Opinion
No. CV04 0286968-S
May 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #101
Before the court is the defendant's motion to strike the second plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons stated herein, the defendant's motion is denied.
This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, Kevin Shanklin, on May 5, 2002, when he was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by the defendant, Robbie Clemons.
On March 2, 2004, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint seeking damages from the defendant. The first count of the complaint contains allegations of common-law negligence and also statutory claims that Clemons violated General Statutes § 14-234 (passing or driving to the left of the highway in a no-passing zone) and General Statutes § 14-227(a) (operating while under the influence of alcohol). In the second count, the plaintiff seeks double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. In that count he incorporates all the claims of negligence, common-law and statutory, asserted in the first count. There is also alleged in the second count that "the defendant operator, with reckless disregard, operated said motor vehicle in violation of Section 14-227(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury."
On March 31, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's complaint in which he seeks double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 on the grounds that the plaintiff fails to state a legal theory under which the defendant can be held liable in that he fails to allege facts sufficient to take the defendant's conduct beyond that alleged to be merely negligent in the first counts. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum in support. On April 15, 2004, the plaintiff filed a timely memorandum in opposition.
In Connecticut, our appellate courts have not addressed the issue of the specificity of pleading required to support a claim of statutory recklessness and, "[t]here is a split of authority within the Superior Court on the specificity needed to properly allege a claim of statutory recklessness . . . with some courts taking the position that it suffices to plead the terms of the statute, see, e.g., Lombard v. Booth, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 383637 (July 12, 2001, Stevens, J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 78), and cases cited at footnote 2 therein, and other courts requiring specific factual allegations to support the requisite degree of recklessness to impose statutory liability, see, e.g., Id., cases cited at footnote 3 therein." Hopwood v. Sebastiano Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Derby, Docket No. 75934S (July 11, 2002, Lager, J.) ( 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 474).
General Statutes § 14-295 provides in pertinent part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
"[Section] 14-295 is clear on its face . . . [and sets forth] "the essential components of a properly pleaded statutory recklessness claim: deliberate or reckless operation; violation of one or more of the listed statutes; and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Where a plaintiff specifically pleads each of these components, the plaintiff has fully complied with all that the statute requires." Rocco v. Hall, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 358709 (April 7, 1999, Skolnick, J.).
It also appears to this court that in fully complying with the statute, a plaintiff, in effect, complies with the specificity required under the common law. "`[W]illful,' `wanton,' or `reckless' conduct . . . must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention . . ." W. Prosser W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.) 34, p. 214. CT Page 7268 Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533 (1988).
Inasmuch as the second count of the plaintiff's complaint in the case before the court alleges that the defendant operator violated General Statutes §§ 14-227(a), one of the enumerated statutes within § 14-295, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a cause of action in recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.
BY THE COURT
Tanzer, Judge