OPINION

EASTAUGH, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

We consider here the validity of a 2005 emergency regulation creating a cooperative Chignik purse seine salmon fishery. In Grunert v. State ( Grunert I), we invalidated former 5 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 15.359 (2002), an Alaska Board of Fisheries regulation that created a cooperative fishery within the Chignik purse seine salmon fishery. In response to Grunert I, the board in 2005 adopted an emergency regulation that retained the basic cooperative scheme but that required each permit holder in the cooperative to "actively participate" in the fishery by making at least ten deliveries during the fishing season. When Michael Grunert and other commercial fishers brought suit, the superior court held the emergency regulation invalid per Grunert I. The board appealed. After hearing oral argument on February 3, 2006, we issued a dispositive order on February 9. Our opinion today explains our reasoning more thoroughly. We hold that the board exceeded its authority by promulgating the 2005 emergency regulation, former 5 AAC 15.358, because the cooperative fishery created by the emergency regulation was fundamentally at odds with the Limited Entry Act, AS 16.43. We also hold that the emergency regulation employed means outside the board's authorized powers to allocate fishery resources within a single fishery. Although the emergency regulation has now expired, we consider these and other issues raised by the cooperative scheme under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Many of the facts underlying this case were set out in our opinion in Grunert v. State ( Grunert I). In 2002, in response to declining salmon prices in the Chignik commercial salmon fishery, the Board of Fisheries (board) promulgated regulations authorizing a majority of Chignik salmon purse seine permit holders to apply to fish as a cooperative. After more than the minimum number of permit holders applied to participate, the board issued a single cooperative fishery permit to the cooperative (Chignik Seafood Producers Alliance) and allocated to the cooperative a percentage of the "harvestable surplus" of Chignik sockeye salmon based on the number of permit holders participating in the cooperative. The cooperative fishery had goals of decreasing overhead expenses and improving fish quality by controlled harvesting. Both goals would be advanced by reducing the number of fishing vessels in the fishery.

Michael Grunert, a high-earning Chignik salmon purse seine fisher and permit holder, did not participate in the 2002 cooperative and instead filed a complaint in superior court in April 2002 challenging the validity of the cooperative regulation. One other Chignik salmon purse seine permit holder joined Grunert in the litigation.

While the Grunert lawsuit was pending, the board made minor changes to the cooperative regulation, 5 AAC 15.359, in 2003 and changed the allocation formula in 2004. The board also amended the regulation to allow cooperative fishers to use equipment different from that open fishers were permitted to use under 5 AAC 15.330, 15.332, 39.240, and 39.260.

The superior court rejected Grunert's challenge and held that the cooperative regulation was statutorily and constitutionally valid. Grunert appealed and on March 17, 2005 we reversed the superior court judgment and held that the regulation was fundamentally at odds with the Limited Entry Act. The intervenor, Chignik Seiners Association, petitioned for rehearing and moved for a stay of our decision until after the 2005 salmon fishing season. We denied both the petition and the motion on April 22, 2005.

In response to our decision in Grunert I, the Chignik Seafood Producers Alliance (the Alliance) petitioned the board to adopt an amended version of the cooperative regulation as an emergency regulation. The board met on May 2 and May 4, 2005 in response to the Alliance's petition and voted to take no action on the petition. Instead, the board considered whether to find an emergency under AS 44.62.250, which gives agencies authority to promulgate an emergency regulation upon making a written finding that the regulation "is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety, or general welfare." After considering the comments of board members about the detrimental effects potentially resulting from the unavailability of a cooperative for the 2005 Chignik salmon season, the board voted to find an emergency under AS 44.62.250. The board then considered and adopted Emergency Regulation 5 AAC 13.358, an amended version of the invalidated cooperative regulation. The board did not intend to make the regulation permanent, and it expired on September 2, 2005.

The emergency regulation differed from the original cooperative regulation in a number of ways. The emergency regulation required cooperative participants to "actively participate" in the fishery as a prerequisite to any remuneration:

[A] CFEC permit holder who participates in the annual cooperative fishery . . . (C) must actively participate in the cooperative fishery to receive any economic benefit; for the purposes of this subparagraph, "actively participate" means to make at least 10 deliveries of salmon to a buyer using the participant's CFEC permit card; it does not mean a CFEC permit holder has to participate in the cooperative fishery from season opening to season closing, and it does not mean that every boat registered for the Chignik salmon fishery be used in the cooperative fishery.

The emergency regulation prohibited multiple permit holders from splitting deliveries: "All fish from each delivery must be attributed to only one CFEC permit holder on an [Alaska Department of Fish and Game] fish ticket; no split deliveries may be made." The emergency regulation also incorporated those 2005 amendments to the former regulation that permitted different types of equipment to be used in the cooperative fishery:

(f) The participants in the cooperative fishery may operate a fixed lead only under the conditions of a commissioner's permit. Notwithstanding 5 AAC 39.260, a vessel attached to a fixed lead or to a seine attached to a fixed lead may be allowed to go dry or be anchored without the vessel engine running in the waters of the Chignik Bay District from Mensis Point to Pillar Rock, as long as the lead and seine are not configured to form a fish trap prohibited under AS 16.10.070 and 16.10.100.

(g) Notwithstanding 5 AAC 39.240, and only under the conditions of a commissioner's permit, a vessel may have on board a purse seine or hand purse seine and up to two fixed leads.

(h) The participants in the cooperative fishery may use net pens to hold live salmon until processing, only under the conditions specified in a commissioner's permit.

On May 16, 2005 Grunert and other Chignik commercial fishers and fish tenders (collectively, Grunert) challenged the validity of the emergency regulation by filing a superior court complaint against the State of Alaska, Alaska Board of Fisheries, and Alaska Department of Fish and Game (collectively, the board) for declaratory and injunctive relief. Grunert alleged that the board did not have authority to adopt the emergency regulation without legislative approval of cooperative salmon fisheries and that no emergency existed to justify the board adopting the emergency regulation. Grunert simultaneously moved for summary judgment and requested a speedy hearing and advancement on the court's calendar. The board timely opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment.

Superior Court Judge William F. Morse heard oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment on June 1, 2005 and promptly announced the superior court's decision the next day. First, the court concluded that the timing of the publication of our Grunert I decision created an emergency and that the board met the procedural requirements for promulgating a regulation in response to that emergency. It found that the "general welfare" of the fishery was at stake because permit holders who had previously fished in the cooperative fishery and who wanted to fish during the 2005 season did not have enough time to deal with all of the "financial, logistical, personnel, personal, and equipment arrangements" necessary to participate in the fishery. Second, it found that the cooperative and open fisheries are two distinct fisheries. Third, it found that the emergency regulation was invalid because it exceeded the statutory authority of the board. The court noted that Grunert I made clear that the Limited Entry Act restricts eligibility for permits to natural persons who are economically dependent on and actively participating in fishing. The court found that the cooperative regime under the emergency regulation was still "dramatically different" from the regime envisioned by the Limited Entry Act. The court noted that the cooperative system changes the distribution of profit, reduces competition, permits different timing and pace of participation, allows some cooperative members to maintain alternative primary occupations, changes the amount of risk involved in commercial fishing, changes the economic model of commercial fishing, and encourages less equipment and a smaller support system. The court concluded that the emergency regulation did not satisfy the problems identified in Grunert I and that the regulation was therefore invalid.

The superior court entered final judgment for the Grunert plaintiffs. The board immediately filed an emergency motion for stay of the judgment. We granted the stay through the end of the 2005 Chignik salmon season and stated that we would consider any appeal of the final judgment on an expedited basis.

