, 1995], a claimant must have been awarded the sum of fifty percent in prior [PPD] awards or have suffered an occupational injury or disease which results in a finding that the claimant has suffered a medical impairment of fifty percent. Upon filing such an application, the claim will be reevaluated by the examining board pursuant to subdivision (j) of this section to determine if he or she has suffered a whole body medical impairment of fifty percent or more resulting from either a single occupational injury or occupational disease or a combination of occupational injuries and occupational diseases. A claimant whose prior [PPD] awards total eighty-five percent or more shall also be examined by the board and must be found to have suffered a whole body medical impairment of fifty percent in order for his or her request to be eligible for further review. The examining board shall review the claim as provided in subdivision (j) of this section. If the claimant has not suffered whole body medical impairment of at least fifty percent, then the request shall be denied. Upon a finding that the claimant does have a fifty percent whole body medical impairment, the review of the application shall continue as provided for in the following paragraph of this subdivision [ W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(2) [1995]]. Those claimants whose prior [PPD] awards total eighty-five percent or more and who have been found to have whole body medical impairment of at least fifty percent shall then be entitled to the rebuttable presumption created pursuant to subdivision (d) for the remaining issues in the request.

(footnotes and emphasis added).

III.

The denial of Petitioner Ullom's request for reopening for consideration for PTD because he did not suffer a medical impairment of 50% as required by W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] warrants our review of that statute in two areas: first, whether W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] is constitutional under the equal protection clause, W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, and, finally, if W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] is constitutional, whether its application to Petitioner Ullom's claim violated W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, the due process clause.

Equal Protection

Petitioners argue that W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995], which requires, inter alia, that a claimant have a medical impairment of at least fifty percent in order to be considered for a PTD award, violates W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, the right to equal protection of the law and is, therefore, unconstitutional. W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, which contains our state's constitutional equal protection principle, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers."

This Court has consistently stated that economic legislative classifications are subject to a minimum level of judicial scrutiny, that is, "the traditional equal protection concept that the legislative classification will be upheld if it is reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate state purpose." Randall, 186 W. Va. at 344, 412 S.E.2d at 746. See Lewis, 185 W. Va. at 691, 408 S.E.2d at 641. We held in syllabus point two of Lewis, supra:

`"`Where economic rights are concerned, we look to see whether the classification is a rational one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution, which is our equal protection clause.' Syllabus Point 7, [as modified,] Atchinson v. Erwin, [172] W. Va. [8], 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983)." Syllabus Point 4, as modified, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W. Va. 538, 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984).' Syl. Pt. 4, Gibson v. West Virginia Department of Highways, 185 W. Va. 214, 406 S.E.2d 440 (1991).

See syl. pt. 4, Randall, supra; syl. pt. 2, O'Dell, supra.

Moreover, "the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." Lewis, 185 W. Va. at 692, 408 S.E.2d at 642 ( citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 517 (1976)). See Randall, 186 W. Va. at 345, 412 S.E.2d at 746; O'Dell, 188 W. Va. at 603, 425 S.E.2d at 558. See also Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 165 W. Va. 199, 203, 271 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1980) (If legislation does not impinge on fundamental or constitutional rights, the "State must only demonstrate that the statutory classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate State purpose.")

Petitioners contend that the legislative classification in W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] — claimants whose whole body medical impairments exceed fifty percent and those whose impairments do not — is not a rational one and does not bear a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose. See syl. pt. 2, Lewis, supra. Petitioners' argument is derived from W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(i) [1995], which forms the foundation for determining PTD eligibility and, ultimately, PTD awards. W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(i) [1995] provides:

For the purposes of this chapter, with the exception of those injuries provided for in subdivision (f) of this section and in [ W. Va.Code, 23-4-6b] the degree of permanent disability other than [PTD] shall be determined exclusively by the degree of whole body medical impairment that a claimant has suffered. For those injuries provided for in subdivision (f) of this section and [ W. Va.Code, 23-4-6b], the degree of disability shall be determined exclusively by the provisions of said subdivision and said section. The occupational pneumoconiosis board created pursuant to [ W. Va.Code, 23-4-8a] shall premise its decisions on the degree of pulmonary function impairment that claimants suffer solely upon whole body medical impairment. The workers' compensation division shall adopt standards for the evaluation of claimants and the determination of a claimant's degree of whole body medical impairment. Once the degree of medical impairment has been determined, that degree of impairment shall be the degree of [PPD] that shall be awarded to the claimant. This subdivision shall be applicable to all injuries incurred and diseases with a date of last exposure on or after [February 2, 1995], to all applications for an award of [PPD] that were pending before the division or pending in litigation but not yet submitted for decision on and after such date. The prior provisions of this subdivision shall remain in effect for all other claims.

