MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAUL STICKNEY, Magistrate Judge

This is a consent case before the United States Magistrate Judge. Before the Court for consideration is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Defendant Texas State Employees Union, Communications Workers of America Local 6186/AFL-CIO ("TSEU"), filed July 6, 2004. This Court has reviewed the record on summary judgment, and finds that the motion is ripe for determination.

Procedural Background

TSEU employed Karim Shabazz ("Plaintiff") as a union organizer from April 1986 until December 2000. Plaintiff initially sued TSEU, and its employees Michael Gross, Danny Fetonte, Amy Milburn, Sandy Rusher, Lynn McCray, Marilyn Hart, and Boone Taylor for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- 2000e-17, and violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Hon. Barbara M.G. Lynn, United States District Judge, dismissed all of Plaintiff's civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as all of his claims against the TSEU employees whom he had named in the Complaint. (Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Mem. Op."), filed September 30, 2004.) Plaintiff's only remaining claim is that TSEU terminated him in retaliation for activities protected under Title VII.

Prerequisites to a Title VII Action

Plaintiff claims that TSEU (1) deliberately undermined his ability to gather public information on disparate treatment of minority union members, and relieved Plaintiff of his duties at Texas Youth Commission ("TYC") branches in January 1999, (2) retaliated against him for filing an Open Records Act ("ORA") request with TYC about their discriminatory practices, and (3) retaliated against him for writing a letter to the Governor by taking away his Wichita Falls State Hospital ("Wichita Falls") campaign. He also alleges that TSEU (1) retaliated against him for petitioning TSEU delegates at the General Assembly for a progressive disciplinary action and due process procedure, and (2) retaliated against him for filing a charge with the EEOC on July 5, 2000, regarding the reassignment of the Wichita Falls campaign.

The filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, while not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, is a statutory requirement. Cruce v. Brazosport Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1983). The Court has examined Plaintiff's contentions in light of his administrative complaint in this case to determine whether he has satisfied this statutory prerequisite. "A Title VII cause of action may be based, not only upon the specific complaints made by the employee's initial EEOC charge, but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related to the charge's allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination." Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Fellows v. Universal Rests., Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1983)).

On December 12, 2000, Plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing an administrative complaint prior to initiating his Title VII lawsuit. However, his only claims were that TSEU terminated him in retaliation for (1) petitioning General Assembly Delegates for a progressive disciplinary action, and for (2) filing a charge with the EEOC on July 5, 2000, regarding the reassignment of Wichita Falls. (Def.'s App. at 42 (EEOC Charge No. 310A10592, Dec. 12, 2000).) Plaintiff's earlier claims regarding his retaliatory removal from the Wichita Falls assignment for opposing racial discrimination within TYC, making ORA requests, and complaining to the Governor were raised in his July 5, 2000 EEOC charge. (Def.'s App. at 26, EEOC Charge No. 360A1753, July 5, 2000.) In that charge, he also complained that he was suspended without pay for seven days and that he was denied a due process hearing by the TSEU executive board. ( Id.) Plaintiff does not allege that he filed suit in federal court after receiving his right to sue letter with respect to his earlier claims. The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, forecloses relitigation of claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies in this case only with respect to his two claims that were brought in his December 12, 2000 EEOC Charge, i.e., his claims that TSEU terminated him in retaliation for (1) his filing an EEOC charge of discrimination with the EEOC in July 2000, and (2) his petitioning the General Assembly Delegates on October 27, 2000. His other claims were not within the scope of the EEOC's investigation of the charge he filed in December. Plaintiff's other claims are dismissed with prejudice as barred by res judicata. He either raised them, or could have raised them, in his July EEOC charge and requested de novo review in federal court.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the court's granting summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support his motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Rather, the movant may satisfy his burden by pointing to the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Once the movant meets his burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement is not appropriate. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). "[A properly supported summary judgment motion] requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). To determine whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Material Undisputed Facts

TSEU is a state-wide local of the Communication Workers of America which has over 10,000 members employed by state, local and county governments and by several private sector employers. (Def.'s App. at 1.) TSEU's goal for the labor movement is to promote social justice and unite workers by defeating racism, sexism, and other divisive forces. ( Id.) In March 1988, TSEU hired Plaintiff for a permanent position in the Rusk, Texas office, and he worked there until 1992. ( Id. at 2.) Plaintiff requested and was granted a transfer to the Dallas office in 1992, where his Organizing Coordinators were Michael Gross and Lynn McCray. ( Id.)