The board appealed that part of the superior court's decision that declared the emergency regulation inconsistent with the Limited Entry Act and Grunert I. Grunert cross-appealed the superior court's approval of the board's finding of an emergency and the superior court's conclusion that the cooperative fishery and the open fishery are two different fisheries.

On November 16, 2005, after the opening briefs had already been filed in this appeal, the board voted to adopt a permanent regulation for a Chignik cooperative fishery similar to that permitted by the 2005 emergency regulation. Among other things, this conditionally approved regulation will retain the ten-delivery requirement, but will restrict the total number of deliveries a cooperative participant may make in a season to thirty-five.

We heard oral argument on February 3, 2006 and issued a dispositive order on February 9.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a superior court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

We review emergency regulations in the same way we review other agency regulations. We presume that a regulation promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedures Act (APA) is both procedurally and substantively valid and place the burden of proving otherwise on the challenging party. Grunert argues that the board bears the burden of proving the regulation's validity because the regulation was promulgated as an emergency regulation, bypassing the notice and comment procedures of the APA. We disagree. Emergency regulations promulgated in accordance with AS 44.62.250 enjoy the same presumption of validity as regulations promulgated after a notice and comment process. We presume that the emergency regulation was valid, and that Grunert bears the burden of demonstrating that it was not.

We will uphold a regulation so long as it is consistent with and reasonably necessary to implement the statutes authorizing its adoption. As we explained in Grunert I, our review of agency regulations involves the following analyses:

[W]e consider first whether the board exceeded its statutory mandate in promulgating the regulation, either by pursuing impermissible objectives or by employing means outside its powers. Determining the extent of an agency's authority involves the interpretation of statutory language, a function uniquely within the competence of the courts and a question to which we apply our independent judgment. Second, we consider whether the regulation is reasonable and not arbitrary. Where highly specialized agency expertise is involved, we will not substitute our own judgment for the board's. Our role is to ensure only that the agency has taken a hard look at the salient problems and has genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making. And third, we consider whether the regulation conflicts with any other state statutes or constitutional provisions.

B. We Review the Validity of the Emergency Regulation Under the Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.

Because the emergency regulation has expired and no relief can be granted to reverse its effect on the 2005 Chignik purse seine salmon season, the question of the regulation's validity is technically moot. Although we generally refrain from deciding questions when events have rendered the legal issues moot, we may consider certain issues if they fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

We consider three factors in determining whether an issue falls within the public interest exception: "(1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine." "None of these factors is dispositive; each is an aspect of the question of whether the public interest dictates that a court review a moot issue."

All three factors support present review. First, the disputed issues are capable of repetition and indeed have already repeated themselves. On November 16, 2005 the board voted to adopt a permanent regulation similar to the 2005 emergency regulation. In addition, the board informed us at oral argument that it has established cooperative regimes in other fisheries around the state. Second, because the publication of a judicial decision regarding a permanent regulation might unavoidably occur shortly before a new Chignik purse seine salmon season, the board might again feel compelled to promulgate another short-term emergency regulation, potentially preventing effective judicial review. Moreover, because the board has already voted to adopt a substantially similar permanent regulation, failing to review the now-expired emergency regulation will merely delay judicial review of the essence of the cooperative scheme. Dismissing the appeal as moot will not advance issue finality or judicial or party economy. Third, the board argues that the validity of the cooperative regime is of great public interest. We agree. That great public interest is evidenced by the numerous meetings of the board to consider regulatory changes to the Chignik fishery as well as by the outcry of members of the public both opposing and supporting the state's motion to stay Grunert I. Because the emergency regulation was similar to the recently proposed regulation, because the board has dedicated a substantial amount of time to the cooperative program, and because many people have an interest in the outcome, we will consider whether the emergency regulation was valid under the public interest exception.

But we decline to consider the reasonableness of the board's finding of an emergency. A finding of emergency follows a fact-intensive inquiry into a set of events unlikely to be repeated, and the prospect of a permanent regulation reduces the likelihood of another emergency regulation for a Chignik cooperative fishery. The public interest exception does not justify review of this moot issue.

