Opinion
15-P-1470
01-12-2017
Bodhisattva SKANDHA v. Luis SPENCER & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking judicial review of two institutional grievances, as well as declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. He alleged that the defendants had violated his constitutional right to due process under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Skandha also challenges the denial of his motion to disqualify defendants' counsel. We affirm.
Background . In his first grievance, Skandha alleged that a noxious odor (the smell of fecal matter) originating from nearby cells permeated the dining area while he was eating breakfast. He asked for a maintenance officer to examine the problem and to make any necessary repairs. Institutional grievance coordinator (IGC) Danielle Laurenti partially approved the grievance, the maintenance staff were informed of the problem, and a new motor was ordered to repair a fan that would alleviate the odor. Skandha did not appeal from the decision on his grievance.
Skandha then filed a second grievance, and requested that then-deputy superintendent Sean Medeiros personally adjudicate it. He complained that, regarding the first grievance, Laurenti did not interview him during her investigation, in violation of 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 491.10 (2006), and that Laurenti was not properly trained. He also suggested that "[t]he IGC should be at the Lieutenant level in rank." After review, the grievance was denied by Lieutenant Kimberly Kenney, and Skandha's appeal was denied by the superintendent.
In a thorough and comprehensive memorandum of decision and order, a judge allowed the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 365 Mass. 756 (1974), and dismissed Skandha's complaint. The judge concluded as to the first grievance that Skandha failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, as to the second grievance, that the defendants did not violate Skandha's due process rights because they did not violate the grievance procedure, and there was no violation of Skandha's art. 26 or Eighth Amendment rights. The judge further concluded that Skandha was not entitled to declaratory relief.
Though the defendants raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the judge did not address the issue. In light of our conclusion that Skandha's rights were not violated, we do not address whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
Discussion . Our review is de novo. Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund , 456 Mass. 594, 600 (2010), S .C ., 465 Mass. 297 (2013). We treat a rule 12(c) motion as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Jarosz v. Palmer , 436 Mass. 526, 529 (2002). Therefore, our inquiry here is whether Skandha's complaint, assuming all allegations therein are true, raises a nonspeculative right to relief. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co ., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).
1. First grievance . All of Skandha's claims regarding his first grievance were properly dismissed as Skandha failed to appeal the adverse decision and, therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. This failure left the Superior Court without authority to adjudicate Skandha's claim, and the judge properly dismissed it. See Ryan v. Pepe , 65 Mass. App. Ct. 833, 834, 839 (2006).
2. Second grievance . As regards the adjudication of his second grievance, Skandha alleges three procedural errors. First, he claims that Laurenti did not interview him as required by 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 491.10(1)(c) (2006). Second, he asserts that Laurenti did not propose a resolution as required by 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 491.10(1)(e) (2006). And third, he argues that the superintendent improperly delegated consideration of the second grievance to Kenney.
There is no merit to Skandha's second grievance, which complains of the handling of his first grievance, because the first grievance was handled properly and in conformity with the regulations. The regulations do not entitle Skandha to any specific grievance procedure and, in any event, prison officials properly resolved all issues presented.
Finally, Skandha argues that the alleged procedural defects in the handling of his grievances deprived him of his rights to due process under art. 12 and the Fourteenth Amendment. As previously discussed, the defendants did not violate the applicable regulations and, thus, there was no violation of his due process rights. Cf. Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction , 395 Mass. 382, 394-395 (1985) (due process claim mooted by revision of regulations that provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards).
3. Cruel and unusual punishment . Skandha claims that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was subjected to the odor of fecal matter during his meals in the dining area. We disagree.
A prison official is liable for violating art. 26 and the Eighth Amendment only if the official knowingly disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. 'Abdullah v. Secretary of Pub. Safety , 42 Mass. App. Ct. 387, 394 (1997), citing Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Here, even if we were to assume (which we do not) that the odor of fecal matter poses an excessive risk to inmate health or safety, the administrative record indicates that the defendants did not actively disregard it. To the contrary, the defendants made reasonable efforts to investigate and to correct the issue.
4. Declaratory relief . "[D]eclaratory relief is not 'an appropriate remedy where the validity of an adjudication ... in an individual case is being challenged.' " Grady v. Commissioner of Correction , 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 135 (2013), quoting from Averett v. Commissioner of Correction , 25 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 287 (1988), S .C ., 404 Mass. 28 (1989). Here, Skandha has "failed to raise or plead sufficient facts to establish that the regulation at issue has resulted in an ongoing, repeated violation of his constitutional rights." Id . at 136. Thus, we agree with the judge's conclusion that declaratory relief is unavailable here. Ibid .
5. Disqualification of counsel . Finally, Skandha purports to appeal the denial of his motion to disqualify the defendants' counsel on the basis that she was not an assistant attorney general. Whatever the merits of this claim, we do not reach it because this argument is not properly before us. An issue is properly appealed where the notice of appeal "designate[s] the judgment, decree, adjudication, order, or part thereof appealed from." Mass.R.A.P. 3(c), as appearing in 430 Mass. 1602 (1999). Skandha has not met this requirement because he only appealed from the judgment on the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, not the separate order denying his motion to disqualify defendants' counsel. This failure forecloses appellate review. See Bateman v. Consolidated Rail Corp ., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 918 (1998) (notice of appeal defective where it failed to designate proper order and failed to name proper appellee).
To the extent that Skandha argues error in the single justice's denial of his petition for interlocutory review of the order denying his motion to disqualify, the argument is likewise not before us.
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Judgment affirmed .