Opinion
83191-COA 84999-COA
11-23-2022
FREDERICK OMOYUMA SILVER, Appellant, v. CANDICE KATIE TOWNER, Respondent. FREDERICK OMOYUMA SILVER, Appellant, v. CANDICE KATIE TOWNER, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
GIBBONS, C.J.
In these related appeals, Frederick Omoyuma Silver appeals from a district court order regarding child support and the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment. The appeals are not consolidated. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jack B. Ames, Senior Judge; T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., Judge.
In early 2017, the Clark County District Attorney Family Support Division (DAFS) initiated child support proceedings on behalf of respondent Candice Towner and against Silver. Silver was subsequently determined to be the legal father and a child support order was issued. Silver has since filed numerous documents, repeatedly challenging the court's jurisdiction, the paternity decision, and child support order. As relevant here, after a hearing on June 29, 2021, the district court entered an order reducing Silver's child support arrears to judgment and denying his various motions challenging paternity, jurisdiction, and enforcement of the child support obligation, amongst other requests. Silver now appeals this order in Docket 83191-COA.
Silver continued to file documents and motions challenging paternity, jurisdiction, and enforcement of the child support order, along with several motions to set aside the default judgment. In June 2022, the child support hearing master recommended denying one of Silver's motions to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to NRCP 60, concluding that the court had previously denied the same motion on at least three prior occasions. The district court approved and adopted the hearing masters recommendation in an order filed July 1, 2022, after no objection was filed, giving rise to Silver's appeal in Docket 84999-COA.
On appeal in Docket 83191-COA, Silver summarily asserts that DAFS violated his constitutional rights, but fails to offer any cogent argument explaining how his constitutional rights were violated or otherwise challenging the basis for the district court's decision. See Powell v. Liberty Mitt. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) ("Issues not raised in an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived."); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (explaining that this court need not consider claims that are not cogently argued).
And insofar as Silver asserts that NRS 126.151(3) is unconstitutional, he only summarily requests that this court conclude the same, again without providing any argument to support his request. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38; see also Tarn v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 792, 796, 358 P.3d 234, 237-38 (2015) (explaining that statutes are presumed valid, and the challenger must make a clear showing that it is unconstitutional).
Similarly, in Docket 84999-COA, Silver has offered no argument as to the district court's order denying his motion to set aside, nor offered any argument as to why he is entitled to relief in light of the fact that he failed to timely file an objection to the hearing master's recommendation. See Powell, 127 Nev. at 161 n.3, 252 P.3d at 672 n.3; Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38; see also NRS 425.3844(3) (providing that when a party does not file a timely objection to a hearing master's report and recommendation, the recommendation "shall be deemed approved by the district court"). He likewise fails to offer any cogent argument supporting his summary request that this court declare NRS 126.151(3) unconstitutional. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38; see also Tarn, 131 Nev. at 796, 358 P.3d at 237-38.
Finally, Silver's assertion that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him is barred by the law of the case doctrine as this court previously addressed his personal jurisdiction argument. See Silver v. Towner, No. 81982-COA, 2021 WL 3878865, at *2 (Nev. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2021) (Order of Affirmance) (holding that "[t]he district court correctly determined it had personal jurisdiction over Silver"); Recontrust Co., N.A. v. Zhang, 130 Nev. 1, 8, 317 P.3d 814, 818 (2014) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine prohibits reopening questions that have been previously decided "explicitly or by necessary implication"); Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16, 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975) (stating that "[t]he law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals" and noting that the law of I the case "cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED.
We deny all other requests for relief currently pending before this court.
TAO, J., BULLA, J.
HON. JACK B. AMES, SENIOR JUDGE
HON. T. ARTHUR RITCHIE, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE