OPINION AND ORDER

FRANKLIN VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge

I. Introduction

We have before us Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for failure to state cognizable claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs Drake Saxton, Jimmy Little, and Thomas C. Dudley, acting on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, allege that Defendants Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Pension Fund, Trustees, and Fund Administrator violated various provisions of ERISA, including breach of fiduciary duty provisions, § 404(a)(1)(A)-(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D); unlawful reduction of accrued benefits, § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g); unlawful forfeiture of accrued benefits, § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a); illegal transfers of plan assets, § 4231, 29 U.S.C. § 1411; and prohibited transactions, § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a). Plaintiffs also assert violations under the LMRA, § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186, as well as a violation of collective bargaining agreements. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Jurisdiction

This case arises under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.: thus, we have federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).

III. Background

We present the relevant facts as Plaintiffs allege them in their brief. Defendant, the Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Fund ("Fund" or "Pension Plan") is a multi-employer pension fund governed by the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs are participants in the Fund, which is administered by three union Trustees, and three employer Trustees, as well as a Fund Administrator appointed by the Trustees. The Fund itself, a trust, is comprised of three distinct pension sub-plans, or sub-trusts, all of which qualify as separate ERISA benefit plans. These sub-plans include the Defined Benefit Plan ("DB Plan"), the Retirement Income Plan 1987 ("RIP 87 Plan"), and the Retirement Income Plan 2000 ("RIP 2000 Plan"). Each sub-plan is governed by the Central Pennsylvania Teamster Pension Fund Trust Agreement, as restated December 9, 1999 ("1999 Trust Agreement" or "Trust Agreement"), as well as by its own plan document. The DB Plan is a defined benefit plan, whereas the RIP 87 Plan and the RIP 2000 Plan are defined contribution or individual account plans, as defined by ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). Plaintiffs filed the instant action as a class action lawsuit. Named Plaintiffs Drake Saxton, Jimmy Little, and Thomas C. Dudley are participants in both the DB and RIP 87 Plans.

In addition to asserting claims against the Fund, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges various ERISA violations against the Trustees and the Fund Administrator. Briefly, Count 1 of the Amended Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to clarify and enforce Plaintiffs' rights to future benefits under the DB Plan and the RIP 87 Plan upon this Court's resolution of Plaintiffs' remaining statutory based claims. Count II alleges that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator breached their fiduciary duties through various measures. Counts III and IV aver that the plan amendments adopted by Defendant Trustees in 2002 violated the "anti-cut back" rule of ERISA § 204(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1) and constituted unlawful forfeitures of Plaintiffs' accrued benefits under § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a), respectively. Count V contends that the Trustees flouted ERISA § 4231(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1411(a) by causing illegal transfers of plan assets without meeting certain specified requirements. Count VI alleges that Defendants breached collective bargaining agreements with employers. The employers' obligations to contribute to the Fund arise from these agreements. Finally, Count VII sets forth claims pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and seeks to hold Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator personally liable for committing prohibited transactions in connection with the violations alleged throughout the Amended Complaint.

The Fund was created in 1955 by its settlors, the Transport Employers Association ("TEA") and the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman, and Helpers Local Union No. 429 ("Local 429"). Since then, the Fund and its sub-plans have been amended on multiple occasions. In 1986, the Fund documents were amended to phase out the DB Plan over a three year span, and establish a new "Retirement Income Plan," which, after the RIP 2000 plan was created, became known as the RIP 87 Plan. The DB Plan and RIP 87 Plan had overlapping, but not identical participation. As the collective bargaining agreements ("CBA") governing employer contributions into the DB Plan expired during the three-year window, 95% of future employer contributions were directed into the RIP 87 Plan, and the remaining 5% were directed into the old DB Plan. This apportionment of employer contributions between the two plans was made pursuant to a formula set forth the Trust Agreement. The DB Plan was thereafter amended in 1989, effective January 1990, to direct all employer contributions into the RIP 87 Plan. The amendment was implemented based on the Trustees' incorrect assumption that the DB Plan was "fully funded" and thus required no further employer contributions to meet its existing benefit obligations to beneficiaries.

By 1999, however, it became evident that the DB Plan was in danger of not meeting ERISA's minimum funding requirements. The Fund's Settlors, TEA and Local 429, therefore amended the Fund's Trust Agreement in 1999. This agreement, known as the 1999 Second Amended and Restated Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Pension Trust Agreement, contained two important amendments. First, the RIP 2000 Plan was spun off from the RIP 87 Plan. The RIP 2000 Plan was established as a separate defined contribution plan for employers who had joined the Fund since 2000 and whose employees had never participated in the DB Plan. Second, to ameliorate the DB Plan's funding problems, an amendment allocated a certain amount of future contributions of RIP 87 Employers from the RIP 87 Plan into the DB Plan for the years 2000 to 2005. The quantity of contributions reallocated was calculated from the total forfeitures of RIP 87 Plan employees from the previous year. Significantly, the previous year's forfeitures remained in the RIP 87 Plan. The quantity of forfeitures merely served as a guide for determining the portion of future contributions from RIP 87 Employers that would be allocated to the DB Plan. Thus, while the employers' overall contribution obligations did not diminish, a portion of those contributions were directed into the DB Plan. These amendments to the Trust Agreement were signed by both TEA and Local 429, the Fund's settlors.

In another attempt to surmount the DB Plan's underfunding issue, the Trustees announced two proposals to the membership in 2001. The first involved freezing the RIP 87 Plan, and re-activating the DB Plan for receipt of future employer contributions. The second option reallocated a additional percentage of future contributions of RIP 87 Plan employers into the DB Plan pursuant to a formula based on the participant's age and years of service. The Trustees ultimately selected this latter option, deemed Amendment No. 4, effective March 1, 2002. Amendment No. 4 also contained a second, separate amendment. The Trustees added to the amendment provisions of the Trust Agreement the statement, "[n]othing in this Trust Agreement shall preclude the Trustees from acting in their Settlor-capacity as appropriate by law." (1999 Trust Agreement, Art. XI, Sec. 11.1.) Amendment No. 4 was signed and issued by the Trustees, without the signatures of Local 429 and the TEA. Several months later, however, the Trustees reversed their position and adopted Amendment No. 6 to the 1999 Second Amended and Restated Trust Agreement. This amendment, effective January 2003, froze the RIP 87 Plan and allocated all future contributions of RIP 87 Plan employers into the DB Plan. Plaintiffs' allegations stem primarily from these amendments.

IV. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Accordingly, an action will be dismissed under 12(b)(6) only when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The criteria for deciding whether a plaintiff has met this standard have been clearly established. "In reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom must be accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987). This Court need not credit, however, any conclusory allegations of law, unsubstantiated conclusions, and/or unwarranted factual inferences.Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). In addition, a complaint should be dismissed only if it appears to a legal certainty that a plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. P.P. Enterprises v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).

Generally, a court may not take into account materials extraneous to the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). If, however a document is "integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," it may be considered "without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment." Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996), superceded by statute on other grounds, as noted in Greebel v. FTP Software. Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); See also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding district court's reliance on document provided by defendants in ruling on motion to dismiss appropriate because plaintiffs complaint was based on that document, even though complaint did not explicitly refer or cite to it); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1993) ("a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the document") (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiffs' allegations, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, are heavily based upon the 1999 Trust Agreement, and the February 2002 and December 2002 amendments thereto, the 1999 RIP 1987 Plan Document, the 1994 DB Plan Document, and the collective bargaining agreements governing the named Plaintiffs' employment. These documents are attached as exhibits to both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' supporting Memoranda. The authenticity of these documents is not in dispute. Thus, it is proper for this Court to consider these documents in adjudicating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Notably, if the plan documents are unambiguous, we may construe them as a matter of law. Kemerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1995).