(emphasis and footnote added).

Petitioners object to the fact that permanent partial disability awards are now, according to W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(i) [1995], determined exclusively by the degree of whole body medical impairment, thereby "eliminat[ing] any consideration of the extent to which an individual is `disabled' — that is, economically affected — by the injury." Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers' Compensation Reform, supra at 100. See n. 10, supra. Professor Spieler has explained that it was

estimated that use of medical impairment as the only basis for evaluating permanent [partial] disability would result in a $7.5 million reduction in claims' costs on an annual basis. These savings would presumably result from the elimination of the more subjective process of determining partial disability which had been used previously. In addition, use of a single impairment-rating scheme was designed to increase consistency among medical opinions and, therefore, reduce litigation. [ W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(i) [1995]], together with other sections of S.B. 250, was intended to limit the need for lawyers in resolution of workers' compensation claims. The impairment-based system would also serve to reduce the number of claimants who would meet any minimum threshold for consideration for a PTD award.

(footnotes omitted). Id. at 101-02.

The core of the petitioners' argument is that there is no rational basis for using impairment, rather than disability, as a threshold for determining which claimants will be eligible for permanent total disability review. In this regard, "because specific injuries may affect claimants differently, depending upon a variety of medical and vocational factors, the very consistency and rigidity of an impairment-only system results in a failure to provide appropriate benefits for many claimants. . . . [T]he impairment-only approach `presupposes that there is an abstract and uniform measure of `disability' that is valid and fair for all persons, apart from their activities or occupations.'" Id., at 102 ( quoting 1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.14, at 10-97 n. 68 (1995)). In other words, the petitioners assert that it is irrational to disregard a claimant's age, education, intelligence, and work-experience in determining whether the claimant's work-related injuries warrant permanent total disability consideration.

The Commissioner's response attempts to place the fifty percent impairment threshold in perspective. He argues that the use of the threshold enhances predictability and is consistent with its use in the determination of permanent partial disability awards, which have generally served as a predicate for permanent total disability determinations. Finally, the Commissioner observes that this heightened threshold is directly related to the legislature's goal in preserving the financial integrity of the Fund.

In conjunction with our analysis of the argument that the fifty percent impairment threshold violates principles of equal protection, three aspects of the new permanent total disability system are worthy of note. First, decisions regarding permanent partial disability have traditionally been impairment-oriented. For example, W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(f) [1995] has contained a schedule of permanent partial disability benefits based solely upon the type of injury without regard to the claimant's personal factors. Under the statute, the loss of a foot is a thirty-five percent permanent partial disability whether the claimant is a ballet dancer or an accountant, and the loss of a hand is a fifty percent permanent partial disability whether the claimant is a concert pianist or a television anchor. Second, decisions regarding permanent partial disability may not be accomplished with scientific precision. Inevitably, there has always been a certain degree of uncertainty. For example, W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(f) [1995] designates a wide variety of percentages of permanent partial disability for the whole or partial amputation of different appendages, from sixty percent for the loss of an arm to two percent for the loss of one phalanx of any toe other than the great toe. Finally, although the "threshold" for permanent total disability review has been modified, the ultimate decision regarding the "award" of permanent total disability remains intact, that is, under W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(2), "a disability which renders the injured employee unable to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he or she has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time shall be considered in determining the issue of total disability."

Though we may believe the legislature's actions are harsh or even cruel, or sound economic policy, its policy decisions, under our constitutional framework, are its own, subjecting it to the scrutiny of the electorate in whose hands the constitution vests the ultimate reviewing authority. As previously noted, we are not constitutionally authorized to superlegislate nor decide the social and economic merits of legislative judgments. Boyd, supra. Only when the legislature violates specific constitutional principles can we invalidate legislation. In the exercise of our limited judicial function, we are unable to say that predicating consideration of a claimant's permanent total disability claim on a medical impairment of fifty percent is not rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of ensuring the financial integrity of the workers' compensation fund.

As we have previously established, under our rational basis test, "the determination of the group or class to be protected by the statute is peculiarly a legislative judgment." Gibson, 185 W. Va. at 220, 406 S.E.2d at 446 (emphasis added). We have further established that

`"[t]his inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classification is neither possible nor necessary."'

Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1083, 67 L.E.2d 186, 198 (1981) and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976)). See also O'Dell, 188 W. Va. at 603, 425 S.E.2d at 558 ("`But every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.'" ( quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1542, 39 L.Ed.2d 797, 803-04 (1974)); Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 186 W. Va. 720, 729-30, 414 S.E.2d 877, 886-87 (1991) ("'[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.' (internal citation omitted))" ( quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-63, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 503 (1970)).

