SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants Sandra, Robert, Patrick, Bobbi, Billie, Casey, and Sherri Sheehy, pro se, appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, J.), sua sponte dismissing the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, procedural history and issues on appeal.

Having reviewed de novo the district court's sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e), see Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001), we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellants' complaint.

First, any 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983 claim against Appellees Lucy or Edward Sherwood, Thomas Fuoco, Mark Wattenberg, or Steve Presutti was properly dismissed, as private actors and institutions generally are not proper § 1983 defendants. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (§ 1983 actions do not reach purely private conduct). Additionally, for an individual to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, he or she "must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . ." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Thus, any § 1983 claims arising out of the allegedly false prosecutions of Sandra, Patrick, or Robert Sheehy were appropriately dismissed, as Appellants did not allege that their convictions or sentences were invalidated or otherwise expunged. Id.

As for the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Allegany County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and Appellee Presutti, claims against these defendants were properly dismissed, as Appellants did not allege any wrongdoing on their part or specify how they were involved in the constitutional violations alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Next, to the extent that Appellants challenge the conduct of county district attorneys or state court judges, such actors are entitled to immunity. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Buckley v. Fitztimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993).

Appellants also assert § 1983 claims against: (1) county sanitation workers for entering the Sheehys' property, in violation of their property and privacy rights; (2) state troopers for use of excessive force and retaliation; and (3) Allegany County Department of Social Services employees for entering the Sheehys' property and removing the Sheehy children from their homes, in violation of their First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendment rights. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Thus, a pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). We conclude that because the Appellants' § 1983 allegations are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them, the district court did not err in dismissing them.

Appellants also assert claims under § 1985, for which a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) which has an intent or purpose to deprive a person of equal protection of the law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which results in an injury to a person, or a person's property, or the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Here, the Appellants' claims of conspiracy failed to specifically allege (1) the formation of a conspiracy; or (2) overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed any claims brought pursuant to §§ 1985 and 1986.

To the extent that Appellants assert claims based on the violation of federal criminal statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 241- 242, these claims are not cognizable, as federal criminal statutes do not provide private causes of action. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, any claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits the exclusion of individuals from a federally funded program or activity on the basis of race, color, or national origin, properly was dismissed, as Appellants did not allege that they were excluded from a federally funded program or activity and, thus, no claim exists under that statute. Similarly, although former 42 U.S.C. § 13981 authorized a cause of action arising out of a crime of violence motivated by gender, the Supreme Court has held that statute unconstitutional. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000).

We have reviewed Appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We also note here that we see no indication in the record that Appellants perfected service on any of the defendants in this case.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.