C. The Chignik Cooperative Fishery Scheme Permitted by Former 5 AAC 15.358 Was Fundamentally at Odds with the Limited Entry Act.

In Grunert I, we stuck down former 5 AAC 15.359 (2002) because it was "fundamentally at odds with the Limited Entry Act." We explained that a central premise of the limited entry system is that permit holders are individuals who actively fish. We also explained that the Limited Entry Act was enacted to protect "economically dependent fisher[s]." Our main concern with the cooperative regime created under former 5 AAC 15.359 was that it did not require "active participation" of all Chignik salmon purse seine permit holders. The Chignik cooperative fishery scheme was incompatible with the limited entry system "because it allow[ed] people who [were] not actually fishing to benefit from the fishery resource."

Although the lack of an active participation requirement was the flaw on which we focused the most attention in Grunert I, we expressed concern with other aspects of the cooperative regime as well. For example, we expressed concern with the reduced number of crew members necessary under the cooperative regime. We noted that the cooperative regulation may interfere with the ability of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) to determine the optimum number of permits because the regulation "destroys any relation between the number of permits issued per fishery and the ultimate number of participating vessels and units of gear." And we criticized the corporate-like nature of the cooperative regime: "the cooperative regulation . . . transforms the limited entry permit from what used to be a personal gear license into a mere ownership share in a cooperative organization."

We directed the board to seek legislative approval: "Before this regulatory scheme accomplishes such radical departure from the historical model of limited entry fisheries in Alaska and the spirit of the Limited Entry Act, . . . we conclude that the legislature must first authorize the board to approve cooperative salmon fisheries." We repeat that command here.

The emergency regulation was not a valid exercise of the board's authority. Although the ten-delivery requirement mandated some significant participation by each participating permit holder, the emergency regulation still allowed permit holders in the cooperative to benefit economically from the work of others. As long as the cooperative fishers made ten deliveries, they received the same profit as cooperative fishers who made more than ten deliveries. It is this aspect of the Chignik cooperative scheme that is so contradictory to the Limited Entry Act.

The emergency regulation also did not resolve the problem of interference with the CFEC's ability to determine the optimum number of permits per fishery. The CFEC determines the optimum number of permits, in part, based on time spent fishing and investment in vessels and gear. But the emergency regulation, like the predecessor regulation, did not require each fisher to operate his or her own gear and vessel and it minimized the amount of time many of the cooperative fishers needed to spend fishing.

The board urges us to read Grunert I narrowly, and suggests that Grunert I only identified one fatal flaw — the lack of meaningful, active participation by all fishers — in an otherwise valid regulatory regime. The board argues that in Grunert I we held that the board does not have authority to promulgate a cooperative fishery regulation that does not require active participation. It argues that by requiring significant participation in the cooperative fishery it has satisfied our holding. Likewise, the dissenting opinion attached to our February 9, 2006 order suggested that Grunert I never signaled complete rejection of a cooperative fishery and impliedly condoned a cooperative fishery in which permit holders had significant active participation even if they did not make every delivery that directly benefitted them. Today's dissenting opinion repeats that argument here. But nothing we said in Grunert I expressed a notion that cooperative participants could be active participants if they derived benefit from deliveries they did not make. And nothing in Grunert I implied as much, either.

It was not necessary in Grunert I to decide whether a partial participation scheme such as that allowed by the emergency regulation might satisfy the Limited Entry Act. The emergency regulation had not yet been adopted when we issued Grunert I and the state never contended in Grunert I that a partial participation scheme might satisfy the Limited Entry Act. There was therefore no reason for us to anticipate future promulgation of a partial participation scheme. But even if we had anticipated that possibility, it would not have been necessary to address its validity; the only question before us was the validity of the 2002 regulation then in litigation.