Plaintiff's job as an organizer was to bring new members into the union and to maintain their membership. (Def.'s App. at 2.) Each organizer is assigned to organizing campaigns at various places of employment. ( Id.) The organizer encourages employees (activists) at each location to form organizing committees. ( Id.) The activists help persuade other employees to join and remain in the union, and to become active in the union's programs. ( Id.) Organizers must maintain organizing charts to measure the progress of a campaign and submit weekly activity reports. ( Id.) Organizers work long hours, often in the evening and early morning, and travel around the state. ( Id. at 2, 58.)

Plaintiff handled many racial discrimination grievances for employees, including those at TYC and other state agencies, during his almost fifteen years as an organizer. ( Id. at 62-3.) Plaintiff had used ORA requests to get information to support grievances, and he had reported racial discrimination to former Governor Mark White, to the TYC Executive Board, to BYC Executive Directors, and to the TYC superintendent. ( Id. at 64.) TSEU did not tell Plaintiff not to file grievances that involved complaints of racial discrimination, and it never disciplined him when he did file them. ( Id. at 65.)

On May 6, 1991, Plaintiff's Organizing Coordinator sent him a memo outlining Plaintiff's below standard performance, his failure to meet production expectations, his failure to develop plans, and his resistance to supervision and direction from staff leadership. ( Id. at 11-13.) Plaintiff's productivity decreased over time. ( Id. at 3.) In early 1999, when Plaintiff complained he had to drive too much between his organizing assignments, TSEU reassigned three of Plaintiff's TYC facilities to other organizers. ( Id. at 3, 15.)

In April 2000, a group of nurses were engaged in a very active organizing campaign at Wichita Falls State Hospital ("Wichita Falls"), where Plaintiff was assigned. Marilyn Hart, a nurse and activist at Wichita Falls, complained to Mr. Gross that Plaintiff repeatedly rescheduled meetings, failed to provide information he had promised, failed to meet with the nurses, was not available to employees working on the evening and night shifts, did not inform employees of union meetings, and held meetings at times which were not convenient for many employees. ( Id. at 45-6, 48.) Ms. Hart complained that Plaintiff was evasive and resistant, and that when she asked him for information, he gave excuses for not meeting her requests. He did not provide shirts or other items, or schedule meetings. ( Id.) She also complained that he had arrived at the last minute for a disciplinary hearing without any time to discuss the issues, leaving her feeling unprepared, and that after the hearing, he criticized her "in a hateful tone of voice." ( Id. at 51.) Additionally, Plaintiff failed to represent another nurse, Patricia Smith, at a counseling session. When sixty nurses prepared and signed a petition criticizing management, he did not advise them not to send it. ( Id. at 4, 17, 91.) As a result of the petition, management at Wichita Falls attempted to discipline some of the nurses. ( Id. at 44.) However, Jim Branson, an organizer who had been assigned to assist Plaintiff at Wichita Falls, worked with management and was able to forestall the disciplinary action. ( Id.) Also, Plaintiff did not have organizing charts for Wichita Falls. ( Id. at 4, 44, 87-9.)

Plaintiff does not rebut these contentions. Rather he offers excuses, such as, his forgetting to attend the meeting with Ms. Smith; the failure of others to make the charts as they had promised; his having plans to set up meetings; his failure to receive a fax copy of the nurses' petition; and his having to care for his wife who was ill. ( Id. at 49-54, 56, 85-91, 109.)

On April 21, 2000, TSEU advised Plaintiff that his work at Wichita Falls was "below minimally acceptable levels" and reassigned Wichita Falls to Jim Branson because of these complaints. ( Id. at 4, 17.) The reassignment did not change Plaintiff's position or his pay. ( Id. at 5, 69.) Plaintiff asserts that Wichita Falls was his most productive assignment; however, according to Jim Branson, any increases in membership at Wichita Falls were due to the activist nurses and not to any efforts on Plaintiff's part. ( Id. at 43-4, 128.)

