Opinion
4:22-CV-13-FL
08-29-2022
KAROLINA SORENSSON, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, KINSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, and LENOIR COUNTY COURT, Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT B. JONES, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [DE-1] and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72,74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition .... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed Med Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md House o/Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II ANALYSIS
1. Background
Plaintiff Karolina Sorensson initiated this case against the State of North Carolina, Kinston Police Department, and Lenoir County Court, generally alleging that Defendants “are violating [] my Civil Rights” and “committing federal level crimes” including retaliation and obstruction of justice “using the color of the law.” Plaintiff claims that the acts complained of concern “Discrimination, Retaliation, Negligence, Obstruction of Justice, Violation of United States of America Civil Rights, Cruel and Unusual Punishment to Victims of Crimes, Police & Sheriff Brutality Incl. but NOT limited to Intimidation, Corruption, Prejudice, Malicious Prosecution from State of NC, Harassment, Harassment & Frivolous Prosecution from State of NC, Dereliction of Duty, Discrimination (also from Kinston NC Police Department), Corruption, & other (Lenoir Co. Courthouse/Court & Kinston Police Department) Violation of 1st & 2nd Amendment.” [DE-1-1] at 2.
Plaintiff describes interactions with several individuals, who appear to be private citizens. Plaintiff asserts that on December 2, 2021, she “took to court” Donna Gamer and Letrize Franklin and that these individuals, “their male clients,” and “apparently Nicolette Frick's son” communicated death threats to her. Id. Plaintiff does not explain who these people are, and they are not named Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that these individuals communicated threats, assaulted her, intimidated her, blocked her way, and “threw” their dogs at her. Plaintiff states that “defendants,” though seemingly referring to Gamer, Letrize, and Franklin, broke into Plaintiff's apartment, and called Plaintiff racial slurs. Id. Plaintiff says she communicated this information to the police, “who take their side.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Gamer “charged” Plaintiff with damaging $5.00 in groceries, and Gamer and Frick blocked Plaintiff's way into Plaintiff's apartment, “Frick help[ed] Donna Gamer in her stalking,” and Gamer intimidates and attacks Plaintiffwithadog. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also describes an unidentified man yelling obscene language at Plaintiff when she was exiting her car and that Donna Garner's father also yelled at her. Id.
Plaintiff also identifies an Officer Rouse. Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that she was “falsely” and “unjustly” arrested for calling 911 and for vomiting in a sheriff's car, though it is unclear whether Officer Rouse was involved. Id. Plaintiff states that the Defendants are “taking these past old charges against me,” and further states that the “clerk of court let the people that throw their dogs at me to try to bite me on the face, the judge let them go, because of their bias and corruption.” Id. Plaintiff states that Donna Gamer and Letrize Franklin were never served, and Officer Rouse lied and said that they were served. Id.
Plaintiff requests relief “no less than $5,000,000,” as well as costs and fees. Id.
2. Discussion
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the Iqbal and Twombly standards. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). At the pleading stage, “while a complaint. . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.. . Id.
Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges claims based on violations of her civil rights but fails to include sufficient supporting facts. See Swanson v. Smith, No. 7:19-CV-00141-BR, 2019 WL 5700043, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 1, 2019) (dismissing complaint on frivolity review for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff failed to allege any facts to support his discrimination claims), adopted by 2019 WL 5699934 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 4, 2019). Plaintiff fails to describe with any particularity how the State of North Carolina, the Kinston Police Department, or the Lenoir County Court violated any laws or rights.
Plaintiff's complaint largely describes acts by several individuals who appear to be private citizens. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for alleged federal statutory and constitutional violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” Williams v. Studivent, No. 1:09-CV-414, 2012 WL 1230833, at *4 (M.D. N.C. 12 Apr. 2012) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988)). To show that a defendant acted under the color of state law, “[t]he person charged must either be a state actor or have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that a court would conclude that the non-state actor is engaged in the state's actions.” Wahi . v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615-16 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999)). There are no allegations in the complaint from which .. the court could find state action on behalf of the individual actors. “The under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983, like the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement, excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Rodgers v. Waste Indus., Inc., No. 4:12-CV-294-FL, 2013 WL 4460265, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (quotations omitted), aff'd, 553 Fed.Appx. 332 (4th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff does generally state that Officer Rouse lied about serving Gamer and Franklin, and also that an unnamed clerk of court and unnamed judge, presumably of Lenoir County, let “the people that throw their dogs at me” go “because of their bias and cormption.” [DE-1-1] at 3, 5. However, these allegations are insufficient to state civil rights or constitutional violations cognizable under § 1983.