Although the ten-delivery requirement softened the distinction between the cooperative model and the "model of the economically dependent fisher whom the Limited Entry Act was intended to protect," the two models still fundamentally differ. The emergency regulation still allowed cooperative fishers to benefit economically from the work of other fishers. The legislature might conclude that such a cooperative fishery is desirable and that the board should have authority to approve a Chignik cooperative commercial fishery. But because it has not yet done so, the emergency regulation was not authorized by the Limited Entry Act.

D. The Chignik Cooperative Fishery Scheme Permitted by Former 5 AAC 15.358 Impermissibly Allocated Within a Single Fishery.

The emergency regulation, former 5 AAC 15.358, allowed cooperative participants to use fixed leads and net pens, as well as longer seines, tools not available to the open fishers under the code provisions applicable to them, including 5 AAC 15.330, 15.332, 39.240, and 39.260. The superior court determined that the board could reasonably conclude that the cooperative fishery and open fishery were different fisheries because they use different gear types. We disagree.

The Chignik commercial salmon fishery has been a purse seine fishery for over one hundred and twenty years. Since implementation of the Limited Entry Act, commercial fishers in the Chignik salmon fishery have held Chignik CFEC salmon purse seine permits. The part of the board's Chignik area regulation entitled "Gear" has been in effect since before 1988. It states that "salmon may be taken only by purse seine or hand purse seine." It is against this background that the board contends that the regulation created two fisheries in the Chignik area: a "purse seine" fishery in which the open fishers used the traditional gear — purse seines and leads — and a "purse seine plus" fishery in which the cooperative fishers used the traditional gear plus longer seines, fixed leads, and net pens. But these differences in gear and gear size, although potentially dramatically different in efficiency, did not fundamentally alter the fact that all holders of CFEC purse seine permits continued to harvest Chignik salmon with purse seine gear.

Alaska Statute 16.05.251(e) authorizes the board to allocate fishery resources "among personal use, sport, guided sport, and commercial fisheries." We explained in Grunert I that "among" means "between," not "within," the fisheries. The board's authorizing statute defines "fishery" as "a specific administrative area in which a specific fishery resource is taken with a specific type of gear." That statute also defines "gear" and "type of gear" as follows:

(A) "gear" means the specific apparatus used in the harvest of a fishery resource; and

(B) "type of gear" means an identifiable classification of gear and may include

(i) classifications for which separate regulations are adopted by the Board of Fisheries or for which separate gear licenses were required by former AS 16.05.550- 16.05.630; and

(ii) distinct subclassifications of gear such as "power" troll gear and "hand" troll gear or sport gear and guided sport gear.

The differences in equipment the board authorized for open and cooperative fishers did not create two distinct fisheries under AS 16.05.940(14). The words of both the board's authorizing statute and the Limited Entry Act make it clear that the legislature intended to distinguish between types of gear based on broad methodological differences. The definitions of "gear" and "types of gear" distinguish between power troll and hand troll gear and refer to historical distinctions, for example, between set and long lines, drift, set and stake gill nets, and purse and hand purse seines, suggesting real-world, methodological, gross differences between equipment types. But the alterations in equipment the board authorized for open and cooperative fishers did not change the fundamental method by which Chignik salmon are harvested. The Chignik salmon are harvested by purse seine, whether open or cooperative fishers harvest them. Cooperative fishers used fixed leads before the salmon were harvested and used net pens after harvesting the salmon. These additional tools were thus incidental to the type of gear — the purse seines — actually used to harvest the Chignik salmon.

The statutory definition of "type of gear" includes "classifications for which separate regulations are adopted by the Board of Fisheries." But the board has not adopted separate regulations classifying net pens or fixed leads as distinct types of gear. The board regulation that lists "legal types of gear" does not even mention net pens or fixed leads. And although we are not required to decide here whether the board could adopt a regulation classifying a net pen or a fixed lead as a "type of gear" within the meaning of the statute, we note that doing so would not necessarily resolve Grunert's contention the board cannot do so legally.

