ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH VANCE, District Judge

Defendant JRL Enterprises, Inc. moves to dismiss several of Trina Sawyer's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1). For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Trina Sawyer worked for JRL Enterprises, Inc. as a human resource assistant from October 2001 until December 2004. She alleges that on December 8, 2004, she complained that Doug White, JRL's vice president of finance and administration, made offensive and inappropriate comments to her, spread rumors that created a hostile work environment for her and other female employees, and sexually harassed her. The next day, Lawrence R. Robinson, JRL's vice president of human resources, gave Sawyer her annual employment evaluation. Plaintiff alleges that although she had received favorable performance evaluations before she complained about White's behavior, after she complained, Robinson gave her an evaluation that was unfairly harsh. Sawyer alleges that Robinson unfairly criticized her organizational skills, work ethic and reliability. She asserts that he reduced her overall evaluation from "above average" to "average" and placed her on an "improvement action plan." Plaintiff further alleges that during the evaluation, Robinson spoke to her about her sexual harassment complaint in a threatening manner and told her, in substance, that he felt her complaint was orchestrated.

On December 28, 2004, plaintiff met with Robinson and James Womack, JRL's general counsel. At that meeting, plaintiff was told that her employment was being terminated because she was "no longer happy." Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated for no legitimate reason and that JRL's stated reason for terminating her was a pretext for prohibited retaliation and/or gender discrimination.

Plaintiff filed this action on May 5, 2005, alleging that JRL violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 23:301, et seq. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for retaliation under the Louisiana Human Rights Act, see id. §§ 51:2231, et seq., reprisal under Louisiana's "whistleblower" statute, see id. § 23:967, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and unpaid wages.

On May 24, 2005, JRL moved to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Specifically, JRL asserted that plaintiff failed to allege that she had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and that she had received a right-to-sue notice. JRL also moved to dismiss plaintiff's retaliation claim, her requests for injunctive relief under state statutory law, as well as her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff filed her responsive brief on July 12, 2005 and attached a copy of her May 12, 2005 EEOC charge as Exhibit A to that brief. On August 24, 2005, while defendant's motion to dismiss was pending, plaintiff sought leave to supplement the record to include a copy of her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, which was issued on August 23, 2005.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). The claim should be dismissed only if it appears that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Id.; Pitotrowsji v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995).

B. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

It is well-settled that before a plaintiff can bring an action in federal court under Title VII, she must first exhaust available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002); Reed v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys. Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-1214, 2004 WL 2115596, at *1 (E.D. La. July 15, 2002). Title VII's exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if a plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory right-to-sue notice. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 378-79 (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996)). Failure to comply with this requirement will result in dismissal of plaintiff's claim. See Reed, 2004 WL 2115596, at *2.

Although receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a precondition to bringing suit, it is not a jurisdictional requirement in the strict sense. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982) (filing timely EEOC charge is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite"); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) ("We hold that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. . . ."); see also Julian v. City of Houston, 314 F.3d 721, 725 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff's failure to comply with Title VII's exhaustion requirement can be cured by obtaining a right-to-sue letter at any time before the suit is dismissed. Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1219 ("[T]he receipt of a right-to-sue letter . . . while the action remains pending satisfies the precondition that a plaintiff obtain statutory notice of the right to sue before filing a civil action under Title VII."); Peterson v. Slidell Mem. Hosp. Med. Ctr., Civ. A. No. 96-2487, 1996 WL 732840, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 16, 1996) (receipt of right-to-sue letter while motion to dismiss was pending cured defect in plaintiff's complaint).

Here, it is undisputed that, as of the date of the complaint, plaintiff had neither filed an EEOC charge, nor received a right-to-sue letter. As of that date, therefore, plaintiff had not complied with Title VII's exhaustion requirement, and her Title VII claim was subject to dismissal without prejudice on that ground. See Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1218. By filing her EEOC charge and her right-to-sue letter with the Court, however, plaintiff has cured that defect. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim is denied.

C. Plaintiff's State-Law Retaliation Claim

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim for unlawful retaliation under the Louisiana Human Rights Act, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:2256. Defendant argues that the Louisiana Human Rights Act does not provide a cause of action for retaliation in the context of employment discrimination. Defendant's argument is correct.

Section 51:2256 makes it unlawful for any person to, inter alia, "retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "this Chapter" refers to the Louisiana Human Rights Act. See id. §§ 51:2231, et seq. The Louisiana legislature initially included prohibitions on employment discrimination in the Louisiana Human Rights Act. See Smith v. Parish of Washington, 318 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (E.D. La. 2004). But the Louisiana legislature repealed those provisions and reenacted them as part of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law in 1997. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 23:301, et seq; smith, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 371. The practices that the Louisiana Human Rights Act now prohibits are discriminatory practices (i) in public accommodations and advertising public accommodations, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 51:2247-48; (ii) against breastfeeding mothers, id. § 51:2247.1; (iii) in providing financial services, id. § 51:2254; and (iv) in credit transactions. Id. § 51:2255; see also Cristia v. Sys. Eng'g Sec., Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-2138, 2004 WL 1801326, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2004).

Courts in this district have repeatedly held that the bar against retaliation in section 51:2256 of the Louisiana Human Rights Act does not provide a cause of action for retaliation in employment discrimination cases because the Louisiana Human Rights Act no longer applies to employment discrimination. See, e.g., Cristia, 2004 WL 1801326, at *14-15; Smith, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 371-73. The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reached the same conclusion. See Lowry v. Dresser, Inc., 893 So.2d 966, 968-69 (La.Ct.App. 2005).