V. Discussion

A. Count 1

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), Count 1 of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief to clarify and enforce their rights to future benefits under the DB Plan and the RIP 87 Plan. (Am. Compl. ¶ 59.) § 1132(a)(1)(B) enables ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries to institute a civil enforcement action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Before a federal court may entertain a claim under this provision, however, the Third Circuit requires that a plaintiff first exhaust any remedies available under the plan. Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 244, 252 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Zipf v. Am. Tel. Tel., 799 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1986)). The exhaustion requirement applies "to ERISA benefit claims, but not to claims arising from violations of substantive statutory provisions." Id. Courts require exhaustion of administrative remedies "to help reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a nonadversarial method of claims settlement; and to minimize the costs of claims settlement for all concerned."Id. at 249 (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980)). The exhaustion requirement, however, is not absolute. If a plaintiff can provide a "clear and positive" showing that exhaustion would be futile, the requirement is excused. Brown v. Cont'l Baking Co., 891 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.Pa. 1995): see Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Although the exhaustion requirement is strictly enforced, courts have recognized an exception when resort to the administrative process would be futile").

Plaintiffs admit that they have not exhausted their claim. Because the determination and clarification of benefits under the plans depend upon this Court's resolution of Plaintiffs' remaining statutory claims, they allege that exhaustion under the plans' administrative claim procedures would be futile. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60.) To support this argument, Plaintiffs characterize Count 1 as a "claim for benefits" not under the current plans' terms, but rather under the terms of the plans as ultimately determined by this Court. This distinction is unavailing because it does not overcome the fundamental nature of the Count as a claim for the clarification and enforcement of future benefits.

In essence, Plaintiffs first seek reconstitution of the plans' terms through this Court's adjudication of their remaining statutory-based counts before any resolution of claims for benefits. Thus, in one sense, it would be futile to require Plaintiffs to exhaust any claims for benefits before these statutory issues are resolved, because the changes in the plans' terms constitute the gravamen of the Amended Complaint. But all this means is that Plaintiffs' claim for clarification and enforcement of future benefits is premature. It does not provide a basis to apply the futility exception. Once this Court rules on Plaintiffs' remaining counts, they are then free to exhaust claims for benefits under the reconstituted plans' internal administrative procedures. Because such a claim must first be exhausted through the plans' internal administrative procedures before being brought in federal court, and because the futility exception is inapplicable, Count 1 must be dismissed at this time, without prejudice for Plaintiffs to refile the claim if and when appropriate.

B. Count II

Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator, acting as "fiduciaries" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(1) , breached their ERISA mandated fiduciary obligations through various measures.

To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant undertook the challenged actions in a fiduciary capacity, and that the action taken constituted a breach of that duty. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (a), 1132(a)(3). An ERISA fiduciary, properly identified, must employ within the defined domain "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). The fiduciary should act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," and must discharge his duties "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]." §§ 1104(a)(1)(A), (D). 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) authorizes a beneficiary to bring suit against a fiduciary who has violated any of the fiduciary obligations ERISA imposes.

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert nine separate violations of Defendants' fiduciary duties. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64(a)-(j).) For purposes of the following analysis, the alleged violations are grouped as follows: (1) inappropriately amending the 1999 Trust Agreement on several occasions in 2002 without the requisite signatures; (2) improperly issuing to retired DB Plan participants the "thirteenth check" through 2000; and (3) failing to prudently and effectively monitor the performance of investment advisors and managers responsible for the investment of plan assets.

1. Trust Amendments

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' claims relating to Defendants' implementation of the 2002 Amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement are dismissed with prejudice.

i. Trustees' Failure to Abide by the Amendment Provisions Of The Trust Agreement In Undertaking Amendment 4

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator:

[f]ailed to discharge their duties in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plans by again purporting to amend the 1999 Trust Agreement in February 2002 to arrogate to themselves broad powers to act as settlors in amending the Trust Agreement, again without the authorizing signatures of Fund settlors, Local 429 and TEA, as required by the 1999 Trust Agreement.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 64(i).) Specifically, "[a]mendment No. 4 was signed solely by the Fund Trustees, but not by the TEA or by Local 429, as required by the 1999 Restated Trust Agreement, the document purportedly being amended." (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.) Thus, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' failure to comply with the appropriate Trust Agreement amendment procedures in implementing Amendment No. 4 constituted a breach of their fiduciary obligations. For the following reasons, we find that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Article XI, section 11.1 of the 1999 Trust Agreement gives the power of amendment to the Trustees or Settlors, and explicitly sets forth the appropriate procedures to be employed when the amending party seeks to amend the Agreement:

The Trustees or the Settlors may amend the Trust Agreement in any manner and at any time, subject to the provisions of the Trust Agreement, ERISA and other federal and/or state law; provided, however, that no amendment shall prejudice the rights of any Participant or Beneficiary with respect to claims which have been opened and are in being pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Fund; provided, further, that no amendment shall cause any of the assets of the Fund to revert to any Employer. Any amendment shall be effective as of the date set by resolution of the Trustees. Amendments shall be in written form. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth herein, any amendment to the Trust Agreement which would affect any rights or obligations of the Trustees or of TEA, as a Settlor, or of the Union, as a Settlor, shall not be effective unless approved in writing by the party or parties affected.

(1999 Trust Agreement, Art. XI, Sec. 11.1 (emphasis added).)

Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires that every employee benefit plan provide (1) a "procedure for amending [the] plan and (2) "[a procedure] for identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan."Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 82, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d 94 (1995). So long as these minimal requirements are met, "ERISA follows standard trust law principles in dictating only that whatever level of specificity a company ultimately chooses, in an amendment procedure or elsewhere, it is bound to that level."Id. at 84, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d 94; see 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). Thus, a plan sponsor's failure to act in accordance with the amendment procedures of the governing plan document when implementing an amendment constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty possibly warranting judicial annulment of the amendment. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 84-85, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 131 L.Ed.2d 94. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs note that the February 2002 (and presumably December 2002) amendments to the Trust Agreement were promulgated without the signatures of TEA or Local 429. As the 1999 Trust Agreement indicates, however, the Trustees need only obtain the signatures of TEA and Local 429 if the amendment being adopted somehow impacts the rights or obligations of those parties as settlors. Thus, Defendants' adoption of the 2002 amendments without the signatures of either TEA or Local 429 constituted a failure to act in accordance with the Trust Agreement's amendment procedures only if the amendments impacted the settlors as such. Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege that the contested 2002 amendments affected the rights or obligations of TEA and Local 429 as settlors. To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in this context, it must be alleged that the defendant neglected to administer the plan in accordance with its terms. The absence of any specific allegation that Defendants did not obtain the signatures required by the Trust Agreement despite the fact that the 2002 amendments implicated the rights and obligations of TEA and Union as settlors renders Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim fatal. This claim of Count II is accordingly dismissed with prejudice for the aforementioned reasons.

ii. Plan Amendments As A Fiduciary Act

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA by adopting various amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement in 2002. ERISA, a comprehensive statutory scheme, is intended to protect employees enrolled in pension and benefit plans. The responsibility of administering a plan in the best interests of its participants and beneficiaries resides with plan trustees, who are obligated under § 404 of ERISA to act in accordance with a standard of fiduciary conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(A)-(D). Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that the 2002 amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement violated ERISA § 404 because the amendments "severely reduc[ed] the accrued benefits of plaintiffs and the members of the class and their accrual of future benefits under the terms of the pre-amendment RIP 87 Plan." (Am. Compl. ¶ 64(h).)

Before we may consider whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, we must first decide whether the Trustees' adoption of the 2002 amendments invoked ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions. In urging that we answer this question in the affirmative, Plaintiffs argue that in the context of this multi-employer Pension Plan, the Trustees' actions in implementing amendments which affected the allocation of a finite asset pool constituted administrative and fiduciary functions. Defendants, in turn, counter with the proposition that a plan sponsor acts within its power as a settlor when amending any plan. As the following discussion reveals, the issue is not clear-cut. Upon careful consideration, we find that the Trustees functioned as settlors when amending the Pension Plan. They were, consequently, free to amend without the restraints imposed by ERISA § 404.