The statutory definition of "type of gear" also includes "classifications . . . for which separate gear licenses were required by former AS 16.05.550-16.05.630." Former AS 16.05.550-.630 did not require separate gear licenses for fixed leads or net pens, nor did those provisions require separate gear licenses for purse seiners using fixed leads or net pens, nor, indeed, did they even mention fixed leads or net pens. Historically there is no sign that the legislature, the board, or the CFEC distinguished between those fishers who were using net pens and fixed leads and those who were not.

Moreover, net pens are not "gear." A net pen is not a "specific apparatus used in the harvest" of salmon, but is a device used to store live salmon after they are harvested and before they are transferred to processors. And the only apparent difference between leads and fixed leads is that fixed leads may be operated unattached to the purse seine and affixed to the bottom of the sea by anchors. Fixed leads and leads are therefore not "distinct subclassification[s] of gear" when they are used in conjunction with a recognized method, e.g., by purse seine, of harvesting the fish.

Finally, the board argues that the combination of fixed leads, longer seines, and net pens allows cooperative fishers to operate a materially different type of fishery. It asserts that the pace of a cooperative fishery is slower and that the fishery is directed by only a few experienced fishers. It argues that the legislature intended that methodological differences in the way actual mechanical gear is used to take fish would be considered in differentiating between fisheries. The board contends that AS 16.05.940(14)(B)(ii) "contemplates distinctions between fisheries such as those that exist between cooperative and competitive fisheries, just as it does for sport and guided sport fisheries."

We assume the cooperative fishers did or could fish at a slower pace than those operating in the open fishery. But we do not believe that this distinction made the cooperative fishery a separate fishery under AS 16.05.940(14). As discussed above, the legislature apparently intended to distinguish between gear types that function differently. We disagree with the board's argument that the differences between open and cooperative gear are analogous to the differences between "sport" gear and "guided sport" gear. "Sport" fisheries and "guided sport" fisheries are already distinct fisheries under the board's authorizing statute. The distinction between "sport" and "guided sport" gear in the board's authorizing statute reflects the legislature's intention that the board distinguish between sport and guided sport fisheries in general. The legislature has not distinguished between open and cooperative fisheries.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Chignik purse seine salmon fishery was a single fishery, and that the board did not alter that fact by making detail changes to the type of equipment used by the cooperative fishers. Both cooperative and open fishers captured the same species of salmon common to the fishery with purse seine gear. The board cannot divide what has historically been a single fishery by simply tinkering with ancillary apparatus and seine dimensions. The emergency regulation therefore authorized the board to allocate fishery resources within a single fishery, in violation of the authorizing statute, AS 16.05.251(e).

We note that the board's allocation of the harvestable salmon between the cooperative and the open fishers was potentially arbitrary and capricious. Allowing some, but not all, Chignik salmon purse seine permit holders to operate different types and amounts of fishing equipment potentially raises questions of efficiency, arbitrary decision making, and equal protection. The allocation may be vulnerable to attack on the theory that under a two-subfishery system, the open fishers only have access to a small percentage of the allocation for the whole Chignik fishery. Grunert contends that allowing open and cooperative fishers to use different amounts and types of equipment may violate subsection .150(a) of the Limited Entry Act. That subsection provides that "an entry permit authorizes the permittee to operate a unit of gear within a specified fishery." "Unit of gear" is defined by the Limited Entry Act as "the maximum amount of a specific type of gear that can be fished by a person under regulations established by the Board of Fisheries defining the legal requirements for that type of gear." Because only some of the Chignik permit holders could operate the maximum amount of gear, Grunert contends, the regulation unlawfully discriminated. We do not need to consider these contentions, however, because we conclude that the emergency regulation authorized an allocation of fishery resources within a single fishery in violation of the authorizing statute.

E. We Address Other Arguments Raised on Appeal To Inform the Parties of Other Concerns We Have Regarding the Cooperative Scheme.