Plaintiff argues that section 51:2256 confers a cause of action for retaliation in the employment discrimination context because another provision of the Louisiana Human Rights Act, section 51:2232, defines the term "unlawful practice" to include a "discriminatory practice in connection with employment." La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:2232(13). "Discriminatory practice in connection with employment" is defined to include any employment practice prohibited by section 23:332 of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, which, in turn, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. See id. § 51:2232(12); id. § 23:332.

The primary flaw in plaintiff's argument is that, although the definition of "unlawful practice" in section 51:2232 incorporates acts of employment discrimination on the basis of sex, section 51:2256 does not prohibit retaliation for a person's opposition to an "unlawful practice" so defined; rather, it prohibits retaliation for opposition to "a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter." La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:2256. Employment discrimination is declared unlawful by the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, not the chapter containing the Louisiana Human Rights Act. Thus, employment discrimination is not "a practice declared unlawful by" the Louisiana Human Rights Act. Smith, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 373 ("[T]he inclusion of definitions pertaining to employment discrimination in a statute in which substantive employment discrimination provisions were repealed does not create causes of action: it simply creates confusion."); Lowry, 893 So.2d at 968 (same) (quoting Smith).

Moreover, this gap in the law has been apparent since the legislature passed the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law in 1997, as several cases have noted. See Smith, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 373; Cristia, 2004 WL 1801326, at *15. Nevertheless, the Louisiana legislature has taken no action in response to the case law that finds no cause of action for retaliation under section 51:2256 in the employment discrimination setting. It is true that legislative inaction does not amount to an active endorsement of this line of cases. Yet, if the legislature found that the courts were wrong about its intent, it could have easily corrected the situation by clarifying the Louisiana Human Rights Act.

The Court's conclusion is buttressed by the fact that, in the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, the legislature chose to proscribe certain types of retaliation, such as retaliation in the age discrimination context, but it did not proscribe retaliation when the conduct was sex discrimination. Compare La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 23:312(D) with id. § 23:332. This action suggests a conscious legislative choice not to confer a cause of action for retaliation when the claim involves sex discrimination in employment.

Plaintiff also makes the alternative argument that the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S.Ct. 1497 (2005), means that section 23:332 of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law prohibits retaliation in employment discrimination cases because retaliation is itself a form of prohibited sex discrimination. In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that the implied right of action for violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 included a right of action for retaliation. The Jackson Court concluded, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that retaliation against a person for complaining about sex discrimination falls within Title IX's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1504. The Court explained:

Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of "discrimination" because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment. . . . Moreover, retaliation is discrimination "on the basis of sex" because it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.

Neither the holding nor the reasoning of Jackson justifies a finding that section 23:332 of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law prohibits retaliation. First, in determining that the term "discrimination" as used in Title IX encompassed retaliation, the Jackson Court focused on the structure of Title IX itself. It rejected the proposition that Congress did not intend such a retaliation cause of action because it could have expressly provided for one, as it did in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unlike Title VII, the Court noted, the cause of action for discrimination under Title IX was implied, not express. Further, the Court emphasized that Title IX is a "broadly written general prohibition on discrimination, followed by specific, narrow exceptions to that broad prohibition." Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1505. The Court characterized Title VII as "a vastly different statute," one that "spells out in greater detail the conduct that constitutes a violation of that statute." Id. Because, unlike Title VII, Title IX lacks specific descriptions of the conduct that violates the statute, the Court found that Congress' failure to prohibit retaliation expressly under Title IX did not shed light on whether Congress intended to prohibit retaliation. Id.

The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law is far more similar to Title VII than it is to Title IX. Like Title VII, the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law contains an express right of action and specifically delineates the types of conduct that it prohibits. In fact, section 23:332 of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law tracks the language of Title VII almost word-for-word. Thus, the Jackson Court's rationale for broadly interpreting the statutory language of Title IX is inapplicable here.

Moreover, as the Court noted earlier, the Louisiana legislature expressly prohibited retaliation in other sections of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 23:312(D) (prohibiting retaliation against employees for opposing acts of age discrimination); id. § 23:352(D) ((prohibiting retaliation against employees for opposing acts of sickle cell trait discrimination). That the legislature included specific retaliation provisions in other sections of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law suggests that it did not intend to prohibit retaliation when it enacted the general prohibition on sex discrimination in section 23:332 without a prohibition on retaliation. See Smith, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 373 ("[T]hat some sections [of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law] do contain [retaliation] provisions indicates that the legislature intended not to include similar provisions in the other sections.").

Finally, plaintiff's argument that sex discrimination in employment might go unremedied if there is no state law right of action for retaliation is without merit. Title VII, the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law's federal counterpart, expressly prohibits retaliation and may, in many cases, provide aggrieved plaintiffs with a remedy for such conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. In any event, when, as here, the statutory framework does not prohibit retaliation, this Court is not at liberty to create a cause of action simply because it believes, as it does, that it is better policy for there to be a right of action for retaliation under state law. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff cannot state a claim for retaliation in the context presented here under either section 51:2256 or section 23:332.

D. Additional State Law Claims

Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law and Louisiana's whistleblower statute, see La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 23:967, and her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff has stated that she does not oppose dismissal of those claims, and they are therefore also dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim. The Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law retaliation claim, her requests for injunctive relief under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 23:967, together with her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.