Accordingly, we find that W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995], which provides that in order to be eligible to apply for an award of permanent total disability benefits, a claimant must have been awarded the sum of fifty percent in prior permanent partial disability awards or have suffered an occupational injury or disease which results in a finding that the claimant has suffered a medical impairment of fifty percent, does not violate W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, our equal protection clause.

Due Process

Having established that W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] does not violate equal protection, we must now determine if the application of the statute to petitioner Ullom's case violated his constitutional right to due process. W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10.

Under our due process clause, " [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, in part (emphasis added). We have explained that "[a] `property interest' includes not only the traditional notions of real and personal property, but also extends to those benefits to which an individual may be deemed to have a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing rules or understandings." Syl. Pt. 3, Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 161 W. Va. 154, 241 S.E.2d 164 (1977).

It is clear that petitioner Ullom, who was injured in 1988 and who subsequently received a PPD award of 32%, was entitled to consideration for an award of PTD benefits under the workers' compensation law in effect prior to the enactment of S.B. 250. Unlike S.B. 250, the prior law did not require that Petitioner Ullom have a 50% impairment in order to be considered for PTD benefits, but provided:

A disability which renders the injured employee unable to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he or she has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time shall be considered in determining the issue of total disability. In addition, the vocational standards adopted pursuant to . . . [ W. Va.Code, 21A-3-7(m)] shall be considered once they are effective.

W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n) [1994].

Petitioner Ullom would have been, at the very least, afforded the opportunity to be considered for an award of PTD benefits. As we have already pointed out, however, S.B. 250 was introduced on February 2, 1995 and received final legislative approval only eight days later, on February 10, 1995. Moreover, S.B. 250 became effective on date of passage, the legislature having voted to override the 90-day waiting period between passage and date of effect. See W. Va. Const. Art. VI, § 30. As a result, Petitioner Ullom's substantive right to be considered for an award for PTD benefits was precluded by the instantaneous enactment of S.B. 250.

Though a workers' compensation statute, or amendment thereto, may be construed to operate retroactively where mere procedure is involved, such a statute or amendment may not be so construed where, to do so, would impair a substantive right. See syl. pt. 1, Kosegi v. Pugliese, 185 W. Va. 384, 407 S.E.2d 388 (1991). See syl. pt. 2, Shifflett v. McLaughlin, 185 W. Va. 395, 407 S.E.2d 399 (1991); syl. pt. 3, Maxwell v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 123, 144 S.E.2d 493 (1965), overruled on another point, Sizemore v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 100, 219 S.E.2d 912 (1975). It is clear that, but for the application of W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] to petitioner Ullom's request for reopening for consideration of PTD benefits, his request would, at the very least, have been considered and that, further, upon proper proof, may have been awarded.

Though due process has been characterized as the "`least frozen concept of our law — the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society[,]'" Bowman v. Leverette, 169 W. Va. 589, 597, 289 S.E.2d 435, 440 (1982) ( quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891, 900 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)), it is ultimately measured by the concept of fundamental fairness. State ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd, 160 W. Va. 371, 376, 234 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1977). See State ex rel. Peck v. Goshorn, 162 W. Va. 420, 422, 249 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1978) ("Due process of law is synonymous with fundamental fairness.") It is no strain upon the purpose of due process protection to conclude that the Legislature may not so narrow the avenues of justice so as to preclude petitioner Ullom's consideration for PTD benefits. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752, 767 (1976) ("The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process[.]"); State ex rel. Briggs Stratton Corp. v. Noll, 100 Wis.2d 650, 302 N.W.2d 487, 491 (1981) ("`A retrospective statute is unconstitutional if its effect is to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'" (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, where a workers' compensation claimant has been previously awarded permanent partial disability benefits that would have entitled the claimant to file for permanent total disability review, legislation that attempts to immediately preclude the claimant's substantive right to seek such review prior to the expiration of the ordinary ninety days provided in W. Va. Const. Art. VI, § 30, violates principles of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process provisions of W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10.

Courts will not act to prematurely reach ultimate constitutional issues. Only when an issue is clear should courts decide the constitutional validity of a statute. Claimants, including those petitioners whose claims were not resolved in this opinion, may, upon a sufficient showing, be able to demonstrate in the appropriate forum, that the application of S.B. 250 to his or her particular claim violates his or her constitutional rights.

IV.

In summary, we conclude that W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995], which provides that in order to be eligible to apply for an award of PTD benefits, a claimant must have been awarded the sum of fifty percent in prior PPD awards or have suffered an occupational injury or disease which results in a finding that the claimant has suffered a medical impairment of fifty percent, does not violate W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 10, our equal protection clause.

Additionally, we conclude that it is fundamentally unfair and, therefore, a violation of due process, to apply W. Va.Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995] to petitioner Ullom's request for consideration for PTD because he filed such request immediately after the statute's passage and date of enactment.

Writ granted as moulded.