Plaintiff also alleges that she was arrested “falsely and unjustly” for calling 911 and for vomiting in a sheriff's car, “after the Caucasian young sheriff handcuffed [her].” [DE-1-1] at 3. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim of false arrest under § 1983, which is a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure, see Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (analyzing false arrest claim under Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable seizures), she has failed to state a claim. “To establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, [the plaintiff] needs to show that the officers decided to arrest [him] . . . without probable cause.” Id. (citation omitted). “For probable cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.” Id. (citation omitted). Even construing the complaint liberally, Plaintiff asserts insufficient facts to state a plausible claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
In sum, Plaintiff's conclusory list of alleged violations is insufficient to state a claim. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff's “pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that her complaint contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, but it ‘cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts' that set forth a cognizable claim.” Alford v. Cobert, No. 7:19-CV-00194-D, 2020 WL 6140737, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 13, 2020) (citing Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766,776 (E.D. N.C. 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6139942 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 19, 2020). No potentially meritorious claims are discernable from Plaintiff's complaint.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and the pleading standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Alternatively, Defendants State of North Carolina and Lenoir County Court are entitled to dismissal because they are immune from suit.
The Lenoir County Court is considered a state agency not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Fuller v. North Carolina, No. 1:12-CV-1198, 2013 WL 5817652, at *5 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 29, 2013) (recommending that claims against the Guilford County District Court be dismissed, as it was a state agency entitled to dismissal “because the North Carolina district courts operate as part of the state's unified court system[.]”). Additionally, the claims against the Lenoir County Court appear to be based on actions of an unnamed judge and clerk, but they too are entitled to immunity.
Plaintiff provides little information as to how the judge and clerk allegedly violated any laws or Plaintiff's rights but simply states that the clerk and judge let people go because of “their bias and corruption.” The judge and clerk are entitled to absolute immunity for any “judicial acts.” See Dove v. Pate, No. 5:15-CT-3132-BO, 2016 WL 7655777, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2016) (“judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability claims”) (collecting cases), aff'd, 651 Fed.Appx. 188 (4th Cir. 2016). “Judges are subject to civil liability for judicial acts only where they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Fullard v. Horne, No. 5:17-CT-3159-FL, 2018 WL 3302732, at *3 (E.D. N.C. July 5, 2018) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357), aff'd, No. 18-6896, 2019 WL 117113 (4th Cir. Jan. 7,2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that because there was not “a clear absence of subject-matter jurisdiction,” the judge was “clothed with judicial immunity”); Green v. North Carolina, No. 4:08-CV-135-H, 2010 WL 3743767, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 21, 2010) (claims against North Carolina Superior Court Judge and/or clerk of court within their capacities as judicial officers are barred by doctrine of judicial immunity). Plaintiff has not alleged that the judge acted without subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Further, even with allegations of bias and corruption, ajudge is still entitled to judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,11 (1991) (“judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (“immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). Accordingly, it is alternatively recommended that Plaintiff's claims against the Lenoir County Court be dismissed on the basis of immunity.
With respect to the State of North Carolina, the Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const, amend. XI. “Under the Eleventh Amendment, . . . neither a State nor its officials in their official capacity may be sued for damages in federal court without their consent.” Gamache v. Cavanaugh, 82 F.3d 410,1996 WL 174623, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ, of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”). There are three exceptions to the bar against suing states: “when an individual sues ‘for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law,”' when Congress unequivocally abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity, or when a state waives its immunity. Budayr v. Michigan, No. 5:17-CV-327-FL, 2017 WL 6061972, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 7, 2017) (quoting Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2012)).
None of the three exceptions applies here. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants, not prospective injunctive relief; she has not alleged that Congress has unequivocally abrogated North Carolina's sovereign immunity; and North Carolina has not waived its immunity. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's suit against the State of North Carolina, and it is alternatively recommended that Plaintiff's claims against State of North Carolina be dismissed on the basis of immunity.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert state law claims, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over them where Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing that a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Calvert Cnty., 401 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2005) (having dismissed federal claims, district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction of state claims); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106,110 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that under § 1367(c), the district courts “enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain [supplemental] jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished”) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,350(1988)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and because Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and the pleading standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed for failure to state a claim and the court decline to exercise jurisdiction over any state law claims. Alternatively, it is further recommended that any claims against Defendants State of North Carolina and Lenoir County Court be dismissed as they are entitled to immunity.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until July 25, 2022, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).