Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-cv-3453-RBH-TER
04-11-2022
MUHAMMAD Z. SHAIKH, Plaintiff, v. AEKTA MOTELS, LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered discrimination because of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff, who is Muslim, began working for Defendant in June of 2018 as a manager. Compl. ¶ 10 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employs fifteen or more employees. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff obtained permission to be off on Fridays to attend Mosque, but was subsequently called in to work anyway. Compl. ¶ 11. Chandrakant Pandoria, one of Defendant's owners, also made comments to Plaintiff regarding his beard and his wife's hijab, both requirements of the Muslim religion. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15. Pandoria also interrupted Plaintiff's prayer time and told Plaintiff to pray at home. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff made numerous complaints regarding Pandoria's comments and behavior to Defendant's other owner, Rajishreey. Compl. ¶ 13. Following his numerous complaints of discrimination, Plaintiff's employment was terminated on July 20, 2020. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and received a Right to Sue Letter on July 23, 2021. Compl. ¶ 2.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) examines whether the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Generally, the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). In evaluating a defendant's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is to “regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Id.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that dismissal of this action is appropriate because it did not employ fifteen or more employees at any time relevant to the facts alleged in this case as required under Title VII. To be defined as an employer under Title VII, a defendant must have fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Defendant submits the affidavit of Pandoria, part-owner of Defendant, who avers that Defendant “did not employee fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar years.” Pandoria Aff. ¶¶ 2-3 (ECF No. 10-1). He also avers that “this issue was thoroughly and properly investigated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which also correctly and similarly dismissed the Plaintiff's claims because the Defendant employs ‘less than the required number of employees.'” Pandoria Aff. ¶ 4.
Though Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the only argument it raises is the employee-numerosity requirement. However, a defendant's status as an employer is not a jurisdictional issue and thus should not be analyzed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) standard. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (“[W]e hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.”). Consequently, it is inappropriate to consider evidence outside the pleadings on this issue as is allowed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Delarosa v. Comsource Mgmt., Inc., No. GJH-20-3174, 2021 WL 3857813, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2021) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768). Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that “Defendant employs fifteen (15) or more employees and is an ‘employer' within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.” Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Shomo v. Junior Corp., No. 7:11-CV-508, 2012 WL 2401978, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 1, 2012); Burnette v. Austin Med., Inc., No. 1:11cv52, 2011 WL 1769445 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 14, 2011).
Further, Defendant's argument that the EEOC has already thoroughly investigated this issue and determined that Defendant did not employ the requisite number of employees is insufficient to grant a motion to dismiss. Determinations made by the EEOC are not binding on this court. See Georator Corp. v. EEOC., 592 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding that EEOC determinations lack any binding effect) (citations omitted); McClure v. Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that “EEOC determinations and findings of fact” are “not binding on the trier of fact”). The Right to Sue Letter issued to Plaintiff by the EEOC states that the EEOC is closing its file because Defendant “employs less than the required number of employees or is not otherwise covered by the statute.” Right to Sue Letter (ECF No. 10-1). However, “an EEOC Right to Sue letter does not resolve issues with finality: it informs the charging party that the EEOC has found no violation of law but that the charging party may nevertheless file suit seeking an independent determination by a federal court.” Woodbury v. Victory Van Lines, No. CV TDC-16-2532, 2018 WL 5830764, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2018). Therefore, Defendant's argument is without merit, and dismissal is not appropriate at this juncture.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) be denied.