Opinion
1086 CA 17–02159
12-21-2018
Laporsha SHAW, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Barbara FRIEDLY, Defendant–Respondent, et al., Defendant. (Appeal No. 2.)
BROWN HUTCHINSON LLP, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY CAMPBELL OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT. LAW OFFICE OF JOHN TROP, ROCHESTER (KEVIN MATHEWSON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT.
BROWN HUTCHINSON LLP, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY CAMPBELL OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT.
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN TROP, ROCHESTER (KEVIN MATHEWSON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the order insofar as it denied leave to reargue is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this premises liability action, plaintiff moved for leave to reargue and renew her opposition to the motion of Barbara Friedly (defendant) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her. We dismiss the appeal from that part of the order denying leave to reargue (see Empire Ins. Co. v. Food City, 167 A.D.2d 983, 984, 562 N.Y.S.2d 5 [4th Dept. 1990] ) and affirm that part of the order denying leave to renew for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court. We add only that, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff submitted new facts that could raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant was an out-of-possession landlord at the time of plaintiff's accident, we conclude that the motion insofar as it sought leave to renew was properly denied. Those new facts, which had not been submitted in opposition to defendant's prior motion, "would [not] change the prior determination" because the court also granted that motion on the ground that defendant neither created the dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it ( CPLR 2221[e][2] ).