On May 18, 2000, Plaintiff failed to attend a required staff meeting in Austin, choosing instead to picket TSEU to protest the reassignment of the Wichita Falls campaign. ( Id. at 4, 58-9, 92-3.) Plaintiff was suspended without pay from May 19, 2000 through May 28, 2000 for his failure to attend the staff meeting. ( Id. at 4, 18.)

Staff members were discouraged by Plaintiff's negative attitude when he did attend staff meetings. ( Id. at 44, 58.) In May 2000, records showed that from 1999 to 2000 the membership decreased in all of Plaintiff's campaigns except two, one of which was Wichita Falls. ( Id. at 4, 19.) In 1999, the average number of new members per month was 30.2, while Plaintiff's average was 18.5, the lowest average for an organizer with over six months on the staff ( Id. at 4, 44.) Plaintiff was not developing activists and leaders and few, if any of his committees met regularly. ( Id. at 3.) He did not have the requisite organizing charts. ( Id. at 22.)

On May 30, 2000, Mr. Gross and Ms. McCray sent Plaintiff a memorandum warning him that his work was "below minimum standards for an organizer." ( Id. at 6, 23.) The memorandum outlined what was required of Plaintiff. ( Id. at 23.) Plaintiff did not follow the instructions in the memo. He failed to turn in a monthly organizing calender and several weekly activity reports, despite their repeated requests and his promises to comply. ( Id. at 5, 24-6, 66, 97.)

In July 2000, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that Plaintiff retaliated against him for writing a letter to the Governor's office opposing racial discrimination within TYC by removing his Wichita Falls assignment, by suspending him, and by denying him a due process hearing. ( Id. at 26.)

In a staff meeting on July 20, 2000, each organizer was directed to select a campaign to emphasize by expediting the charting and creating an organizing committee. ( Id. at 5-6, 25.) Plaintiff refused to select a campaign. ( Id. at 26.)

On October 20-23, 2000, TSEU held a General Assembly, a forum at which members met to discuss the Union's agenda and goals for the coming year and to gather information. ( Id. at 6.) All TSEU staff were required to attend the full General Assembly. ( Id. at 6, 70, 101.) Plaintiff failed to attend a substantial part of the three-day General Assembly and did not fulfill his responsibilities for the portion that he did attend. ( Id. at 6-7.) In one of the caucuses, Plaintiff became angry with Ms. McCray when she asked him to talk about "how bad [TYC's] grievance procedure is and how badly they treat blacks." ( Id. at 89, 111.) As a result of his anger, he decided to protest TSEU's lack of due process in disciplinary proceedings. ( Id. at 89, 99, 111.) In both the afternoon and evening, Plaintiff handed out packets of literature to the delegates involving his own complaints about the lack of due process for TSEU employees. ( Id. at 89, 111.) The packets Plaintiff distributed were not uniform, and he does not recall what documents were in them. ( Id. at 113-18, 136-139.) Some documents were confidential documents regarding a disciplinary action against Marilyn Hart by her employer, Wichita Falls. ( Id. at 113, 138.) Marilyn Hart complained about Plaintiff's activity at the General Assembly and followed up with a written complaint. ( Id. at 46, 53.) Mr. Gross felt Plaintiff's actions with respect to Ms. Hart's confidential information were highly inappropriate and that he misled Mr. Gross by telling him he had to leave to care for his wife, when, in fact, he stayed to pass out literature about his own job situation. ( Id. at 7.)

After the General Assembly, Ms. McCray and Mr. Gross placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave and asked him to explain his absences and activities at the General Assembly. ( Id. at 7, 29.) Plaintiff claimed he had received permission from Mr. Gross and Ms. McCray, and he submitted a doctor's note stating that his wife had physical therapy appointments of Friday, October 20 and Monday, October 23, 2000. ( Id. at 8, 30.)

TSEU notified Plaintiff on November 3, 2000, that his employment would be terminated effective December 31, 2000. ( Id. at 8.) The reasons for his termination included his continued poor performance, his failure to submit weekly activity reports, his absence from the TYC caucus on Saturday afternoon, his giving of a false excuse, and his absence from the General Assembly on Sunday without a valid reason. ( Id. at 33.)