In ascertaining whether plan sponsors act in a settlor or fiduciary capacity when amending ERISA-governed benefit plans, courts have drawn distinctions between multi-employer and single-employer plans, and between those plans that "affect the allocation of a finite plan asset pool" to which each participating employer has contributed. Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1745, 104 L.Ed.2d 182 (1989). Undoubtedly, the general rule is that the ERISA fiduciary obligations do not apply to a plan amendment. But, as the below discussion indicates, by no means has this general rule been unequivocally applied by courts.

Plaintiffs' argument is premised upon the rationale articulated by the Second Circuit in Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 1995). Former employees brought suit challenging the defendant corporation's adoption of an amendment to a single-employer pension plan. The plaintiffs argued that the plan amendment, which excluded the plaintiffs from a selective early retirement program, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty to act for the sole benefit of plan participants. Id. at 500. In holding that the plan trustees' amendment of the single-employer plan did not invoke ERISA's fiduciary obligations, the Second Circuit explained that "[i]n the single-employer setting, where plan trustees are also corporate officers, their actions must be made in the interest of both the plan's participants and the employer." Id. at 506. Because the trustees have dual responsibilities in this regard, subjecting them to fiduciary obligations in their adoption of plan amendments would discourage the creation of benefit plans, a result ERISA intended to prevent. In setting forth its rationale, the Second Circuit distinguished cases where plan amendments were held to be fiduciary functions. Those cases involved multi-employer pension plans.

The cases holding plan amendment to be an administrative and fiduciary task concern multiemployer pension plans, jointly administered by trustees representing the employers and trustees appointed by and representing the union. In the multiemployer setting, trustees amending a pension plan "affect the allocation of a finite plan asset pool" to which each participating employer has contributed. For that reason trustees administering a multiemployer plan are expected to act solely for the benefit of beneficiaries and are barred from acting on the employers' behalf.

In drawing a distinction between single-employer plans and multi-employer plans implicating a finite plan asset pool, the Second Circuit garnered support from the Sixth Circuit's dicta inMusto, 861 F.2d at 912, that "[i]n amending a multi-employer plan, where the level of contributions of each participant employer has generally been set by collective bargaining, the trustees 'affect the allocation of a finite plan asset pool between participants' . . . and hence act as plan administrators subject to a fiduciary duty." The Sixth Circuit, however, subsequently refused to treat single-employer and multi-employer plans differently in Pope v. Central States S.E. S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund, 27 F.3d 211, 213-214 (6th Cir. 1994). In Pope, the Court of Appeals held that the trustees of a multiemployer welfare-benefit plan were not subject to fiduciary standards in amending a plan to reduce benefits in order to protect its financial stability. The Third Circuit recognized Pope's impact on the fine distinction drawn by Musto as well: "Pope stands for the proposition that the Sixth Circuit, despite its authorship of Musto, is prepared to treat single-and multi-employer plans similarly in the absence of some other salient difference." Walling v. Brady, 125 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 1997). In the aftermath of these decisions, the Supreme Court has had occasion to address the issue of whether ERISA's fiduciary obligations apply to plan sponsors who amend plan agreements. These decisions, however, arose in the context of single-employer plans.See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882. 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (1996). In Lockheed, the Court counseled that:

Plan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries. As we said with respect to the amendment of welfare benefit plans . . . "[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans." When employers undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust.

Lockheed speaks of "plan sponsors," a term that applies to both single-employer sponsors and multi-employer sponsors under ERISA, and the opinion lacks any hint that single-and multi-employer plans should be analyzed differently. At the same time, the silence of Lockheed on this topic could arguably be a result of its subject matter, a single-employer plan. The Court did not mention multiemployer plans nor state that its decision was intended to reach them or to address their particular characteristics. . . . [W]e do not read Lockheed to be the definitive word that there are never valid occasions on which to distinguish between the two types of plans. . . .

Following the Walling decision, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general principle that a plan sponsor's decision to amend a plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself and thus does not implicate ERISA's fiduciary obligations in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999). Hughes clarified that the prior holding inLockheed does not turn on "the type of plan being amended for the simple reason that the plain language of the statute defining fiduciary makes no distinction." Id. Notably, the issue arose before the Supreme Court once again in the context of a single-employer benefit plan. Id. Thus, while it does not necessarily diminish the import of Walling, it does undermine the notion that the type of plan at issue informs the decision of whether a plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary in undertaking a plan amendment. The Court's textual approach places emphasis on ERISA's definition of fiduciary. Because the term fails to distinguish between various plan permutations, and because it fails to include plan design as a defined function, a plan sponsor is free to amend any employee benefit plan without beings subject to fiduciary review.Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153. Indeed, the Hughes Court stressed that "[o]ur conclusion applies with equal force to persons exercising authority over a contributory plan, a noncontributory plan, or any other type of plan." 525 U.S. at 444-45, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881. Thus, the Court held that the plaintiffs' fiduciary claims were directly foreclosed "bySpink's holding that, without exception, '[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.'" Id. at 445, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (emphasis added). Admittedly, the Court's decision in Hughes does not directly dispose of the issue facing this Court, because the Pension Plan sub judice is a multi-employer plan involving the allocation of finite plan assets. But the reasons underpinning the Court's decision appear to preclude imposition of fiduciary duties on the Trustees in this instance. To prevail, Plaintiffs must address the definition of "fiduciary" set forth in the statute. Yet it appears that under any plausible reading of the term, a plan sponsor's amendments to ERISA governed plans do not fall within its purview. Moreover, the Court's analysis appears to foreclose consideration of any policy driven distinctions premised upon the unique features of the particular plan under review. Therefore, we cannot recognize a legal claim for breach of fiduciary duty stemming from Defendants' promulgation of the 2002 amendments.

Neither the Third Circuit's decision in Walling or the Supreme Court's opinions analyzing this matter directly control the situation where trustees of a multiemployer pension fund reallocate a finite asset pool among various sub-plans through an amendment. Yet an examination of the rationales espoused by the Supreme Court in its teachings on the matter support the view that plan sponsors act as settlors in such setting. Thus, we find that the Trustees' promulgation of the 2002 amendments to the Trust Agreement constitutes settlor conduct unrestrained by the obligations set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D). Accordingly, we grant Defendants' Motion on this issue, and dismiss this claim of Count II with prejudice.

2. The Thirteenth Check

Plaintiffs assert that, in contrast to the explicit terms of the Trust Agreement, Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator paid to DB Plan retirees a "thirteenth check" from 1987 through 2000. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 64(a)-(f).) Defendants move to dismiss this allegation on the ground that it fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties. For the following reasons, we find that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duties in this context.

The DB Plan required that its participants be issued an additional benefit check, known as the "thirteenth check" so long as certain funding prerequisites were met. Specifically, the DB Plan provided that:

For certain retired participants and their Beneficiaries, an additional retirement benefit check in the form of a bonus check shall be paid. . .[This benefit] is payable only to those retired Participants . . . who are entitled to receive a monthly benefit check for each month of the calendar year with respect to which the thirteenth check is being paid. Notwithstanding the preceding, the "thirteenth check" shall only be payable if the Fund Actuary certifies that the unfunded vested liability of the Fund, as calculated for MPPAA purposes as of the last day of the calendar year preceding distribution of the Additional Retirement Benefit check, does not exceed $85,000,000.

