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dismissing Title I claim against a judge in his official capacity because it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the Garrett holding
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-3708, SECTION "K" (3).
May 29, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before this Court is the defendant, Kirk Granier's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Rec. Doc. 5). For the reasons that follow, the defendant's Motion is GRANTED and the plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED.
I. Facts and Background
The plaintiff, Catherine Samaha, initiated this action on December 17, 2002, alleging that her employer, Judge Kirk Granier, a state judge for the 29th Judicial District of the Parish of St. Charles, allegedly refused to reasonably accommodate Samaha's depression, and allegedly created a hostile work environment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Samaha, who performed clerical duties for Judge Granier, became diagnosed with depression in 1996. While the Judge initially accommodated her depression, Samaha alleges that in the spring of 2001, Judge Granier became intolerant of her condition and began spreading rumors that she suffered from alcohol related problems. Following in-patient treatment for a nervous breakdown, which Samaha alleges was triggered by Judge Granier's treatment, the judge terminated her employment. The plaintiff alleges that he terminated her in violation of the Title I of the ADA.
In addition to alleging an ADA claim against Judge Granier in his official and individual capacities, Samaha also alleges state law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
II. 12(b)(1) Standard
The defendant has moved that the plaintiffs claims under the ADA and state law should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. See Id. A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Assoc., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). A 12(b)(1) motion may be appropriate when a plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as well as in the typical situation where a defendant alleges that there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, jurisdictional amount, and/or the plaintiff's claim does not involve a federal question. See 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350 (2d ed. 2003).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. See e.g., Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, a federal court must dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986). Uncontroverted allegations of the complaint, however, must be accepted as true. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424.
III. Discussion
A. State Sovereign Immunity
The defendant argues in his motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs claim against him in his official capacity for violations under the Title I of the ADA is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity to prohibit suits against a state by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000). There are two exceptions to this rule: 1) Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) a state may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit. See Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
As to the first exception, the Supreme Court has recently held in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, that Congress has not abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under Title I of the ADA. See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The plaintiff does not argue with this proposition, but in fact concedes this point. However, the plaintiff urges the Court to find that the majority in Garrett applied the wrong standard in finding that the states were not accountable for disability discrimination under the ADA. The plaintiffs suggestion is without merit and unsupported by any case law. Hence, the Court will refrain from finding that Garrett implemented the wrong standard, and instead, applies the current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this circuit. See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 737 (5th Cir. 2001).
As to the second exception, which refers to a state's right to waive its sovereign immunity by consent, the Court finds that there is no evidence that the state has waived its sovereign immunity in this instance. See Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1991); ATT Communications of South Cent. States, Inc. v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc., 43 F.Suupp.2d 593 (M.D. La. 1999). In fact, Louisiana has adopted a statute that states: "No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court." La.Rev.Stat. § 13:5106. The plaintiff has pointed out no authority to the contrary. As a result, the plaintiffs claims against Judge Granier under the ADA in his official capacity must fail.
B. Judge Granier's Individual Liability under the ADA
Judge Granier is also not liable as an individual under the ADA. See Starkman v. Evans, 18 F. Supp.2d 630 (E.D. La. 8/2698). The Fifth Circuit has held that individuals who do not otherwise qualify as "employers" cannot be held individually liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994). The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees, and any agent of such person. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The ADA definition of an employer is parallel to Title VII's definition of employer, and precludes claims against supervisors in their individual capacity. Starkman, at 632; see also, Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc, 881 F. Supp. 240, 245 (E.D. La. 1/18/95). In the instant case, Judge Granier was the plaintiff's supervisor and is not an employer under the statute. As a result he cannot be held liable as an individual for ADA violations.
C. Remaining State Law Claims
The Court originally had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants a federal court jurisdiction to hear "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 133 1; See also Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Co., 171 F. Supp.2d 667 (E.D. Tex. 2001). As to the plaintiffs state law claims, the court had jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which allows a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action having original jurisdiction that they form the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the Court has dismissed the plaintiffs ADA claims against Judge Granier in his individual and official capacities, the remaining state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation have no independent jurisdictional basis. According to 28 U.S.C. § 367(c), a court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when it has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
On the face of the complaint, there is no other basis for federal question jurisdiction other than the ADA claim which has now been dismissed. Further, there is no basis to support diversity jurisdiction because the parties are not diverse. The plaintiff and the defendant are both domiciled in St. Charles Parish in Louisiana. Consequently, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs ADA claims against the defendant in his official and individual capacity are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.