Summary
In Smith v. Columbus Mun. Civil Serv. Comm. (1952), 158 Ohio St. 401, 402-403, 49 O.O. 277, 109 N.E.2d 507, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[w]here the resolution of the controversy involved in an action for a declaratory judgment depends largely on a determination of facts although it may also involve some determination of the meaning of language in a contract or legislative enactment, the trial court, in the exercise of sound discretion, may either entertain or not entertain such action."
Summary of this case from State v. State Medical Bd.Opinion
No. 33049
Decided December 24, 1952.
Declaratory Judgments Act — Remedy not available, when — Determination of question of fact.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin county.
The petition in this action for a declaratory judgment alleges that plaintiff is a member of the division of police of the city of Columbus; that his residence is in the city of Columbus; that he purchased a house in Franklin county to provide his wife with "the type of living place suitable for a woman in her condition of health"; that he has continued to maintain his Columbus residence; that the city civil service commission has ordered that plaintiff be given thirty days to establish a residence within the corporate limits of the city, and upon failure to do so he shall be removed from the division of police; and that the commission "alleges in substance" that plaintiff is not a resident of the city of Columbus, in violation of a city ordinance, the rules of the civil service commission and a provision of the rules of the division of police.
The prayer of the petition is that the court determine that plaintiff is a resident of the city of Columbus within the meaning of the ordinance and regulations involved, and that, upon such determination, injunctive relief be granted.
Defendants demurred to the petition on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and that the petition does not state facts which show a cause of action for declaratory judgment or other equitable relief.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on both grounds and, plaintiff not desiring to plead further, dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.
Messrs. Schwartz Gurevitz, for appellee.
Mr. Richard W. Gordon, city attorney, and Mr. Hugh K. Martin, for appellants.
Although the question of the validity or construction of the ordinance and the rules and regulations of the city civil service commission and the division of police may be involved, the issue presented by the petition and demurrer thereto is largely one of fact.
Where the resolution of the controversy involved in an action for a declaratory judgment depends largely on a determination of facts although it may also involve some determination of the meaning of language in a contract or legislative enactment, the trial court, in the exercise of sound discretion, may either entertain or not entertain such action. See Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Heise., 143 Ohio St. 519, 56 N.E.2d 151; Coshocton Real Estate Co. v. Smith, 147 Ohio St. 45, 67 N.E.2d 904; American Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, Admr., 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301; and Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E.2d 840. Hence, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing that of the trial court, is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, MIDDLETON, TAFT, MATTHIAS and HART, JJ., concur.
WEYGANDT, C.J., concurs in the judgment.