(1994 DB Plan, Art. IV, Sec. I(1)(j).) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs, who were not members of the DB Plan at the time and thus never received any of the additional benefits, do not claim that the Fund Actuary failed to make the requisite certifications. Rather, they aver that the Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator encouraged and permitted the Fund Actuary "to use outdated and improper 1951 mortality tables to calculate the funding liability of the DB Plan, thereby distorting and concealing the true funding status of the Plan, depriving it of needed and legally required funding, and jeopardizing the security of the accrued pension benefits of plaintiffs and the members of the Class." (Am. Compl. ¶ 64(e).) In response, Defendants argue that their decision to issue the check was a settlor decision not falling within the ambit of ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions. (Defs.' Reply Mem. at 22.) Because the Fund Actuary made the requisite certifications, Defendants assert that the DB Plan term afforded them no choice but to pay to DB participants the additional benefits. (Id.)

As noted above, ERISA deems a person to be a fiduciary with respect to a plan "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a)(I). Thus, "[f]iduciary obligations can apply to managing, advising, and administering an ERISA plan." Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 223, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000). ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) imposes upon fiduciaries the requirement that they discharge their duties solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and in accordance with plan documents insofar as such documents are consistent with ERISA. These obligations further include monitoring the plan's solvency and adjusting benefit levels if and when appropriate. See Dippel v. Joint Bd. Of Trustees of the Operating Engineers Trust Fund, No. 80-0271, 1982 WL 2085, at *7 (D.D.C. May 6, 1982) ("The Board obviously retains the discretionary authority and indeed the fiduciary obligation to alter existing types and levels of medical benefits available under the Plan when the financial solvency of the Fund so requires.") (dicta); cf Baum v. Nolan, 853 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1988) (possibility that payment of pension benefits may affect fund's solvency is a matter of fiduciary duty) (dicta).

We find that Plaintiffs' claim passes muster under Rule 12(b)(6). Because Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants paid out thirteenth checks in the absence of the Fund Actuary's certification, Defendants have technically adhered to a DB Plan term that affords them no discretion. They have complied with a term that demands issuance of the check upon meeting a specified prerequisite-the actuary's certification. Nevertheless we must at this point take as true Plaintiffs' factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that Defendants did exercise improper discretion, and thus acted in a fiduciary capacity, in their effort to ensure that the term's prerequisite was met, despite knowledge that the actual circumstances reflected otherwise. Cf. Fechter v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.Pa. 1991) ("[P]laintiffs allege that Connecticut General transcended their usual role as an actuary and became a fiduciary by purposely using an allocation formula that, contrary to the plain language of the Plan, would permit most of the surplus assets to revert to the Company so that the Company would not question Connecticut General's excessively high premium. We have no doubt that if plaintiffs can prove their allegations, then as a matter of law, Connecticut General is an ERISA fiduciary"). Defendants have a fiduciary duty to faithfully administer the terms of the DB Plan, and to act prudently in determining whether the payment of a benefit was in fact authorized. See Gruby v. BradY, 838 F. Supp. 820, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying motion to dismiss fiduciary breach claim that trustees maintained benefits at excessive levels in plan that was in financial difficulty despite trustees following dictates of plan documents because "if the benefits levels as set forth in the Fund's governing plan documents are excessive, the Trustee Defendants may not avoid their fiduciary duties to Members by hiding behind documents which are inconsistent with ERISA"). Permitting or encouraging the Fund Actuary to use an improper assumption in calculating the unfunded vested liability of the DB Plan in order to satisfy the term's prerequisite which subsequently necessitates a certain result, all with the knowledge that continued payments were imprudent and would put the entire Fund in financial jeopardy, states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Defendants may not avoid their fiduciary obligations by circumventing a term that purportedly provides them with no discretion. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim of Count II is denied.

3. Imprudent Investment of Plan Assets

Plaintiffs' last breach of fiduciary duty claim is premised on the allegation that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator:

[f]ailed to prudently and effectively monitor and oversee the performance of the investment advisors and managers who were responsible for the investment of plan assets, and instead continued to employ the services of the same investment advisors and managers despite their unusually poor results from 1998-2000, thereby causing a significant loss of assets to the plans, further jeopardizing the funding of the DB Plan and diminishing the values of the individual accounts of plaintiffs and the members of the Class in the RIP 87 Plan itself and as transferred into the reformulated DB Plan.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 64(g).) As explained below, we find that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the DB Plan and RIP 87 Plan performed poorly because of mismanagement of plan assets by the Trustee appointed investment managers. During this same period, however, other similar multi-employer pension funds experienced a rapid growth in the values of assets held and invested. (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) Although "[t]his sub-par performance and mismanagement was either known to the Trustees and Fund Administrator, or would have been discovered by them had they made prudent and proper efforts to monitor and supervise the performance of the managers who had been engaged to invest plan assets," (Id.). Defendants "did not investigate, consider pursuing, or pursue a legal cause of action or other remedies either against the plans' investment advisors or managers . . . or against the current and former Trustees who failed to take prudent action. . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss challenges whether Plaintiffs have met the liberal pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A complaint that "contains only conclusory allegations and lack[s] any factual assertions for support fails even the liberal standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Crowley v. Corning, Inc., 234 F. Supp.2d 222, 230 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).

Few cases discuss the adequacy of pleading a breach of fiduciary duty claim in this specific context. Indisputably, Defendants' investment conduct is governed by ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)-(C). With respect to the Defendants' fiduciary duties when they retain outside professional assistance, the Third Circuit has stated:

While we would encourage fiduciaries to retain the services of consultants when they need outside assistance to make prudent investments and do not expect fiduciaries to duplicate their advisers' investigative efforts, we believe that ERISA's duty to investigate requires fiduciaries to review the data a consultant gathers, to assess its significance and to supplement it where necessary.

We find that Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, satisfies the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The essential elements of the claim are alleged. In addition to alleging the fiduciary status of Defendants, the Amended Complaint sets forth Defendants' fiduciary duties and specifies the Defendants' involvement in breaching those duties. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42, 64(g).) As summarized above, the Amended Complaint rests on more than mere conclusory allegations. Defendants' reliance on Crowley is inapposite. Unlike the situation confronting the district court inCrowley, the crux of Plaintiffs' claim here is that if Defendants were actually unaware of the Fund's poor investment performance, they would have been aware had they done the type of investigation and oversight that the Third Circuit demands of fiduciaries who employ outside consultants. If, on the other hand, Defendants did possess knowledge of the Fund's inadequate performance, and yet failed to take any remedial measures, this too constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Because Plaintiffs set forth sufficient facts under which relief could be granted, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim of Count II is denied.

Accordingly, we find with respect to Count II that Plaintiffs (1) have failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for Defendants' alleged inappropriate amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement; and (2) have successfully stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for (a) Defendants' alleged improper issuance of the "thirteenth check," and (b) Defendants' alleged failure to prudently and effectively monitor the performance of investment advisors and managers responsible for the investment of plan assets.

C. Count III

Count III of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants unlawfully reduced accrued benefits in the RIP 87 Plan through their amendment of the 1999 Trust Agreement. For this claim, Plaintiffs rely on § 204(g)(1) of the ERISA statute, which prohibits the reduction of accrued benefits by amendment of an employee pension plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1). Defendants counter that while the amendments to the RIP 87 Plan impact future employer contributions, they do not in any way affect accrued benefits. Thus the issue before us in Count III is whether the amendments to the plan constituted a reduction in "accrued benefits."

ERISA defines "accrued benefit" in an individual account plan as "the balance of the individual's account." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B). Neither party here has identified cases that are particularly helpful in establishing how the term "accrued benefit" has been interpreted in practice. However, we believe the Third Circuit's discussion of an "accrued benefit" in Hoover v. Cumberland. Maryland Area Teamsters Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1985), though written in the context of a defined benefit plan dispute, is instructive.Hoover contains an extensive discussion of ERISA's legislative history. Of particular note is the court's citation of language in the Congressional Report accompanying the ERISA bill, which highlights the purpose behind its accrued benefit and vesting protections. The Report states:

Unless an employee's rights to his accrued pension benefits are nonforfeitable, he has no assurance that he will ultimately receive a pension. Thus, pension rights which have slowly been stockpiled over many years may suddenly be lost if the employee leaves or loses his job prior to retirement. Quite apart from the resulting hardships,. . . such losses of pension rights are inequitable, since the pension contributions previously made on behalf of the employee may have been made in lieu of additional compensation or some other benefit which he would have received.

This language indicates that when Congress included § 204(g)(1) in ERISA, it intended to ensure that employees would receive the funds that employers had already set aside for their retirement, not to guarantee a certain amount of future employer contributions. Such a provision reflects the balance Congress undoubtedly sought to achieve between protecting employees' retirement funds and maintaining private pension plans as an attractive option for employers. That ERISA was meant to protect contributions that had already been made on behalf of employees is further substantiated in the Act's "Congressional findings and declaration of policy." See 29 U.S.C. § 1001. This Section establishes the means by which Congress intended to protect employees' retirement income. Specifically, it sought to do so

by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.

Nowhere in this section or in subsequent portions does the Act require employers to make contributions on behalf of employees. Rather, it simply seeks to make employee benefit plans more transparent and predictable and to preserve their integrity and financial well-being when employers choose to contribute to them. This goal has been realized through the decisions of courts which have focused on enforcing the terms of pension plan documents, as can be seen from the cases discussed below.

Hoover illustrates how ERISA's protections work in practice when applied to a defined benefit pension plan, where the employer agrees to make regular payments to participants of a fixed amount upon reaching retirement. In Hoover, the court held that the employer reduced employees' accrued benefits when it lowered the "unit multiplier" it used to calculate the amount of benefits that employees accrued each year.Id. at 980. Under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 411(a), an employer is required to state the formula by which accrued benefits are calculated in a defined benefit plan each year.Id. Since this formula "represents the interest in a retirement benefit that a participant earns each year," it "enables a worker to mark his or her progress toward the full pension benefit due at retirement."Id. Thus when the employer in Hoover lowered the multiplier from $25.00 to $6.00, it diminished by seventy-five percent the amount of funds that had already been theoretically set aside by the employer under the formula it created. Id. at 986. By finding the employer in violation of ERISA, the court held it liable for the level of funds it had voluntarily agreed to set aside for employees. In keeping with the purposes and principles of ERISA, the court's decision turned on the terms of the Plan documents, which obligated the employer to utilize a certain formula for calculating the benefits accrued thus far. In so doing, it effectively defined "accrued benefits" as the product of the formula set out by the employer in Plan documents, which is dependant on the amount of time thus served by employees. Courts have offered a comparable analysis when protecting accrued benefits in defined contribution plans by similarly focusing on the terms of Plan documents. In Izarelli v. Rexene Products Corp., 24 F.3d 1506 (5th Cir. 1994), the plaintiffs argued that their accrued benefits were unlawfully reduced when their employer initially contributed 101,794 shares of stock to the Plan one year, but, after amending the Plan, ultimately allocated a much smaller amount to the individual accounts of Plan participants. Izarelli, 24 F.3d at 1509-16. While the district court held that the act of contributing the shares to the Plan created an accrued benefit, the Fifth Circuit reversed, drawing a distinction between contributions to the Plan and allocations to individual accounts. Id. at 1515. The court drew this distinction from the Plan document itself, which stated that "contributions initially are held in the 'Unprorated Fund,' i.e. 'that portion of the assets or property in the [Plan]. . . which at any particular time, has not been allocated to a particular Member's Account." Id. at 1516. Additionally, the court noted that the Plan gave the employer "'complete discretion' to control the 'time and manner of allocating Stock among [participants'] Accounts.'"Id. Thus the court held that the district court had clearly erred in finding the 101,794 share contribution an accrued benefit because the Plan specified that contributions were not the same as allocations. Id. at 1518. In so doing, the court declined to protect what it deemed were expected contributions to the individual accounts.

The First Circuit's approach to defining "accrued benefits" comports with those of the Third and Fifth Circuits. In Campbell v. BankBoston, 327 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), the plaintiff sued his former employer for making amendments that converted its defined benefit plan to a cash balance system because they ultimately resulted in a reduction in his retirement benefits. Campbell, 326 F.3d at 2. In implementing the amendments, the employer placed participants' accrued benefits, in other words, the amount that had been earned up until the conversion, into an account which was guaranteed a certain level of interest under the new cash balance plan. Id. at 4-5. In exchange for the guaranteed level of interest under the cash balance plan, the accounts ceased to accrue benefits under the old defined benefit plan.Id. Had the plaintiff been able to continue accruing benefits under the old plan, he would have eventually been entitled to an annual retirement benefit of $31,882.12. Id. However, as a result of the conversion, his benefits were reduced by approximately $3,000 per year. Id. The court held that this was not a reduction in the plaintiff's accrued benefits, but a reduction in his expected benefits. Id. at 8-9. The employer had not reduced the amount of benefits accrued by the employee, it simply chose to guarantee a certain interest rate, in lieu of future accruals. The court concluded that the employer was within its rights under the Plan and the law to modify or eliminate future benefits, since ERISA does not offer protection for "expected benefits." Id. Plaintiffs' reliance on John Blair Communications, Inc. v. Telemundo Group, Inc., 26 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1994), is not particularly helpful to this discussion or even applicable when determining when an accrued benefit has been reduced. We discuss it merely to explain why we do not rely on it here. The case concerned an alleged violation of ERISA § 208, which states that assets cannot be transferred to a new plan unless participants are entitled to receive a benefit that is equal to or greater to what they were entitled to under the old plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1058. The plaintiff argued that it received decreased benefits under the new plan because there was a three and a half month delay between the valuation of benefits under the old plan and when the benefits were actually transferred to the new plan.John Blair, 26 F.3d at 363-64. In spite of the fact that the funds under the old plan were appreciating and earning interest during the three and a half month period before they were actually transferred, the plaintiff's account was never credited for this increase in value.Id. The court held that the trustee had violated § 208 because the individuals' accounts post-transfer of plan assets "did not reflect the gains occurring during the interim period before the actual transfer." Id. at 366.

As stated above, we believe that the holding in this case is too abstract to be applied to the instant case, particularly since it concerns an unrelated section of ERISA. However, even if we were to attempt to apply it to this analysis, it would not be inconsistent with our discussion of accrued benefits thus far. John Blair stands for the proposition that trustees must acknowledge and credit appreciation and interest earned in defined contribution accounts. As inHoover. Izarelli, and Campbell, the court interpreted ERISA to protect benefits as they existed prior to any alteration of the plan. Thus the participants in the plan in John Blair were entitled to any gains (and losses) that occurred up until the point of the actual transfer. We fail to see then how the holding in John Blair can be interpreted as offering protection for anything beyond the appreciation and interest earned on funds in a defined contribution plan. Since this case does not concern appreciation and interest earned in a defined contribution plan, we do not find it is an appropriate precedent.

Applying the foregoing discussion to the case at hand, we find that the Defendants did not reduce accrued benefits in the RIP 87 Plan. Accepting Plaintiffs' facts as true, Defendants made several amendments to the RIP 87 Plan which adversely affected its future growth. The first amendment, effective January 1, 2000, caused a portion of employer contributions intended for the RIP 87, in the amount of forfeitures incurred by employees in that fund year, to be invested into the DB Plan. The second amendment resulted in an additional portion of the funds intended for the RIP 87 Plan by employers to be diverted to the DB Plan, according to a formula based on the number of hours worked by participants after March 1, 2002. The final amendment, Amendment No. 6, caused all contributions intended for the RIP 87 to be made to the DB Plan, of which all RIP 87 Plan participants became members.

Although these amendments undeniably reduced and eventually stopped future employer contributions to the RIP 87 Plan, they did not reduce the existing balances of members' individual accounts. Plaintiffs' own brief supports this conclusion. Plaintiffs described the initial reduction in contributions as a "derogation of the expectation [emphasis added] and agreement that contributions on their behalf would be made to the defined contribution RIP Plan and used to earn income to increase their individual account balances." (Pls' Br. at 11.) As to the final amendment, in Plaintiffs' own words, it "froze the RIP 87 Plan for all future accruals of benefits after January 1, 2003 (other than those gains or losses from future investment performance), and directed all employer contributions made on behalf of all RIP 87 Plan participants on and after January 1, 2003 into the DB Plan." (Id. at 12.) These characterizations of the amendments strongly support Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, even if Plaintiffs had not made these apparent admissions, the foregoing discussion of relevant case law leads us to the same conclusion. In each of the cases discussed above, the court looked to see if the alterations or amendments to the employers' pension plans impacted benefits retroactively or just future benefits. In Hoover, the application of a new formula to benefits already earned by employees was considered a reduction of accrued benefits. In Izzarelli, however, a decision not to allocate the full amount of stock contributed to a plan was not considered a reduction in accrued benefits because the stock had not actually been applied to members' accounts and thus there was no deduction of benefits from participants' existing balances. Nor did the court in Campbell consider it a reduction in benefits when the employer decided to stop benefits from continuing to accrue, and instead replaced accruals with a guaranteed interest rate. In each of these cases, the court determined whether the amendments impacted benefits retroactively or prospectively. Only where the amendments were considered retroactive did the court find them in violation of ERISA because, as the court found in Campbell, ERISA does not protect expected benefits.

The Defendants here made a decision to reduce employer contributions to the RIP 87 Plan and eventually eliminate them altogether. However, it did not in any way alter the balances of the individual accounts that had accrued in the RIP 87 Plan. Plaintiffs' facts do not dispute this. Nor did the Defendants act inconsistently with Plan documents by diverting employer contributions to the DB plan, which Plaintiffs allege, had already accrued to the RIP 87 Plan. Plaintiffs argue that since Plan documents mandate direct contribution to the RIP 87 Plan, any diversion of contributions to the DB Plan is a reduction in accrued benefit. However, as correctly quoted in Plaintiffs' own brief, the Second Amended and Restated Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Pension Trust Agreement counters the notion that RIP 87 Employers contributions are deposited directly and fully to the RIP 87 Plan. Specifically, it states that "Contributions paid to the Fund by RIP 1987 Employers shall be paid to RIP 1987, except as otherwise provided in Section 2.4, herein [emphasis added]." (See Art. II, Sec. 2.3.) In other words, contributions made by RIP 87 employers to the Fund are to be paid to the RIP 87 Plan, but only in accordance with the terms of Section 2.4, which initially reduced contributions to RIP 87 and then, as amended, stopped them altogether.

Other portions of the Second Amended Trust Agreement controvert Plaintiffs' contention that RIP 87 employer contributions directly accrued to the RIP 87 Plan, rather than the Fund. For example, the preamble to the Second Amended Trust Agreement makes it clear that employers make contributions to the "Fund," not to individual pension plans or individual accounts. It notes that employers "pay contributions to the Fund on behalf of their employees who were participants of the Fund." Furthermore, Section 7.1 of Article VII states that "[N]o Employer, Employee, Union, Local Union or other party shall have any right, title or interest in or to the Fund or any part thereof." The relevant collective bargaining agreements conform to this principal by stating that employers obligate themselves to contribute to the Fund and not specific plans under the Fund. (See Art. 65 of the National Master United Parcel Service Agreement and Art. 50 of the National Master Freight Agreement.) Thus we find as a matter of law that employer contributions were to the Fund and not directly to the RIP 87 Plan. As such, the diversion of employer contributions to the DB Plan prior to their allocation to the RIP 87 Plan cannot be considered a reduction of accrued benefits in the RIP 87 Plan.

The only way in which we could conceive of Plaintiffs making a claim upon which relief could be granted here is if Plaintiffs had alleged that the balances in participants' accounts were reduced so that they no longer reflected the rate of accrual set out in Plan documents as of the time they were amended. For example, if the balance at the time of amendment was recalculated using a monthly contribution amount for the year 1997 that was less than the amount promised under the case of the National Master United Parcel Service Agreement ($737.52), that would seem to constitute a reduction in accrued benefits. However, Plaintiffs have not made such an allegation. As such, we must conclude that with regard to Count III, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the Motion to Dismiss Count III must therefore be granted. Plaintiffs' Count III claim is dismissed with prejudice.

D. Count IV

Plaintiffs' Count IV claim appears to be a variation of Count III, though we confess we had some difficulty understanding the basis for the claim. It relies on section § 203(a) of ERISA, which states that "each pension plan shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a). Plaintiffs appear to argue from this, and their collective bargaining agreements, that they are entitled to "a nonforfeitable right to accrue and to ultimately receive payment of the pension benefits purchased by these employer contributions on their behalf."

We do not believe that Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted in Count IV. A claim under § 203(a) of ERISA is only valid if accrued benefits have been withdrawn from participants' accounts. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 441, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999). It is not a guarantee that employers will make future contributions to pension plans. Since we have already found in Count III that Defendants' amendments to the pension plan did not reduce Plaintiffs' accrued benefits, we find that none of Plaintiffs' accrued benefits have been forfeited under § 203(a). Therefore Count IV must be dismissed with prejudice.

E. Count V

Count V of the Amended Complaint, asserted against Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator, alleges illegal transfers of plan assets in violation of ERISA § 4231, 29 U.S.C. § 1411(a). Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the following five transactions constituted unlawful transfers of assets:

[D]efendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator did not comply with the notice requirements of Section 423 l(b)(1) or the valuation requirements of Section 4231(b)(4) when they (a) diverted employer contributions to and plan assets of the RIP 87 Plan to the DB Plan; (b) diverted participant forfeitures and plan assets of the RIP 87 Plan to the DB Plan; (c) transferred the RIP 2000 participants and associated assets out of the RIP 87 Plan; (d) diverted assets of the RIP 87 Plan into the DB Plan in March 2002 under Option 2; or (e) transferred all RIP 87 Plan participants and associated assets into the DB Plan in January 2003.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 79.) As a result, "the accrued benefits of RIP 87 Plan participants were lower immediately following each of these transfers and diversions of plan assets, in violation of Section 4231(b)(2)." (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) Significantly, all of Plaintiffs' contentions arise out of transfers from a defined contribution plan into either a defined benefit or a second defined contribution plan. Because we determine that § 4231 of ERISA does not apply to transfers of assets to or from a defined contribution plan, Plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts warranting relief.

Section 4231 of ERISA is contained within title IV of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a), located in title IV, subchapter III, subtitle B, enumerates the specific plan types that title IV does and does not encompass:

"(a) Plans covered

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this subchapter applies to any plan. . . ."

Subsection (b) of § 1321 then states:

"This section does not apply to any plan (1) which is an individual account plan, as defined in paragraph (34) of section 1002 of this title. . . ."

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the RIP 87 and RIP 2000 Plans are defined contribution plans, as that term is delineated by § 1002(34):

The term, "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participants's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account.

Defendants correctly posit that these definitions govern 29 U.S.C. § 1411, because this section is set forth in title IV, subchapter III, subtitle E of ERISA. Consequently, as title IV expressly excludes defined contribution plans from its domain, § 1411 does not regulate transfers of assets and liabilities between defined contribution plans, or between a defined contribution and a defined benefit plan. Bolstering this interpretation is a regulation promulgated by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC"), an administrative agency within the United States Department of Labor charged with interpreting the MPPAA. The following regulation is applicable to part 2 of subsection E of ERISA, which includes 29 U.S.C. § 1411-1415.