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on December 7, 2000, claiming that TSEU had terminated his employment because he had filed a charge of discrimination with respect to the Wichita Falls reassignment in July 2000, and because he had petitioned the General Assembly for a progressive disciplinary procedure on October 27, 2000. ( Id. at 8, 35.)

Analysis

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by demonstrating that 1) he engaged in protected activity, 2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and 3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996).

Activities Protected Under Title VII Protesting at the General Assembly

An employee has engaged in protected activity when he has "opposed any practice made an unlawful practice under [Title VII]," or "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Not all "opposition activity" is protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See Smith v. Texas Dep't of Water Res., 818 F.2d 363, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 727 (5th Cir. 1986); Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1980); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230-34 (1st Cir. 1976); Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892, 895-96 (8th Cir. 1976). Courts require that the employee conduct be reasonable in light of the circumstances, and hold that "the employer's right to run his business must be balanced against the rights of the employee to express his grievances and promote his own welfare." Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233. Some conduct, even though the protestor had the most sincere of intentions, may be so inappropriate as to justify the curtailment of statutorily-afforded safeguards. Jones, 793 F.2d at 727. See Rosser v. Laborers' Int'l Union of North America, Local No. 438, 616 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1980).

Courts must apply a balancing test to determine whether Title VII's protections may be denied to an employee's activities that adversely affect the effective performance of job duties. Jones, 793 F.2d at 727. The yardstick for measuring an employee's conduct is "reasonableness in light of the circumstances." Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1036.

Plaintiff is not asserting a racial discrimination claim under Title VII. (Mem. Op. at 11.) His claim is that TSEU retaliated against him for passing out leaflets to General Assembly Delegates, complaining about TSEU's lack of a step-based grievance procedure and lack of due process with respect to his own disciplinary actions. TSEU contends Plaintiff's opposition at the General Assembly was not protected under Title VII because it had nothing to do with employment discrimination and because Plaintiff passed out confidential information about a disciplinary action against Marilyn Hart. (Def.'s Br. at 15, 18.)

Defendant responds that as long as he had a "good faith, reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful under Title VII," the opposition was protected, citing Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 1999). However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence in response to TSEU's motion for summary judgment to show that he had such a reasonable good faith belief. Moreover, as a union organizer, Plaintiff knew that the discrimination Title VII's prohibits is discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Marilyn Hart was a Wichita Falls activist who had criticized Plaintiff's handling of the Wichita Falls campaign before Plaintiff was reassigned. Plaintiff does not deny that, in addition to his documents protesting the need for progressive disciplinary action at TSEU, he also passed out to some of the General Assembly Delegates a disciplinary reprimand issued to Marilyn Hart by Wichita Falls State Hospital. (Def.'s App. at 116, 138.) When Ms. Hart learned what Plaintiff had done, she was angry that Plaintiff publicized confidential information about her that he had learned only in his capacity as an organizer. ( Id. at 2, 46.) She complained to Mr. Gross about Plaintiff's distribution of her confidential disciplinary record. ( Id. at 2, 46, 53.) Mr. Gross felt Plaintiff's actions with respect to Ms. Hart's confidential information were highly inappropriate and that had he misled Mr. Gross by telling him he had to leave to care for his wife, when, in fact, he had stayed to pass out literature about his own job situation. ( Id. at 7.)

TSEU clearly had a legitimate and substantial interest in keeping Marilyn Hart's personnel record from Wichita Falls confidential. Plaintiff has shown no legitimate need for surreptitiously copying and disseminating her confidential record. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that TSEU's interest in protecting the confidentiality of the personnel records of its activists outweighs Plaintiff's self-proclaimed "right" to protest TSEU's lack of a grievance procedure. The Court finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's conduct at the General Assembly was clearly unreasonable in the light of the circumstances and that his petitioning the delegates at the General Assembly was clearly an activity unprotected by Title VII.

Plaintiff's July 2000 EEOC Charge

Plaintiff has shown one protected activity, his filing of the EEOC charge regarding Wichita Falls in July 2000. He has also shown an adverse employment action, his termination in December 2000. He has satisfied the first two prongs of a retaliation claim.