1. The emergency regulation authorized a legal entity other than a natural person to operate gear in a Commercial Fishing Entry Commission administration area.

Grunert argues that the emergency regulation impermissibly authorized the commissioner to issue permits to the Chignik cooperative corporation. Grunert claims this authorization conflicts with the Limited Entry Act because the Limited Entry Act only allows natural persons to operate gear. The board does not refute this argument. This contention was not squarely made below, although the superior court commented on the issue without resolving it. Given the likelihood the issue will arise if the legislature approves cooperative fisheries and the commissioner again issues a permit to an association and given the disruption likely to occur if a court were to hold invalid a cooperative permit issued to an entity that is not a natural person, we address the issue now.

The emergency regulation authorized the commissioner to issue permits to a non-person in violation of AS 16.43.140. That statute states: "After January 1, 1974, a person may not operate gear in the commercial taking of fishery resources without a valid entry permit or a valid interim-use permit issued by the commission." We have read that provision to mean that the Limited Entry Act "limits operation of gear to persons with valid entry permits." The Limited Entry Act defines "person" as a "natural person"; "`person' does not include a corporation, company, partnership, firm, association, organization, joint venture, trust, society, or other legal entity other than a natural person." The emergency regulation authorized cooperative permit holders to operate fixed leads and use net pens under the conditions imposed by the commissioner's permits. The commissioner's permits were issued to the cooperative as a whole, not to individual Chignik salmon purse seine permit holders. Thus, fixed lead, purse seine, and net pen permits were issued to the Alliance. Although it is unclear from the record what type of organizational entity the Alliance is, it is not a "natural person." Because the emergency regulation authorized the commissioner to issue a permit to operate gear to the Alliance, the emergency regulation impermissibly conflicted with AS 16.43.140.

2. The emergency regulation did not require permit holders to "pledge" their permits.

Grunert argues that the emergency regulation required "pledging" of permits in violation of AS 16.43.150(g). Although this claim was not presented or considered below, we could choose to consider it if it offered an alternative basis for affirming the superior court's ruling. But we instead choose to consider it because both parties have briefed the issue on appeal and it seems inevitable that it will be raised again should the legislature grant the board authority to create cooperative fisheries.

Alaska Statute 16.43.150(g) prohibits an entry permit from being "pledged, mortgaged, leased, or encumbered in any way" except as provided in certain subsections dealing with loans. The statute does not define "pledge." Grunert argues that we should read "pledge" to mean "to promise solemnly or to put under obligation or commitment by or as if by a pledge." The board responds that "pledge" is a legal term of art that refers to personal property transferred as security for a debt, engagement, or the performance of an act.

We have previously stated that AS 16.43.150(g) was intended "to allow fishermen to take advantage of the value of their permits if they no longer wish to participate in the fishery, but to prevent the forced loss of livelihood that would result from court-ordered sales of permits." The emergency regulation did not require permit holders to put up their permits as security. Although there was the possibility of criminal sanctions if a permit holder fished in another fishery, permit holders always retained ownership of their permits. The emergency regulation did not require illegal pledging of permits.

3. It would be inappropriate to decide here whether the emergency regulation permitted cooperative fishers to operate fish traps.

Grunert argues that "fixed leads take on the character of fish traps, when unattached to purse seines and vessels which are prohibited in Alaska waters." Whether fixed leads take on the character of fish traps is a fact-intensive inquiry that was never presented to the superior court. We therefore decline to consider it here on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that promulgating former 5 AAC 15.358 was not a valid exercise of the board's authority. We therefore AFFIRM that portion of the superior court's decision that held that the emergency regulation was invalid. But we REVERSE that portion of the superior court's decision that held that the emergency regulation did not involve an impermissible allocation within a single fishery. The Board of Fisheries must obtain legislative approval before adopting another cooperative scheme in the Chignik purse seine salmon fishery.