(a) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to prescribe notice requirements under section 4231 of ERISA for mergers and transfers of assets or liabilities among multiemployer pension plans. . . .

(b) Scope. This part applies to mergers and transfers among multiemployer plans where all of the plans immediately before and immediately after the transaction are multiemployer plans covered by title IV of ERISA.

F. Prohibited Transaction Claims

In Counts II, V, and VII of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator engaged in various transactions in violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D). Congress enacted this section "to bar categorically a transaction that [is] likely to injure the pension plan."Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160, 113 S.Ct. 2006, 124 L.Ed.2d 71 (1993). To effectuate this purpose, § 406(a)(1) "plac[es] certain transactions outside the scope of their [plan fiduciaries] lawful authority." Lockheed v. Spink. 517 U.S. 882, 888, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (1996).

To sustain an alleged transgression of § 406(a)(1)(D), the Third Circuit requires that five elements be satisfied:

(1) the person or entity is "[a] fiduciary with respect to [the] plan"; (2) the fiduciary "cause[s]" the plan to engage in the transaction at issue; (3) the transaction "use[s]" plan assets; (4) the transaction's use of the assets is "for the benefit of a party in interest; and (5) the fiduciary "knows or should know" that elements three and four are satisfied.

Specifically, Count II of the Amended Complaint states that the Defendants:

Entered into, or enabled or allowed, a series of per se prohibited transactions using plan assets, as more fully specified in this Complaint, including paying to the DB Plan retirees a "thirteenth check" in violation of the established minimum funding requirements for such payments and the terms of the Plan, and diverting contributions which had been allocated to and/or received by the RIP 87 Plan and hence were assets of that plan into the separate DB Plan.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 64(d).)

Although we found that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged a breach of fiduciary duty claim stemming from Defendants' issuance of the "thirteenth check," see discussion infra Part V.B., we find that they have failed to adequately plead a claim for breach of § 406(a)(1)(D). The Amended Complaint does allege elements one, two and three of the § 406(a)(1)(D) claim-namely that Defendants acted in a fiduciary capacity when they issued the thirteenth check, that Defendants, as fiduciaries, caused the challenged transaction to occur, and that the transaction used plan assets. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 62, 64(a).) As noted above, however, element four of the five element test requires that the challenged transaction employ plan assets "for the benefit of a party in interest. The Third Circuit has held that this factor requires manifestation of a subjective intent to benefit a party in interest. Compton, 57 F.3d at 279. In other words, it encompasses more than merely having "the effect of benefitting" a party in interest. Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do assert that the Trustees

on a continuing basis encouraged and allowed the Fund actuaries to improperly use outdated 1951 mortality tables . . . to calculate the unfunded vested liability of the DB Plan in order to justify their conclusion that the DB Plan was "fully funded," that it required no additional employer contributions to satisfy its benefits obligations to participants and their beneficiaries, and that the continued payment of the 'thirteenth check' to retirees of the DB Plan was permissible under the terms of the DB Plan.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) We fail to recognize how this allegation can be construed as identifying the party in interest that was benefitted by the Defendants' issuance of the thirteenth check-a benefit paid to DB Plan participants. Certainly the allegation suggests that the employers benefitted as a result of Defendants' actions in ensuring that the Fund appeared to be fully funded. It does not allege or even insinuate, however, that a party in interest benefitted through the Defendants' decision to continue to pay bonus benefits to the DB Plan participants. Plaintiffs' failure to allege this element of a § 406(a)(1)(D) renders their claim fatal. As such, this prohibited transaction claim of Count II is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs' right to file a Second Amended Complaint.

The second portion of the above quoted Amended Complaint also fails to state a claim warranting relief. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 64(d).) Plaintiffs contend that the 2002 amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement, that "diverg[ed] contributions which had been allocated to and/or received by the RIP 87 Plan . . . into the separate DB Plan," (Id.), constituted a prohibited transaction under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D). 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D) mandates that fiduciary status must exist for a transaction to constitute a prohibited one.See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D). As explicated in Part V.B.2. of this opinion, the 2002 amendments to the 1999 Trust Agreement were instituted by Defendants in their settlor capacity. See discussion infra Part V.B.2. Thus, § 406(a)(1)'s requirement of fiduciary status is not met. See Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 891, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 135 L.Ed.2d 153. As a matter of law then, Plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts with respect to the challenged plan amendments that would justify relief under § 406(a)(1)(D). This prohibited transaction claim of Count II is thus dismissed with prejudice.

Next, Count V of the Amended Complaint alleges that:

Inasmuch as defendant Trustees and defendant Fund Administrator did not comply with the requirements of Section 4231(a) and (b), the transfers constitute prohibited transactions under ERISA Section 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), pursuant to Section 4231(c).

(Am. Compl. ¶ 81.) As Part V.E. of this opinion explains, ERISA § 4231 is not applicable to the circumstances presently confronting this Court. Moreover, as described above, the purported transfers were the product of Trust Amendments that we found the Defendants to have instituted in their settlor capacity. In addition, we found as a matter of law in Part V.C. of this opinion that the Trust documents provide for employer contributions into the Fund, as opposed to any of the individual plans that comprise the Fund. The Fund then distributes these employer contributions-plan assets-among the participating plans pursuant to the allocation formula set forth in the Trust Agreement. The various amendments to this Agreement reallocated a percentage of future RIP 87 employer contributions into the Fund to the DB Plan. Consequently, we determined that the existing assets of the RIP 87 Plan, a defined contribution plan, were never transferred to another plan. As discussed above, a prohibited transaction claim under § 406(a)(1)(D) requires there to be a transfer of plan assets. The unambiguous language of the plan documents precludes a finding that, by virtue of the Trust Amendments, plan assets were transferred out of the RIP 87 Plan. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a prohibited transaction claim with respect to the supposed illegal transfer of plan assets. As such, this prohibited transaction claim of Count V is dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege in Count VII of the Amended Complaint that:

Defendant Trustees and defendant Fund Administrator engaged in a series of prohibited transactions by, inter alia, paying the DB retirees a "thirteenth check" in violation of the established minimum funding requirements for such benefit.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 87.) For the reasons set forth in the above discussion regarding the "thirteenth check,", we find that Plaintiffs have failed to successfully state a claim for violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(D). Count VII continues:

In addition, defendant Trustees' and defendant Fund Administrator's agreement to accept, and their acceptance of, employer contributions made on behalf of RIP 87 Plan participants but then to divert those plan assets into the different DB Plan, for the benefit of the DB Plan, violates . . . ERISA Section 406, because such payments are not for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees for whom such contributions were made and received. . . . Such payments and diversions are also prohibited transactions under ERISA Section 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D), because they constitute a direct or indirect use and transfer of assets of one plan (the RIP 87 Plan) to benefit employers who are parties in interest to that plan by reducing their independent funding obligations to another plan (the DB Plan).

(Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) Once again, for the reasons reiterated above, this claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' prohibited transaction claims are dismissed.

G. Count VI

Count VI of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint advances the claim that Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator breached relevant Collective Bargaining Agreements by amending the Trust Agreement so as to reallocate employer contributions from the RIP 87 Plan to the DB Plan. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that:

Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Class members have contractual rights under their respective CBA's to employer contributions, which are made on their behalf in consideration of their current services to the employers, to be directed into their RIP 87 Plan accounts. Insofar as the CBA's define the employees' rights to pension benefits and contributions with respect to the RIP 87 Plan, the CBA's constitute documents and instruments governing the RIP 87 Plan. In violation of those rights under the Plan, defendant Trustees have purported to amend the Trust Agreement, and defendant Trustees and defendant Fund Administrator have acted, so as to divert all employer contributions from the RIP 87 Plan to the DB Plan without obtaining the necessary and corollary amendments of the relevant CBA's. In so doing, these defendants have violated the CBA instruments governing the RIP 87 Plan and breached their strict fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the CBA's.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 83.) The CBAs relevant to the named Plaintiffs' participation in the Fund include the National Master Freight and Central Pennsylvania Supplemental Agreement, and the 1997 and 2002 National Master United Parcel Service agreement and Central Pennsylvania Supplemental Agreement. (See Defs.' Mem. at 29.) These CBAs unequivocally provide that employer contributions be made to the Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Pension Fund in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement and Pension Plan. Although it thus appears that the relevant CBAs do not require that participating employers' contributions be allocated specifically to the RIP 87 Plan, nonetheless we accept as true at this stage of litigation Plaintiffs' assertion that "[a]t all times following 1989, the CBA's pursuant to which employer contributions are owed to the Fund and the plan have directed that these employer contributions in varying amounts must be made into plaintiffs' and other Class members' accounts in the RIP 87 Plan." (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) We hesitate to construe the CBAs as a matter of law despite the unambiguous language of the above-referenced CBAs only because Plaintiffs allude to other possibly relevant CBAs and employer participation agreements that they claim support their allegation, but which they have not yet received through discovery.

Significantly, Plaintiffs' claim rests on the presupposition that the Trust Agreement does not conflict with the provisions in the CBAs that allegedly require employer contributions to be routed directly into the RIP 87 Plan. (See Pls.' Br. at 54 ("[n]othing in the provisions of the CBA's in this case, which expressly require that the employer contributions be paid to the RIP '87 or to the RIP 2000, in any way conflicts with the terms of the Trust Agreement. . . . In total, they require direction of employer contributions into particular plans and the Trustees do not have the discretion to do otherwise").) We found as a matter of law, however, that the Trust Agreement has at all times explicitly mandated that employer contributions be paid to the Fund, and then allocated to the various sub-plans comprising the Fund as provided by the Trust Agreement's allocation formula. See discussioninfra Part V.C. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' assumption, there exists an apparent conflict between the Trust Agreement and the CBAs, as interpreted by Plaintiffs.

This conflict is pertinent because, in the absence of any provision in the Trust Agreement to the contrary, the Trust Agreement term will prevail over the conflicting CBA term. See Sinai Hosp. of Balt. v. Nat'l Benefit Fund for Hosp. Health Care Employees, 697 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that "[l]abor-management contracting parties . . . cannot control expenditures from funds already vested in a trust entity where the trust instrument reposes that authority solely with the trustees. Likewise, neither an employer nor a union, singly or together, can alter the terms of a trust instrument such as the one involved in this case unless the power to do so was reserved when the trust was created or properly amended"); see also Hale v. Trustees of United Mine Workers Health Ret. Funds, 23 F.3d 899, 902 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that collective bargaining agreement is not enforceable against trustees of pension fund); Cent. States. Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Tank Transport, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 947, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting that trustees of multiemployer pension fund are not bound to arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement of a participating employer and its union). In short, the Trustees are bound only by the terms of the Trust Agreement. Consequently, they cannot be held liable for breaching a conflicting term in a CBA.

Nothing in the 1999 Trust Agreement indicates that the provisions of any CBA prevail over the terms of the Trust. As this Court has previously noted, "'[t]he provisions of the trust agreement provide the framework with which a court should analyze an employer's obligation to a . . . fund.'" Cent. Pa., Teamsters Pension Fund v. WL Sales. Inc., 778 F. Supp. 820, 829 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (quoting Ind. State Council of Roofers v. Adams Roofing, 753 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Trust Agreement itself belies Plaintiffs' argument that the Trust Agreement obligates the Trustees to comply with the terms of the CBAs insofar as the employers' contribution obligations are concerned. Indeed, the Trust Agreement sets forth the exact opposite proposition:

Each Employer shall make prompt contributions or payments to the Fund in such amount and pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement and the Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect from time to time between the Employer or his bargaining representative and the Local Union. . . . A Collective Bargaining Agreement or other written document that provides for Contributions to the Fund in an amount or in a manner that is not in accord with or does not comply with the Trust Agreement or with any rules promulgated by the Trustees . . . is null and void to the extent of such inconsistency.

(1999 Trust Agreement, Art IV, Sec. 4.1(A).) This Court employed a similar analysis in WL Sales to reach the same conclusion that the trust agreement, rather than the conflicting CBA, controlled determination of pension eligibility. 778 F. Supp. at 829-30. Unless the Trust Agreement expresses otherwise, and we find that it does not, Defendants cannot be held liable for breaching a CBA term that conflicts with the unambiguous provisions of Trust Agreement. Accordingly, Count VI which contains Plaintiffs' claim for violation of collective bargaining documents must be dismissed with prejudice.

H. Count VII

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for violation of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 186. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Fund provisions providing for the allocation of contributions from participating RIP 87 Plan employers into the DB Plan violated §§ 302(b) and (c)(5) of the LMRA because such payments were not undertaken for the "sole and exclusive benefit of the [RIP 87 Plan] employees for whom such contributions were made and received." (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) In response, Defendants assert that § 302(e) of the LMRA does not create a private cause of action for purported violations of §§ 302(b) and (c)(5). Additionally, Defendants argue that even if this Court had jurisdiction, no such transgression occurred because employer contributions to a multi-employer pension plan need only be used to benefit the Fund's beneficiaries, as opposed to the particular employee on whose behalf the employer contributed. (See Defs.' Mem. at 41-42.)

Plaintiffs failed to adequately reply to this part of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, we dismiss Plaintiffs' LMRA claim against Defendants pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c).See Toth v. Bristol Township, 215 F. Supp.2d 595, 598 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claim on Motion to Dismiss under Local Rule 7.1 because plaintiff did not respond to portion of defendants' motion discussing claim); Smith v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program. 156 F. Supp.2d 520, 522 (E.D.Pa. 2001) ("[B]ecause plaintiffs failed to address defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to defendants' argument that costs, interest, and attorneys' fees are not recoverable under the National Flood Insurance Act, the court will grant this aspect of the defendants' motion to dismiss as unopposed"). We suppose that, given their lack of response, Plaintiffs do not challenge this dismissal.

Even if we were to undertake a cursory examination of the claim, however, we would find that we do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate it. Plaintiffs' claim contests Defendant Trustees and Defendant Fund Administrator's administration of the Fund's assets. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) Such a claim is permissibly brought, and indeed has been brought, under, inter alia, the fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA. (See generally Am. Compl.) The Supreme Court has made clear that an attack on the actual administration of trust funds cannot be properly brought under §§ 302(b) and (c)(5) of the LMRA, because these provisions are directed towards policing the purposes for which a trust fund is established.

We hold today that § 302(e) does not provide authority for a federal court to issue an injunction against a trust fund or its trustees requiring the trust funds to be administered in the manner described in § 302(c)(5). By its unmistakable language, § 302(e) provides district courts with jurisdiction "to restrain violations of this section." A "violation" of § 302 occurs when the substantive restrictions in §§ 302(a) and (b) are disobeyed, which happens, not when funds are administered by the trust fund, but when they are "pa[id], len[t], or deliver[ed]" to the trust fund, § 302(a), or when they are "receive[d], or accept[ed]" by the trust fund, or "request[ed], [or] demand[ed]" for the trust fund, § 302(b)(1). And the exception to violation set forth in paragraph (c)(5) relates, not to the purpose for which the trust fund is in fact used (an unrestricted fund that happens to be used "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees" does not qualify); but rather to the purpose for which the trust fund is "established," § 302(c)(5), and for which the payments are "held in trust," § 302(c)(5)(A). The trustees' failure to comply with these latter purposes may be a breach of their contractual or fiduciary obligations and may subject them to suit for such breach; but it is no violation of § 302.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.