TSEU attacks Plaintiff's prima facie case primarily by asserting that he has failed to establish a "causal link" between the protected activity and the termination. A "causal link" is established when the evidence demonstrates that the employer's decision to terminate the employee was based in part on knowledge of the employee's "protected activity." Plaintiff's EEOC charge concerned his removal as organizer for Wichita Falls State Hospital for work below minimally acceptable levels. It is clear that TSEU knew about Plaintiff's July 2000 EEOC charge. Assuming that Plaintiff has met the "causal link" element because the Wichita Falls charge was made only six months before his termination, he has stated a prima facie case.

The burden of production now shifts to TSEU to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. See Long, 88 F.3d at 305. This burden is satisfied by introducing evidence which, if true, would permit the trier-of-fact to conclude that the termination was nondiscriminatory. See id. TSEU asserts that Plaintiff was terminated for legitimate reasons and supports this assertion with competent summary judgment evidence of his continued poor job performance, his failure to provide weekly activity reports, his failure to attend the full afternoon session of the TYC Caucus Meeting of the TSEU General Assembly and providing a false reason for leaving, and his failure to attend the Sunday session of the TSEU General Assembly or to provide a reason for not attending. (Def.'s App. at 33, Gross Exh. 17.) Therefore, TSEU has satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff.

Finally, Plaintiff has the burden to adduce evidence that TSEU's proffered reason for his termination was merely a pretext for retaliation. See Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show that he would not have been terminated "but for" engaging in protected activity. See id. at 1123. The burden here is more stringent than that of the prime facie case. See McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff must reveal "a conflict in substantial evidence on the ultimate issue of retaliation in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1122.

In Long, the plaintiffs sued their employer for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII. Long, 88 F.3d at 304. One of the plaintiffs introduced evidence that her performance evaluations never fell below "exceeds" until after she complained to her employer about another employee's harassing conduct. See id. at 308. She also introduced evidence that no other employee had been terminated for the reason which her employer gave for her termination. See id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer retaliated against its employee for engaging in protected activity. See id. at 309.

Plaintiff's case is distinguishable from Long. On May 6, 1991, long before Plaintiff filed his EEOC charge, TSEU notified Plaintiff that his work was well below standards and expectations. (Def.'s App. at 11-13.) His probation had been continued well beyond the two-year period, and he had worked under a number of supervisors. However, his work had not improved. ( Id.) He had resisted supervision and direction. ( Id.) In January, 1999, TSEU adjusted his organizing assignment to reduce the amount of time he had to spend driving. ( Id. at 15.) In April 2000, TSEU received serious complaints about Plaintiff's performance at Wichita Falls. In an April 13, 2000 memo, Plaintiff was told that in order to reestablish a good relationship with TYC, he should do his organizing outside the gates, refrain from frivolous ORA requests, and fill out grievance forms for grievances he had filed in the past six months. ( Id. at 16.) In a memo dated May 16, 2000, TSEU notified Plaintiff in great detail of his deficiencies in Wichita Falls, including failing to review planned on-the job strategy with activists, failing to represent members at disciplinary hearings, failing to keep current charts, refusing to set up organizing meetings at proper times, failing to attend an activist's personal counseling session, and refusing to contact an activist prior to a disciplinary meeting. ( Id. at 17.) These deficiencies are documented by contemporaneous records, affidavits, and memos. ( Id. at 45-55.) TSEU had to assign another employee to help Plaintiff in Wichita Falls and assure that the work there was completed. On May 13, 2000, Plaintiff failed to attend a required staff meeting in Austin and instead, picketed outside the office. ( Id. at 4, 58-9, 92-3.) He was suspended without pay for a number of days and was notified that it was a serious offense. ( Id.) All of this happened before Plaintiff filed the July 2000 EEOC charge.

Plaintiff has failed to point to even a scintilla of admissible evidence in the record on summary judgment that TSEU's reasons for terminating his employment were a pretext for retaliation for his having filed the July EEOC charge. Rather, Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that TSEU's evidence regarding poor performance is "far fetched" and highly implausible." (Pl.'s Br. at 2, 12.) An employee is not immune from discharge merely because he claims that he was opposing discriminatory practices; rather, an employer remains entitled to loyalty and cooperativeness from its employees. Smith v. Texas Dept. of Water Resources, 818 F.2d 363, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Like the employee in Smith, Plaintiff has pointed to nothing that would support a reasonable inference of retaliation in fact. As in Smith, he concedes that he has no basis for believing there was a causal connection between his EEOC charge and his termination, other than the timing. (Pl.'s Br. at 11.) As the Fifth Circuit teaches, "that is simply not enough." Smith, 818 F.2d at 366. The Court has considered the lapse of time between the EEOC charge and the termination, but without more, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the reasons given for his termination were a pretext.

As early as 1991, Plaintiff was receiving bad performance evaluations. With respect to the petition by Wichita Falls employees that he failed to review, he claims Ms. Hart did not fax him a copy of the petition. ( Id. at 85.) He admits he knew about the petition and that he did not discourage the employees from sending it to management, but he claims this was because he did not see it. ( Id.) He admits there were no up-to date charts for the location. ( Id. at 87.) Although he blames others, he admits he was ultimately responsible. ( Id. at 89.) He claims he had plans to set up meetings. ( Id. at 90.) He claims he forgot to go to the counseling session with Patricia Smith. ( Id. at 91.) He admits that instead of going to the required staff meeting on May 17, 2000, he picketed the TSEU office, simply because he felt as if he had the right to do so. ( Id. at 92.)

With respect to Plaintiff's failure to sign up the minimum 20 new members in only nine out of twenty-four months, he stated he "had not done the math." ( Id. at 95.) He did not know that another organizer, Jim Branson, had been assigned to his area to help him, nor did know that membership in seven of his nine main assignments fell during the last year of his employment. ( Id. at 95.) He knew that he was required to comply with the directions to turn in an organizing calendar for each month, to prepare a weekly report of organizing work, and to clear all proposed correspondence with TYC with his supervisor. ( Id. at 96.) He states that if TSEU did not receive his calendar, he must not have sent it. ( Id.) He admits that he was late with weekly organizing reports and with his weekly activity reports for the weeks of June 18, June 25, July 9, and July 20, 2000. ( Id.) He further admits that he did not select a campaign when he was ordered to do so on July 20, 2000. ( Id. at 98.) He did not consider failing to select a campaign to be insubordination because, in his own mind, the order's purpose was to humiliate him. ( Id at 98-9.)

Plaintiff admits it was part of his duties as an organizer to attend the General Assembly. ( Id. at 101.) He admits he wandered in and out of the room at the Saturday morning caucus because he was sleepy. ( Id. at 103.) He claims did not attend the whole afternoon session because Ms. McCray told him he could take a nap. ( Id. at 104.). He admits that he only had one delegate at the General Assembly. ( Id. at 105.) He blames his delegates and alternates for failing to attend. ( Id. at 108.) In one of the caucuses, Plaintiff became angry at Ms. McCray and decided to pass out literature about his own job situation. ( Id. at 111.) He doesn't recall handing out literature regarding Marilyn Hart's disciplinary warning, and he doesn't know to whom he handed it. ( Id. at 115.) However, when he was shown a copy of Marilyn Hart's disciplinary report, he did not deny that he had distributed it, claiming instead that he felt it was a public record.

Finally, the only evidence that supports Plaintiff's claim of retaliation is his subjective, personal belief that the timing is suspicious because he had been employed at TSEU for almost fifteen years and his termination came six months after his EEOC charge. Such a belief is simply not enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Nichols v. Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[A] subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, [cannot] be the basis of judicial relief.") (quoting Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1991)). "Speculation and belief are insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext." McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (S.D. Tex. 1997). Moreover, conclusory allegations of intentional discrimination are not sufficient. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "[i]n short, conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the non-movant's burden.") (en banc). In sum, taking the facts and inferences therefrom most favorably to Plaintiff, he has failed to point to competent summary judgment evidence to show that TSEU's reasons for terminating him were a pretext for retaliation for filing a July 2000 EEOC charge.

Conclusion

Plaintiff failed to show that "but for" his protected activity of filing an EEOC complaint, his employment would not have been terminated. He failed to meet his burden to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to pretext. Accordingly, TSEU's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

It is SO ORDERED.